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abstract
This thesis is about attempts to provide a theoretical framework for the law of 
Restitution, a subject in which there is growing academic and judicial interest.
Part I of the thesis considers the concept of "unjust enrichment", which is 
currently gaining the status of orthodoxy as an explanation of Restitution. The 
law of Restitution, perceived to be a third category, alongside contract and tort, 
of the law of obligations, is said to consist of liability rules uniformly explicable 
as having a purpose of the reversal of unjustly obtained or retained enrichment. 
As a brief historical survey of Restitution demonstrates, unjust enrichment 
theory is an a-historical attempt to unify and explain a very diverse range of 
topics. Part I goes on to consider what unjust enrichment means, specifically by 
considering the content given to the two most important parts of that concept: 
"unjustness", and "enrichment" or "benefit". A range of views as to the 
meaning of both parts are considered. None of these views or approaches, 
however, satisfactorily allows us to explain liability in many cases. Many cases 
said to be explicable on the basis of the reversal of unjust enrichment are not in 
fact so concerned. It is concluded that the concept of unjust enrichment is not 
useful as an explanation of much of the law of Restitution.
In Part II of this thesis, the writer consequently seeks alternative ways of 
conceptualising Restitution. Rather than conceive of that subject as explicable in 
terms of one, unifying principle, the writer instead identifies four distinct 
categories of cases. Each category addresses very different types of problems, 
and is explicable in terms of distinct ideas.
In the first category of cases, (Chapter 6) liability is imposed because of 
particular conduct of a defendant, where a plaintiff has relied on such conduct 
to his or her detriment. Liability is imposed on a defendant at least to return the 
plaintiff to his or her previous position before the offending conduct, and 
irrespective of whether the defendant has obtained any benefit.
In the second category of cases (Chapter 7) liability may arise because parties 
share a common interest in a matter, which matter is affected by an unprovided 
for contingency. In such cases, the parties community of interest in the matter 
justifies the operation of a principle of "just sharing", which principle requires 
the parties to share gains and losses arising as a result of the contingency,
xxv
according to their relative contributions to the matter in which they have the 
common interest.
In the third category of cases (Chapter 8) liability may arise where a plaintiff 
has justifiably intervened in another's affairs, and seeks to recover the costs of 
such intervention from that other. Social policy concerns appear to be the most 
important factor in determining in which circumstances such recovery will 
ensue.
In the fourth category of cases (Chapter 9) recovery is sought from an innocent 
defendant who have received something (money, goods or services) from a 
plaintiff. The plaintiff will be entitled to recover the money or goods, or obtain 
some form of remedial relief for the services conferred, where such remedial 
relief or recovery in no way leaves the innocent defendant at a disadvantage.
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PART I
Chapter 1
VENTURING INTO THE 
RESTITUTION THICKET
Those who venture into the restitution thicket not infrequently become lost3
§ 1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
After a long period of relative obscurity,1 2 the law of Restitution,3 as it is
1 Snider v. Dunn, 160 N.W. 2d 619 (1968) 628, per Levin J. (dissenting). Levin J. went on 
to add: "It is part of our task to see that they are heard from again." The writer hopes that this 
thesis may make a contribution toward that task.
2 Cf. Birks, P., Introduction to the Law of Restitution (1985) (hereinafter: "Birks"), 1-8, 
who considers that Restitution was for a long time "hidden under the fringes of other better- 
known subjects" (at 5). Similarly, in "The English Recognition of Unjust Enrichment" [1991] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 473, 473, Birks writes:
Historically the law of restitution has been so effectively concealed by clouds of 
impenetrable language that its very existence has been debateable. And it has laboured 
under the extraordinary handicap of having to manage without any intelligible generic 
name for the events to which it, restitution, is the remedial response. All that is now 
over.
In a similar vein, Butler has described Restitution as an "area of law ... neglected for a period as 
a back-water tucked away in contract": Butler, P.A., "Viewing Restitution at the Level of a 
Secondary Remedial Obligation" (1990) 16 Univ. Q.L.J. 27, 27; and Laycock has said "restitution 
is a relatively neglected and underdeveloped part of the law": Laycock, D., "The Scope and 
Significance of Restitution" (1989) 67 Texas L.R. 1277,1277.
According to Birks, this neglect of Restitution was the deleterious consequence of the "implied 
contract" theory, which sought to explain obligations in quasi-contract (the historical name of 
much of the subject-matter of Restitution: see infra, § 1.2.1) on the basis of an "implied" 
promise to perform the obligation. The effect of the "implied contract" theory "was to drive 
these non-contractual obligations into the category of contract": Birks, 4. The "implied 
contract" theory has now been widely rejected as a general explanation of all liability in 
Restitution (see infra nn. 4, 85), a view with which the writer concurs. However, it will be seen 
in Chapter 6 that some parts of Restitution are best explained in contractual terms, that is, that 
the obligations appear "contract-like". For further on "implied contract" theory, generally, see 
Lord Goff of Chieveley & Jones, G., The Law of Restitution (4th ed., 1993) (hereinafter: "Goff & 
Jones"), Chp. 1; Birks, 29-39; and Birks, P., & McLeod, G., "The Implied Contract Theory of 
Quasi-Contract" (1986) 6 O.J.L.S. 46.
3 References to the legal category of Restitution will be capitalised in order to
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now commonly called,* 4 is exciting much legal interest.5 Not only are we seeing 
judgments of the highest judicial authorities—in Australia6 and elsewhere7— 
address issues in Restitution, there is also a spirited theoretical debate at large, 
much of it concerned to "reveal the skeleton of principle which holds 
[Restitution] together."8 The focus of much of this debate is on the concept of 
"unjust enrichment", a concept claimed to provide such a "skeletal" framework 
for the liability rules said to constitute Restitution. These liability rules are said 
to be explicable as having the purpose of reversing unjust enrichment, which 
purpose is given effect in an individual case by the remedial response of the
distinguish it from the remedial response of restitution, the meaning of which will be considered
below.
4 Previously, much of the subject-matter now claimed for Restitution coalesced under 
the historical title of "quasi-contract". This title has now become unfashionable, for reasons 
which will become obvious below. Nevertheless, some recent writing on the subject has 
persisted with the historical title. See, e.g., Stoljar, S.J., The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd ed., 1989) 
(hereinafter: "Stoljar"). It will be argued in this thesis that many of the liability rules gathered 
under Restitution do not have a restitutionary remedial purpose and, to that extent at least, 
"Restitution", as a designation for all of the subject-matter it is commonly claimed to 
encompass, may be misleading. The nature of the remedial response of restitution will be 
considered infra, § 1.3.2.2.
5 Cf. Goff & Jones, (3rd ed., 1986), v.
6 See, e.g., the High Court decisions of Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577; 
ANZ Banking Grp v. Westpac Banking Corp. (1988) 78 A.L.R. 157; David Securities Pty Ltd v. 
Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57; Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (1993) 111 A.L.R. 289.
7 The Supreme Court of Canada has been active now for many decades in the field of 
Restitution. Generally, see McCamus, J.D., "Restitution and the Supreme Court: The 
Continuing Progress of the Unjust Enrichment Principle" (1991) 2 S.C.L.Rev. (2d) 505. In 
England, the House of Lords has also been called upon in recent times to consider the law of 
Restitution, in, for example, Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10 and Woolwich 
Equitable Building Society v. IRC [1992] 2 All E.R. 737.
8 Birks, 1. Generally, see the attached bibliography for detailed references to the 
principal sources used in this thesis. Listed below are non-American books and collections of 
essays on the topic published in the last ten years or so:
Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (1991) (hereinafter: "Beatson"); Burrows, A., 
(ed) Essays on the Law of Restitution (1991) (hereinafter: "Burrows, Essays"); Burrows, A., The Law 
of Restitution (1993) (hereinafter: "Burrows"); Birks, Introduction; Birks, P., Restitution—The 
Future (1992) (hereinafter: "Birks, Restitution: The Future"); Finn, P., (ed.) Essays on Restitution 
(1990) (hereinafter: "Finn"); Fridman, G., Restitution (2nd ed., 1992) (hereinafter: "Fridman"); 
Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution; Jones, G., Restitution in Public and Private Law (1991); 
Klippert, G.B., Unjust Enrichment (1983) (hereinafter: "Klippert"); Maddaugh, P.D., & 
McCamus, J.D., The Law of Restitution (1990) (hereinafter: "Maddaugh & McCamus"); Stoljar, 
The Law of Quasi-Contract.
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disgorgement of enrichment, that is, restitution. In short, preventing9 unjust 
enrichment is argued by many to be the crux of any theory of Restitution.10 It is 
the burden of this thesis to examine "unjust enrichment" critically and to 
question its value as a unifying and explanatory concept.* 11 In Part II of this 
thesis, an alternative and, it is suggested, more appropriate conceptualisation 
of Restitution will be proffered.
§ 1.1.1 The Law of Restitution
To refer to a law of Restitution, without clarification, is not overly 
informative. The subject-matter of Restitution, even to many lawyers, is largely 
unfamiliar. In the view of one writer:
In the mental map of most lawyers, restitution consists largely of blank 
spaces with undefined borders and only scattered patches of familiar 
ground.12
One must begin, then, by locating Restitution on this "mental map".
One way of identifying Restitution, if seeking an overview of the broad 
divisions of the law, is to view it as one category, alongside contract and tort, in 
a tripartite division of the law of obligations.13 Contract and tort are legal 
categories, or subjects, which are organised around common "causative 
events" ,14 that is, the particular liability rules and doctrines which establish the
9 It is also labelled as the principle against, or of reversing, unjust enrichments. More 
usually, however, a shorthand formulation, the principle of unjust enrichment, is used. These 
forms are all common and the shorthand version will, for the most part, be utilised here, 
although admittedly it does not convey quite the same meaning.
10 In the words of Lord Goff of Chieveley, “The Future of the Law of Restitution" 
(1989) 12 Syd. L.R. 1, 2, unjust enrichment is the "principle lying at the root of the subject."
11 The task is undertaken in the context of strident claims as to the triumph of unjust 
enrichment theory: see Birks, supra n. 2, 473, referring to sceptics of a law of Restitution based 
on unjust enrichment as "flat-earthers".
12 Laycock, supra n. 2,1277, a comment made in 1989. Similarly, Patterson, E.W., "The 
Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment" (1936) Mo.L.Rev. 223, 223: Restitution "does not 
at once bring to mind a well recognized division of the field of private law."
13 See generally Burrows, A., "Contract, Tort and Restitution—A Satisfactory Division 
or Not?" (1983) 99 L.Q.R 217; Birks, 28 et seq.
14 Birks, P., "The Independence of Restitutionary Causes of Actions" (1990) 16 Univ. 
Q.L.J. 1, 13 calls the primary source of obligation the "causative event", involving an inquiry 
into the "facts constitutive of a remedy". Primary rights, that is, ones which establish the basis 
of legal liability, are usually contrasted with secondary or remedial rights which merely 
determine the appropriate remedy once liability has been established. See, e.g., Perillo, J.M.,
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right to relief are satisfied by similar criteria.15 In the words of Stoljar,
to acknowledge a proper subject, one forming a distinctive source of 
obligation, we have to concentrate on the causes of action, causes 
coherently grouped together according to their internal affinities.16
The question, then, becomes one of whether Restitution consists of causes of 
action (or liability-establishing rules) which can be "coherently grouped 
together" on some common basis. Within a tripartite division, and to simplify 
the matter,17 Restitution is perceived as imposing a personal obligation on a 
defendant in circumstances different to those justifying liability in contract or 
in tort. Consequently, liability rules are sought to be divided into three 
"distinct doctrinal pigeon-holes" .18 The burden of the tripartite division is that 
it
separates at least most of the law based on each of the three most
"Restitution In A Contractual Context" (1973) 73 Col. L.R. 1208, 1214-15, and further on this, § 
1.3.2.1
15 This contrasts with earlier divisions of the law according to the form of relief or 
remedy sought, specifically, according to the writ utilised. Remedy and right are, however, 
closely related. Dobbs, D.B., Remedies (hereinafter: "Dobbs"), at xiv, considers that "right and 
remedy are merely two expressions of the same legal policy—or ought to be". Similarly, it has 
been said that "both remedy and obligation are part of a whole": Carlston, K.S., "Restitution— 
The Search For a Philosophy" (1954) 6 J.Leg. Ed. 330, 335; and Goulding J., in Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. Israel-British Bank [1979] 3 All E.R. 1025,1037, considered that:
Within the municipal confines of a single legal system, right and remedy are 
indissolubly connected and correlated, each contributing in historical dialogue to the 
development of the other, and save in very special circumstances it is idle to ask 
whether the court vindicates the suitor's substantive right or gives the suitor a 
procedural remedy, as to ask whether thought is a mental or a cerebral process. In fact 
the court does both things by one and the same act.
16 Stoljar, S., "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603, 605. Cf. 
Denning J., in Nelson v. Larholt [1947] 2 All E.R. 751, 752.
17 Proprietary remedies in Restitution also need to be taken into account, whereas the 
tripartite division focuses on personal liability. Generally speaking, proprietary claims are ones 
over some specific property. For the most part, proprietary claims will not be considered in this 
thesis. The reason for this is that this thesis concentrates on two stages of inquiry: firstly, the 
nature of the liability rules and the reason for imposing liability; and secondly, the appropriate 
measure of any remedy (leaving aside the possibility of non-monetary relief such as injunctions, 
for example). The measure of recovery may be determined according to the plaintiff's losses, 
the defendant's gains, or the plaintiff's expectations. See further, infra n. 139. But the form of 
recovery, personal or proprietary, will in many cases be peripheral to the first two stages of 
inquiry.
18 Hedley, S., "Contract, Tort and Restitution; or, On cutting the legal system down to 
size" (1988) 8 Legal Studies 137,141.
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important principles of the law of obligations. And these three cardinal 
principles are the fulfilment of expectations engendered by a binding 
promise [contract], the compensation of wrongful harms [tortl, and the 
reversing of unjust enrichment [Restitution].19
The utility of dividing obligations into three sharply defined categories 
has been questioned:20 one obvious drawback is that it does not address how 
property law (with which parts of Restitution share a strong affinity) and 
personal obligations imposed in equity fit into such a division.21 Other 
problems which spring from such a division will become evident in Part II 
below. Nevertheless, a tripartite division does highlight that certain factual 
circumstances may activate liability rules which cannot be subsumed readi ly  
within our existing22 conceptions of contract or of tort.23 This does not, 
however, greatly assist us in identifying the subject-matter of Restitution.
19 Burrows, supra n. 13, 217. Cf. infra n. 139.
20 See, for example, Atiyah, who has argued that the principles which underlie 
contract, tort and Restitution are not largely separate and distinct (contrary to Burrow's view, 
for example), but instead "permeate" the whole of the law of obligations: Hedley, supra n. 18, 
140. See Atiyah, P.S., The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (1979) 768, 778-9, and 
"Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 193, 220-3. For a different 
perspective again, see Hedley, ibid; as well as Hedley, S., "Unjust Enrichment as the Basis of 
Restitution—An Overworked Concept" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56. Theorists who favour a 
tripartite division concede that such a division cannot be too sharply made. See, e.g., Davis, P., 
"Restitution: Concept and Terms" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 1167,1170, citing Prosser, W., Selected 
Topics on the Law of Torts (1955), 380:
Actually there are, of course, no such distinctly segregated compartments of the law. 
Everywhere the fields of liability and doctrine interlock; everywhere there are 
borderlands and penumbras, and cases which cut across arbitrary lines of division ....
Nevertheless, such a tripartite division is seen as the starting point for understanding the 
imposition of personal legal obligations and much emphasis is placed on keeping the 
categories conceptually separate. See, e.g., Davis, 1170-6, and Birks, P., "Unjust Enrichment—a 
reply to Mr. Hedley" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 67, 69-72.
21 This assumes, of course, that equitable obligations are more than just a "gloss" on 
the common law, are indeed, substantive doctrines in their own right.
22 It will be argued in Chapter 6 that many of the liability rules said to fall within 
Restitution do in fact share a close affinity with concerns fundamental to contract or tort. 
Nevertheless, if this view is correct, it still leaves for consideration liability rules which do not 
share such affinities and which must consequently be explained in other terms.
23 Cf. Patterson, supra n. 12, 226, referring to quasi-contract, the historical predecessor 
of much of Restitution:
In Anglo-American law, as in Roman law, [quasi-contract] was invented as a category 
to include obligations which could not be conveniently subsumed under either contract 
or tort, as soon as those two categories came to be defined by general principles. Quasi­
contracts was the catch-all.
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While "contract" and "tort" do suggest the sorts of factual circumstances with 
which they are concerned,24 Restitution is not of this nature. It is useful, then, 
to provide a number of examples which illustrate the types of facts which may 
activate liability rules claimed to lie in Restitution. The term "claimed" is used 
deliberately, for reasons which will become clear shortly.
(1) Perhaps the simplest example is the mistaken payment of money. If a 
bank credits a client's account with $1000 as a result of, say, a computer 
error, the bank may have a right to recover such a mistaken payment.
(2) A plaintiff who mistakenly improves his or her neighbour's property, 
say, by building a house on one corner of that neighbour's land, may be 
entitled to recover the costs incurred, or perhaps even claim an interest 
in the defendant's land.
(3) A plaintiff who performs services under an agreement with a defendant, 
where such agreement is legally unenforceable as a contract,25 
nevertheless may still have a right to either reasonable compensation for 
the work done, or perhaps even a claim for the agreed remuneration. 
Historically, the Statute of Frauds has proved fertile ground for examples 
of claims under unenforceable contracts.
(4) A plaintiff who attempts to save a defendant's life or property in an 
emergency may have an entitlement, in strictly circumscribed 
circumstances, to claim either reimbursement for expenses incurred or 
reasonable remuneration for the services rendered.
(5) Finally, a de facto spouse who has made financial or other contributions 
to the domestic relationship may seek a share in property legally owned 
by the other (ex-)spouse after the breakdown of the relationship.
The above examples are not intended as an exhaustive list of the types of 
problems which may be resolved, at least on some views,26 by reference to the 
law of Restitution. Indeed, much "territory" is claimed for Restitution, for on 
most current theories, as will be seen below, the very subject-matter of
24 In the case of contract, one might consider, generally, "agreements", or more 
specifically, transactions such as sales of goods or land, employer-employee relationships, and 
so on. In the case of tort, one might consider, generally, "wrongdoing", or more specifically, 
circumstances such as trespass to the person or property, negligent conduct, or defamation.
25 The unenforceability may be the result of some statutory or common law rule.
26 In Australian law, the fifth example would likely be resolved by resort to equitable 
principles (presuming there is no statute governing the situation). Nonetheless, in Canada, 
Restitution has provided the doctrinal vehicle for recovery by de facto spouses in such 
circumstances. See § 7.4.
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Restitution is largely or exclusively determined by unjust enrichment. But since 
"[t]he boundaries of the law of unjust enrichment are only now being drawn", 
the "pioneers" of that concept, "in the spirit of true frontiersmen ... have sought 
to annex as much territory as possible."27 Hence, the supposed pervasive reach 
of unjust enrichment throughout our law sustains the existence of a "large" 
subject of Restitution.28
The expansive claims of modern unjust enrichment theory represent a 
marked shift from the historical development of the subject of Restitution. In 
the past, the sheer diversity of topics encompassed by Restitution (and its 
historical predecessor, quasi-contract29) was undoubtedly one reason for the 
subject being perceived as "no more than a heterogeneous collection of 
unrelated topics".30 Today, much opinion has shifted to the opposite extreme, 
with Restitution argued to be principally or exclusively a manifestation of a 
single, overarching concept of unjust enrichment.31 Before we can proceed to 
consider in greater detail the relationship of unjust enrichment with 
Restitution, it is necessary to survey the historical development of the subject.
§ 1.1.2 The Organisation of This Chapter
In § 1.2, it is proposed to survey the historical sources of Restitution. 
This involves a consideration of the origins of quasi-contractual obligations. In 
this century, however, attempts have been made to unify such obligations on 
the basis of unjust enrichment, and thus the supposed reach of Restitution has 
been extended.
In § 1.3, the relationship of Restitution and unjust enrichment will be
27 Gamer, M., 'The Role of Subjective Benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment" (1990) 
10 O.J.L.S. 42,42.
28 In support of this point one need only refer to the considerable subject-matter 
covered by modern texts on Restitution such as Goff & Jones and Maddaugh & McCamus. 
Such texts may be compared with earlier works on quasi-contracts, such as Munkman, J.H., The 
Law of Quasi-Contract (1950), and the claim of Stoljar that quasi-contract is a "relatively small 
subject": Stoljar, v, (preface). See also Birks, P., "In Defence of Free Acceptance" in Burrows, 
Essays, 105,146.
29 See infra n. 32. Restitution is said to incorporate all of quasi-contract and add new
matter.
30 Goff & Jones, 5.
31 Generally, see Chapter 2.
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explored further. This section will introduce ideas to be developed in Part I of 
this thesis.
In contrast to the recent emphasis upon the unity of Restitution on the 
basis of unjust enrichment, § 1.4 will emphasise the diversity of the liability 
rules of Restitution and the equitable role (in the sense of a "gap-filling" or 
ameliorative function) such rules perform. This will lay the foundations for 
ideas to be developed in Part II of this thesis.
In § 1.5, the organisation of the thesis as a whole will be outlined.
§ 1.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 1.2.1 The Sources of Quasi-Contract
Irrespective of the exact reach of Restitution, the subject's origins can be 
traced to what is called "quasi-contract". It is quasi-contract which still forms 
the core matter of Restitution. Goff and Jones, for example, consider that
the common law of quasi-contract is the most ancient and significant 
part of restitution and, for that reason, restitution is more easily 
understood if approached through that topic.32
Quasi-contract has had a relatively obscure status within a legal system 
which itself is largely unfamiliar with what quasi-contract incorporates, let 
alone its conceptual basis.33 Any attempt to map the terrain of quasi-contract 
must begin with a consideration of its history34 and this history is inextricably 
linked with the developm ent of certain forms of actions—the "common 
counts" as they became known—from the sixteenth century onwards.35
32 Goff & Jones, 3. Similarly, Birks, 29, considers that Restitution has taken over quasi­
contract, displaced the name, and added new matter.
33 Cf. statements cited supra n. 2, in relation to Restitution; and cf. Morrison & 
Morrison v. Canadian Surety Co. [1954] 4 D.L.R. 736, 751. Stoljar has said that in the early 1960's, 
quasi-contract was still “a novel subject, of somewhat remote interest": Stoljar, v.
34 For a detailed consideration, see Jackson, R.M., The History of Quasi-Contract in 
English Law (1936) (hereinafter: "Jackson").
35 Jackson, 3. The influence of the forms of action, although abolished in England in 
the mid-nineteenth century by s. 3 of the Common Law Procedures Act 1852, extended well into 
this century, so that Dawson remarked in 1952 (Unjust Enrichment, 16), that "[wlhen one reads 
modern English discussions of the subject, one has the sensation of being suddenly transported 
to the Middle Temple in 1603 to overhear some fresh debate on Slade's Case.”
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Claims which would now be considered within Restitution, such as for 
recovery of money paid under a mistake, date back to the middle ages and 
were upheld by the use of the ancient writs of account and debt.36 But these 
writs had considerable drawbacks, such as a requirement for great particularity 
in p lead ing ,37 so that it was not until the late sixteenth century that an 
expeditious means of enforcing such suits became, potentially at least, 
available .38 Slade's Case,39 in the early seventeenth century, firmly entrenched 
this possibility by deciding that an action in assumpsit would lie once a plaintiff 
established the existence of a debt. Whereas previously, an action in assumpsit 
would only lie on the basis of an express promise to pay money, after Slade's 
Case, a promise to repay a debt could be implied or presumed subsequent to 
the debt arising .40 Consequently, a separate promise to repay did not have to 
be proved, though the existence of the debt could itself be challenged .41 
Assumpsit, or as it became known, indebitatus assumpsit,42 therefore became a 
preferable alternative to an action in debt, as it was not encumbered with many 
of the disadvantages of that action.
At the time of Slade's Case, the debt which formed the basis of the
36 Holdsworth, W.S., A History of English Law (2nd ed., 1937), Vol. 8, 88. See also 
Jackson, xxiv, fn. 2, where he claims that the Yearbooks contain over 170 "cases" of actions of 
account before 1377.
37 See Klippert, 10, for some of the disadvantages of the debt action; similarly, see 
Holdsworth, ibid, Vol. 3, 423-4. Contrast Baker, J.H., "New Light on Slade's Case” (1971) 29 
C.L.J. 213, 234-5. Another significant disadvantage of the action in debt was that wager of law 
was available to a defendant, allowing such a defendant to resist a claim simply by obtaining 
the oaths of a number of persons.
38 This occurred with the liberalisation of the action of assumpsit, which itself had 
originated as a species of an action on the case. See Holdsworth, supra n. 36, 88 et seq. 
Assumpsit was not utilised for such purposes, however, until the latter part of the 17th century. 
Holdsworth cites Mayor of London v. Gorry (1676) 2 Lev. 174, as an example. Stoljar, 11, cites 
earlier examples such as Bonnel v. Foulke (1657) 2 Sid. 4, Babington v. Lambert (1611) Moo. K.B. 
1168, and Cavendish v. Middleton (1628) Cro. Car. 141; but note that Jackson, 9, and Holdsworth, 
94, consider the latter to be an example of an "action on the case".
3  ^ (1602) 4 Co. Rep. 92A. The Court of King's Bench had been allowing such actions 
for some time, only to be overturned by the Exchequer Chamber. It has been said that it is an 
"unsolved mystery" as to why no attempt was made to reverse the King's Bench decision in 
Slade's Case, in the Exchequer Chamber. See Baker, supra n. 37, 233-36.
40 Jackson, 40; Birks, 35. Contrast Baker, ibid, 234-5. For further references, see Stoljar, 
11, fn. 24.
41 Jackson, 44.
47 An assumpsit implied from the fact of indebtedness: Stoljar, 11.
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implied promise to repay nevertheless still had to have arisen from a genuine 
agreem ent.43 By the middle of the seventeenth century, despite some 
opposition,44 assumpsit began to be utilised to recover not only debts arising 
from executed contracts, in today's parlance, but also non-promissory "debts", 
such as a mistaken payment.45 The notion that the defendant had promised to 
repay the debt thus appeared to be in some cases a "pure legal fiction"46 
devised to make possible conceptually quite diverse claims. Given the range of 
matters for which assumpsit now lay, it became necessary to indicate with more 
specificity the basis of the plaintiffs action 47 Consequently a "series of stylised 
and yet simple forms of declaration",48 known as the "common counts", were 
developed. Four of these are of significance here.
(1) The action for money had and received, from which "the largest bulk of 
quasi-contractual solutions spring".49 This action was available for the 
recovery of money paid under a mistake, or a consideration which had 
failed; money obtained by the defendant "through imposition ... 
extortion; or oppression";50 or as a result of some "actionable wrong".51
(2) The action for money paid to a third party to the defendant's use. A 
common example where such an action would lie was where the 
plaintiff had "compulsorily discharged" the defendant's liability.52
43 Ames, J.B., "The History of Assumpsit" (1888-9) 2 Harv. L.R. 1 <Sc 54, at 64.
44 Chiefly from Holt C.J. See, e.g., Shuttleworth v. Garnet (1689) 3 Lev. 261; City of York 
v. Toun (1700 ) 5 Mod. 444.
45 See Birks, 35, fn. 20, and Stoljar, 11-2, for some authorities.
46 Munkman, J.H., The Law of Quasi-Contract (1950), 6.
47 Maddaugh <Sc McCamus, 5.
48 Fifoot, C.H.S., History and Sources of the Common Law (1949), 368.
49 Stoljar, 10.
50 Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005,1012. See also Stoljar, 13. Examples might be 
money extorted colore officii or by duress: Morgan v. Ashcroft [19371 3 All E.R. 92,105.
51 Morgan v. Ashcroft, id. The plaintiff in some cases could "waive the tort" and seek a 
remedy of money had and received, rather than damages in tort.
52 E.g. Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308.
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(3) The quantum meruit53 action, for the reasonable value of services 
rendered.
(4) The quantum valebant action, for the reasonable value of goods supplied.
The latter two counts expanded the scope of indebitatus assumpsit by allowing 
unliquidated sums to be pursued.54 Previously, in an action for debt, only 
liquidated sums were recoverable.55 Once this restriction was overcome, new 
claims became possible and arose with greater frequency.56
§ 1.2.2 The Rise of Quasi-Contract, and "the ties of natural justice and 
equity"57
By the eighteenth century, the common counts provided litigants with a 
num ber of remedial options to pursue personal claims arising from both 
consensual and non-consensual transactions. It was still recognised, however, 
that in many of these claims, the promise to pay was fictional,58 a convenience 
facilitating actions which would previously have had to find their home in the 
less useful actions of account and debt. "Promise", or "agreement", therefore 
was not the true basis of many of these claims. This was emphasised in Moses v. 
Macferlan when, in relation to the money had and received action, Lord 
Mansfield stated that
if the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice,
55 Klippert, 8, however, points out that there is debate as to whether the quantum 
meruit and quantum valebat actions were considered to be separate entities from indebitatus 
assumpsit—"linked by their historical derivation from the action of assumpsit but distinct in 
their development and application"—or whether they were "derived directly" from indebitatus 
assumpsit. In support of the former view, see Stoljar, S.J., A History of Contract at Common Law 
(1975), 108-10, who points out that the quantum meruit action started out as a species of express 
assumpsit and that "its early history was quite separate from that of the indebitatus count" (110). 
In support of this view, Stoljar cites cases pre-dating Slade's Case (1602) 4 Co. Rep. 92A. Such 
evidence lends historical weight to the view of some commentators that service cases are 
conceptually distinct from money cases. Such views will be considered at various points in this 
thesis.
54 Stoljar, 187.
55 For possible exceptions to this rule, however, see Stoljar, 187, fn. 5.
56 Generally, see Stoljar, Chp. 7, for some of the types of claim. Of particular interest 
because of their clearly non-consensual basis are those cases in which necessaries are supplied 
to legally or otherwise incapacitated parties, or where services are performed in an emergency, 
and so on. See further on this, Chapter 8.
57 Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005,1112.
58 Id.*
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to refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the 
equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract ("quasi ex 
contractu," as the Roman law expresses it).59
In alluding to "quasi ex contractu" ,60 it does not appear that Lord 
Mansfield was intending to draw a link with contract.61 In fact, his reference to 
the Roman use of the term might be seen as an acknowledgment of the division 
in the Roman law of obligation into contracts, delicts (torts), quasi-contracts 
and quasi-delicts.62 This division, perhaps first made by Gaius,63 was a 
recognition of the inadequacies of any classification based merely on contract 
and tort. The recovery of money paid under a mistake,64 for example, would 
have made it difficult to sustain such a division. But in seeking to explain such 
obligations, Lord Mansfield, and others,65 went no further than to appeal to the 
broadest equitable principles: defendants were required to refund money 
which, ex aequo et bono (in equity and good conscience) they were obliged to 
refund.66 In subsequent cases, Lord Mansfield considered the action of money 
had and received as "analogous to a bill in equity" 67 and "founded on 
principles of eternal justice."68
Such references to broad equitable notions were given, judicially at least,
59 Ibid, 1008.
60 This was not the first such reference in English law. Bracton, in his De Legibus in the 
thirteenth century, used the term. See Maddaugh & McCamus, 3.
61 Cf. Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour [1943] 
A.C. 32, 62. For a detailed consideration of the case, arguing that Moses v. Macferlan is the 
historical source of unjust enrichment, see Birks, P., "English and Roman Learning in Moses v. 
Macferlan" [1984] C.L.P. 1.
62 The latter term has failed to gain any currency.
63 See his Digest, of the second century A.D. There is some evidence that the term may 
have been interpolated by Justinian's commissioners. See Birks, 29; Stoljar, 16, fn. 61.
64 The Roman condictio indebiti for recovery of mistaken payments lay from very early
times.
65 E.g. Edwards v. Bates (1844) 7 Man. & G. 590, 597-8; 135 E.R. 238, 241, per Tindal C.J.
66 Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005,1012.
67 Jestons v. Brooks (1778) 2 Cowp. 793, 795; 98 E.R. 1365,1366.
68 Towers v. Barrett (1786) 1 T.R. 133,134.
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a mixed reception;683 but certainly, much English authority was disapproving. 
There were two broad grounds of criticism.69 First, there was a jurisdictional 
argument: the common law courts could not, of course, administer equity.70 
Secondly, and more substantially, the concepts to which Lord Mansfield 
appealed were often considered too vague and uncertain to be applied by the 
courts.71 One need only repeat the now famous comment by Scrutton L.J. in 
Holt v. Markham that the history of the money had and received action was one 
of "well-meaning sloppiness of thought" .72
The term "quasi-contract" did not meet such disapproval, however, and 
it was used intermittently by the courts.73 By the nineteenth century, when the 
demise of the old forms of action led to the search for new theoretical 
foundations for the law,74 it had become a convenient label for many causes of 
action which could not be placed readily into the developing categories of 
contract or tort.75 More specifically, quasi-contract was being utilised to refer to 
claims originating in the four common counts noted above, though some of 
these claims were also recognised to be truly contractual.76
68a Australian authorities early this century were often approving of quasi-contractual 
claims on the basis of broad equitable notions. See, e.g., Campbell v. Kitchen & Sons Ltd (1910) 12 
C.L.R. 513, 531, per Barton J.; R v. Brown (1912) 14 C.L.R. 17, 25, per Griffith C.J.
69 Generally, see Winfield, P.H., The Law of Quasi Contracts (1952), 10.
70 The criticism is encapsulated by one judge's lamentation that "the character of the 
law of this country...has suffered more by the circumstances of courts of law acting upon what 
they conceive to be rules of equity than by any other circumstance": Cooth v. Jackson (1801) 6 
Ves. Jun. 39; 31 E.R. 913, 927.
71 Winfield, supra n. 69,10-14.
72 [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513. A similarly famous statement is that of Hamilton L.J. (later to 
become Lord Sumner) in Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 140, who proclaimed that 
whatever may have been the case in Lord Mansfield's time, the courts were no longer free to 
"administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes attractively styled 'justice as between 
man and man'." Dawson, 15-6, dates the beginnings of such reactions against Lord Mansfield's 
views to around 1850.
73 Although in the late 1920's, Fraser J. in Hardie & Lane Ltd v. Chiltern [1928] 1 K.B. 
663, 680 still referred to it as "so-called quasi-contract."
74 Goff & Jones, 9.
75 See supra n. 23, where quasi-contract is referred to as a "catch-all"; Stoljar, 18, refers 
to it as a "renvoi-category". Similar references are numerous.
76 Cf. Goff & Jones, 4. In particular, quantum meruit and quantum valebat continued to 
be used to enforce contracts in which a term was implied as to the (reasonable) price to be paid,
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Importantly to this point, there had been no notable attempts to bring 
together or rationalise actions originating in the common counts in a unifying 
principle. At most, appeals were made to "equity" and "natural justice". 
Instead, the outstanding feature of possible claims under the common counts 
was their sheer diversity, a point still emphasised this century in relation to 
quasi-contract. Thus, Corbin wrote in 1912:
It will be seen that [quasi-contractual obligations] are very numerous, 
that some of them have little in common with others, that some more 
closely resemble contractual obligations while others approach more 
nearly to torts, and in the past, in treatises upon the common law, they 
have generally been handled under diverse headings.77
Reflecting this diversity of claims, many different reasons were given to 
justify individual decisions, both before and after the abolition of the forms of 
actions. In some cases, property notions were resorted to;78 in others, promise 
or agreement was emphasised;79 and in others still, tort notions emphasising 
the defendant's wrongdoing formed the basis of explanations of liability.80 By 
the mid-nineteenth century, this began to change. Writers and judges began to 
search for the theoretical foundations of quasi-contract.
§ 1.2.3 "Implied Contract" and the Move Toward a General Theory of 
the Law of Quasi-Contract/Restitution
Partly for historical reasons, the search for some theoretical explanation 
of quasi-contract initially saw an "implied contract" theory gain hold. The non­
contractual nature of much of quasi-contract was, for the most part, gradually
although some commentators may cavil with a view of such actions as contractual. See further, 
§ 6.23.2.
77 Corbin, A., "Quasi-Contractual Obligations" (1912) 21 Yale L.J. 533, 536. See also 
Corbin, A., Corbin on Contracts (1963), Vol. 1, 49: quasi-contracts includes "numerous odds and 
ends of obligation"; and Sullivan, T.J., "The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-Contract" 
(1975) 64 Geo.L.J. 1, 25: "The divergent factual settings in which quasi-contract principles are 
invoked stretch across an extraordinarily broad range of legal categories."
78 E.g. Clarke v. Shee & Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp. 197 (Lord Mansfield); Hudson v. 
Robinson (1816) 4 M. & S. 475,478 (Lord Ellenborough).
79 This was so particularly in cases of quantum meruit, in which frequent references to 
implied promise were made.
80 E.g. Hall v. Swansea (1844) 5 Q.B. 526, 547 (Lord Denman). See also Blackstone, Sir 
William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (9th ed., 1783; 1978 reprint, Garland Publishers), 
Vol. II, 163, and Austin,)., Jurisprudence (4th ed., 1879), Vol. 2, 944-5.
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forgotten.81 Many courts and commentators sought to incorporate all of quasi­
contract into developing contract law theories, with quasi-contractual 
obligations said to be "founded upon an implied contract by the defendant to 
pay to the plaintiff the money claimed by him ."82 The implied promise of old, 
in many cases previously and manifestly a fiction, was reified,83 and the courts
81 A number of reasons have been given to explain this judicial amnesia and its most 
important consequence, the rise of the "implied contract" theory of quasi-contractual 
obligation. See generally Birks, 34-8. The first factor which may explain the implied contract 
theory's rise was the obvious confusion that could arise as a result of the fictitious promise 
inherent in the indebitatus assumpsit action itself. As Stoljar, 14, has said, "indebitatus assumpsit 
was somehow always hinting at contract." The fictitious promise became known as a "contract 
implied in law", a development which was not surprising given that particular common counts 
(such as quantum meruit) were being used indiscriminately for both consensual and non- 
consensual transactions. Examples of the former include Rolte v. Sharp (1627) Cro. Car. 77, and 
Rogers v. Head (1610) Cro. Jac. 261. Examples of the latter include Jenkins v. Tucker (1788) 1 
H.B.L. 90; and Rogers v. Price (1829) 3 Y. & J. 28 (both "funeral" cases, on which see further, 
Chapter 8). See Maddaugh & McCamus, 6; Stoljar, 18. Given the willingness of the courts to 
infer the existence of contracts from the conduct of the parties (i.e., non-express contracts), it 
became difficult at times to establish whether the term "implied contract" was being used to 
refer to a non-express contract or to the fictional promise to pay the money.
Secondly, and compounding the confusion, even at the time of Lord Mansfield's equitable 
rationale for the count for money had and received, Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws 
of England (1768), was seeking to explain all legal obligations on the basis of "an implied 
original contract to submit to the rules of the community whereof we are members" (Vol. 3, 
160). In the process of elucidating this "social contract" theory, Blackstone failed to differentiate 
clearly between those indebitatus assumpsit claims based on consensual relations and those 
imposed by the law in given circumstances. See ibid, Vol. Ill, 162-3; Vol. II, 443. See also Birks, 
37-38, 4; Keener, W.A., A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contract (1893), 7. Cf. Holdsworth, supra n. 
36,96.
Finally, by the end of the nineteenth century, the term "quasi-contract" was being used to 
identify obligations which were said to originate from an implication of law and which, before 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 had been enforced by the use of some of the common 
counts. This term also had strong contractual overtones.
The combination of these three factors would have given a strong impetus to the implied 
contract theory: quasi-contractual claims based, as were all obligations, on a social contract, 
had in the past been enforced by means of common counts utilising an implied promise to 
repay! Not surprisingly, therefore, quasi-contract became inextricably linked with contract and 
scant attention was paid to these anomalous and little understood actions. See Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 7. Any scholarly consideration was limited to postscripts to early contract law texts, 
which in turn meant there was little scope for any conceptual development. Nevertheless, some 
judges continued to recognise the fictional nature of this implied contract and the 
inappropriateness of contractual doctrines. Thus, in In re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch. D. 94, 105, for 
example, Cotton L.J. considered the term "implied contract" "erroneous and very unfortunate", 
and Lindley L.J., at 107, indicated that it had been used to denote an "obligation which does not 
arise from any real contract." The court considered that a quasi-contractual claim could 
potentially lie against a lunatic for necessaries supplied even though such defendants could 
not, by reason of their legal incapacity, contract.
82 Goff & Jones, 6.
83 The implied contract theory reached a new height in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] 
A.C. 398. In that case, the House of Lords considered that the "fictional" implied contract could
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and commentators in consequence emphasised a bi-partite division of the law 
of obligations, namely into contract and tort.84 It is not proposed to detail the 
developments of the implied contract theory. It suffices to say that as a general 
explanation of all of quasi-contractual liability, it has now been widely rejected 
by both commentators and the courts, essentially because of the artificiality of 
utilising implied contract to explain liability arising from non-consensual 
relationships.85 The writer concurs with the rejection of implied contract as a
only be enforced in situations in which a contract between the parties, if it really existed, would 
be valid (415). Lord Sumner considered that claims for money had and received "rest, and long 
have rested, upon a notional or imputed promise to repay. The law cannot de jure impute 
promises to repay, whether for money had and received or otherwise, which, if made de facto, 
it would inexorably avoid" (452). Cf. Viscount Haldane L.C., at 415. Thus, a quasi-contractual 
action would not lie where the ultra vires doctrine would invalidate any contract actually 
entered by the parties. This approach seems inconsistent with that of the Court of Appeal in Re 
Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch. D. 94, a case which was not, however, referred to in the House of Lords. 
Ironically, the court proceeded to allow a far more "drastic" remedy of an equitable proprietary 
claim to succeed, thereby greatly relaxing the requirements of tracing "to a really startling 
extent" (Dawson, 17-8; see also Maddaugh & McCamus, 10). A satisfactory result was thereby 
achieved but in a way which further relegated quasi-contract to the status of an insignificant 
appendage to contract law. For similar views to those expressed in Sinclair v. Brougham, see, 
e.g., Cowern v. Nield [1912] 2 K.B. 419; Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493. As a result of such 
cases, the fiction of an implied promise was given an existence of its own and contractual 
doctrines were applied to determine rights originating in quasi-contract. This, at times, led to 
injustice, or at the very least, doctrinal confusion.
On the reification of legal fictions, generally, see Fuller, L., "Legal Fictions" Pts I, II, & III, (1930- 
1)25 111. L.R. 363; 513; 877.
84 E.g. Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398, 415, per Viscount Haldane L.C.:
so far as proceedings in personam are concerned, the common law of England really 
recognizes (unlike the Roman law) only actions of two classes, those founded on 
contract and those founded on tort. When it speaks of actions quasi ex contractu it 
refers merely to a class of action in theory based on a contract which is imputed to the 
defendant by the fiction of law.
85 For example, recovery of money from a recipient of a mistaken payment or a thief. 
For some reasons for the rejection of the implied contract theory, see Goff & Jones, 6-10, who 
conclude that the concept is a "meaningless, irrelevant and misleading anachronism" (10). One 
of the most persuasive reasons they give is that the idea of a fictional implied contract does not 
indicate when and in which circumstances the contract is to be implied. Instead, it merely 
interposes an extra step in the process of reasoning. Cf. Morrison v. Canadian Surety Co. [1954] 4 
D.L.R. 736, 754. In rejecting the generalisation of implied contract, however, Goff & Jones 
proceed under the assumption (and this is a "massive" assumption, according to Hedley, supra 
n. 20, 58) that there must be one coherent explanation for the diverse subject-matter covered. 
Thus, a rejection of implied contract is equated with an acceptance of an alternative unifying 
concept of unjust enrichment: e.g. Burrows, supra n. 13, 233-4. This does not, of course, 
necessarily follow: Hedley, 64., and see also Klippert, 22. See also Sutton, R., "Unjust 
Enrichment" (1981) 5 Otago L.R. 187,198.
For a judicial rejection of implied contract theory, see Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 
577, 583, 603-4, but see infra n. 86.
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general explanation of all of quasi-contractual liability. Nevertheless, as will be 
argued below, contractual notions are clearly of relevance to some 
Restitutionary claims and the rejection of a general theory of implied contract 
ought not to lead to the significance of contractual notions being ignored in at 
least such claims. Fortunately, the courts have still recognised the relevance of 
contractual notions in some such cases.86
Growing disenchantment with the implied contract theory prompted the 
search for a unifying theory of quasi-contract, and it was a notion of unjust 
enrichment which began to emerge as a contender.87 This was despite 
opposition to unjust enrichment from many judges, even until quite recently.88 
American writers and courts were at the forefront of these developments 89 The
86 See Guinness pic. v. Saunders [19901 1 All E.R. 652. But contrast the unequivocal 
rejection of an implied contract explanation in relation to a quantum meruit claim under an 
unenforceable contract, in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 583. It will be argued 
below that this case goes too far in suggesting that claims under unenforceable contracts are 
quite independent of contractual notions. See § 6.2.2.2. Reasoning such as that in Pavey & 
Mathews could arguably be the result of the "fanatical unbelief" in "implied contract" displayed 
by many unjust enrichment theorists. On "unbelief" see Hedley, supra n. 18,139, fn. 9.
87 Some supporters of unjust enrichment appear to equate the rejection of "implied 
contract" with the acceptance of unjust enrichment. In other words, it is assumed that there 
must be one unifying theory of quasi-contract, and the choice is expressed in sharp either/or 
terms. Cf. Hedley, supra n. 20, 58-9, 64.
88 See, e.g., Lord Diplock in Orakpo Investments v. Mansons Investment Ltd [1978] A.C.
95,104:
My lords, there is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English law. 
What it does is to provide specific remedies in particular cases of what might be 
classified as unjust enrichment in a legal system that is based upon the civil law.
This is one of a long line of English judicial authorities showing a marked resistance to any 
"general doctrine" of unjust enrichment—judicial warnings against its "siren song" (Re Byfield 
[19821 Ch. 267, 276) are numerous. Generally, see Goff & Jones, Chp. 1. See also Dickson, B., 
"The Law of Restitution in the Federal Republic of Germany" (1987) 36 I.C.L.Q. 751, 760. 
Outside England, see, e.g., Avondale Printers v. Haggie [19791 2 N.Z.L.R. 124.
It has been suggested that Lord Diplock was denying the existence of any unifying basis of 
Restitution, that no single theory, unjust enrichment or otherwise, "would do": Hedley, supra 
n. 20, 58-9. See further, § 2.2.1.1.
89 The first text on quasi-contract, by Keener, W.A., A Treatise on the Law of Quasi- 
Contract, was published in 1893. This work highlighted quasi-contract as a subject in its own 
right, covering, inter alia, such topics as money paid under mistake, compulsion or duress, 
waiver of tort, rights arising from unenforceable contracts, and the improvement of another's 
land. Ames, in his seminal work on the history of assumpsit, in 1888, had already emphasised 
that the quasi-contractual obligation, created by law, "is no contract at all": supra n. 43, 63. 
Keener perceived the implied contract as merely a remedial mechanism and, like Ames (at 66), 
argued that the most important source of quasi-contractual obligations could be found in the 
"doctrine" of unjust enrichment (19). Keener did identify certain exceptions, at 16-9— 
obligations created by judgments or statutory or customary duties—but these are no longer
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subject of Restitution, incorporating quasi-contract as well as equitable and 
other doctrines claimed to be unjust enrichment-based, emerged .90 As Muir has 
described these developments:
Anglo-American writers have only recently put restitution on a broad 
canvas so as to give the overall picture, as it were, rather than painting a 
series of intricate pictures not all of which could be hung as a series.91
Muir goes on to observe that the ''broad canvas" approach is becoming quite 
fashionable.
§ 1.2.4 Imposing Order from Without: "The" New Interpretation of a 
Disordered History
The influence of unjust enrichment has been profound, particularly in 
C anada92 and, most recently, in England .93 Its appeal is w idespread, for
considered to form part of the law of quasi-contract or Restitution. See Winfield, supra n. 69,. 
who considered them to be "pseudo" quasi-contracts. See also Stoljar, 18. Neither Goff & Jones, 
nor the Restatement of Restitution include these topics.
Keener's work was undoubtedly influential, for 20 years later another text (Woodward, The 
Law of Quasi-Contracts (1913)) presented similar views (although Woodward referred to the 
inequitable retention of a benefit received: see Wade J. "The Literature of the Law of 
Restitution" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 1087, 1089), and, in 1937, the American Law Institute 
published the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, authored by W.A. Seavey and A.W. Scott 
(hereinafter: "Restatement of Restitution"). This further expanded the claims for unjust 
enrichment. §1 states simply that:
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.
90 In advocating a general principle of unjust enrichment, the Restatement of Restitution 
not only sought the recognition of quasi-contract as a separate, clearly distinguishable subject, 
but also claimed that many other areas of law were based on this principle: most notably, 
equitable doctrines giving rise to relief in the form of specific restitution, constructive trusts, 
equitable liens, or subrogation. See Farnsworth, E.A., Contracts (2nd ed., 1990) 103. This 
incorporation of much equitable doctrine necessitated a new name for the subject. "Restitution" 
was adopted, to reflect what the authors considered to be the restitutionary nature of the 
remedy granted in these cases. See Seavey, W.A., & Scott, A.W., "Restitution" (1938) 54 L.Q.R. 
29. The consequence of all this, in the view of Maddaugh & McCamus, 11, was that the 
Restatement of Restitution "established the law of restitution in America as an independent 
discipline entirely separate from both the law of contract and the law of tort".
91 Muir, G., "The Contribution of Professor Sam Stoljar To The Law of Quasi- 
Contract" Paper delivered to the Restitution Group, Society of Public Law Teachers 
Conference, Aberdeen, 1991, paragraph 3.01.
92 In the decision of Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. & Constantineau [19541 3 D.L.R. 785, 
the Supreme Court of Canada accepted unjust enrichment as the basis of the law of Restitution. 
This followed a "spirited" attack on the theory of implied contract in Morrison v. Canadian 
Surety Co. [1954J 4 D.L.R. 736: Maddaugh & McCamus, 15. In the view of Cartwright J. in
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reasons which will be considered in § 1.3. The principal aim for which unjust 
enrichment is invoked is to impose order upon and explain a difficult, even 
"utterly confused"94 area of law. Although some notion of unjust enrichment 
has an undoubted historical pedigree, in much recent writing, unjust 
enrichment purports to provide a theoretical construct for the law. In this 
regard, it is being asked to perform an essentially a-historical role.
Early proponents of unjust enrichment did not identify the authority for 
their sweeping assertion of the pre-eminence of that concept,95 but today, the 
common law origins of unjust enrichment are usually said to be traceable to 
Lord Mansfield, particularly his Lordship's statements in Moses v. Macferlan.96 
But this case is not the unequivocal support for unjust enrichment theory it is 
said to be.97 Certainly, references to "natural justice" and "equity" do not, of 
themselves, equate with unjust enrichment.98 They are terms of sufficient
Deglman, at 794, the plaintiff's successful action for quantum meruit for services rendered under 
an unenforceable contract (the agreement was not evidenced in writing as required by the 
Statute of Frauds) was said to be "based not on contract, but on an obligation imposed by law." 
Since that case, Canadian courts have largely abandoned the idea of implied contract and 
embraced that of "unjust enrichment." See Fridman, 12-9, for example. For some exceptions, 
see Fridman, 14, fn. 78.
95 The effect of these events on Anglo-Australian law was delayed, but significant. In 
1931, quasi-contract was still considered a "no man's land ... not in the sense that there are 
constant battles for it but that nobody wants it": Winfield, P., The Province of the Law of Tort 
(1931), 118. By 1966, however, after some earlier, minor interest in the subject—see works by 
Jackson, Winfield, supra n. 69, and Munkman, supra n. 28—Goff and Jones published their Law 
of Restitution. This wide-ranging text covered similar topics to that of Keener but, like the 
Restatement of Restitution, also incorporated numerous equitable doctrines such as subrogation; 
contribution; benefits acquired by undue influence, in breach of fiduciary duties or from 
unconscionable bargains; and maritime law doctrines such as salvage and general average 
contribution. Goff and Jones considered that all of these areas, despite their seeming diversity, 
involved restitutionary responses and, like their American cousins, considered that liability 
was explicable on a concept of "unjust enrichment".
94 Stoljar, 18.
95 Neither Keener nor Ames give authorities for their general statements.
96 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005.
97 Contrast, however, Oldham, J., The Mansfield Manuscripts, and the Growth of English 
Law in the Eighteenth Century (1992), Vol.l, 226-31, who suggests that many of Lord Mansfield's 
decisions suggest an "overall philosophy of moral transactional behaviour that required the 
honouring of legitimately created expectations and the return of benefits unjustly acquired" 
(231). See similarly, Fifoot, C.H.S., Lord Mansfield (1936), 145-6.
98 Contrast Goff & Jones, 13-4, and Maddaugh & McCamus, 7, who simply jump from 
Lord Mansfield's comments to a general unjust enrichment principle and are thereby equating 
it with natural justice and equity. See Davis, supra n. 20, 1168 for an even more sweeping
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vagueness and generality to be utilised, in different contexts, in a variety of 
w ay s."  And certainly, no interpretation of such references sustains the 
complex theoretical constructs unjust enrichment has engendered.100 In any 
case, whereas Lord Mansfield's statements were limited to one quasi- 
contractual action—money had and received101—unjust enrichment is today 
said to underlie quasi-contractual claims generally (including quantum meruit 
for services rendered),102 as well as liability rules and doctrines of equitable 
origin103 (such as contribution and undue influence), and other doctrines of 
miscellaneous origin (for example, originating in maritime law).104 Given this 
added diversity, one might expect greater difficulties in sustaining a single 
unifying concept than if merely seeking to explain quasi-contract.
The flirtation with unjust enrichment, however, has been far from 
universal. Professor Stoljar was one writer in Anglo-Australian law who 
questioned the utility of such a theory and doubted its "historical" justification. 
Stoljar, whose work was shaped by its "historical focus" 105 and "deep study of
historical inaccuracy. Admittedly, however, Lord Mansfield had earlier in his judgment made 
reference to Roman law which did recognise a principle of unjust enrichment. See also Birks, 
supra n. 61, particularly at 20.
"  There is, however, today a tendency to equate unjust enrichment with general 
equitable notions. For example, in ANZ v. Westpac (1988) 78 A.L.R. 157, 162, it was said that 
“contemporary legal principles of restitution or unjust enrichment can be equated with the 
seminal equitable notions of good conscience." See also Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 
583, 619, per Deane J.
100 See particularly Chapters 3 & 4.
101 Cf. Hutchinson, R.B., “The Necessity of Conferring a Benefit For Recovery in 
Quasi-Contract" (1969) 19 Hastings L.J. 1259, 1262^  who considers that it appears that Lord 
Mansfield meant his statements only “to apply when the defendant held money belonging to 
the plaintiff." (emphasis added).
102 The inclusion of quantum meruit claims for services rendered appears to be a recent 
phenomena. As Muir points out, “services were never conceptually part of the historical 
justification of unjust enrichment." See Muir, G., “Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener" 
in Finn, 304. There is continued judicial support for an analysis of service cases outside of any 
unjust enrichment principle. See, e.g., Sabemo Pty Ltd v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 
880, 897, per Sheppard J.
103 See, for example, the equitable topics incorporated by Goff & Jones, supra n. 93.
104 Maritime salvage and general average contribution are commonly claimed.
105 Muir, supra n. 91, paragraph 1.01.
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legal history",106 showed a marked hesitancy about modern developments. 
Stoljar appeared to see no need for the wide claims made for unjust enrichment 
and Restitution, "and indeed much danger in doing so."107 Stoljar offered 
alternative explanations of different parts of quasi-contract and his ideas will 
be considered in greater detail at appropriate points in this thesis.
Not too much, however, should be made of these historical arguments 
against unjust enrichment. Proponents of that concept would concede the 
complex and confused history of quasi-contract and, thus, Restitution. Indeed, 
they reject the legacy of history and wish to strike out in new directions.108 It is 
as a theoretical explanation that the strengths of unjust enrichment are 
proclaimed. It is as theory that it must be judged.
As an interesting aside, it might be noted that as one traces the historical 
development of Restitution in Anglo-Australian law, although interest in 
unjust enrichment is still clearly on the rise, its appeal may be short-lived. In 
the United States, despite early and influential writing, interest in unjust 
enrichment as a cause of action appears to be on the wane. This is evidenced by 
the decision, lamented recently by one of England's foremost Restitution 
lawyers, to shelve a second Restatement of Restitution.109
§ 1.2.5 Summary of Historical Development
A number of points need to be reiterated, following this consideration of 
the historical development of the law of Restitution.
(1) The sources of Restitution are diverse. Even within quasi-contract, the 
factual and conceptual variety of claims is notable, but given that 
equitable and other doctrines are also now claimed, the topics said to fall 
within Restitution raise a wide variety of conceptual problems.
(2) It was not until comparatively recently that any attempt was made to 
explain these topics on the basis of any single concept. Although a
106 Sutton, R., "Quasi-Contract: Lost Cause or Current Issue?" (1990) 7 Otago L.R. 336.
107 Muir, supra n. 91x paragraph 1.05. Professor Stoljar's caution might be a warning 
to those who view unjust enrichment as an historical inevitability.
108 See, e.g., Goff & Jones, (3rd ed., 1986) 29. Cf. Hedley, supra n. 20, 57, who points 
out that Goff & Jones "strenuously dispute" the historical divisions of the subject.
Jones, G., "The Law of Restitution: The Past and the Future" in Burrows, Essays, 1- 
2. See also Birks, supra n. 14, 25-6.
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notion of unjust enrichment has a long history, its perceived role as a 
unifying and explanatory concept of the subject of Restitution is 
essentially new. Restitution as a unified whole does not have the same 
deep historical roots as, say, contract. Hence, it is as theory that unjust 
enrichment and the constructs it has engendered must be judged. Thus, 
the thesis which follows is not a historical treatise but largely a 
theoretical discourse.
(3) History does emphasise, however, that not all personal obligations can 
be explained in terms of contract and tort. The courts have repeatedly 
stressed the equitable basis of liability outside of mainstream contract 
and tort. Even though, at times, such claims have been seen as 
peripheral, they are nevertheless a significant part of our law. It will be 
seen that part of this significance stems from the gap-filling and 
ameliorative function such claims have performed.
§ 1.3 RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 1.3.1 The Visceral Appeal of Unjust Enrichment
A concept such as unjust enrichment—that "no one should be made 
richer through another's loss"110—strongly appeals to an innate sense of 
justice.* 111 Unjust enrichment, when stated in such terms, has a powerful, 
visceral appeal. It is perhaps for this reason that the concept has captured the 
imagination of many commentators, even though it "expresses an aspiration 
that, as we know well, could never be realised fully in human affairs."112 No 
doubt, to take one example, it is in certain circumstances a morally satisfying 
conclusion to state that the recipient of a mistaken payment would be unjustly 
enriched if he or she is not required to return the money. Such a conclusion 
activates "our sense of justice in response to an allegedly undue benefit."113
110 Pomponius, Digest 12.6.14; 50.17.206, quoted in Dawson, J.P., "Restitution Without
Enrichment" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 563, 621. Maddaugh & McCamus, 32, suggest that the moral 
premise underlying unjust enrichment is a familiar one that one ought not reap where one has 
not sown.
111 Cf. Dawson, 8. Unjust enrichment has been labelled a "moral principle": see Scott 
L.J. in Morgan v. Ashcroft [1938] 1 K.B. 49, 75.
112 Dawson, supra n. 110, 621.
113 Stoljar, supra n. 16, 603.
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But the question to be asked is whether unjust enrichment can ever be much 
more than such a conclusion; whether it can ever provide us with solutions to 
individual problems, or, more saliently, the means of arriving at such solutions. 
If unjust enrichment does not provide useful analytical tools for solving 
problems in Restitution, and it will be argued here that it does not, then the 
fascination with that concept may prove a dangerous thing. Dawson, writing in 
the 1950's, noted that
once the idea [of unjust enrichment] has been formulated as a 
generalization, it has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens 
to jump right off the dock. This temporary intoxication is seldom 
produced by other general ideas, such as "equity," "good faith," or 
"justice," for these ideals themselves suggest their own relativity and the 
complexity of the factors that must enter into judgment. The ideal of 
preventing enrichment through another's loss has a strong appeal to the 
sense of equal justice but it also has the delusive appearance of 
mathematical simplicity. It suggests not merely the need for a remedy 
but a measure of recovery. It constantly tends to become a "rule", to 
dictate solutions, to impose itself on the mind.114
The danger exists that the morally satisfying conclusion, legitimately used to 
describe the result arrived at after a particular process of reasoning, may 
instead displace that process of reasoning. For example, if the application of 
certain rules result in a determination that D must pay P $1000, we might say 
that D would be "unjustly" enriched if he or she did not pay. This is quite 
different to saying that D must pay because he or she is unjustly enriched.
Whether, indeed, unjust enrichment as a generalisation is "dictating 
solutions" to problems depends upon the role within Restitution assigned to 
that concept. This matter calls for further consideration.
§ 1.3.2 The Role of Unjust Enrichment Within Restitution
Unjust enrichment is argued by many to be central to any understanding 
and conceptualisation of Restitution. It is said, for example, that the scope of 
the subject of Restitution is itself defined by reference to a principle (if principle 
it be) of preventing unjust enrichment—that "Restitution and unjust 
enrichment identify exactly the same area of law."115 Alternatively, others
114 Dawson, 8.
115 Birks, 17. Similarly, Goff & Jones, 5, consider that Restitution is composed of "all 
claims, quasi-contractual or otherwise, which are founded on the principle of unjust 
enrichment". See also Burrows, 1. Cf. Davis, supra n. 20,1193. See contra, references cited infra 
n. 116, particularly Hedley, 56-60.
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perceive unjust enrichment to be at the core of Restitution, although it is 
accepted that the subject-matter of Restitution may extend beyond that 
principle .116 On either view, unjust enrichment is of critical importance, and a 
perception of that principle as paramount has become so widespread that it 
may "fairly be said to represent academic orthodoxy in this area . " 117 The
116 Beatson, 22, 24-5 (also in "Benefit, Reliance and the Structure of Unjust 
Enrichment" [1987] C.L.P. 71, 73-4) sets out the different approaches of those who equate 
Restitution and unjust enrichment and those who do not. Beatson appears to fall within the 
latter category, a position he makes clear at 258:
[E]ven within restitution, it is no help to try to squeeze everything into unjust 
enrichment. But once we have filtered out the doctrines not based on restitutionary 
principles and recognized that unjust enrichment is not the only restitutionary basis, 
we shall be able to compare bodies of doctrine underpinned by similar principles.
Fridman, 28-30, notes that text-writers and judges seem to employ the terms "restitution" and 
"unjust enrichment" interchangeably, but considers that neither term is entirely satisfactory for 
purposes of reference to this part of the law. Later, he states that restitutionary recovery may 
occur where the defendant has not been enriched (33). The Restatement of Restitution also 
appears to concede that liability may arise in Restitution outside the operation of a principle of 
unjust enrichment (see at 15). This is borne out by the Introductory Note to the underlying 
principles of the Restatement, at 11, which states that the principles are "only intended as 
general guides for the conduct of the courts and are not intended to express that universality of 
application to particular cases which is characteristic of the statements made in subsequent 
chapters." Dawson also appears to favour such a notion of Restitution. See Dawson, supra n. 
110, 620-1, who states:
We constantly use one overworked phrase, unjust enrichment, to describe the manifold 
disparities, arising in the most diverse ways, that the remedies assembled under this 
heading are used to correct.
See also Hedley, supra n. 20, who is generally sceptical of the role of unjust enrichment, but 
who nevertheless accepts that "speaking in very loose and general terms, Restitution can be 
said to concern the recovery of benefits unjustly retained" (56). He goes on to emphasise that 
there is not one underlying principle of Restitution and that there are other, different principles 
at work. Consequently, he perceives the subject-matter of Restitution as a miscellaneous 
category of topics not readily incorporated within existing categories. See at 56-60.
It should be noted that writers in quasi-contract, now largely (see the Restatement of Restitution, 
1-3; Gamer, supra n. 27, 58-9) or entirely (see Birks, 29) said to be subsumed within Restitution, 
did not perceive unjust enrichment to have an exclusive role therein. This includes writers who 
did not consider the implied contract theory satisfactory. Generally, see Stoljar, and Munkman, 
supra n. 28. Keener, 19, considered that "the most important and most numerous illustrations 
of the scope of quasi-contract" are based on the principle of unjust enrichment, nevertheless 
incorporated within quasi-contract a number of topics not considered by him to be based on 
that principle. Admittedly, those parts of quasi-contract which Keener did not consider to be 
based on unjust enrichment were subsequently left out of the Restatement of Restitution. For an 
excellent criticism of attempts to explain all types of actions formerly brought in quasi-contract 
on the basis of unjust enrichment, see Perillo, supra n. 14.
117 Hedley, supra n. 20, 56. Support for this view, if needed, can be found in the 
volume of recent academic literature in the area, of which a significant proportion proceeds 
upon the basic assumption (usually unquestioned) of the pre-eminence of unjust enrichment 
within Restitution. This raises the question as to why theorists who equate Restitution and 
unjust enrichment continue to refer to the subject as "Restitution". Birks, 10, makes the point
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perceived pre-eminence of unjust enrichment is said to shape the very subject- 
matter of Restitution. Since the concern of the first part of this thesis is with the 
utility of unjust enrichment theory, it follows that the exact reach of Restitution, 
to the extent that it has a separate identity from that of unjust enrichment, 
becomes, for now, unimportant. The scope and limits of Restitution and its 
relationship with other legal categories such as contract, tort, property118 and 
equity can be put to one side. It is the claims of unjust enrichment theory which 
will set the agenda of the liability rules and doctrines to be considered. For the 
purposes of this thesis, then, Restitution will be taken to include both
(1) the historical sources of the subject (quasi-contract);119 as well as
(2) any other liability rules (many originating in equity) which on 
current theories are claimed to be unjust enrichment-based, that is, 
concerned with the restitution120 of "enrichment".
This deliberately leaves Restitution with "fuzzy edges",121 as different
that contract, tort and Restitution are not a "properly aligned series", for the first two represent 
causes of action and the latter a remedial response. Fridman, 29, points out that "[i]t might be 
thought that, consistent with his parallel between unjust enrichment, tort and breach of 
contract, it would have been more apposite to speak of his introduction as being to the law of 
unjust enrichment." More recently, however, Birks has begun to write in terms of the "law of 
unjust enrichment". Interestingly, Deane and Dawson JJ. in Baltic Shipping v. Dillon (1993) 111 
A.L.R. 289, 313, have made similar references to the "law of unjust enrichment", as well as to 
the "modem substantive categorisation" of "an action in unjust enrichment".
118 The relationship between Restitution and property law is one of particular 
difficulty. See, for example, the very unsatisfactory distinctions drawn by Birks, 49-73, between 
the two areas. As will be seen, some topics claimed for Restitution have a strong proprietary 
"flavour", suggesting a very close relationship with notions of property. These issues will be 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 9.
119 See § 1.2. A consideration of all of quasi-contract does not concede an unjust 
enrichment basis for that subject. As with Restitution, this question is open.
120 As to the meaning of which, see § 1.3.2.2.
121 Cf. Hedley, supra n. 20, 60:
'Restitution' can simply join that vast class of English words with fuzzy edges— 
concepts whose main outlines are clear but which tend to fade away in any protracted 
argument about their 'true' or 'real' meaning. Any discussion of whether a particular 
rule is 'really7 part of Restitution is, I contend, quite meaningless unless we first have a 
definition to work from;....
The definition of 'Restitution' is not, I think, a matter of much practical importance. 
What is important is that significant branches of the law do not escape serious 
academic attention for the lack of a category within which they may be studied. This is 
precisely what happened to that body of law formerly called 'quasi-contract': and the
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proponents of unjust enrichment have differing views as to what that concept 
encompasses. Consequently, a diverse array of doctrines needs to be 
considered.
It will be argued that unjust enrichment does not accurately explain 
many of the liability rules which are said to be manifestations of that concept. If 
this view is correct, it has one of two consequences: either (1) Restitution will be 
left as a small subject (if its contents are defined by unjust enrichment);122 or 
else (2) Restitution will be seen to consist of numerous heterogeneous topics (if 
its content is defined historically or otherwise).123 In either case, this will 
require a reconsideration of those liability rules in Restitution which cannot be 
explained by unjust enrichment; specifically, one would need to consider how 
these liability rules appropriately should be categorised. It will be seen that 
some liability rules may best be understood by reference to ideas already 
familiar to us from contract or tort; but other liability rules invoke ideas beyond 
contract and tort, so that they cannot be understood by reference to those 
categories. These are matters to be returned to below.
§ 1.3.2.1 Unjust enrichment as a source of liability, unjust enrichment 
as a remedial response
It is important to stress that the concern here is with unjust enrichment 
as a source of and explanation of liability, rather than as a remedial concept. 
This distinction is important and worthy of further examination at this point.
As was noted above, legal categories today are organised around 
causative events which can be used to "coherently group together" liability 
rules. Thus, unjust enrichment, as a basis for organising liability rules, must
new law of Restitution is very welcome if it remedies that problem. ... It would be a 
pity, therefore, if bits of 'quasi-contract' were to drop out of sight again because they 
cannot be fitted into the notion of 'unjust enrichment'. I agree with Birks that it goes too 
far to say that the boundaries of Restitution are solely the result of historical accident. 
But a major part of the justification for the study of Restitution must be that it remedies 
the historical accident which caused quasi-contract to drop out of sight; and this must 
to a certain extent influence its subject-matter, (footnote omitted).
122 E.g. Birks, P., "Unjust Enrichment—A Reply to Mr. Hedley" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 
67. Birks argues that, as a matter of definition, it is impossible for Restitution to consist of 
anything other than liability rules which are a response to unjust enrichment. This may be 
logically correct, but it does not determine whether the subject-matter Birks then proceeds to 
claim to be unjust enrichment-based is indeed so.
123 Cf. Hedley, quoted supra n. 121.
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explain, or give rise to, "independent and primary rights" .124 This contrasts 
with unjust enrichment as a remedial response—that is, as "a remedial alternative 
to other responses ... such as compensation"—where the liability rule which 
gives rise to that remedial response rests on a breach of duty in tort or equity, 
or on a breach of contract.125 The need for a clear distinction between unjust 
enrichment as a source of liability, as opposed to one remedial response 
amongst others, has been persuasively put by Birks126 and is becoming widely 
accepted .127 Birks has called this remedial or secondary role of unjust 
enrichment,128 "restitution for wrongs". To take one example, liability rules in
124 Beatson, 25.
125 Id. The usual remedy for, say, a breach of contract, is an award in damages. 
Where, however, termination of a contract is sought and there has been a total failure of 
consideration by one party, in the sense that there has been no performance of the contract, 
then a plaintiff may obtain restitution of money and goods transferred under the contract. Such 
remedial relief involves a return of the parties to their previous position. Such restitutionary 
remedies are uncontroversial: the gain being disgorged equates with the plaintiff's detriment 
and remedial relief restores the plaintiff to his or her status quo ante. As will be argued in 
Chapter 6, the rules which determine when such a remedy is available, originate in the law of 
contract. The restitutionary remedy is but one of several remedial responses available to a 
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's breach of contract.
Controversy arises, however, as to whether restitutionary remedies of a second type, involving 
the disgorgement of profits derived by a breaching party as a result of the breach of contract, 
are available. Such profits, where there has been an "efficient" breach of contract, may not 
equate with any losses sustained by a plaintiff (indeed, the plaintiff may not have suffered any 
losses). Requiring a disgorgement of such profits does not restore the plaintiff to his or her 
status quo ante. In the United States, such a remedy would likely be available. See Farnsworth, 
E.A., "Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of 
Contract" (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1339. In Australia, such a remedy would appear to be precluded 
by the majority opinion of the High Court in Hospital Products Ltd v. U.S. Surgical Corporation 
(1984)55 A.L.R. 417.
126 According to Birks, whilst an enrichment must have been incurred "at the 
expense" of a plaintiff, this phrase has two quite distinct senses. It may mean by "subtraction 
from" the plaintiff, which identifies a cause of action in unjust enrichment; or it may mean, "by 
doing wrong to" the plaintiff, which identifies a cause of action on the basis of some other 
liability rules (the commission of a tort, or equitable wrong, or perhaps for breach of contract): 
Birks, 23-4. This latter category Birks calls "restitution for wrongs". See Birks, 22-7, 40-4,132-9. 
The Canadian formulation of unjust enrichment (see Chapter 2, below), by emphasising a 
"corresponding deprivation" to a plaintiff, encompasses the notion of the "subtraction from" 
the plaintiff's wealth. See Smith, L.D., "The Province of the Law of Restitution" (1992) Can. B. 
Rev. 672. For unjust enrichment to be a source of obligation different to, say, contract or tort, it 
must be shown that the "causative event" (facts giving rise to liability) falls outside familiar 
categories of "causative events". See Birks, supra n. 14, 13. A similar point is made by Stoljar, 
supra n. 16, 605: any separate category of law must bring together "distinct group of causes in 
which P may recover irrespectively of other causes—more particularly, without any 
involvement of contract, tort or trust."
127 See, e.g., Burrows, 16-23; Gamer, supra n. 27, 62; Smith, ibid.
128 In Restitution—The Future, 1, Birks states the division in terms of that part of
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tort will establish when a tort has been committed. One remedial option which 
may be available to the victim of a tort is a restitutionary one to claim a benefit 
derived by a defendant as a consequence of that tort.129 Similarly, where an 
equitable wrong has been committed, for example, a breach of confidence or 
breach of fiduciary duty, an enrichment-based remedy, such as an account of 
profit, may be one possible remedy. As Finn has indicated:
There are very few equitable doctrines, I would suggest, that have the 
prevention of an unjust enrichment as their sole or principal purpose, 
though a possible (often usual) remedy for their breach can have the 
effect of denying such an enrichment... . Fiduciary law's loss, gain and 
avoidance remedies for the same wrong neatly illustrates this.130
Consequently, restitution for wrongs is not of principal concern when 
attempting to establish the role of unjust enrichment as a liability-creating 
concept. Where a wrong has been committed, restitution of an enrichment may
Restitution which is substantial and that part which is purely remedial. The latter part
is called remedial because it is not concerned to describe and define any cause of action 
but only to ask whether causes of action defined in the law of civil wrongs trigger by 
way of remedy a right to restitution. ...
By contrast the substantive part of the law of restitution focuses on causes of action 
which are not defined in other categories. They are causes of action specifically in 
unjust enrichment and nothing else. Substance here means cause of action.
129 See, e.g., Oughton v. Seppings (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 241, in which the defendant had 
wrongfully seized and sold a horse belonging to the plaintiff, who was held entitled to recover 
the proceeds of the sale, rather than for damages to be assessed. This remedial option has been 
called "waiver of tort". Such a claim is maintainable even where the plaintiff has suffered no 
loss. See Strand Electric and Engineering Co. v. Brisford Entertainment [1952] 2 Q.B. 246, although a 
user fee for use of the plaintiff's property, as was ordered to be paid in that case, may now be 
recoverable as damages for loss of use. See Goff & Jones, 722-3.
130 Finn, P., "Equity, Commerce and Remedy", Paper delivered to the New Zealand 
Law Conference, 1993, 22 (emphasis in the original). See also Finn, P., "Mr. Beatson's 
'Unfinished Business'", Paper delivered to the Restitution Group, Society of Public Law 
Teachers Conference, Aberdeen, 1991, 2-3; and Stoljar, supra n. 16, 610. This is well illustrated 
by the case of McKenzie v. McDonald [1927] V.L.R. 134, in which the defendant had purchased 
property from the plaintiff in breach of a fiduciary duty toward her. Normally, the plaintiff 
would have been entitled to rescission of the contract (which may be considered a form of 
specific restitution), but as this was not possible in the circumstances, the Court considered that 
the plaintiff should be indemnified for the losses suffered by her, namely the difference 
between the value of what the plaintiff received for her property (money and the defendant's 
property in exchange) and the market value of the plaintiff's property at the time of the sale 
(146-7).
30
be one possible remedial response131 available to a plaintiff. In Finn's words, 
the same wrong may give rise to loss, gain or avoidance remedies. Where, 
however, the underlying source of legal liability is said to be unjust 
enrichment, there is no such remedial flexibility. Although there are different 
conceptions of unjust enrichment—to be considered in Chapter 3—the 
distinguishing feature of all these conceptions is that the purpose of the 
liability-creating rules is considered to be exclusively or primarily the 
disgorgement of unjustly retained or unjustly obtained enrichment.132 In other 
words, unjust enrichment as a liability-creating event is said to give rise to only 
one remedial response, that of restitution.
§ 1.3.2.2 The remedial response of restitution
The term "restitution" is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary as the 
"action of restoring or giving back something to its proper owner, or of making 
reparation to one for loss or injury previously inflicted."133 Thus, incorporated 
within the definition of restitution is the idea of restoring someone to his or her 
original position. It might be said, for example, that a criminal ought to make 
restitution to the victim of a crime. But when used in this sense, "restitution" 
does not allow us to distinguish one form of remedy from another: it serves no 
different function to that of "recompense" or "compensation".134 Damages in 
tort could, on this definition, be described as "restitutionary". Consequently, 
"restitution" will not be utilised in this way here and most writing in the area 
excludes such a wide meaning.135
131 A restitutionary response may be effected by a number of specific remedies, such 
as recovery of money had and received, an account of profits, a constructive trust or a lien.
132 However enrichment is defined.
133 Vol. VIII, 551.
134 Cf. Laycock, supra n. 2,1282-3.
135 See, e.g., Birks, 10-1:
There can be restitution of a thing or person to an earlier condition and restitution of a 
thing to a person. These two usages shade into one another but it is important to be 
aware of the difference. Only the second is intended in this book. ... [Wlhen restitution 
is used in this first sense there is no suggestion that the person who is to effect the 
restoration of the status quo has himself received anything which will now have to be 
given up. The thing or person to receive restitution has merely suffered a loss or 
damage required to be made good. This is the crucial contrast with the second sense. 
Where restitution is not of someone or something to a prior condition but is rather of 
something to someone, the implication always is that the person who is to make 
restitution has received the something. ...
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Instead, in this thesis, restitution will be used in the first sense as defined 
above to refer to the return of something (received from a plaintiff) or giving 
up of something (received from a third party) to the plaintiff.136 The 
"something" to be disgorged137 is an enrichment, or benefit,138 in a defendant's 
hands. For example, the obligation upon a recipient of a mistaken payment to 
repay the equivalent sum can be said to be restitutionary. The measure of 
recovery is determined not by any loss or harm suffered by the plaintiff, but by 
the identifiable gain of the defendant. It is this "disgorgement-of-benefit" sense 
of restitution which is linked to unjust enrichment theory and which 
distinguishes it from remedial responses such as loss compensation or the 
making good of expectations.139
The reason why it matters to be alert to and to lay aside the first usage is that 
'restitution' in that sense is not distinct from 'compensation'. ... [T]his book is 
concerned only with the second sense of 'restitution'. That is, with gains to be given up, 
not with losses to be made good.
Contrast Fridman, 23-5, who appears to include recompense within his definition of restitution. 
This appears to reflect Fridman's recognition that many of the remedies in Restitution are not 
benefit-driven, but fulfil other purposes. In this writer's view, this conclusion is correct, but it 
should be acknowledged by means other than a wide use of the term restitution, which tends 
to suggest a return of, or giving up of, a benefit. It is important to note that the "restitution of a 
thing to a person" could incorporate the law of property. As will be seen in Chapter 9, those 
liability rules which do appear to have a remedial aim of restoring something to a plaintiff 
share a strong affinity with property law.
136 Cf. Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 155. Usually, 
most of the cases under consideration here will be of the former situation. The reason for this is 
that the concern here is only with unjust enrichment as an explanation of liability rules giving 
rise to an obligation. Where the defendant has received a benefit from a third party, a plaintiff 
will in most circumstances only be able to claim such a benefit where he or she can show some 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant. On most theories, liability does not depend in such 
circumstances upon any concept of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is only considered to 
be a basis for imposing liability where a defendant has received a benefit—in the language of 
Birks, gaining wide acceptance—by "subtraction from" the plaintiff. This means that the 
defendant will, most usually, have received the benefit directly from the plaintiff. The 
exceptions to this are cases in which the plaintiff can show that the benefit received by the 
defendant from a third party "belongs" to the plaintiff. See further § 9.3.
137 This neutral term includes both the return of a thing and the giving up of a thing.
138 The terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
139 See the seminal article by Fuller, L., & Perdue, W., "Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages" (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52; 373, which draws the distinction in a contractual context 
between different remedial responses, by considering the "interest" of the plaintiff—restitution, 
reliance, or expectation—which such remedial responses protect. The "restitution interest" is 
measured by any value conferred upon a defendant, which he or she may be required to 
disgorge. The "reliance interest" represents the change of position of a plaintiff in reliance on a 
promise and the measure of damages required to return a plaintiff to his or her position before
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There is one further sense in which the term restitution is here used. At 
times, the "something" to be disgorged may be the very thing received from a 
plaintiff, that is, specific restitution is possible. A remedy effecting specific 
restitution, by its nature, also returns the plaintiff to his or her status quo before 
the event which gave rise to the right to specific restitution. As will be seen in 
Chapter 9, the remedial aim of specific restitution may be such restoration of 
the status quo ante. The issue of whether the defendant has been enriched may 
be unimportant in the pursuit of such an aim.140 Hence, "restitution", will be 
used to refer to the disgorgement of benefits generally, whereas "specific 
restitution" will refer to the return of the very thing received by the defendant 
from the plaintiff.141
§ 1.3.2.3 The relationship between Restitution, the subject, and 
restitution, the remedy
For the purpose of this thesis, the subject-matter of Restitution has been 
given a broad and indefinite scope, to take into account both its historical 
sources as well as the widest claims of unjust enrichment theorists. In the view 
of the writer, much of the "territory" claimed for unjust enrichment has been 
claimed unjustifiably. It will be argued that many of the liability rules to be 
considered in detail in this thesis cannot be explained as having a 
restitutionary—that is, an unjust-enrichment related—purpose. This will be 
seen to be so for either of two reasons: (1) the remedial response to some 
liability rules is not in all cases, or even characteristically, restitutionary; or, (2) 
even where a remedial response is restitutionary, the particular liability rule 
giving rise to it cannot be said to have a purpose of reversing enrichment.
Nevertheless, the use of the subject title "Restitution" is necessitated by
the promise. The "expectation interest" is the value of any expectations which a promise creates 
and the measure of damages required to put a plaintiff in the same position as if the promise 
had been performed. See Fuller & Perdue, 53-4.
1411 The restitution of benefits suggests that benefit disgorgement, rather than 
returning parties to their status quo, is the remedial aim. However, even restitution need not be 
aimed at benefit disgorgement if a plaintiff has also suffered loss and that loss is the 
determinative measure of any recovery. Since in most cases this is conceded to be so—an 
enrichment being said to be disgorgeable only to the extent that it was at the expense of the 
plaintiff—this will be seen to be one of the serious weaknesses of unjust enrichment theory.
141 For further on the distinction between "restitution" and "specific restitution", see 
Laycock, supra n. 2, particularly at 1279-81.
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the widespread acceptance of such by many writers.142 Its use here does not 
concede that Restitution forms one subject—a coherent whole explicable on the 
basis of one general concept. Rather, the burden of the argument of this thesis 
is that unjust enrichment lawyers, "in attempting to build a single coherent law 
of restitution, [have] treated very different kinds of cases with identical 
doctrine." 143 It will be suggested that such a treatment is not justified; nor does 
it lead to a clarity of analysis when attempting to solve problems in Restitution. 
Instead, it will be argued that a number of distinct groupings of liability rules 
may be identified within Restitution, which liability rules are better explained 
in terms of the distinctive features justifying their common grouping. Some of 
these rules share considerable affinities with contract and tort, perhaps even so 
much so as to require a reconsideration of our definitions of contract and tort in 
order to incorporate or explain topics presently "peripheral" to those 
categories. Other liability rules appear to be manifestations of ideas unique to 
the groups or categories of which those liability rules form part. These matters 
will be considered in Part II.
§ 1.3.3 Summary
To this point, it is the diversity of Restitution which has been 
emphasised. Historically, there has not existed a single subject of quasi-contract 
or Restitution, which factor of itself casts doubt on the capacity of any single 
concept to adequately explain the variety of liability rules now said to coalesce 
under that rubric. Nevertheless, cases in Restitution perform a significant gap­
filling and ameliorative function which itself needs to be considered. In 
particular, this function is emphasised in repeated references to "equity" and 
"natural justice", and is highlighted by the "peripheral" nature of many of the 
topics to be considered. This gap-filling and ameliorative role of Restitution 
forms the subject of the next section .
142 See, Davis, supra n. 20.
143 Childres, R., & Garamella, } . ,  'The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in 
Contract" (1969) 64 N.W.L.Rev. 433, 436.
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§ 1.4 THE GAP-FILLING AND AMELIORATIVE ROLE OF 
RESTITUTION
§ 1.4.1 Introduction
Restitution consists of liability rules which cannot readily be 
encompassed within mainstream contract, tort or property law. Perhaps 
because of the seemingly peripheral status of many of these rules, a number of 
commentators have equated their role with the traditional role of equity of 
ameliorating the harsher consequences of the strict application of the common 
law.144 Thus, Lay cock has noted that:
The rules of restitution developed much like the rules of equity.
Restitution arose to avoid unjust results in specific cases—as a series of
innovations to fill gaps in the rest of the law.145
This statement subsumes two albeit-not-distinct functions of Restitution 
to be illustrated below: (1) filling gaps where other existing rules and doctrines 
fail to address a particular problem, and (2) ameliorating harsh or unacceptable 
consequences flowing from the application of existing rules and doctrines 
which address a particular problem. Such processes of gap-filling and 
amelioration are worthy of further consideration, for they may provide us with 
a greater insight into the possible utility of any generalisation that seeks to 
unify liability rules which have performed such functions. If Restitution indeed 
augments equity, finding a unifying theory for Restitution may be difficult,146 
if for no other reason than that equity itself has not been explained on the basis 
of one unifying theory.147 This is unless liability rules in Restitution have 
largely filled only one significant gap in our law. If this were the case then a 
single concept such as unjust enrichment may indeed explain and underlie
144 Cf. comments of Finn, cited in text to n. 159.
14  ^ Laycock, supra n. 2,1278.
146 Cf. Sullivan, supra n. 77, 26:
In fulfilling this ubiquitous impulse to do justice where legal logic has failed, quasi­
contract has presented extraordinary difficulties to those who have sought to systemize 
and reconcile the distinctly unsystematic and conflicting cases that constitute the law of 
quasi-contract. The doctrine, in both its origin and its application, has proved itself 
immune to such attempts at organisation.
147 In recent times, however, there have been calls for the more systematic and explicit 
exposition of the organising ideas and principles of equity: see, e.g., Finn, "Mr. Beatson's 
'Unfinished Business'", supra n. 130, 8, and see Beatson, Chp. 9.
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much of, or perhaps all of, Restitution.148 But if the liability rules in Restitution 
have filled a number of gaps in our law and performed varying ameliorative 
functions (and it will be argued that they have), then any single generalisation 
is unlikely to prove useful or accurate. We may need to resort to a number of 
explanatory ideas.
It will be argued that both common law and equitable149 liability rules 
claimed for Restitution fill gaps in the law and ameliorate the effects of extant 
rules and doctrines which applications would lead to results contrary to 
perceived notions of justice. This explains why rules performing a gap-filling 
and ameliorative function are usually perceived to derive from the broadest 
notions of "equity", to yield results "compelled by natural justice" ;150 and 
explains why, at times, such rules are justified by no more specific reason than 
an appeal to such broad notions.
§ 1.4.2 The Need For Gap-Filling and Amelioration
Much of the process of the development of the common law has been 
concerned with the search for rules and principles recognised as necessary 
grounds for the decision in a particular case and distilled from the results of 
many cases.151 Thus, in R v. Bembridge, Lord Mansfield stated that "the law
148 This is the view of the law which appears to be espoused by unjust enrichment 
lawyers. See e.g., Cooke, P.J., and Oughton, D.W., Common Law of Obligations (2nd ed., 1993), 
281: Restitution "straddles the boundary between the law of contract and the law of tort" 
(emphasis added).
149 Statutes have had little direct influence on the development of the particular rules 
and principles of concern here. Indirectly, of course, many quasi-contractual and equitable 
liability rules have been utilised to overcome the less desirable consequences of statutory 
provisions (such as the Statute of Frauds). But in such cases, the statutes themselves are merely 
the forum for the development and application of common law (i.e., judge-made law) principles.
150 Sullivan, supra n. 77, 20, where Sullivan is referring to quasi-contract. In this 
writer's view, this is a valid conclusion in relation to all of Restitution, the boundaries of which 
(given the broad definition adopted) in any case extend to many equitable doctrines.
151 Sir Frederick Pollock, writing in The Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth 
Century (various authors) (1918, reprinted Little, Brown and Co., 1969), at xliv, wrote:
[judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor 
even to all reasons given, but only to the principle recognised or applied as necessary 
grounds for the decision. Therefore, it has never been possible for the courts to impose 
dogmatic formulas on the common law, and the efforts of text-book writers to bind it 
in fetters of verbal definition have been constantly and for the most part happily 
frustrated by the reconsideration and restatements of guiding principles in the 
judgments of the highest tribunals.
There is considerable judicial support for such views. See, e.g., In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts
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does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles which are 
illustrated and explained by those cases." 152 As with any abstract thought, 
however, the articulation of rules and principles, or indeed any broader 
underlying ideas, is a complex process.153 As lawyers, we would be most 
familiar, for example, with the processes of classification and generalisation. In 
order even to begin to comprehend what would otherwise be the vast, 
shapeless bulk of the law, resort is made, at the level of broad generality, to 
classifications in order to divide and compartmentalise. We identify divisions 
such as public, as opposed to private, law; personal, as opposed to proprietary, 
obligations; contract, as opposed to tort.
These processes, though necessary, have their inherent dangers. For the 
categories created, distinctions drawn and rules articulated may not adequately 
or exhaustively reflect the underlying notions of justice at work. As Hayek has 
pointed out:
The common law judge is bound to be very aware that words are always 
but an imperfect expression of what his predecessors struggled to 
articulate.154
[1987] Ch. 264, 278, per Megarry V.C.:
There is today something of a tendency in equity to put less emphasis on detailed rules 
that have emerged from the cases and more weight on the underlying principles that 
engendered those rules, treating the rules less as rules requiring strict compliance, and 
more as guidelines to assist the court in applying the principles.
For recent arguments in the same vein, see his Honour Mr. Justice E.W. Thomas, "A Return to 
Principle in Judicial Reasoning and an Acclamation of Judicial Autonom y" (1993) 23 
V.U.W.L.R. Monograph, No. 5.
152 (1783) 3 Dougl. 332. See also Gorton v. Hancock (1745) Harg. MSS. 353 f.122, per 
Lord Hardwicke, cited in Holdsworth, W.S., Some Lessons from Our Legal History (1928), 17-8.
153 In our pursuit of knowledge, in law as elsewhere, words become our means of 
creating and communicating our image of reality and such communication will often be 
furthered through the use of tools such as metaphors and fictions. See Fuller's seminal article 
on legal fictions: Fuller, L., "Legal Fictions" Pts I, II, and III, (1930-1) 25 111. L.R. 363; 513; 877. As 
to the process of abstract thought generally, see Part III. Even the most elementary thought 
processes only proceed via a "conscious generalization of experience". Ibid, 907. For example, 
the creation of elementary classifications such as that of "person" proceeds despite the fact that 
it is impossible to visualise a "person" in the abstract—"persons" must either be male or female, 
black or white, short or tall, and so on (cf. ibid, 884).
154 Hayek, F.A., Law, Legislation and Liberty, (1973) Vol. I, 87. A similar point is made 
by Roscoe Pound when he states that "[t]he trained intuition of the judge leads him to the right 
results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons": "The Theory of Judicial 
Decision" (1923) 36 Harv. L.R. 940, 951.
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At times, however, the essentially arbitrary divisions utilised to make the law 
more manageable and comprehensible155 become ends in themselves, rigidly 
adhered to—a process which Dawson has labelled "that well-known ailment of 
lawyers, a hardening of the categories." 156 Similarly, previous statements of 
rules of law are at times given "biblical reverence" 157 and adhered to strictly or 
formulistically in circumstances they were never intended to include.
In order to avoid the consequences of such developments, resort is 
sometimes made to legally creative methods: one example is the time- 
honoured use of legal fictions.158 Historically, of course, when the common 
law has applied rules formulistically and in a manner which appeared contrary 
to conscience, it was the role of the Court of Chancery to provide remedies that 
might achieve justice. But as Finn has pointed out, this "creative and 
ameliorative" role has generally, and "often uncritically, [been] attributed to
155 Cf. Fridman, G.H.L., "The Foundations of Restitution: A Canadian Perspective" 
(1989) 19 W.A.L.Rev. 131,138-9:
Our notions of contract, tort or restitution are not naturalistic, they are constructs of 
law, intended to serve certain ends or policies. There is no inherent reason for making 
any distinction between contract, tort and restitution other than those which may be 
derived from history or convenience.
See by way of example, Hedley, S., "Contract, Tort or Restitution; or Cutting the Legal System 
Down to Size" (1988) 8 Legal Studies 137, who seeks to reclassify the law of obligations (itself a 
classificatory convenience) on an entirely different basis. Such attempts, as with existing 
classifications, are neither "right" nor "wrong" but merely more or less useful. A similar 
restructuring will be attempted by this writer, one which it is hoped will prove more useful 
than resort to a concept of unjust enrichment.
156 Dawson, J.P., "Restitution or Damages" (1959) 20 Ohio St.L.J. 175, 187. Rejecting 
rigid divisions, see Deane J. in Hawkins v. Clayton (1988) 78 A.L.R. 69,101:
The law of contract and the law of tort are, in a modern context, properly to be seen as 
but two of a number of imprecise divisions, for the purpose of classification, of a 
general body of rules constituting one coherent system of law. Where rules classified in 
different divisions would otherwise conflict or compete, an essential function of the 
whole system is to avoid, resolve or rationalise such conflict or competition, not to 
induce or preserve it.
157 See Finn, P., "The Liability of Third Parties For Knowing Receipt or Assistance" in 
Waters, D.W.M., (ed.) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993) 195, 205, where he considers the 
excessive reverence given to Lord Selborne's statements in Barnes v. Addy (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 
App. 244.
158 Fuller, supra n. 153, 516: "Generally, a fiction is intended to escape the 
consequences of an existing, specific rule of law." But these fictions may themselves at a later 
stage be inappropriately utilised, as where they are reified, and their initial purpose is 
forgotten. Thus new difficulties are created. Perhaps this is an inevitable and ongoing process. 
But as Fuller has pointed out, it would seem that the problem is not the process of 
conceptualism itself, but "clumsy, hypostatizing conceptualism" (909).
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equity...[and], equally uncritically, is still so often denied the common law."159 
It is suggested that quasi-contractual rules, though not originating in equity, 
nevertheless serve an equitable role, both filling gaps in our legal system and 
ameliorating the effects of the application of rules, principles or categorisations 
which appear to preclude a desired result. This will be demonstrated by a 
number of examples.
§ 1.4.3 Illustrating Gap-Filling
One of the reasons why gaps arise in our legal system is as a result of the 
processes of classification: existing legal categories of what are perceived to be 
related liability rules do not extend beyond their self-defined boundaries. It is 
not relevant for our purposes how and why categories come about, or the 
advantages and disadvantages of a particular categorisation. What is clear is 
that as with any process of classification, boundaries that include of necessity 
must also exclude. The categories thus created will always leave a miscellany of 
cases that cannot be subsumed readily within the ambit of those categories.
The history of quasi-contractual actions provides an illuminating 
illustration of the process of filling gaps which arise as a consequence of the 
adoption of particular legal classifications. As has already been seen, quasi- 
contractual type claims (such as for money paid under mistake) which lay from 
the earliest days of the common law, were enforced by the end of the 
seventeenth century in the action of indebitatus assumpsit.160 A myriad of quite 
diverse claims could be brought in indebitatus and these were, at a later stage, 
differentiated by the use of individual "common counts". With the abolition of
159 Finn, "Mr. Beatson's 'Unfinished Business'", supra n. 130, 1. But the Court of 
Chancery was not always capable of properly performing such a function. During a period 
lasting from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, equity shed its "ex tempore 
characteristics" by the development of positive principles: Meagher, R.F., Gummow, W.M.C., & 
Lehane, J.R.F., E quity: D octrines and Rem edies (3rd ed., 1992), 7-8 (hereinafter: "Meagher, 
Gummow & Lehane"). This was no doubt desirable in that it ended a period of ad hoc decision 
making, so that the "whims of the Lord Chancellor were no longer sufficient" (8), but one of the 
consequences was that the Court of Chancery was also at times guilty of the application of 
these "principles" in as strict and formulistic a manner as the common law.
160 See §1.2.1
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the old forms of actions, however, "it seemed necessary to adopt a new system 
of classification."161
Gaining particular prominence were two types of claims, contractual, 
essentially those concerned with enforcing consensually assumed obligations, 
and delictual, essentially those concerned with wrongdoing causing another 
harm. The categories of contract and tort began to develop.162 Clearly, 
however, many circumstances arose which demanded recovery, but in which 
no real contract could be said to exist or breach of a duty in tort could be said to 
have occurred. The common counts continued to be utilised in order to impose 
liability in such circumstances. The money had and received action for the 
recovery of mistaken payments provides the obvious example. But the 
common counts proved useful in filling other gaps as well. For example, the 
quantum meruit action was utilised, albeit rarely, to allow plaintiffs to recover 
for services rendered in an emergency. This filled the gap arising as a result of 
the common law's failure to embrace a general doctrine of justifiable 
intervention in another's affairs, or negotiorum gestio.163
Eventually, however, and despite the clearly non-consensual nature of 
much quasi-contractual liability, all of quasi-contract became to be viewed as 
based on implied contract. This "false" classification of quasi-contract led to a 
two-fold division of personal obligations, into contract and tort.164 Quasi- 
contractual claims thus became a subset of contract.165 One of the
161 Perillo, supra n. 14,1210.
162 See Chapter 6, for further on the essential characteristics of contract and tort.
165 See further, Chapter 8. Many of the gaps which arose were the consequences of the 
increasingly rigid self-limiting definitions, particularly of contract, adopted by the courts. 
Consequently, as equity also demonstrates (consider, for example, the use of estoppel to impose 
both contract-like and tort-like liability), much of this gap-filling occurred and occurs at the 
boundaries of, or near, contract and tort.
164 The existence of a two-fold division was strenuously reiterated by Viscount 
Haldane L.C. in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398,415, supra n. 84. For an interesting modern 
reformulation of these ideas, see Butler, supra n. 2, 29-36, particularly at 32.
165 Cf. Perillo, supra, n. 14,1210-1:
Private law was seen as a great dichotomy between contracts and torts ... [and such] 
non-consensual obligations which previously had been enforced by the writ of general 
assumpsit... came to be regarded as 'contracts implied in law'.
One possible consequence of such reasoning was that it staved off any need to explore the real 
basis for such claims.
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consequences of this development was that quasi-contract was eviscerated of 
its creative gap-filling function.166
In due course, it came to be recognised again that many cases of implied 
contract were not contracts at all and that the law was imposing obligations for 
reasons other than the parties' express or implied agreements.167 The category 
of quasi-contract was given a separate status and the three-fold division of the 
law of obligations emerged. All common law personal obligations which could 
not be subsumed readily within contract or tort were argued to fall within the 
bounds of this third category. Munkman, for example, perceived quasi-contract 
as that "residue of cases" remaining after the process of the legal 
"differentiation" of contract and tort.168 Importantly, the outstanding feature of 
quasi-contract as a category of rules fulfilling a gap-filling function was again 
being given recognition. The point is made expansively by Rinker:
Quasi-contract from its very inception has overlapped other fields of 
law; from sheer necessity, it developed to supplement the more 
cumbersome common law actions and to supply a remedy for cases 
which would not fit neatly into one of the law's established pigeon­
holes.169
§ 1.4.4 Illustrating the Amelioration of Specific Rules and Doctrines
The application of specific rules and doctrines which address a problem 
arising from particular fact circumstances may result in harsh or undesired 
consequences. Consequently, the courts have at times resorted to ameliorative 
techniques either to circumvent such rules or doctrines, or to modify or recast 
their application in a given circumstance. Quasi-contractual rules have often 
performed such ameliorative functions.
An interesting example which illustrates the point arises in the context 
of the impact of the Statute  of Frauds on the enforceability of contracts. To
166 Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398, is a telling example.
167 Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch.D. 94, is an early example, a decision ignored, however, in 
Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398.
168 Munkman, supra n. 28,1. Similarly, Sullivan, supra, n. 77z 4 & 20.
169 Rinker, G.A., "Quasi-Contracts—Concept of Benefit" (1948) 46 Mich.L.Rev. 543, 
551. See also Fridman, 22, who considers that the "old law of quasi-contract therefore filled a 
gap left by the laws of property, contract and tort."
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simplify the m atter ,170 the Statute of Frauds sought to prevent fraudulent 
allegations of the existence of certain contracts by providing that unless such 
contracts were evidenced in writing, they were unenforceable. Yet if applied 
literally, such a rule could have manifestly harsh consequences. For example, 
parties transferring land under an oral contract of sale might be refused a claim 
either for the sale price or for the return of the land, action on the unenforceable 
oral contract being precluded. If such situations were to be left unremedied, 
then the Statute would itself become a vehicle for perpetuating fraud and rules 
and doctrines both in equity and at common law arose to ameliorate such 
potentially harsh consequences.171
One doctrine which developed was the equitable doctrine of part 
perform ance .172 This doctrine allowed for the specific enforcement of an oral 
contract caught by the Statute  where there were sufficient acts of part 
p e rfo rm an ce 173 referable to the oral contract. Yet by the late nineteenth 
century, the House of Lords in Maddison v. Alderson174 applied a restrictive and 
technical in terpretation of the doctrine .173 Its purpose of “vindicating
170 The issue is considered in greater detail in Chapter 6.
171 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, paragraphs 1220, 2035. Numerous statements exist 
in which judges have emphasised that the courts would not allow the Statute of Frauds to be 
utilised as an instrument for fraud. See, e.g., Simon v. Motivos (1766) 3 Burr. 1921, per Lord 
Mansfield:
The key to the construction of the act is the intention of the legislature, and therefore 
many cases, though seemingly within the letter, have been let out of it; more instances, 
indeed, in Courts of Equity than of Law, but the rule is the same in both. No advantage 
shall be taken of this Statute to protect the fraud of another.
See also per Wilmot J.:
Had the Statute of Frauds been carried into execution according to the letter, it would 
have done ten times more mischief than it has done good, by protecting, rather than by 
preventing, fraud.
These are cited in Fifoot, C.H.S., Lord Mansfield (1936), 125-6. See also Anon. (1773) Lofft 330, per 
Lord Mansfield: "[t]he very title and the ground on which the Statute [of Frauds] was made 
have been the reason of many exceptions against the letter of the Statute."
172 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, paragraphs 2036-2045.
173 For further on this, see ibid, paragraph 2037.
174 (1883) 8 App.Cas. 467.
173 This was part of a general development which Lord Simon described in Steadman 
v. Steadman [1976] A.C. 536, 560 as "a hardening of equity's arteries, an increasing technicality 
until quite recent times. The Chancellor's foot evolves into the Vice Chancellor's footrule."
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conscientious dealing", thus preventing innocent parties from suffering harm 
as a consequence of an unmeritorious and technical reliance on the Statute, 
appeared to be ignored. It is this setting which provides the background of one 
of Canada's foremost Restitution cases: Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada 
& Constantineau.176
In Deglman, the plaintiff performed various domestic services for his 
aunt prior to her death, on the basis of an oral agreement that she would 
bequeath him part of her real property.177 This contract was unenforceable 
under the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, yet the Ontario Court of Appeal 
allowed specific performance of the oral contract on the basis of the doctrine of 
part performance and distinguished Maddison v. Alderson. The Supreme Court, 
however, overruled the Court of Appeal and accepted the more restrictive 
approach of the English House of Lords on the question of whether the acts of 
part performance were referable to the contract alleged.178 But so as to avoid 
the plaintiff being left without any remedy, the Supreme Court instead 
imposed an obligation to pay the reasonable value of the services rendered. 
The basis of this obligation was said to lie in "quasi-contract or restitution",
176 [19541 3 D.L.R. 785.
177 A contract was found to exist by both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of 
Appeal [19531 O.W.N. 665. One might argue that this case appears to fall within the very 
province of the Statute of Frauds, as such a contract could easily be alleged and difficult to 
disprove. Consequently, it may be argued that evidence in writing was essential in establishing 
the probity of the plaintiff's claim. But if that had been the view of the Supreme Court (for 
clearly, it did not trouble the Courts below), then it could not have relied on the contract to 
prove the non-gratuitous nature of the services provided by the nephew. Those services could 
arguably have been motivated by love and affection, as part of the aunt's and nephew's 
domestic arrangements. The nephew would not then have been entitled to the quantum meruit 
award. In Deglman, the Supreme Court simply accepted that the services were given on a 
contractual footing and were to be "paid" for: [19541 3 D.L.R. 785, 788. Such a finding, of 
course, would not have been made had there been serious doubts about the probity of the 
plaintiff's claims.
178 In Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467, the test was stated as requiring acts 
which were "unequivocally, and in their own nature, referable to some such agreement as that 
alleged": per Lord Selborne, at 479. Cf. Chaproniere v. Lambert 119171 2 Ch. 356, 361. The 
question thus turned on whether the plaintiff's acts of part performance were referable to the 
alleged contract for the transfer of the land. The Supreme Court considered that this could not 
be shown by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal, by way of contrast, considered that provided 
"the acts of part performance were referable to some contract and consistent with the contract 
alleged, then evidence was admissible as to the precise terms of the particular contract 
alleged": [1953] O.W.N. 666. Cf. Fry, Specific Performance (6th ed., 1921), 278. Admittedly, the 
plaintiff's claim to specific performance in Deglman appears not as strong as it did in Maddison 
v. Alderson itself. In Maddison, the plaintiff gave 20 years services at great sacrifice to herself in 
return for real estate intended to be left to the plaintiff by will. The deceased's attempt to 
bequeath the property failed for want of adequate testation. The existence of the invalid will 
provided strong evidence of the deceased's intentions and the truth of the plaintiff's claims.
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which provided a rem edy for w hat w ould otherw ise be an "unjust 
enrichment".179
In the view of many Canadian academics, Deglman represents the 
"starting point" of that country's development of the law of Restitution.180 Yet, 
as this brief outline of the case demonstrates, it is probably fair to conclude that 
Deglman illustrates the imaginative utilisation of a common law doctrine to 
overcome the restrictive interpretation of an equitable rule;181 an equitable 
rule, ironically enough, which had itself originated to overcome the harsh 
consequences of the Statute of Frauds. Where equity had "failed", Restitution 
assisted, providing a remedy of last resort.182 An "exception" to the part 
perform ance "exception" was applied, illustrating that the process of 
amelioration is an ongoing one which allows courts to avoid results they are 
not prepared to countenance.
As will be seen in Chapter 6, statutes rendering contracts void, voidable 
or unenforceable have provided fertile ground for the operation of rules 
ameliorating the consequences of the literal application of such statutory 
provisions. But this is only one context w ithin which rules having an 
ameliorative functions are in evidence. Examples abound, many, of course, 
being found in equity. For example, equity has ameliorated and given greater 
sophistication to "crude" and unacceptably lim ited common law rules 
governing transaction avoidance. Thus, equity 's transaction avoidance for
179 The court cited Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson [1943] A.C. 32, 61. 
It should be noted, however, that the remedy, and the circumstances in which it was granted, 
was more akin to the operation of the estoppel doctrine than to any unjust enrichment concept. 
For a consideration of the doctrine of estoppel in greater detail, see Chapter 4. In Australia 
today, the doctrine of estoppel would probably provide a potential means of recovery for a 
plaintiff in a similar position to that of the plaintiff in Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada & 
Constantineau [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785. If it could be shown that the plaintiff had acted on the basis of 
the representations of the deceased, the defendants may then have been estopped from relying 
on their strict legal rights where the insistence on those rights would contradict the 
representations relied upon, thereby causing the plaintiff detriment. The appropriate remedy 
would either compensate the plaintiff for the losses incurred or alternatively, enforce the 
deceased's representation if this were the only means of avoiding the plaintiff's detriment. See, 
e.g., Riches v. Hogben [1986] Qd. R. 315.
180 E.g. Fridman, 12; Maddaugh & McCamus, 13.
181 Cf. Mason, K., "Restitution in Australian Law" in Finn, 20.
182 If the Supreme Court of Canada had simply distinguished or disapproved the rule 
in Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467 (as the Ontario Court of Appeal had done), it 
could have granted relief in far less a circuitous manner. The contract could simply have been 
enforced on the basis of the part performance doctrine.
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innocent misrepresentation overcame the common law's insistence on fraud, 
and actual undue influence expanded the notion of common law duress. 
Significantly, such transactions-avoidance rules are now often claimed for 
Restitution.
§ 1.4.5 Recognition of the Gap-Filling and Ameliorative Role of 
Restitution
As these above examples illustrate, gap-filling and amelioration can 
occur in a variety of different contexts. In fact, the two functions could be said 
to be merely aspects of the same process—producing just results in 
circumstances in which existing rules either do not address an issue, or address 
it in an unacceptable way. The difference between gap-filling and amelioration 
may often be blurred or non-existent, so that a rule might equally be described 
as performing either function. What is significant is that the fundamental 
importance of rules performing such function has been widely recognised, 
perhaps because our legal system's very capacity to attain "justice" is at issue. 
Holdsworth, for example, emphasises how Lord Mansfield in Moses v. 
Macfer lan183
found an incoherent set of rules stated in a number of heterogeneous 
cases; and if there was any one principle at their back, it was the innate 
feeling of the judges that it was just and equitable that a convenient 
remedy should be given in these cases.184
Similarly, Sullivan, writing much more recently, has said quasi-contract is
a doctrine to be pressed into service when the application of more 
conventional doctrines would not yield a result that is compelled by 
natural justice.185
He adds that it
owes its origins to the persistent desire to do justice; it saves a
183 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005.
184 Holdsworth, W.S., History of English Law (2nd ed., 1937), Vol. 8, 97.
185 Sullivan, supra n. 77, 20. See also at 1 & 4. Modern Canadian law has been 
described in this vein: "Canadian judges have been willing, even anxious, to bring into play 
restitutionary principles to fill gaps left by the original common law." See Fridman, G.H.L., 
"The Reach of Restitution" (1991) 11 Legal Studies 304. As to the role of equitable notions in 
European law of Unjust Enrichment, see Zweigert, K., & Kotz, H., An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (2d ed., 1987) Vol. II, 254-5.
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deserving plaintiff's claim from failure under conventional legal
principles.186
Obviously, the reason for a perception that there exists a need to gap-fill 
or ameliorate the effects of a rule will depend on the very instance-specific 
problem arising from the facts of a given case. This fact, it is suggested, is no 
better illustrated than by the very diversity of legal topics within Restitution, 
and the diversity of reasoning adopted in Restitution cases to achieve "just" 
results. When our existing rules do not, at first blush, appear to provide 
acceptable solutions to problems, our "innate" need for a remedy is triggered. 
In the past, our attempts to avoid the unjust consequences of not providing a 
remedy in such cases gave rise to much of the diverse and thus perhaps 
inevitably difficult law of Restitution. This diversity alone makes it unlikely 
that any single principle could ever unify these topics.
If the origins of Restitution can be traced to such an important aspect of 
the legal process itself, of performing a fundamental role of gap-filling and 
amelioration, then this suggests a need for great caution before any general 
theory of Restitution is embraced. A generalisation which seeks to do too 
much—one that is all encompassing or claims to be universal in its ambit—may 
obscure this function and create the fiction of the wholeness or unity of 
Restitution rather than highlight its diversity. As will be seen below, much of 
the theoretical writing on unjust enrichment appears to suffer from such a 
shortcoming.187 It is one of the fundamental arguments of this thesis that the 
liability rules of Restitution do not just fill one gap in our law (the reversal of 
unjust enrichment), but fill a number of gaps and perform various ameliorative 
functions. Consequently, any ordering of Restitution must embrace a number 
of different principles and informing ideas, rather than merely one. Such an 
ordering will be attempted in Part II of this thesis.
§ 1.5 ORGANISATION OF THIS THESIS
The burden of Part I of this thesis is a consideration of the concept of 
"unjust enrichment". This part of the thesis is largely descriptive of both 
current theories of unjust enrichment and criticisms which have (in many cases
186 Sullivan, supra n. 77, 26.
187 See, for example, some of the more dogmatic assertions, such as that by Burrows 
that unjust enrichment is the only explanation of Restitution. See § 2.2.1.2; § 2.2.1.3.
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traditionally) been levelled at such a concept. Such a descriptive task needs to 
be undertaken, however, in order to give the reader an overview of the ideas 
and debate at large in Restitution.
In Chapter 2, differing approaches to unjust enrichment will be 
examined. This chapter will consider both judicial and academic interpretations 
of the role of unjust enrichment in the law of Restitution. Although these 
approaches differ greatly, most share one essential feature: unjust enrichment 
is utilised as a means of analysing and solving problems in Restitution. To 
successfully fulfil such a function is the critical challenge of, and for, unjust 
enrichment. Does it indeed provide a sensible means of solving Restitution 
problems? The argument of this writer, to be the subject of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, is that it does not.
Chapter 3 will take a more detailed look at unjust enrichment theories; 
specifically, to consider the interaction between the constituent "parts" of that 
concept, namely, "unjust" and "enrichment". It will be shown that irrespective 
of the meaning of "enrichment", unjust enrichment theory is ultimately 
dependent upon the existence of some better outcome for the defendant which 
triggers the liability rule. Such an outcome, in turn, is said to give rise to a 
remedial response of reversing that outcome. It will be argued, however, that 
there are considerable difficulties with any "outcomes"-driven approach. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is that such an approach must identify some 
means of determining why the outcome is undesirable; why it ought to be 
remedied; why, in short, it is "unjust". The mere existence of a benefit or 
enrichment does not of itself tell us why it needs to be reversed. It will be 
argued that "unjust" either proves to be too vague and uncertain to serve any 
useful analytical function, or else represents merely a conclusion reached by 
reference to more specific rules about which "unjust" tells us little or nothing.
Chapter 4 will consider specific attempts at giving meaning to 
"enrichment". This will involve detailing a number of complex theoretical 
constructs which have been the subject of recent debate. It will be argued that 
none of these constructs prove adequate; for, to generalise, many of the liability 
rules claimed for Restitution are not ultimately concerned with the reversal of 
enrichments as a sine qua non for imposing liability. This conclusion will be 
reached via a number of specific arguments, but the crux of these is that (1) in 
many cases, the remedy is not, in fact, restitutionary, that is, concerned with the 
disgorgement of enrichment; and (2) in many cases in which the remedy is 
restitutionary, it is nonetheless merely one available remedial response to
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liability rules whose purposes are ones other than, principally, the reversal of 
enrichment.
Chapter 5 will introduce Part II of this thesis and this writer's own 
ordering of the liability rules claimed for Restitution. Part II will categorise the 
liability rules of Restitution into four groups, each group consisting of liability 
rules linked by certain affinities shared with other liability rules in that group. 
Each individual group, however, is identified by very different underlying 
concerns from the next, so that four largely distinct "clusters" of liability rules 
will be considered. Of course, such a categorisation must by its nature be an 
imprecise process: borderline cases do exist. Nor are the four categories 
identified necessarily exhaustive of all possible categories, though they do 
cover a considerable part of Restitution. The four categories are as follows:
(1) The first category of liability rules are activated by the defendant's 
conduct, where such conduct is either "contract-like", that is, 
tantamount to an assumption of liability, or "tort-like", that is, 
essentially amounting to a breach of duty causing harm. The defendant's 
conduct in either circumstances gives rise to an obligation, at the very 
least,188 to make good any losses incurred by the plaintiff. There is thus 
no need to identify any benefit in the defendant's hands to justify 
imposing liability. Of course, where such a benefit exists and equates 
with the plaintiff's losses, restitution may be one means of effecting loss 
compensation.189 Examples of "contract-like" liability include liability 
rules which operate when a plaintiff who has performed his or her part 
of an unenforceable contract seeks relief against a defendant who refuses 
to perform his or her part of the agreement. Examples of "tort-like" 
liability include liability rules which give rise to the right to avoid 
transactions on the basis of conduct such as duress, misrepresentation, 
or unconscionable conduct. Such liability rules form the subject-matter 
of Chapter 6.
(2) The second category of liability rules are activated by the existence of 
parties sharing a "common interest" in a matter. Where an unprovided 
for contingency effects the parties' common interest, so that the parties 
suffer disproportionate losses and gains as a result, such parties may be
188 Expectation-based remedies may also be available.
189 Where the losses and gains are not equal, then the defendant will still be liable to 
make good the plaintiff's losses.
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held to owe a responsibility to each other (stemming from their 
community of interest) to share such losses and gains. Examples of 
parties sharing common interests include parties to a contractual 
relationship, co-sureties, and partners to a marriage, de facto or 
otherwise. Thus, for example, where a de facto marriage breaks down, 
disputes as to the ownership of property may be settled by a "principle 
of just sharing", as it will be called. Such liability rules form the subject- 
matter of Chapter 7.
(3) The third category of liability rules are activated by conduct of a plaintiff 
amounting to an unsolicited intervention in another's affairs such as an 
act of rescue of a defendant's life or property, which intervention the 
law considers to be "justifiable" in the circumstances. Where a plaintiff 
has incurred reasonable "costs"—expended money, goods, time and 
effort—in pursuing the justifiable conduct, the courts may allocate such 
costs to a defendant who is considered a more appropriate party to bear 
them. Both the issues of the justifiability of a plaintiff's conduct and the 
appropriateness of the defendant as cost bearer will be seen to be 
determined largely on grounds of social policy and utility. Liability rules 
to be considered include maritime salvage and "agency of necessity", as 
well as rules governing recovery for justifiable self-interested 
intervention by a plaintiff in another's affairs. Such liability rules form 
the subject-matter of Chapter 8.
(4) The fourth category of liability rules are activated in circumstances in 
which money, goods or services of a plaintiff are conferred on an 
entirely "innocent" defendant, that is, where there is no conduct on the 
defendant's part, or shared common interest, or any reason of social 
policy, to justify making the defendant bear or share in the plaintiff's 
losses.190 Nevertheless, a plaintiff may seek to be returned to his or her 
position before the conferral, because no intention exists or now exists to 
"transfer" the money, goods or services to the defendant. To the extent 
that such restoration is possible without impinging on the innocent  
defendant's right to deny any responsibility for the plaintiff's losses, the 
courts will be prepared to grant such relief. Such remedial relief, often 
by means of specific restitution or what in effect amounts to specific 
restitution, will be seen to achieve a fair outcome as it will not generally
190 if "blame" were to be allocated, it would attach to the plaintiff, whose mistake was 
the cause of the conduct which is now sought to be undone.
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leave the innocent defendant at a disadvantage. Liability rules to be 
considered include those concerning the recovery of mistaken payments 
of money or relief in limited circumstances for the mistaken improver of 
another's property. Such liability rules form the subject-matter of 
Chapter 9.
The consequence of such a division of liability rules is that Restitution is 
not treated as one amorphous area of law. And as most of these categories 
operate within the "borderlands and penumbras"191 of contract, tort, property 
and equity, they raise implications for our understanding of those categories 
and invites us to reconsider their relationship with Restitution. Some of the 
issues raised by the re-ordering of Restitution proposed in Part II will be 
touched on in the Conclusion, Chapter 10 .
191 See Prosser, cited supra n. 20.
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Chapter 2
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL STATUS 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
But the solution of the problem through the invention of a new generalization is 
no final solution: The new generalization breeds new problems. Stressing a 
newly perceived likeness between many particular happenings which had 
theretofore seemed unlike, it may blind us to continuing unlikeness. 
Hypnotised by a label which emphasizes identities, we may be led to ignore 
differences ... For with its stress on uniformity, an abstraction or generalization 
tends to become totalitarian in its attitude towards uniquenesses-1
The abundance and confusion of our materials should have trained us in 
skepticism towards general forms of statement 2
§2.1 INTRODUCTION
Different conceptions of the status of unjust enrichment in Restitution 
abound, both in terms of its perceived existing role or function in the law, and 
in terms of the role or function that it is argued that it ought to perform. Unjust 
enrichment has been characterised in a variety of ways: amongst others, as an 
"informative generic label";3 as a "unifying legal concept";4 as the "underlying 
principle" of Restitution providing a "rationalisation" of the law ;5 or as a
1 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 Fed. 2d 608 (1944), 618-19, per Frank J.
2 Dawson, 25.
3 Muschinski v. Dodds (1986) 160 C.L.R. 583, 617, per Deane J.
4 See David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 73, which 
recognises unjust enrichment as a “unifying legal concept" in Australian law, citing Pavey & 
Mathews v. Paul (1987) 162 C.L.R. at 256-7, per Deane J.
5 See, Coleman, A., "The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in English Law" (1979) 10 
Cambrian Law Rev. 8, for example, who utilises such language, but also argues that 
restitutionary claims ought to be developed into "general actions for the prevention of unjust 
enrichment". This, it would seem, places Coleman with those who advocate a general cause of 
action in unjust enrichment, a position arguably different from those who merely advocate 
unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of a number of individual, specific and
"cause of action" * 6 giving rise to a "generalised right to restitution" .7 Before we 
can begin to consider the substance and meaning of unjust enrichment, or 
perhaps more accurately as part of the process of so doing, it is necessary first 
to consider the various possible roles of unjust enrichment in Restitution. This 
task must be undertaken in the context of the range of views one encounters 
throughout the common law, views at times expressed without clarification. In 
the High Court of Australia, for example, descriptions of unjust enrichment as a 
"unifying legal concept" have been left largely in the air, and the exact status of 
unjust enrichment in Australian law remains uncertain. This will be returned to 
below.
Apart from purely semantic differences,8 what is evident is that the 
different descriptions of unjust enrichment reflect a progression or spectrum of 
views whereby unjust enrichment has an increasingly important status within 
Restitution as one moves from one end of the spectrum to the other. At the 
"weaker" end of the spectrum, unjust enrichment is seen as merely one idea 
informing our law, alongside other ideas. At the "stronger" end of the 
spectrum, unjust enrichment is seen as a single, generic cause of action itself 
determinative of liability: previously seemingly autonomous individual 
liability rules are subsumed by the cause of action, becoming merely 
manifestations of it arising in the context of particular facts. And in between, 
unjust enrichment is an explanatory principle administered through specific 
liability rules. Such an explanatory principle is given an increasingly exclusive 
role as one "moves" toward the "stronger" end of the spectrum. What is 
important to note is that as the perceived role of unjust enrichment varies, so 
will the theoretical constructs built around that concept, though underpinning
historically confined actions.
6 See, e.g., Litman, M.M., 'The Emergence of Unjust Enrichment as a Cause of Action, 
and the Remedy of Constructive Trust" (1988) 26 Alb. L.R. 407, and see references cited infra n. 
51.
7 See, e.g., Goff & Jones, (3rd ed., 1986) 15, 57. Goff and Jones have since changed the 
emphasis of their argument and in the fourth edition merely call for the recognition of a general 
principle of unjust enrichment which unites the "particular cases" representative of that 
principle. See Goff & Jones, 70.
8 At times, only individual choices of language distinguish commentators sharing 
essentially similar views. For example, unjust enrichment as an underlying principle has been 
said to provide a "rationalisation" of the law of Restitution: Coleman, supra n. 5. Such a view 
does not seem to be essentially different to, say, Burrows' description of unjust enrichment as 
an "organising tool" for legal decisions in Restitution (Burrows, 1, 54-5).
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all such theoretical constructs is an emphasis upon the reversal of "enrichment" 
unjustly gained at another's "expense".9
The notion of a spectrum of views highlights that the boundaries 
between closely related views may be blurred. But at the extremes, the views of 
the status of unjust enrichment are irreconcilably at odds. It is proposed then to 
consider this spectrum of views. In particular, this will be done by identifying 
three broad and, at least in some significant respects, distinct conceptions of the 
role of unjust enrichment. The conceptions considered, by no means exhaustive 
of all possible views, are representative and descriptive of much of the current 
thinking amongst both commentators and the judiciary.
§ 2.2 THE ROLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The three broad conceptions of the role of unjust enrichment to be 
considered are as follows: (1) unjust enrichment as but one "informing idea" 
which exerts influence over Restitution, but does not exclude the operation of 
other ideas; (2) unjust enrichment as the "underlying principle" of Restitution, 
which principle unifies and rationalises the liability rules in Restitution and 
provides a means of analysing them; and (3) unjust enrichment as a "cause of 
action", whereby prima facie liability is justified once the constituent elements of 
that cause of action have been made out. Each of these wTill be considered in 
turn, though it needs to be reiterated that these conceptions are merely 
representative of views forming part of the spectrum wherein the divides 
between different views may be blurred. Clearly, there are other ways of 
describing the role of unjust enrichment.10
§ 2.2.1 Three Conceptions of Unjust Enrichment
§ 2.2.1.1 Unjust enrichment as but one "informing idea"
The notion of unjust enrichment as but one "informing idea" is used 
here to identify views whose distinguishing characteristic is their emphasis 
upon the non-exclusive status of unjust enrichment. In other words, unjust 
enrichment is perceived as only one idea or principle—albeit on some views, an
9 This is a term of art of quite specific meaning in Restitution writing. See Chapter 3.
10 Contrast, for example, the distinction drawn by Sutton, R.J., "Unjust Enrichment" 
(1981) 5 Otago L.R. 187, between unjust enrichment as: a "classification of legal rules", a "social 
goal", a "general right" or a "general principle".
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important one—amongst other ideas or principles informing the law of 
Restitution.11 As such, unjust enrichment exerts influence over Restitution and 
may even be a material consideration in determining how some at least 
established liability rules and doctrines are shaped (or reshaped) and applied to 
given problems. But significantly, unjust enrichment on such views does not 
exclude the operation of other ideas.12
Proponents of unjust enrichment as an informing idea or general 
principle point to the diversity of claims in Restitution and previously, quasi­
contract, to support a conclusion that no overarching principle, unjust 
enrichment or otherwise, can cogently explain such a wide variety of claims.13 
Thus, Muir has suggested that
there is no single and simply expressed principle which explains 
recovery, even in the mainstream money had and received situation.14
Similarly, Sutton, after considering the possible role of unjust enrichment in 
Restitution, concludes that "underlying cases on restitution there is not one
11 Generally, see Hedley, S., "Unjust Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution—an 
Overworked Concept" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56; Sutton, ibid; Muir, G., "The Contribution of 
Professor Sam Stoljar To The Law of Quasi-Contract" Paper delivered to the Restitution Group, 
Society of Public Law Teachers Conference, Aberdeen, 1991. Hedley, at 66, sums up his views 
as follows:
The concept of unjust enrichment, then, is of some use within the law of Restitution.
But its use as the universal solvent to all problems within Restitution leads to disaster.
It simply does not work. To find the way forward, 'unjust enrichment7 lawyers must
retreat, and recognise that their concept is only one amongst several of value in
Restitution.
12 For a consideration of some other concepts of relevance, see Part II of this thesis, in 
which a number of informing ideas or principles of relevance to different areas of the law of 
Restitution will be outlined.
13 Hedley, supra n. 11, 58, points out that the "alleged internal coherence of 
Restitution is not a proven fact" but instead a "massive assumption" of unjust enrichment 
lawyers.
It is interesting to note that no other theory of Restitution has sought to encompass so much 
"terrain" as many supporters of unjust enrichment perceive that concept to encompass. For 
example, implied contract theory only ever applied to quasi-contractual obligations and 
further, did not so much seek to explain such obligations and the liability rules giving rise to 
them, as to provide a "convenient" categorisation for them. Similarly, Stoljar's proprietary 
theory, noted below and considered in detail in Chapter 9, only seeks to explain some claims in 
quasi-contract. In contrast, however, Sutton, supra n. 10, 198, considers that the "various 
theories of restitution" all "assume that there is a single, unifying principle upon which we can 
draw to explain and justify the decisions within its ambit."
14 Muir, supra n. 11, paragraph 3.12.
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principle, but at least three and possibly more." 15 Sutton, for example, 
considers that contractual and property law notions are of relevance.16 The 
importance of such notions in Restitution will become evident in Part II of this 
thesis.
Stoljar is another writer whose views may arguably be characterised as 
falling within a conception of unjust enrichment as but one informing idea. 
Stoljar sought to divide quasi-contract according to a number of distinct 
theoretical grounds. Although he was rather dismissive of the value of unjust 
enrichment, to the extent that Stoljar perceived it to have any relevance at all,17 
it was only in relation to some of the obligations originating in the common 
counts and subsumed as part of quasi-contract. Stoljar considered that much of 
quasi-contract was concerned with what are essentially contractual notions.18 
And his development of ideas of unjust sacrifice19 further limited the scope of 
quasi-contract as an unjust enrichment-based subject. Stoljar thus stressed the 
relatively minor significance of unjust enrichment ideas.20
One variation on this theme of unjust enrichment as informing idea 
suggests that unjust enrichment may exert influence not only over Restitution, 
but over other areas of law as well.21 Beatson considers the burden of such
15 Sutton, supra n. 10,199. See also Hedley, supra n. 11.
16 Specifically, Sutton, supra n. 10, 199-207, outlines what he labels the "principle of 
transactional integrity" and the "principle of security of property".
17 Stoljar did make references to "unjust enrichment", but did not appear to consider it 
an overly useful concept. See The Law of Quasi-Contract (2nd ed., 1989), passim, and particularly 
1-2, 6-7, as well as "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603. Instead, 
Stoljar sought to give "a more concrete clarification" of what is meant by unjust enrichment by 
developing his own proprietary theory as an explanation of some of the money claims. See 
Burrows, 5.
18 Stoljar was not, however, an advocate of a general implied contract theory.
19 See particularly Stoljar, supra n. 17, and more generally, Negotiorum Gestio, Pt I, and 
the discussion of these ideas in Chapter 8, below. See also Muir, G., "Unjust Sacrifice and The 
Officious Intervener" in Finn, 297.
20 Stoljar never much concerned himself with those equitable doctrines now said to be 
based on a principle of unjust enrichment. This is reflected in his preferred title for the subject, 
"quasi-contract", and its relative "smallness" when compared with the wide range of subject- 
matter of texts on Restitution.
21 Atiyah is perhaps the most prominent proponent of such views. See Chapter 1, n. 
20. Hedley appears to support such views. See Hedley, supra n. 11, particularly at 66; as well as 
"Contract, Tort and Restitution: or, On Cutting the Legal System Down to Size" (1988) 8 Legal 
Studies 137.
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views to be that while unjust enrichment exerts interstitial influence over a 
number of areas in the law of obligations and elsewhere, it is not a complete 
explanation of any single category. Beatson notes that on such views there 
cannot be said to exist a "coherent" law of Restitution on the basis of unjust 
enrichment.22
As an informing idea, then, unjust enrichment is not unimportant, but 
too much must not be asked or made of it.23 Unjust enrichment may have some 
explanatory value, but other ideas and concepts must be sought to assist in 
explaining the causative events in Restitution. The reluctance of proponents of 
unjust enrichment as but one informing idea to place too much weight on the 
concept reflects, perhaps, their awareness of that concepts abstract nature. 
Unjust enrichment, for the most part, is either used merely as a description of a 
factual state of affairs suggesting a need for legal redress, or else provides a 
useful shorthand label for the conclusion reached after a particular process of 
legal reasoning. The limited value of the concept when used in such ways does 
not seem problematic. Unjust enrichment as informing idea makes no claim to 
exclusivity. No attempts are made to impose any particular analysis on all 
Restitution problems. Other principles must also be taken into account when 
explaining or formulating liability rules in Restitution. There is some judicial 
support for such views.24
22 Beatson, 24; also in [1987] C.L.P. 71, at 73.
23 Cf. Hedley, supra n. 11,66.
24 See, e.g., Morgan v. Ashcroft [1938] 1 K.B. 49, 76-7, per Scott L.J., who points to the 
"heterogeneous list" of the causes of action falling within the field of "implied contract", and 
notes (emphasis added)
the importance of trying to find some common positive principle upon which these 
causes of action ... can be said to rest, and which will not altogether exclude that of 
unjust enrichment....
[These causes of action] are so various in kind as almost irresistibly to invite the 
inference that there may be one or more unifying principles upon which they rest.
It should be noted, however, that although Scott L.J. referred to "implied contract" to describe 
quasi-contractual liability, he had earlier stated (at 75) that the name was a misnomer, with "no 
element of agreement about it."
The famous statement of Lord Diplock in Orakpo v. Mansons Investments Ltd. [1978] A.C. 95, 
(cited Chapter 1, n. 88) has been interpreted, by Hedley, supra n. 11, 58, as suggesting that there 
exists no single explanatory principle of all of Restitution; that "no [single] theory would do". 
Admittedly, however, there have been a number of other, quite different interpretations of this 
statement, so that its value as authority may be limited. For example, Sutton, supra n. 10,197-8, 
appears to consider that Lord Diplock was suggesting that there are no principles or theories 
which explain quasi-contract and thus "worth pursuing". Sutton rightly goes on to reject such a
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Perhaps surprisingly, given the modest claims made for unjust 
enrichment as but one informing idea, such views appear unfashionable in the 
context of the current debate. Many commentators make more ambitious claims 
for unjust enrichment. The allure of that concept has engendered theories 
which give unjust enrichment a more significant status within Restitution. 
Broadly speaking, unjust enrichment is perceived by many writers today as 
either the underlying principle of Restitution, or else as a cause of action. These 
approaches, although considered separately, will be seen to share much 
common ground which distinguishes both approaches from one which 
perceives unjust enrichment merely as but one informing idea.
§ 2.2.1.2 Unjust enrichment as "underlying principle"
A view of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of the liability 
rules of Restitution is perhaps the most prevalent in current writing on the 
subject outside Canadian legal circles.25 Unlike many Canadian commentators, 
such a view rejects unjust enrichment as a single cause of action giving rise to a 
right of Restitution once the constituent elements of that cause of action have 
been satisfied.26 Proponents of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle 
tend to reject the view that the generalisation of unjust enrichment can be used
view (197-8). A different interpretation again is offered by Birks, who perceives Lord Diplock's 
comments as supporting Birks' own view of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of 
Restitution, rather than as a cause of action. See Birks, 26-7.
25 Commentators who appear to view unjust enrichment in this light include Birks 
(see particularly Birks, 26-7, and "Unjust Enrichment—a Reply to Mr Hedley" (1985) 5 Legal 
Studies 67, 68: unjust enrichment is a "principle whose function is to integrate not one, but 
many liabilities"); Burrows (see Burrows, 54-6, and Burrows, A.S., "Contract, Tort and 
Restitution—a Satisfactory Division or Not?" (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 217); and Goff and Jones, who in 
previous editions called for a "generalised right to restitution", but have in their fourth edition, 
at 70, changed their emphasis to unjust enrichment as the principle which unites the "particular 
cases" of Restitution. This would also appear to accurately describe the views of the House of 
Lords. See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10 and Woolwich Building Society v. IRC 
(No. 2) [1992] 3 All E.R. 737, particularly per Lord Browne-Wilkinson (quoted infra n. 31). This 
would also appear to be the legal position in the United States. See the Restatement of Restitution, 
particularly the first section, on underlying principles; Seavey and Scott, "Restitution" (1938) 54 
L.Q.R. 29; and Dawson, particularly 3-8. Contrast Coleman, supra n. 5,17. In Canada, Fridman 
would seem to fall within the unjust-enrichment-as-principle school of thought (see Fridman, 
Chp. 2), but as will be seen below, such a view would appear to be contrary to much 
mainstream thought in that country.
Beatson is another commentator who utilises unjust enrichment as an explanatory principle 
which unifies much of the law of Restitution, but does not, however, appear to give unjust 
enrichment an exclusive role within Restitution. See references above, Chapter 1, n. 116.
26 As to which elements, see below.
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as a determinative of liability.27 Instead, unjust enrichment is perceived as a 
principle which unifies, or rationalises, or provides an "organising tool" 28 for, 
the liability rules of Restitution. Although the language of "underlying 
principle" is often used and will thus be adopted here, perhaps more accurately 
such views could be described as perceiving unjust enrichment as an 
"overarching principle". This follows from the emphasis upon that principle's 
unifying qualities.29
An important feature of such theoretical writing is that unjust 
enrichment is utilised to explain individual liability rules. But what is more, 
unjust enrichment is utilised as an explanatory principle which does not just 
provide us with an imprecise guide, perhaps merely identifying particular 
values at play (much as, say, "good faith" and "unconscionability" have 
explanatory force), it is instead utilised as an analytical tool which prescribes 
our forms of analysis of legal problems and "dictates" solutions.30 Thus, unjust 
enrichment is perceived to provide a mechanism for organising the "individual 
instances in which the law does give a right of recovery."31 It is a means of 
rationalising causes of action and as such, becomes the "universal or complete
27 Birks, especially, has argued strongly against unjust enrichment as a cause of action. 
In his Introduction, 27, for example, he points out that a "general doctrine" of unjust enrichment, 
"if it would be intelligible at all, would be unusably vague." See also, in particular, Birks, supra 
n. 25, 67-8. In Birks, P., "The English Recognition of Unjust Enrichment [19911 L.M.C.L.Q. 473, 
475, he states:
Important as is the high-level principle against enrichment, it must not be mistaken for 
a rule of immediate liability. ... It merely co-ordinates and gives direction to the many 
specific grounds for restitution.
28 Burrows, 1, 54-5.
29 Claims for unjust enrichment as the unifying principle of Restitution are made 
despite the fact that contract and tort law, at least, have largely withstood any attempts at 
explanation on the basis of single principles.
30 Cf. Dawson, quoted § 1.3.1. Whereas Dawson seems to suggest that this is a process 
over which we have little control, theorists here under consideration, such as Birks, 
purposefully use unjust enrichment to prescribe a methodology aimed at imposing certainty, 
perhaps even rigidity, into the law.
31 In Woolwich Building Society v. IRC (No. 2) [1992] 3 All E.R. 737, Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson states:
Although as yet there is in English law no general rule giving the plaintiff a right of 
recovery from a defendant who has been unjustly enriched at the plaintiffs expense, 
the concept of unjust enrichment lies at the heart of all individual instances in which 
the law does give a right of recovery.
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legal touchstone whereby to test" 32 specific causes of action in Restitution. The 
principle is converted into an operational analytical tool by reference to stages 
of inquiry, or questions to be asked, in resolving problems in Restitution. Birks, 
for example, considers that the principle allows us to identify the "instantly 
recognisable phases" of inquiry that provide for the stable analysis of 
Restitution problems.33 According to Birks, these are:
Was the defendant enriched? if so, Was he enriched at the plaintiff's 
expense? if so, Was there any factor calling for restitution? if so, Was 
there any reason why restitution should none the less be withheld?34
Unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of Restitution is used to 
rationalise past decisions, solve future problems and shape liability rules.35 
Generally linked with such theoretical constructs is the fact that many 
proponents of unjust enrichment as underlying principle give it an exclusive role 
within Restitution.36 Burrows, for example, perceives that the "principle of 
unjust enrichment provides the only rational explanation for a large body of 
law ." 37 Other commentators similarly emphasise that principle's "unifying" 
qualities, or claim it to be the basis of Restitution 38 Any suggestions that other 
principles may be at work in this area of law, or that they are even relevant, are 
often perfunctorily dismissed.39 At the very least, the principle is perceived as
32 Morgan v. Ashcroft 11938] 1 K.B. 49, 75, per Scott L.J.
33 Similarly, unjust enrichment is said to provide the "shared analytical scheme which 
the subject lacks": Birks, 19.
34 Birks, 7.
35 On such constructs, unjust enrichment might even be used as a basis for "fixing" 
defects in our existing liability rules.
36 Hedley, supra n. 11, 57.
37 Burrows, supra n. 25, 233 (emphasis added). Cf. Peel (Regional Municipality) v. 
Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 151: "The concept of restitution for unjust enrichment in the 
common law world has evolved ... toward a body of law unified by a single set of coherent 
rules applicable in all cases."
38 Birks, supra n. 27, 473. See also Birks, 17. Hedley, supra n. 11, 147, states: "Birks is 
claiming a special status for his framework, saying that it is not a classification but in some 
sense the classification. Other classifications threaten this thesis by their very existence" 
(emphasis in original).
39 See, for example, Birks' dismissal of the view that Restitution may extends beyond 
unjust enrichment, in Restitution—The Future, 101. See also Birks, supra n. 25, where he stresses 
the illogicality of any contrary view. According to Birks, as a matter of definition the subject of 
Restitution consists only of those doctrines concerned with the reversal of enrichment. This is 
hardly helpful, however, if the doctrines claimed to be principally concerned with the reversal of
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paramount, utilised to explain the bulk of Restitution, if not all of it.40 In short, 
on most views of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of Restitution, 
that principle both provides a means of analysis and is exclusive. It need only 
be noted at this stage41 that, given that so much is asked of unjust enrichment 
on such theories, one justifiably can expect that the suggested analytical tools or 
"phases of inquiry" are capable of reasonably certain application.
One traditional criticism of unjust enrichment has pointed to the 
uncertainty of that concept, which it is claimed appeals to "an unknowable 
justice in the sky."42 This criticism will be considered in Chapter 3, but for now 
it suffices to say that this criticism is less cogent where unjust enrichment is 
seen as the underlying principle of Restitution, as opposed to where it is seen as 
a cause of action 43 This is because the "unjust" part of the principle is said "to 
identify in a general way those factors which, according to the cases 
themselves, call for an enrichment to be undone."44 Or, as Seavey and Scott 
have stated, "[i]t requires an extensive set of individual rules to spell out what 
is meant by 'unjust'".45 Accordingly, "unjust" can be viewed simply as a 
shorthand description of the specific legal rules and doctrines which must be 
referred to in order to determine questions of liability.46 "Unjust", therefore, in
unjust enrichments, and thus within Restitution, are not in fact so concerned. The mere fact that 
a remedial response in a given case is restitutionary does not mean that the purpose of the 
liability rule giving rise to that response is the reversal of enrichments. See Chapter 4. For views 
similar to those of Birks, see Burrows, 1-6.
4^ Beatson uses the language and formula of unjust enrichment to describe and 
explain much of the law of Restitution, but concedes that some topics claimed may not satisfy 
the concept of "enrichment" and must be explained by resort to other ideas. Nonetheless, he 
appears to consider such other topics to fall within the law of Restitution. See, in particular, 
Chp. 2 of The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment.
41 The point is made in Chapters 3 and 4.
42 Birks, 19.
43 Sutton, supra n. 10,194-7.
44 Birks, 19. See also Birks, supra n. 27, 475.
45 Seavey & Scott, supra n. 25, 36. This also appears to be the view of those who 
perceive that the principle should be more accurately described as "unjustifiable enrichment", 
the emphasis thus being shifted from questions of "justice" to ones of legal justification. See 
Angus, W.H., "Restitution in Canada Since the Deglman Case" (1964) 42 Can. B. Rev. 528, 530.
46 Such a "descriptive" function of "unjust" is only possible where unjust enrichment 
is seen as a principle underlying more specific rules which determine liability. If, instead, 
unjust enrichment is said to be a cause of action, then "unjust" will of necessity have a far more
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the words of Birks, "does not look up to an abstract notion of justice" .47 As will 
be seen, this is perhaps the most significant contrast with conceptions of unjust 
enrichment as a cause of action.
§ 2.2.1.3 Unjust enrichment as a "cause of action"
Seemingly48 far wider claims are made for unjust enrichment when it is 
said to constitute a "single action" 49 giving rise to a prima facie case of liability 
once the constituent elements of that cause of action have been satisfied.50 
There has been significant academic support for such a view of unjust 
enrichment, in Canada at least.51 As for judicial recognition, although there is
significant role—see § 2.2.1.3, and Chapter 3. Contrast Smith, L.D., "The Province of the Law of 
Restitution" (1992) 71 Can. B. Rev. 672, however, who considers unjust enrichment to be a cause 
of action, but nevertheless views "unjust" in the same light as Birks. Given the diversity of the 
specific doctrines that "unjust" then refers to, each doctrine satisfied by reference to its own 
specific elements, it is difficult to see how they can all be considered to be part of one generic 
cause of action.
47 Birks, 99. See also Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, 33, per Lord 
Goff. If this view is accepted, however, then the statement that unjust enrichments are 
reversible or remediable "is a truism, rather than a truth." For if "unjust" merely refers to those 
specific rules which determine whether an enrichment is remediable, then the statement 
becomes "remediable (according to law) enrichments are remediable": Abbott, E.V., "Keener on 
Quasi-Contracts" (1896) 10 Harv. L.R. 209, 221-3. This point will be considered in Chapter 3.
48 But see below.
49 Klippert, 42. This "cause of action" will be subject to any available defences.
50 Ibid, 37-8.
51 Litman, supra n. 6, 408 considers that the Supreme Court decision of Pettkus v. 
Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, amounts to a recognition of a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment. See also Klippert, 37-8, where he suggests the necessary elements of the cause of 
action, though his formulation has not gained widespread acceptance. Maddaugh & McCamus, 
27, tentatively at least, appear to support such a role for unjust enrichment: note, for example, 
their view that in Canadian jurisprudence, there has been a "recognition of a general right of 
restitution". But compare their conclusion that the issue "may not be a matter of great 
moment", infra n. 74. See also McCamus, J.D., "Restitution and the Supreme Court: The 
Continuing Progress of the Unjust Enrichment Principle" (1991) 2 S.C.L.Rev. (2d) 505, 509, who 
considers "[t]hat the notion that a generic cause of action has been recognised by the Court is, at 
the very least, a plausible one." Contrast Fridman, 15-9.
Outside Canada, support for unjust enrichment as a cause of action is muted. But see Coleman, 
supra n. 5, 17, who appears to advocate a general right of restitution. Coleman proceeds to 
identify the elements necessary and sufficient for establishing a claim, despite an earlier 
acceptance of the view (at 9) that "unjust enrichment" is an "abstract proposition of justice" and 
probably undefinable (citing Goff & Jones (2nd ed., 1986), 11). Goff and Jones in the past seem 
to have advocated such an approach in English law but no longer do so. See supra n. 7.
61
still debate in some Canadian circles,52 it is probably fair to conclude that the 
law in that country now recognises a "full fledged cause of action" of unjust 
enrichment.53 In fact, it has been emphasised that the developments in unjust 
enrichment thinking and the challenges such developments pose have been 
fuelled not so much by academic analysis and reorganisation, but by an active 
Canadian Supreme Court.54 Thus, Dickson }. (as he then was), in his seminal 
judgment in Pettkus v. Becker,55 considered that there were three necessary 
requirements or elements of "unjust enrichment" which needed to be satisfied 
in order to establish liability: "an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and 
the absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment."56
There can be little doubt that the influence of unjust enrichment is being 
felt throughout the Canadian legal system and in different ways. Courts are 
granting relief on facts which previously would not have fallen within 
traditional heads of recovery;57 the constructive trust, said to remedy unjust
52 See discussion of this question in Maddaugh & McCamus 21-7. Cf. Fridman, 15-9.
53 Litman, supra n. 6, 408. See also Klippert, Chp. 2, and Fridman, G.H.L., 'The Nature 
and Scope of Restitution: Past, Present and Future", Unpublished Paper, at 16, who states:
While there is some uncertainty in Canada as to whether unjust enrichment is a cause 
of action or a general principle, it seems to me that the way Canadian courts have been 
utilising the notion of unjust enrichment as set out by Chief Justice Dickson in the 
Pettkus case indicates their assumption that it is a cause of action in appropriate 
circumstances.
The issue seems to have been put beyond doubt by Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 
98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, see particularly at 154. This is especially so when one considers the very 
general analysis now utilised by the Canadian courts. See, for example, the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, particularly at 6. See also 
the comments of La Forest J. in White v. Central Trust Co. (1984) 7 D.L.R. (4th) 236, 246-7. Not all 
Canadian cases, however, have abandoned the language of quasi-contract and implied contract. 
See, e.g., Building Design 2 Ltd v. Wascana Rehabilitation Centre [1992] 6 W.W.R. 343.
54 McCamus, supra n. 51, 507, emphasises the unusual extent to which the Supreme 
Court has been involved in this process of "mapping out the contents of this new legal subject."
55 (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
56 Ibid, 274. See also Sorochan v. Sorochan [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38,44, per Dickson C.J.C.
57 See, e.g., White v. Central Trust Co. (1984) 7 D.L.R. (4th) 236, and Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 21-7, 478-9. See also Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 
and McCamus, supra n. 51, 506-9. But such developments may also be a possibility where 
unjust enrichment is given a less significant role. For example, in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 
69 A.L.R. 577, 604, Deane J. (with whom Mason C.J. and Wilson J. agreed) considered that
the concept of unjust enrichment... constitutes a unifying legal concept which explains 
why the law recognises in a variety of distinct categories of case, an obligation on the 
part of the defendant to make fair and just restitution for a benefit derived at the
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enrichment, is being utilised to shape legal rights;58 and increasingly, the 
language of unjust enrichment appears as a shorthand justification for a wide 
array of conclusions which previously would have been reached within the 
narrow and self-limiting confines of specific claims in quasi-contract or 
equity.59 It has even been stated that the categories of Restitution "are never 
closed" .60 Outside of Canada, however, developments have not been as 
dramatic, and a view of unjust enrichment as a general cause of action has been 
judicially disavowed .61 Nonetheless, some commentators advocate the 
recognition of a cause of action as a next necessary step in the development of 
the law of Restitution 62
As was already noted, in one regard unjust enrichment as a cause of 
action is significantly different to unjust enrichment as the underlying principle 
of Restitution. For "unjust", on the cause of action approach, does not appear to 
function as a shorthand description referring back to the specific rules and 
doctrines of Restitution.63 Instead, "a general right to restitution" 64 will arise 
whenever the elements of the cause of action have been satisfied (and Dickson 
C.J.C/s formulation has become standard in Canadian courts) and this may 
enable courts to grant a remedy whether or not the situation is covered by any
expense of a plaintiff and which assists in the determination, by the ordinary processes
of legal reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, recognise such an
obligation in a new or developing category of case.
58 See, e.g., Razvlukv. Rawluk (1990) 65 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
59 See Smith, supra n. 46, 678.
60 James More & Sons Ltd v University of Ottawa (1974) 49 D.L.R. (3d) 666, per Morden J.
61 See e.g., David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 75-6, and 
see § 2.2.2. Cf. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10. According to one proponent of 
that concept, the judicial acceptance of unjust enrichment as a cause of action giving rise to a 
generalised right to restitution “must be a long way away": Lord Goff of Chieveley, “The 
Future of the Law of Restitution“ (1989) 12 Syd. L.R. 1, 4. See, however, Gummow, W.M.C., 
“Unjust Enrichment, Restitution and Proprietary Remedies" in Finn, 49, who considers that 
statements of Goff J. (as he then was) in B.P. Exploration v. Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 839, 
are "consistent with the proposition that there is a cause of action to deprive a defendant of 
'unjust enrichment/" But this interpretation would appear inconsistent with recent 
pronouncements on the issue by the House of Lords.
62 See supra n. 51.
63 Cf. Sutton, supra n. 10; Hedley supra n. 11. But note Smith, supra n. 46.
64 Maddaugh & McCamus, 27.
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previous authority or perhaps even existing rule or doctrine.65 In fact, the 
status of such a cause of action has been compared to that of a negligence action 
in tort.66 Viewing unjust enrichment as a cause of action assumes the 
explanatory value of unjust enrichment—indeed, subsumes all "weaker" claims 
made for unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment must have explanatory value 
and be exclusive to justify a generic cause of action within which liability is 
determined by resort to the highly generalised elements of the cause of action, 
rather than by the very particular liability rules to which "unjust" refers when 
part of the underlying principle of Restitution. Consequently, apart from the 
"extremely broad" nature of this approach (a point conceded and extolled by 
its proponents),67 it does also inevitably place a far greater burden, perhaps 
even a decisive burden, upon the idea of "unjustness" and would appear to free 
that concept from the "vital constraint" that it must conform to the case law.68 
With such a burden on "unjust", moreover, there is the concomitant danger of 
the uncertainty already alluded to above, namely, that the concept of unjust 
enrichment becomes no more than an appeal to abstract and individual notions 
of justice.69 This matter will be discussed further in Chapter 3, but this 
difference, important though it may be, should not obscure the significant 
common feature shared by the two conceptions of unjust enrichment as 
underlying principle and cause of action.
At first blush, unjust enrichment as a cause of action appears to suggest 
few limitations, representing a break with the fetters of the historical 
development of doctrine.70 Although whereas unjust enrichment as the
65 Cf. Hedley, supra n. 11, 65, who interprets Coleman's views, supra n. 5, similarly. 
See also comments of Deane J. cited supra n. 51.
66 Klippert, 43.
67 Cf. Litman, supra n. 6, 425-6, discussing the concept of "enrichment".
68 Cf. Hedley, supra n. 11, 65-6. Cf. Sutton, supra n. 10,194. Maddaugh & McCamus, 
23, point out that one argument in support of a principle of unjust enrichment, as opposed to a 
cause of action, derives from the "abstract and generalised nature" of unjust enrichment.
69 And Birks, supra n. 27, 474, fn. 9, has said of the Canadians that on occasions they 
apply unjust enrichment "too impressionistically".
70 Such a break with history is one against which the courts, and others, have warned. 
Cf. Holt v. Markham [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513, per Scrutton L.J.; Holdsworth, W.S., "Unjustifiable 
Enrichment" (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 37, 52.
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underlying principle of Restitution suggests a more conservative approach,71 
irrespective of whether labelled one or the other, unjust enrichment is said by 
most advocates of either approach to provide the framework for the analysis of 
Restitution.72 Depending on the approach, unjust enrichment provides either a 
framework for the analysis of specific and distinct causes of action, which can 
all be explained in the same way, or alternatively, it provides a framework for 
analysis in terms of the elements of one cause of action, of which specific 
liability rules are individual instances. In either case, unjust enrichment is 
called upon to explain past decisions and to provide the formula for analysing 
future problems. And some theorists seek to impose their analytical formulae 
with particular rigour.73 Closely linked with the explanatory and analytical role 
assigned to unjust enrichment is the exclusive province claimed for that 
concept. It is either implicit in much of the writing on unjust enrichment or else 
expressly stated that unjust enrichment is the only relevant concept within 
Restitution. Hence, unjust enrichment becomes the only explanation and means 
of analysis of the liability rules in Restitution.74
71 The emphasis on this approach being on the rationalisation of various extant 
doctrines and rules in terms of one overarching explanatory principle.
72 Compare, for example, the approaches of Birks and Burrows, on the one hand, with 
Smith, supra n. 46, and Litman, supra n. 6, on the other.
73 For example, it is interesting to note that Birks, who argues for unjust enrichment as 
a principle, advocates what is perhaps one of the most rigorous theoretical approaches for the 
determination of all Restitution problems. Indeed, as legal analysis generally appears to be 
moving toward more flexible approaches, Birks' analysis begins to look decidedly formulistic.
74 See § 2.2.1.2. Consequently, Maddaugh & McCamus, 21-7, after a consideration of 
the status of unjust enrichment in Canada, may well be justified in concluding that whether one 
describes the Canadian position "as the 'acceptance of a general principle', [or] the 'recognition 
of a general cause of action'... may not be a matter of great moment." At 22 they state:
[T]he unjust enrichment principle provides a theoretical foundation for the pre-existing 
law of quasi-contract and constructive trust and, further, that it provides a source of 
guidance for the adjustment and improvement of that doctrine through the recognition 
of new causes of action at a particularized level. Against this background, it may be 
asked whether there is any practical consequence to taking what appears to be the 
further step of embracing the notion that unjust enrichment has become recognized as 
an independent cause of action. In these circumstances, it may be that recognition of 
unjust enrichment as a cause of action represents little more than a shift in the style of 
writing, rather than in the manner of deciding restitution cases.
Similarly, Kos, S., & Watts, P., Unjust Enrichment—A New Cause of Action N.Z. Law Society, 
Seminar Series, 1990, at 26, see "little significant practical difference" between these two 
approaches. Hedley, 65, sums up these views when he states that unjust enrichment supporters 
would not appear to perceive the acceptance of a cause of action of unjust enrichment to be a 
"major innovation". Hedley disagrees with such conclusions, because of the greater emphasis 
placed on "unjust" in the latter case. This is a significant difference which will be considered in
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This common feature distinguishes this end of the spectrum of views 
from those views within which unjust enrichment is but one informing idea 
amongst others. This represents a significant divide between those who seek to 
impose an exclusive analytical framework for all of Restitution and those who 
perceive other explanatory principles to be relevant. But any unjust enrichment 
theory formulated to be an exclusive means of analysis must be shown to be 
more than just of some explanatory value in Restitution. The formulation of the 
theory must be shown to provide a workable means of analysis of the law. 
Further, such theory must have sufficiently wide an application as to justify the 
generalisation to the point of that theory being treated as an exclusive analytical 
concept. These are, it is suggested, demanding challenges. In one regard then, it 
seems unimportant whether we label such an exclusive, analytical concept a 
cause of action or a principle. Rather, what is important is whether unjust 
enrichment can in fact perform such an exclusive analytical function in 
Restitution.
If unjust enrichment cannot adequately perform an exclusive analytical 
function, and it will be argued that it cannot, then we need to resort to other 
principles. If, however, unjust enrichment theory does meet this challenges, the 
further issue remains of whether a move toward a generalised right to 
restitution arising from a single cause of action in unjust enrichment is a natural 
and justifiable progression in the development of the law. Until unjust 
enrichment can prove its value as an exclusive means of analysis, it is 
suggested that such a development will not be forthcoming, at least in 
Australian law.
§ 2.2.2 The Status of Unjust Enrichment in Australia
The above consideration of the different conceptions of the role of unjust 
enrichment within Restitution has failed to address the status of that concept in 
Australian law. Clearly, the High Court of Australia has rejected resort to 
unjust enrichment as a cause of action.75 However, the High Court has utilised 
the terminology of unjust enrichment and it is unclear whether unjust 
enrichment is perceived to be but one informing idea or the underlying
Chapter 3. But in this writer's view, there is also much overlap in the theoretical burden of the 
two approaches.
75 See David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 75-6. Cf. 
Butler, P., "Viewing Restitution at the Level of a Secondary Remedial Obligation" (1990) 16 
Univ. Q.L.J. 27, 34.
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principle of Restitution. More particularly, it is unclear whether the High Court 
perceives unjust enrichment to be an explanatory concept which provides the 
means for analysing problems in Restitution and shaping the formulation of 
liability rules. The language of the High Court is ambiguous and open to 
differing interpretation.
There are a number of statements of the High Court of Australia which 
recognise unjust enrichment describing it, for example, as an "informative 
generic label" 76 or "unifying legal concept" .77 Some commentators have 
interpreted such statements as supporting a view of unjust enrichment as the 
underlying principle of Restitution.78 Certainly, some of these statements— 
though ambiguous—are open to such an interpretation and some Justices of the 
High Court have shown particular enthusiasm for unjust enrichment.79 But the 
real issue is whether the High Court is utilising unjust enrichment as an 
exclusive means of analysis in Restitution. It would seem that the High Court 
has not taken such a step. Support for such a conclusion may be found in the 
very generality of the statements of the Court; no attempts have been made in 
the cases cited, for example, to apply the "recognisable phases of inquiry" 80 
that, say, Birks suggests. Instead, the High Court has reached its decisions by 
resort to the detailed and very specific doctrinal learning of the particular 
causes of action.81 And in David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank, the 
majority expressly rejected the view
76 Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 160 C.L.R. 583,617.
77 Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 604, cited supra n. 57. See also David 
Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 73, 75. For other references, see 
ANZ v. \Mestpac (1988) 78 A.L.R. 157, 161-2; Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 87 
per Toohey J.
78 Commentators who appear to interpret these statements in such a way include 
Beatson, 2 (see also Beatson, J., "Unjust Enrichment in the High Court of Australia" (1988) 104 
L.Q.R. 13); Mason, K.,: "Restitution in Australian Law" in Finn, 20; and Jones, G., "The 
Topography of the Law of Restitution" in Finn, 12-3.
79 See, e.g., Deane and Dawson JJ. in Baltic Shipping v. Dillon (1993) 111 A.L.R. 289, 313, 
where their Honours make references to the plaintiff's "action in unjust enrichment" and to the 
"law of unjust enrichment".
80 Birks, 7.
81 See, e.g., Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, but contrast the approach of 
Gaudron J. in Stern v. McArthur (1988) 81 A.L.R. 463. In the former case, the use of the language 
of unjust enrichment appears to be no more than a conclusion which further justifies the 
Court's decision, rather than a necessary step in reaching that conclusion.
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that in Australian law unjust enrichment is a definitive legal principle
according to its own terms and not just a concept.82
Certainly, it is safe to conclude that, unlike their Canadian counterparts, 
the High Court and Australian courts generally largely have shown a 
restrained attitude toward unjust enrichment.83 At present, that concept's 
influence is far from pervasive. We are perhaps at a pivotal point in the 
development of the law of Restitution in Australia. As yet, unjust enrichment is 
not dictating solutions, by imposing the means of analysis of Restitution 
problems. In the writer's view, moves in such a direction should be resisted. 
The generalisation of unjust enrichment, it will be argued, is of limited value in 
explaining past decisions and as such, should not be utilised to analyse and 
solve future problems. Many of the liability rules in Restitution, it will be seen, 
are not principally concerned with the reversal of enrichment.
This chapter commenced with the warnings of others against "general 
forms of statement", against stressing uniformity whilst ignoring differences.84 
Yet despite such warnings in the past, the appeal of a concept of unjust 
enrichment has led, increasingly, to theories which seek to monopolise the 
diverse and very complex law of Restitution. As will be seen, varied factual 
circumstances, such as those encountered when considering remedial relief for 
a co-surety claiming contribution,85 or a necessitous intervener,86 or a mistaken 
improver of another's land,87 raise complex and sophisticated issues, seemingly 
peculiar to the type of factual context within which the liability rules operate. Is 
it likely that a single generalisation can explain and, further still, provide us 
with the means of analysing all such cases? In this writer's view, the answer to 
this question must be no. But in their attempt to shape a coherent law of 
Restitution, unjust enrichment theorists have chosen to treat very different
82 (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 75.
83 See, e.g., Service Station Association Lim ited v. Berg Bennett & Associates P ty  Limited  
(1993) 45 F.C.R. 84, 97, per Gummow J.
84 See supra, text to nn. 1 & 2.
85 See Chapter 7.
86 See Chapter 8.
87 See Chapter 9.
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cases identically.88 This may well prove to have deleterious consequences for, 
as will be argued in this thesis, the explanatory value of unjust enrichment may 
prove to be limited. What is more, even i f  unjust enrichment proved to be a 
particularly useful principle, it ought not be allowed to exclude other 
significant principles where they offer an at-least-equally useful explanation of 
parts of the law of Restitution.
In the following two chapters, we will consider current theories which 
attempt to give substance to unjust enrichment and utilise it as an analytical 
tool. The value of such theories will be tested by reference to the numerous and 
diverse cases applying liability rules and doctrines now claimed to be unjust 
enrichment-based.89 Many of these cases involve claims for the recovery of 
money paid by a plaintiff to a defendant, but there will be a greater focus on 
non-money cases, that is, where a plaintiff seeks recovery for "services" 
rendered (which "services" will be defined below). The reason for this 
emphasis is that the greatest test for any enrichment-based analysis arises in 
such service cases. Of course, money cases will not be ignored. Indeed, it will 
be argued that no distinction in principle should be drawn purely on the basis 
of whether a plaintiff expended money or provided services.
88 Cf. Childres, R., & Garamella, J., "The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest 
in Contract" (1969) 64 N.W.L.Rev. 433,436.
89 Perhaps such an approach is justified for no other reason than that it will dispel any 
"illusion of certainty"' and therefore cast doubts on any generalisation which seeks to do too 
much, which is stated in absolute terms, or is sought to be used mechanically. See Gilmore, G., 
The Death of Contract (1974), 58, quoting I Corbin, Contracts (1963) §109:
[A] sufficient reason for comparative historical study of cases in great number is the 
fact that such study frees the teacher and the lawyer and the judge from the illusion of 
certainty; and from the delusion that law is absolute and eternal, that doctrines can be 
used mechanically, and that there are correct and unchangeable definitions.
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Chapter 3
THE MEANING OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT
Unjust enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is 
indefinable3
Many attempts have been made to define the concept of unjust enrichment, but 
the concept of unjust enrichment is essentially an "abstract proposition of 
justice", and, as such, it is probably indefinable1 2
§3.1 INTRODUCTION
Although unjust enrichment has been described as an "abstract 
proposition of justice", of itself, such an abstract nature may not preclude that 
concept having some explanatory value, much like other general principles or 
informing ideas (for example, "good faith", "unconscionability") can perform a 
valuable explanatory role in helping us to understand bodies of law, or at least 
their general burden. As has been noted by others, at the level of general 
principle one would not expect to find "precise 'common formula'" .3 Yet as has
1 Palmer, G.E., The Law of Restitution (4 Vols, 1978), Vol. I, 5.
2 Coleman, A., "The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in English Law" (1979) 10 
Cambrian L.R. 8, 9. Coleman's reference to an "abstract proposition of justice" is from Goff & 
Jones, (2nd ed., 1978), 11. See also Goff & Jones, 13.
3 Goff & Jones, 13, who refer to the "vagueness" of other general principles. At 14, they 
cite Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Herbert Smith (No. 2) [1969] 2 Ch. 276, 301, per Edmund Davies L.J., in 
support of the view that a principle "may defy definition and yet the presence in or absence 
from a situation of that which [it denotes] may be beyond doubt." As Goff and Jones point out: 
"The search for principle should not be confused with the definition of concepts." The authors 
proceed to provide "subordinate principles" which they suggest are the basis of analysis of 
Restitution problems, and include the existence of a benefit or enrichment as a precondition for 
imposing liability (at 16). The "subordinate principles" they identify are directly derived from 
the principle, indeed, appear to be little more than a fuller statement of the original principle. 
See further, § 3.2.1.
In a similar vein, it has been said that "concepts need not be determinate to be useful 
organising devices for thinking about a problem": Braucher, J., "Defining Unfairness: Empathy 
And Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission" (1980) 68 B.U.L.R. 349, 389. Wurzel, 
K.G., "Methods of Juridical Thinking" in Vol. IX of The Science of Legal Method (various authors,
already been seen, many perceive unjust enrichment to be more than just an 
informing idea or general principle. Further claims are made, both as to its 
utility as a means of analysis of liability rules, as well as to its exclusive or at 
least paramount status in the law, so that unjust enrichment becomes excluding 
of other formulations or means of analysis. More strongly still, claims are made 
that the generalisation is (or ought to become) a cause of action itself and as 
such determinative of liability in Restitution. But the more we ask of a concept, 
the more we are entitled to expect of it in terms of the clarity of its meaning and 
purport. Even presupposing that unjust enrichment as a general principle does 
have explanatory value, as one moves along the spectrum of viewing unjust 
enrichment, from the "weaker" to the "stronger" end, one would expect an 
increasing precision in the way the concept is utilised. This calls for a 
consideration of the content characteristically given to unjust enrichment.
§ 3.2 GIVING CONTENT TO UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 3.2.1 The "Component Parts" of Unjust Enrichment
The ideal of unjust enrichment, that no one "should be made richer 
through another's loss",* 4 is usually given content by reference to a number of 
"subordinate principles",5 "component parts"6 or "essential elements".7 On 
most formulations, the last of these component parts is the issue of available 
defences, but defences can be left to one side for now, as they are not relevant 
to establishing prima facie liability. Characteristically, this leaves three 
component parts, variously formulated in different theories, but the essence of 
which can be distilled as: (1) the existence of a "benefit"; (2) which benefit is
1917), 403-5, refers to terms which are left deliberately vague and uncertain as "safety-valve
concepts".
4 To take but one formulation: Pomponious, D igest 12.6.14; 59.17.206, quoted in 
Dawson, J.P., "Restitution Without Enrichment" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 563, 621. Cf. Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 31-6, who identify the principal underlying moral premise of unjust enrichment to 
be that "one ought not reap where one has not sown", but also identify a second rationale, "that 
a person shall not be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing."
5 Goff & Jones, 16.
6 Burrows, 7, who seeks to "strip" "the cause of action principle down into its 
component parts." These take the form of four questions to be answered.
7 Maddaugh & McCamus, 36.
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gained "at the plaintiffs expense"; and (3) the presence of some "unjust 
factors" justifying Restitution.8 As has been noted in Chapter 2, Birks, for 
example, describes the following "phases of inquiry":
Was the defendant enriched? if so, Was he enriched at the plaintiffs 
expense? if so, Was there any factor calling for restitution?9
In a similar vein are Burrows10 and Goff and Jones,* 11 but outside of 
Canada there has been only limited judicial adoption of such formulations.12 In 
Canada, the formulation often cited is that of Dickson C.J.C. as repeated in a 
number of cases, that in order to establish unjust enrichment,
the facts must display an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation and 
the absence of any juristic reason—such as contract or disposition of 
law—for the enrichment.13
Leaving aside the linguistic differences in these formulations, the 
essential feature of all of them is an enrichment or benefit (the terms are
8 Cf. Burrows, 7, fn. 17, who concedes the terminology of "unjust factors" is "inelegant, 
but saves repeating the long-winded formulation that the question at issue is whether the 
enrichment at the plaintiff's expense is unjust" (emphasis in original).
9 Birks, 7.
10 Burrows, 7.
11 Goff & Jones, 16.
12 See, e.g., B.P. Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v. Hunt (No. 2) [19791 1 W.L.R. 783, 839, per 
Goff J. (as he then was). Goff J. considered that, in relation to a claim under the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, a claim for restitution was founded on unjust enrichment, which 
presupposed the three component parts identified above. In the Court of Appeal, [1981] 1 
W.L.R. 232, 243, however, upholding the decision of Goff J., the Court nonetheless concluded 
that "[wje get no help from the use of words [unjust enrichment] which are not in the statute."
Although the "unifying legal concept" of unjust enrichment has been recognised in the High 
Court of Australia, the writer knows of no Australian decision which has utilised such a three- 
point formulation as the basis for analysing liability in Restitution. Note, however, Kirby P.'s 
consideration of unjust enrichment in Bryson v. Bryant (1992) 16 Farn. L.R. 112, 127-32. 
Specifically, at 131, he applies the Canadian formulation to the facts of the case as one possible 
analysis. Contrast Sheller J.A., at 144-5.
13 Rathwell v. Rathwell (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289, 306, per Dickson J. as he then was. See 
also his Honour's seminal judgment in Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, 273-4; and 
Sorochan v. Sorochan [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38; 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1. This is the formulation adopted by 
Maddaugh & McCamus. Contrast Klippert, 37-8.
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usually,14 and will be here, used interchangeably) in the defendant's hands, 
gained at the plaintiff's expense, which is for some reason unjust. Most 
commentators tend to focus separately on these commonly identified 
component parts of unjust enrichment.15 It is nevertheless conceded that these 
parts are "closely interrelated and cannot be analysed in complete isolation 
from each other."16 This needs to be stressed, for although much of the debate 
about the content of unjust enrichment proceeds on the basis of a separate 
treatment of the questions of "enrichment", "unjust" and "at the plaintiff's 
expense", with the emphasis on the first two, the issues are linked and cannot 
be treated entirely separately. Each component part may well have separate 
work to do, but that work must be related back to an overall concern with 
preventing unjust enrichment.
If the most prominent several parts of unjust enrichment are "unjust" 
and "enrichment", linking those parts is the intermediate requirement that the 
enrichment was gained at the expense of the plaintiff. Birks has argued that "at 
the expense of" has two quite distinct meanings: that the enrichment was 
obtained (1) by the defendant doing wrong to the plaintiff; or (2) by 
"subtraction from" the plaintiff.17 A defendant will be said to have gained an 
enrichment by "wrongdoing" where, for example, he or she has received a 
benefit as a result of the commission of a tort, a breach of a fiduciary duty or a 
breach of contract. Birks has argued, and the view has gained widespread 
acceptance,18 that in such cases of "restitution for wrongs", unjust enrichment 
operates merely as a remedial or secondary concept. Hence, liability is 
established by rules which are in the particular province of the law of torts,
14 But contrast, e.g., Fridman, 30-36; Rinker, G.A., "Quasi-Contracts—Concept of 
Benefit" (1948) 46 Mich.L.Rev. 543, 543. See also Woodward, F.C., The Law of Quasi-Contracts 
(1913), §8.
15 E.g., Birks, 109, considers them "distinct issues".
16 Goff & Jones, 16.
17 Birks, 22-7, 40-4,132.
18 See, e.g., Burrows, 16-23; Garner, M., "The Role of Subjective Benefit in the Law of 
Unjust Enrichment" (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 42, 62; Smith, L.D., "The Province of the Law of 
Restitution" (1992) Can. B. Rev. 672; cf. Maddaugh & McCamus, 32-36, 44-45; and see § 1.3.2.1. 
Beatson, 25-6, generally accepts such a division, but does not accept that all cases of "restitution 
for wrongs" treated as such by Birks are instances of unjust enrichment performing merely a 
secondary or remedial role. See Beatson, Chp. 8. For a good summary by Birks of his own 
views, see Restitution—The Future, 1-2.
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fiduciary wrongs, contract, and so on .19 This wrongdoing gives rise to a 
restitu tionary  rem edial response .20 But as our concern is with unjust 
enrichment as a liability-establishing concept,21 it is not proposed to consider 
this aspect of "at the expense of".
The second aspect of "at the expense of", namely, that the enrichment 
was gained by subtraction from the plaintiff, or as the Canadians have 
formulated it, that the enrichment has resulted in a corresponding deprivation 
of the plaintiff, is said to explain liability rules in Restitution. This is the 
province claimed for an "autonomous unjust enrichment" ,22 in which that 
concept is utilised as an explanation of the causative events giving rise to 
liability.
Where an "enrichment" and an "unjust factor" can be established, the 
subtraction from the plaintiff will often readily be provable, for the 
"enrichment" will usually have passed directly from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.23 For our present purposes, then, the question of "at the expense of"
19 As Burrows, 23, points out, the reference to "wrongs" is not, therefore, an appeal to 
any individual conceptions of unacceptable behaviour, but merely a reference to conduct which 
amounts to a breach of an established legal duty. The profits derived as a result of such breach 
of duty may be recoverable, and such profits may not have been obtained from the plaintiff, but 
rather from a third party. Hence, it will not be necessary to show where such remedies are 
available (and they are not available for all "wrongs") that there has been any subtraction from 
the plaintiff; that is, the plaintiff need not have suffered any loss. Where, however, unjust 
enrichment is said to provide the primary source of liability, the plaintiff will need to show that 
the enrichment was gained by subtraction from him or her; that is, that the plaintiff has 
suffered a corresponding deprivation or loss. Therefore, where purely profit-based remedies 
are available, it is conceded by unjust enrichment theorists (with the exception of Beatson, 
noted supra n. 18) that unjust enrichment does not provide the explanation of the liability rule.
20 Burrows, 17. Other remedial responses, such as compensation for losses incurred, or 
the fulfilment of a plaintiff's expectations, may also be available.
21 See § 1.3.2.1
22 Burrows, 16. "Autonomous" highlights that no wrong need be shown in order to 
establish the claim.
23 Birks, 133, considers that "the question covered by the phrase 'at the plaintiff's 
expense' will almost always be uncontroversial" but concedes "one important area of 
difficulty", which Birks considers under the label of "interceptive subtraction". In some cases, 
according to Birks, a claim may be available against a defendant who has not received the 
"enrichment" directly from the plaintiff, but intercepted it en route from a third party. Birks 
considers that an autonomous unjust enrichment claim by subtraction from the plaintiff will 
then be available "[i]f the wealth in question would certainly have arrived in the plaintiff if it 
had not been intercepted". Cf. Goff & Jones, 35. Three-party transactions in which a defendant 
has received something from a third party which can be said to belong to the plaintiff will be 
considered in Chp. 9. See also Smith, L., "Three-Party Restitution: A Critique of Birks's Theory 
of Interceptive Subtraction" (1991) O.J.L.S. 481.
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is rarely a critical issue when considering the application of unjust enrichment 
theory to a particular case.24 For the most part it is proposed to concentrate on 
the issues of "unjust" and "enrichment".
§ 3.2.2 The Crux of Unjust Enrichment Theory: The Reversal of Unjust 
"Better" Outcomes
The crux of all unjust enrichment theory is that the liability rules which 
unjust enrichment is said to explain are concerned with reversing a defendant's 
unjust enrichment gained at the plaintiff's expense.25 Whatever "unjust" may 
mean, then, it can only operate once there has been an identifiable 
"enrichment", however that term is understood.26
The notion of "enrichment", as will be seen in Chapter 4, is the subject of 
much debate. There are a range of views as to what the term encompasses. At 
one extreme, one could take a strictly materialistic view of enrichment, 
whereby, say, only money, corporeal property or advantages realised in money 
are considered enriching. At the other extreme, one could take a largely 
metaphysical view, whereby enrichment might be said to constitute any 
advantage, "however fleeting or tenuous it might be."27 A range of 
intermediate views are possible.28
It will be argued in Chapter 4 that some reasonably precise conception of
In theory, there should also be a causal link between the "enrichment at the plaintiff's expense", 
and the "unjust factor", but the issue is rarely addressed. Cf. Burrows, 23-7.
24 In Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 24, Cory J. considered that in the context 
of contributions having been made by a party to a domestic relationship, "the conclusion that 
the plaintiff has suffered a corresponding deprivation is virtually automatic." Little attention is 
paid to the issue of "at the expense of" in much of the commentary. See, e.g., Arrowsmith, S., 
"Ineffective Transactions and Unjust Enrichment" (1989) 9 Legal Studies 121,133.
25 Cf., e.g., Goff & Jones, 12; Burrows, 1; Maddaugh & McCamus, 3, and Peel (Regional 
Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140,154.
26 An identifiable "enrichment" becomes a precondition for a claim in Restitution. See, 
e.g., Goff & Jones, 16. As the authors stated in their 3rd edition, (1986), 16: "In restitution it is 
not material that the plaintiff has suffered a loss if the defendant has gained no benefit."
27 According to Rinker, supra n. 14, 552, in order to establish a benefit "there must be 
some sort of advantage or gain, however fleeting or tenuous it might be."
28 In particular, objective tests, whereby the market or reasonable person are utilised 
to determine enrichment, can be contrasted with subjective tests, whereby the "benefit" must 
be of value to the particular defendant. Cf. Birks, 109. See further, Chapter 4.
76
benefit is required for unjust enrichment as a whole to be a workable analytical 
concept.29 But even if one accepts an imprecise approach to enrichment (a 
"fleeting or tenuous" advantage sufficing), such an approach nevertheless 
shares with the more "rigorous" conceptions of benefit adopted by most 
theorists an ultimate focus upon some '"better" outcome which is sought to be 
reversed. There must be some discernible change in the defendant's position 
when compared with his or her position immediately before a particular 
transaction or course of events. In other words, the defendant must be "better 
off" as measured against some identified standard and relative to a prior state 
of affairs.30 If unjust enrichment is to have any explanatory force, the purpose 
of any liability rule on such an "outcome-orientated"31 approach must be to 
"undo" that outcome.32
Let us accept for now (the contrary will be argued in Chapter 4) that the 
liability rules of Restitution can be said to be explicable in terms of a purpose of 
undoing the beneficial change in a defendant's position, that is, the reversal of 
enrichment in the widest sense of the term. This raises for consideration the 
question of what it is about such an outcome that we do not consider to be 
acceptable. In which circumstances should the outcome be reversed? When, in 
short, can it be said to be "unjust"? In unjust enrichment theory, it is the term 
"unjust" which bears the burden of informing us as to when an enrichment 
should be reversed. Hence, we will consider attempts to give meaning to 
"unjust" in § 3.3.
Before we proceed to consider such attempts, however, it is worth
29 The various attempts made to give substance to enrichment will be considered.
30 The standard by which the "better" outcome is measured would constitute the test 
of enrichment. For example, we might measure the outcome of a transaction, say, a contractual 
transfer of goods, against some objective standard such as a market valuation in order to 
determine whether any party has been advantaged (or conversely, disadvantaged) by the 
transaction.
31 Getzler, J., "Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for 
Judicial Review" (1990) 16 Monash U.L.R. 283, 305.
32 One could argue that the full range of views as to what constitutes an enrichment 
could be incorporated into an unjust enrichment approach, with the form of an enrichment (or 
"better" outcome) being an important factor in the overall interaction of the "unjust" and 
"enrichment" components of unjust enrichment. It might be said that where there is a clearly 
discernible enrichment, such as a receipt of money, then perhaps the less outrageous need be 
the "unjustness" of it. Conversely, where no clear-cut benefit is identifiable, with a defendant 
receiving at most a "fleeting or tenuous" advantage, then the "unjust factor" may be far more 
crucial in establishing liability: perhaps some egregiously bad conduct on a defendant's part 
may be required.
77
briefly emphasising one possible danger of any outcome-orientated approach. 
There is a danger in that by focusing on an outcome, especially one that seems 
particularly outrageous or unfair, we may lose sight of the need to identify 
those factors which justify the outcome being reversed. Even where a 
defendant has received a large windfall,33 one still needs to determine whether 
the defendant is entitled to retain it or not. The mere existence of the windfall, 
or any advantage, does not of itself answer this question.34
There are a range of different reasons as to why in law an outcome ought 
to be reversed. For one, there may have been some procedural unfairness which 
produced the outcome. "Procedural unfairness" refers to the fact that the focus 
is upon some conduct on the part of a defendant which is considered 
unacceptable in law: some fraud, unfair dealing or sharp practice, for example, 
which attracts the operation of a particular doctrine. A seemingly "unfair" 
outcome, such as a particularly large windfall in one party's hands, might be 
evidence of some procedural unfairness, though such an outcome is not 
necessary in establishing such procedural unfairness. Alternatively, an outcome 
may be seen as "substantively unfair", that is, the outcome is perceived to 
result in some injustice "if relief were not granted, irrespective of the conduct of 
the parties."35 An outcome may be seen as substantively unfair because it is 
inconsistent with parties' particular allocation of risk, or because an outcome is 
contrary to a particular social policy36 or perhaps some statutory provision,
33 This term of itself suggests some judgment about how the gain was obtained. 
Certainly, it suggests that the gain was not earned.
34 Cf. Mason C.J. in Stern v. McArthur (1988) 81 A.L.R. 463, 471 (a case of relief against 
forfeiture, to be considered below): "The contest therefore concerns the question: who should 
have the benefit of the windfall increase in the value of the land." See also at 482-4, per 
Brennan J. Cf. also the Earl of Halsbury L.C. in Ruabon Steamship Company Ltd v. London 
Assurance [1900] A.C. 6, 12-13, who denied the existence of some general principle of justice 
"that a man ought not to get an advantage unless he pays for it." Similarly, see Lord 
Macnaghten, at 15.
35 Parkinson, P., "The Notion of Unconscionability" in Laws of Australia, Vol. 35, 35.5,
14-5.
36 As an historical aside, it is interesting to note that the expectant heir cases in equity 
provide one of the few examples in which the law has been prepared to scrutinise the value 
exchanged in a contractual transaction by reference to an objective test of adequate price. 
"[E]ven a minor discrepancy between the value exchanged" would lead to the cancellation of 
the transactions, even ones in which no procedural unfairness was evidenced: Dawson, J.P., 
"Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective" (1947) 45 Mich.L.R. 253, 271. See, for example, 
Bromley v. Smith (1859) 26 Beav. 644, cited by Dawson at 272. It is interesting to note that since 
such cases were concerned with substantive outcomes, that is, when an objectively determined 
benefit was gained, then the "unjustness" of the benefit was not established by reference to any 
moral notion of equality or justice. Instead, as Dawson points out, the doctrine aimed at the 
"narrow objective [of] the protection of the landed aristocracy against its own improvidence"
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and so on. But there must be a reason for a perceived substantive unfairness.
While focusing on outcomes, if the pejoratives "unjust7' or "unfair" are 
then applied, it may at times be forgotten that the underlying reasons (other 
than the mere existence of a substantial unequal outcome) for reversing such 
outcomes need still be articulated.37 The danger with outcomes-driven 
reasoning is that courts may explain liability rules by reference to nothing more 
than the need for the reversal of the outcome. Courts may construct 
"unjustness" or "unfairness" in idiosyncratic ways, without regard to the 
reasons in principle (if any) which justify their decision.
The point may be illustrated by the decision of the High Court in Stern v. 
McArthur 38 In that case, the majority39 was prepared to reverse the particular 
outcome (forfeiture of the purchasers' interest in land by the vendor, after 
repeated breaches by the purchasers of their obligation to make payments 
under an instalment contract),40 despite the apparent absence of any dishonest
(267.) "The motive was dear—to preserve for a dominant class the economic resources upon 
which its prestige and power depended" (268.)
37 See, however, the Contracts Review Act 1980 (N.S.W.), s. 9, under which relief may be 
granted if a contract is determined to be "unjust". The consequences arising from compliance 
with the contract (i.e., the outcome) may of themselves justify a contract being determined to be 
"unjust".
38 (1988) 81 A.L.R. 463.
39 Deane and Dawson JJ., in a joint judgment, and Gaudron J. The appeal against a 
N.S.W. Court of Appeal 2:1 decision was dismissed.
40 The McArthurs purchased land from the Sterns under a long term instalment 
contract. The purchasers took possession and built a home on the land. After several years 
occupation, the purchasers failed to pay their monthly instalments over a period of nearly one 
year, and fell into arrears. The purchasers then made attempts to pay outstanding instalments, 
but the vendors demanded (pursuant to the terms of the contract) the whole purchase price still 
owing. After another considerable delay, during which time the purchasers unsuccessfully 
sought to meet this demand, the vendors rescinded the contract. The vendors undertook to 
compensate the respondents for the value of any improvements to the land (see 81 A.L.R 463, at 
465), but as there had been a large increase in the unimproved value of the land, the purchasers 
nevertheless sought relief against forfeiture.
The vendors' undertaking to compensate for the improvements made prevented the High 
Court from drawing a comparison with an earlier decision, Legione v. Hateley, (1983) 152 C.L.R. 
404; 46 A.L.R. 1, in which the vendors of land had sought to appropriate the improvements 
made to the land by the purchasers, by relying on their right to forfeiture. In Legione this was 
the major factor leading to the Court's decision that the vendors' conduct was unconscionable. 
The Court indicated that such relief would only be give in exceptional circumstances (see also 
Ciavarella v. Balmer (1983) 48 A.L.R. 407), and that the basis for such relief was the 
unconscionability of the vendors' conduct.
79
or unfair conduct by the vendors before or after the purchasers' repeated 
breach of contract.41 A lthough the majority did utilise the language of
41 Seemingly, the only possible way in which the vendors' conduct can be described as 
unconscionable, thereby justifying relief against forfeiture on the basis of some procedural 
unfairness, is if the parties' understanding of the underlying purpose of the transaction was one 
which essentially equated the transaction with a mortgage. If this was indeed the parties' 
understanding of the transaction, then keeping any windfall after outstanding debts were paid 
would appear to be unconscionable conduct on the vendors' part. This was the approach of 
Deane and Dawson JJ. In their Honours' view, the parties' conduct was relevant to demonstrate 
how the transaction was regarded by the parties, (81 A.L.R. 463, 490) and in the case at hand, 
their Honours perceived that the transaction was
essentially an arrangement whereby the appellants [vendors] undertook to finance the 
respondents' purchase upon the security of the land. In other words, there was a close 
and obvious parallel between it and a purchase with aid of a mortgage (489).
Their Honours thus accepted an approach adopted in some United States jurisdictions, 
equating long term instalment contracts of this type with mortgage agreements (citing Jenkins v. 
Wise, 574 P. 2d 1337 (1978)). The respondents' attempt to terminate the contract and thus gain 
the windfall of the increase in value was therefore said to amount to unconscientious conduct.
Gaudron J., making up the majority, justified her finding in one sense, more narrowly and in 
another, more broadly. More narrowly, because her Honour rejected the view that all sales of 
land by instalment contract could be equated with a purchase with the aid of a mortgage. 
Gaudron J. considered that such an equation may be true of some instalment contracts, but not 
of all (498). The dissentients, Mason C.J. (468-9) and Brennan J. (482), rejected such an equation, 
so that it can be said to have been rejected by a majority of the judges. More broadly, because 
her Honour considered that the respondents' insistence upon their strict legal rights was 
unconscionable in the circumstances. Specifically, the loss of the appellants' home and their 
interest under the contract, as well as the considerable profit that would accrue to the 
respondents by reason of the sale of land, justified intervention (499). Since, however, all these 
factors related merely to the outcome of the vendors' exercise of their rights, and do not of 
themselves point to any unfairness in so doing, the outcome rather than any conduct leading 
up to that outcome appears to have driven the unconscionability finding.
The reasoning of Gaudron J. has been criticised. See, e.g., Mason, K., “Restitution in Australian 
Law" in Finn, 20. It has even been said that her Honour's approach reduces the “doctrine" of 
unjust enrichment to “the incoherent level of unstructured discretion": Bryan, M., “Book 
Review" of Finn, P.D., (ed.) Essays on Restitution (1990), in (1991) 18 M.U.L.R. 201,202.
The above suggests that, unless the interpretation of the parties' transaction adopted by Deane 
and Dawson JJ. is correct, the outstanding feature of Stern v. McArthur is the absence of any 
conduct on the vendors' part which could be described as unconscionable. The purchasers 
always had adequate time to meet their contractual obligations and this was one of the facts 
which led Mason C.J. and Brennan J., dissenting, to deny that relief against forfeiture was 
appropriate. Mason C.J. considered that a finding of “unconscionability" in the present 
circumstances would “drain unconscionability of any meaning" (472), given the absence of any 
conduct on the vendors' part that “caused or contributed to a situation in which it would be 
unconscionable ... to insist on the forfeiture of the purchaser's interest" (471). See also the 
judgment of Brennan J., who concluded that "[t]he so-called 'windfall' of the natural increment 
in land value properly belongs to the vendors" (484). Brennan J. added, however, that the 
vendors were “bound to compensate the purchasers for the value of the improvements made." 
This focuses sharply on the differences between the minority and majority. The minority were 
concerned to ensure that the purchasers did not suffer any loss (as measured against the status 
quo ante), but this formed the limit of their willingness to interfere. The majority, however, were 
concerned to ensure that the vendors did not acquire the windfall gain as a result of the 
transaction.
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"unconscionability" to describe the vendors' conduct,42 as one commentator 
has concluded, "it is difficult to envisage how the vendors could have 
'conscionably' exercised their right of termination and forfeiture, once the 
purchasers fell behind in their payments."43 Instead, the jurisdiction to grant 
relief appears to have been driven by a desire to remake a bargain which in the 
circumstances resulted in particularly harsh consequences for the purchasers.44 
In the view of one writer:
If the majority position is to be accepted, what ought be openly 
acknowledged is that in such circumstances the court is prepared to re­
make the parties' contract, because as events have turned out it leads to 
very unfair consequences. It is the bargain which is mended not the 
vendors' conduct which is unconscionable 45
If this interpretation of the majority's grounds for the decision are 
correct, then the majority judges, though perhaps warranted in their 
conclusion, did not clearly spell out the standard of "fairness" on which their 
conclusion was based .46 Were the consequences "unfair" because the 
purchasers had not expected such an outcome;47 or because of a general
42 Of the majority, Deane and Dawson JJ., in a joint judgment, considered that:
The general underlying notion is that which has long been identified as underlying 
much of equity's traditional jurisdiction to grant relief against unconscientious conduct, 
namely, that a person should not be permitted to use or insist upon his legal rights to 
take advantage of another's special vulnerability or misadventure for the unjust 
enrichment of himself... (488).
43 Nicholson, K., "Stern v. McArthur—The Jurisdiction to Relieve Against Forfeiture 
and Instalment Contracts" (1989-90) 2 J.C.L. 148,158.
44 If there had been no increase in value of the land (other than the improvements) it is 
unlikely, from the reasoning of the majority, that relief would have been granted.
43 Nicholson, supra n. 43,158.
46 Cf. Getzler, supra n. 31, 305, who has described the majority's view of 
unconscionable conduct as a "discretionary, outcome-orientated concept of unconscionable 
conduct". He earlier concluded:
The minority approach in Stern v. McArthur is perhaps more principled and coherent 
than that of the majority: it is difficult to see how a court of equity can rationally 
identify 'unconscionability' in an insistence on an unjust enrichment or outcome, 
entirely without reference to either the quality of the relational conduct of the parties or 
the intrinsic fairness of the legal rights which gave rise to such final outcome. The Stern 
v. McArthur majority gave no reasons as to why the enrichment accruing to the vendor 
was 'unjust', beyond asserting that it was 'reasonable' that purchaser and not vendor 
should win the benefit of the capital gain (footnote omitted).
47 The conclusion by the Court, that the reasonable expectations of the purchasers 
were that they would obtain the advantage of the increased value, does not really add much
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principle that any increase in the value of land should inure to a purchaser in 
possession? One can only speculate given the doubts which remain after 
considering the majority's reasoning.
None of the above need of course be seen as specifically an attack on 
unjust enrichment per se. Unjust enrichment theorists themselves emphasise 
that the existence of an enrichment gained by subtraction from another does 
not of itself justify relief. It must still be "unjust". But given that "unjust" can at 
times be no more than an appeal to individual notions of justice, the term may 
be used merely as a pejorative conclusion which avoids a need to identify the 
reasons for a decision. As will be seen, most unjust enrichment theorists reject 
such a use of the term "unjust", and yet "unjust" is asked to fulfil the important 
function of isolating the reasons as to why an enrichment is reversible. It 
remains to be considered then, whether "unjust" can successfully fulfil such a 
function.
§ 3.3 THE MEANING OF "UNJUST"
§ 3.3.1 The Rejection of "Unjust" as a Reference to Individual Notions 
of Justice
Although few would cavil with the view, encapsulated by Sir Anthony 
Mason and Gageler, that "[ujltimately, legal rules, whether based in statute or 
the common law, are justifiable only in terms of their justice and social 
utility" ,48 it is equally uncontroversial to conclude that rules or judgments 
which merely invoke such terms as "justice" do not necessarily guarantee a just 
result. In any case, appeals to notions such as "justice", it has been said, "are 
persuasion, not argument."49 In the context of unjust enrichment, one might
and may not even be accurate. Can a defaulting purchaser be said to have such an expectation? 
This might depend on whether the parties view the relationship from the outset as a mortgage. 
If so, then purchasers would expect to receive such gains, even where they foresaw the 
possibility of default. But if the parties did not view the transaction in this way, then any 
reasonable purchaser would know that if they defaulted, they could not expect to gain the 
benefit of any increase in value in the land.
48 The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason & Gageler, S.J., "The Contract" in Finn, P.D., (ed.) 
Essays on Contract (1987), 1, 30.
49 Ross, A., On Law and Justice (1958), 274:
To invoke justice is the same thing as banging on the table: an emotional expression 
which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate. That is no proper way to mutual
82
describe past decisions in which recovery was granted by concluding that in all 
such cases, the defendants' enrichments were unjust, but this, without more, 
does not explain those decisions, nor does it provide one with any guidance for 
approaching future cases.
It has of course been a "traditional criticism" of unjust enrichment50 that 
it is too vague51 or uncertain a notion to form the basis for the adjudication of 
legal rights 52 "Unjust", standing alone, would appear to be an arbitrary appeal 
to the "formless void of individual moral opinion."53 To decide cases merely on 
the unjustness or otherwise of the issue, it has been said, is to succumb to 
decision-making on the basis of "subjective judicial opinion as to where the 
merits lie."54 The very generality of the notion prevents such doubts being 
readily assuaged.55 As will be seen, such traditional criticism may still have
understanding. It is impossible to have a rational discussion with a man who mobilises 
'justice', because he says nothing that can be argued for or against. His words are 
persuasion, not argument.
50 Sutton, R., "Unjust Enrichment" (1981) 5 Otago L.R. 187,194.
51 Cf. Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127,140, per Hamilton L.J.:
Whatever may have been the case 146 years ago, we are not now free in the 20th 
century to administer that vague jurisprudence which is sometimes attractively styled 
'justice as between man and man.'
52 See, e.g., Holdsworth, W.S., "Unjustifiable Enrichment" (1939) 55 L.Q.R. 37, 51-3. At 
51, he states that
whatever theory is adopted, the law must adopt some technical rules to determine 
whether or not an action for unjustifiable enrichment will lie; ... if the result ... is to 
leave the matter wholly to the discretion of the judge, it means in effect that the law has 
thrown up the sponge, and has abandoned the attempt to produce any workable rules 
on this question.
See also Lord Sumner in Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398, and for an excellent summary of 
such views, see the judgment of Mahon J. in Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v. Haggie [1979] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 124, 144-55. For a recent case that appears to give weight to these criticisms, see the 
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Hill Estate v. Chevron [1993] 2 W.W.R. 545, 
discussed below.
53 Carley v. Farrelly [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 356, 367.
54 Avondale Printers & Stationers Ltd v. Haggie [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124,153, per Mahon J. 
At 149, his Honour considered that in some cases, unjust enrichment is being invoked "as a 
principle of fairness applicable by reference to the assumed merits of each individual case."
55 This generality, according to Birks, 18, gives rise to a "fear" of uncertainty. Cf. ibid,
152.
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considerable force in Canada, given the role assigned to "unjust" in that 
jurisdiction as an element of a cause of action.
Though its resonances are still being felt, for the most part, this historical 
debate is of little relevance in English or Australian law. There are two reasons 
for this. Firstly, there have been repeated and authoritative rejections by the 
highest judicial authorities of any attempt to utilise "unjust" merely as a 
justification for "judicial discretion to do whatever idiosyncratic notions of 
what is fair and just might dictate."56 As the High Court of Australia indicated 
in David Securities v. Commonwealth Bank:
[I]t is not legitimate to determine whether an enrichment is unjust by 
reference to some subjective evaluation of what is fair or unconscionable. 
Instead, recovery depends upon the existence of a qualifying or vitiating 
factor such as mistake, duress or illegality.57
Secondly, most theoretical writing rejects any discretionary approach based 
merely on vague notions of "fairness" and "justice" .58 It is generally accepted 
that if unjust enrichment as a whole is to have explanatory value, some 
clarification of the operation of "unjust" is necessary. The predominant view 
amongst English theorists perceives "unjust" as operating merely as a
56 Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 604, per Deane J.
57 (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 75, per Mason C.J., Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
See also Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 604 per Deane J. In the House of Lords, 
see Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, 33, per Lord Goff.
Cf. the view of Parkinson, supra n. 35, 35.5 at 7, in relation to "unconscionability":
However, a clear understanding of the term is necessary because, without it, the notion 
[unconscionability] can decline all too readily into a generalised justification for the 
courts doing whatever they deem to be fair. In Australian law, such an approach has 
clearly been rejected, (fns. omitted).
In a similar vein is The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason, (1989) 12 N.S.W.L.J. 1, 2.
58 See, e.g., Burrows, 1, 21; Goff & Jones, 15-6. Birks' views are considered below. 
Some Canadian theorists concur with this view (e.g., Fridman, 18-19; and see also Fridman, 
G.H.L., "The Reach of Restitution" (1991) 11 Legal Studies 304, 324-5), but other Canadian 
commentators are little troubled by charges of uncertainty arising from an appeal to individual 
notions of what is fair and just. One writer considers that "unjust" can "embrace any argument 
capable of persuading the judicial mind": Litman, M.M., "The Emergence of Unjust Enrichment 
as a Cause of Action and the Remedy of Constructive Trust" (1988) 26 Alb. L.R. 407, 434-5. 
Litman responds to the traditional criticism levelled against such discretionary decision­
making by referring to the subjectivity of all decision-making. It is hoped that this is not 
intended to suggest that there is no longer any need to give principled reasons for a decision, 
outlining the competing considerations to be taken into account and how such competitions are 
to be resolved. Contrast the comments of Sutton, supra n. 50.
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shorthand description which refers to the specific rules and doctrines found by 
reference to the case law and statute.59 It is those specific rules and doctrines 
which then determine the limits of liability.60 This view warrants a more 
detailed consideration.
Perhaps the most comprehensive, though by no means earliest,61 
articulation of a view of "unjust" as merely a descriptive label can be seen in 
the writing of Birks. Birks, noting the judiciary's "fear of uncertainty", and 
rejecting a subjective appeal to "abstract conceptions of justice", writes:
It should be obvious, therefore, that 'unjust' can never be made to draw 
on an unknowable justice in the sky....
In the phrase 'unjust enrichment' the word 'unjust' might, with a 
different throw of the dice, have been 'disapproved' or, more neutrally, 
'reversible'. Those words might have been better in being more 
obviously downward-looking to the cases. The essential point is that, 
whatever adjective was chosen to qualify 'enrichment', its role was only 
to identify in a general way those factors which, according to the cases 
themselves, called for an enrichment to be undone. No enrichment can 
be regarded as unjust, disapproved or reversible unless it happens in 
circumstances in which the law provides for restitution. The answer to 
the fear of uncertainty is not to reject the word but to deal firmly with 
any argument which attempts to detach it from the law.62
Birks summarises his views as follows:
'Unjust' ... is merely a general word expressing the common quality of 
those factors which, when present in conjunction with enrichment, have 
been held to call for restitution.63
Such a view has widespread support,64 and appears consistent with references
59 Birks, 99. See also Chapter 2 above.
60 As well as any limits imposed by the particular meanings of "enrichment" and "at 
the expense of" that are adopted.
61 See, e.g., Seavey & Scott, "Restitution" (1938) 54 L.Q.R. 29; Angus, W.H., 
"Restitution in Canada Since the Deglman Case" (1964) 42 Can. B. Rev. 528, particularly at 530; 
and Patterson, E.W., "Scope of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment" (1936) 1 Mo.L.Rev. 223, 228: 
"This is not to say that such a vague principle [as unjust enrichment] is a workable test of 
liability in a particular case, if unaided by precedent."
62 Birks, 19.
63 Birks, 99.
64 E.g., Burrows, 1-2, 21; and references cited supra n. 61. Cf. Fitzgerald, B., "Ultra 
Vires as an Unjust Factor in the Law of Unjust Enrichment" (1993) 2 G.L.R. 1,11-13. This view is 
usually closely associated with a view of unjust enrichment as the underlying principle of
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to unjust enrichment in the High Court of Australia and the House of Lords.65
But for one sweeping assumption, it is difficult to take issue with such 
views, as far as they go. It must be stressed, however, that Birks' approach 
really tells us very little. If "unjust" looks "down to the cases", it makes no 
claims to describing the content of our law of Restitution, but merely refers us 
to our sources of law. Indeed, the statement that "unjust enrichments are 
remediable" can be distilled down to a rather trite truism, that "remediable 
(according to law) enrichments are remediable".66 Birks appears to concede the 
point:
The generic conception [unjust enrichment] of the event which triggers 
restitution adds nothing to the existing law and effects no change except 
what comes from better understanding of what is there already.67
Nevertheless, Birks considers that unjust enrichment has useful work to 
do, particularly in providing a "shared and stable pattern of reasoning" for the 
law of Restitution.68 But if "unjust" merely refers us back to the very specific 
rules and doctrines giving rise to obligations in Restitution, such a formulation 
of "unjust" avoids, almost by sleight of hand, what is perhaps the most 
fundamental issue. The general explanatory principle is given content by 
reference to the liability rules it is said to explain. This circularity of reasoning 
assumes, though, that the liability rules are explicable on the basis of unjust 
enrichment. It assumes the purpose of the rules to be the reversal of 
enrichment. This assumption needs to be proved for such reasoning to be valid. 
It will be rejected in Chapter 4. If the liability rules identified by "unjust" have 
purposes other than the reversal of enrichment, "unjust" becomes a conclusion 
about something other than enrichment.
Even if the assumption is correct, however, and "unjust" performs the
Restitution. But contrast Smith, supra n. 18, who considers unjust enrichment as a cause of 
action, but appears to view "unjust" in the same light. Such a position would seem difficult to 
sustain, given that "unjust" would refer back to rules and doctrines which are very dissimilar, 
each having their own very specific formulations and elements.
65 See, respectively, D avid Securities P ty  Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 
and Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10.
66 Cf. Abbott, E.V., "Keener on Quasi-Contracts" (1896) 10 Harv. L.R. 209, 221-4.
67 Birks, 27.
68 Birks, 19-22.
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function of alerting us to the fact that the purpose of the specific liability rules is 
the reversal of enrichment, such a formulation still tends to suggest against an 
exclusive principle. For in looking down to the cases, other extrinsic principles 
may be seen to be relevant; principles perhaps of far greater explanatory value 
than the shorthand description, "unjust". Moreover, if this is so, one may 
question the need to resort to "unjust enrichment" in the first place.69
§ 3.3.2 The Canadian Approach to "Unjust"
In Canada, "unjust" is perceived to have a far more active role in the law 
of Restitution: it operates as more than just a reference to very particular rules 
and doctrines. This follows from the almost certain acceptance by the Canadian 
courts of unjust enrichment as constituting a single cause of action giving rise 
to a right to Restitution. "Unjust" becomes one element of a cause of action and 
one need only satisfy that element to establish prima facie liability to reverse an 
enrichment gained at the plaintiff's expense. "Unjust" is required to do its own 
work. The possibility of claims being decided on the basis of idiosyncratic 
notions of fairness becomes very real and the determination of the "unjustness" 
of an enrichment may not even be tempered by reference to existing doctrine or 
case precedent.70
As Sutton has pointed out, advocates of a general right of Restitution 
face a dilemma. If such concerns about the vagueness of "unjust" are not 
rebutted or addressed, one's worst fears are confirmed: the term "unjust" is 
merely a reference to personal moral opinion. If instead the response is to point 
to a set of rules applied in a predictable way, then the very generality of the 
original theory appears thus to have been refuted.71 Hence, if "unjust" is to 
operate as an element of an independent cause of action, it must be given 
content beyond mere references to the detail of particular doctrines, whilst at 
the same time avoiding charges of uncertainty, that is, of operating either at too 
high a level of abstraction or else as justifying decision-making on the basis of
69 Cf. Abbot, supra n. 66, 224-6. Contrast Learned Hand, "Restitution or Unjust 
Enrichment" (1898) 11 Harv. L.R. 249.
70 Hedley, S., "Unjust Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution—An Overworked 
Concept" (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56, 65-6, states that "if the terms 'unjust' and 'enrichment' are 
no longer tied to the cases, the charge that they are too vague to be of practical use really comes 
home to roost."
71 Sutton, supra n. 50,194-6. See also Hedley, ibid.
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idiosyncratic notions of justice.72 Can "unjust" be given content in a way which 
treads this middle path?
At first blush, a statement that an enrichment is unjust appears merely to 
be a statement of conclusion—it in no way identifies the intellectual processes 
which have been applied to reach such a conclusion. It thus raises far more 
questions than it answers. Which principles determine when an enrichment is 
unjust? Should recovery, for example, be granted because of factors relating to 
the conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff, both, or neither? "Unjust" sheds no 
light on these questions. Yet it is not unreasonable to demand of any legal 
system that its courts openly justify and explain their resolution of legal issues.
This is not to suggest that "unjust" in this context must be capable of 
precise definition. Many important legal concepts are incapable of definition, 
yet they perform an important function in the law.73 The point is often stressed 
by the courts.74 Not surprisingly, proponents of unjust enrichment often refer 
to the generality of other principles to rebut the traditional criticism of the 
uncertainty of unjust enrichment.75 Unjust enrichment has been equated, for
72 One way in which "unjust" could be given content is by applying a general theory 
of justice to the law of Restitution. Such a general theory would need to be clearly articulated 
before "unjust" could operate merely as a consideration of the "justice" of a particular claim. 
Cf. Fitzgerald, supra n. 64,11-3. The search for a theory of justice might be considered as part of 
the process of searching for, in the words of Sir Owen Dixon, "deeper, more ordered, more 
philosophical and perhaps more enduring conceptions of justice": Sir Owen Dixon, 
"Concerning Judicial Method" in Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (1965) 165. In this 
writer's view, it seems unlikely, however, that such a theory of justice can be found.
73 Indeed, some consider that definitions ought generally to be avoided. It has been 
said, for example, that to "attempt to devise precise definitions ... is an unnecessary and 
perhaps impossible task." See Cairns, H., "A Note on Legal Definition" (1936) 36 Col.L.Rev. 
1099, and the opinions cited therein. This is not just a modern sentiment. Roman jurists 
expressed similar concerns in the maxim "All definition in law is dangerous, for one can rarely 
be found that cannot be overthrown" (Omnis definitio in jure civili periculosa est, parum est enim ut 
subverti possit) (1099).
74 In National Westminster Bank Pic. v. Morgan [19851 1 A.C. 686, 709, Lord Scarman 
stated that "definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or 
is not unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the particular facts of the case." In 
the High Court of Australia, see Deane J.'s comments in relation to "unconscionability" in 
Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. at 441. Similarly, in relation to notions of 
"fairness", see O'Connor v. Hart [1983] N.Z.L.R. 280, 289. Extra-judicially, the Chief Justice of 
Australia has expressed no difficulty with such views. See the Honourable Sir Anthony Mason, 
"The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the Contemporary Common Law World: An 
Australian Perspective" in Waters, D.W.M., (ed.) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 1993, 20. In 
relation to "unconscionability", his Honour was of the opinion that it is "very much a matter of 
fact, degree and value judgment so that greater guidance will only come from an array of 
decisions on particular fact situations." See also 22-3.
75 See, e.g., Goff & Jones, 12-3; Litman, supra n. 58; and Davis, P.W., "Restitution:
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example, with concepts such as "unconscionability" .76 Perhaps one of the 
difficulties w ith such argum ents is that, w hereas concepts such as 
"unconscionability" operate for the most part within the strict confines of very 
specific doctrines,77 this may not be the case with "unjust". For if "unjust" is 
perceived as one element of a cause of action, then the only restriction on 
"unjust" is the need to show an enrichment at the plaintiffs expense.78 But
Concept and Terms" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 1167, 1175-6, for examples of rebuttals of this type. 
Analogies have been drawn with the law of negligence (see, e.g., Klippert, 36-7). Birks has 
persuasively argued, however, that such an analogy is unacceptable, as unjust enrichment 
stands on "too abstract a moral plane" to function in the same way as the neighbourhood 
principle in Donoghue v. Stevenson. See Birks, P., "Unjust Enrichment—A Reply to Mr. Hedley" 
(1985) 5 Legal Studies 67, 67-8. Sutton, supra n. 50,194 points out
that the answer most often given to the criticism [of uncertainty] is an affirmation of 
faith in the ability of judges to work things out, coupled with dark hints about other 
generalised doctrines which, in the view of the restitutionary theorist, are really no 
better. Our understanding of the issues is not, I am afraid, much enhanced by such 
debates.
76 See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 86-7, per Toohey J. Cf. Pasi 
v. Kamana [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603, 605, per Cooke P.
77 As Gummow J. in Winterton Constructions v. Hambro Aust. Ltd. (unreported, case no. 
6733 of 1990, Federal Court of Australia, N.S.W. District) at page 20, has indicated in rejecting 
the use of "unconscionable" to assert a "legal right to remedy injustice":
the meaning of the term "unconscionable" is, as Deane J. has reminded us in 
Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394, at 444, more accurately conveyed by 
the term "unconscientious" which indicates its roots in equitable doctrines.
For example, the doctrine of estoppel (accepting that there is a unified doctrine of estoppel: see 
Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394) may arise if it would be "unconscionable" for 
a defendant to insist upon his or her strict legal rights. Though unconscionability remains an 
open-textured notion, which seeks to test the standards of the defendant's conduct against 
some bench-mark, the notion only comes into play after the doctrine of estoppel has filtered out 
most fact situations by reference to the operative criteria of that doctrine. In other words, the 
question of whether someone has acted unconscionably does not roam at large. Randomly 
asking whether people have behaved "unconscionably" would be quite a meaningless exercise. 
Instead, such a question is asked only after certain specific requirements have been met. Taking 
estoppel, there must first have been the creation of an expectation by the conduct or 
representations of the defendant; and the plaintiff must reasonably have acted on the basis of 
this expectation to his or her detriment. Only then will the courts determine whether it would 
be unconscionable for the defendant to act in a manner contrary to that expectation by insisting 
on his or her legal rights.
78 The concept of enrichment may not in any case provide a clearly articulated limit to 
relief. Cf. Fridman, G.H.L., "The Nature and Scope of Restitution: Past, Present and Future" 
Unpublished Paper, at 14, who has said:
Since 'unjust' in the context of enrichment is itself a nebulous expression, it would 
appear undesirable to attempt to elucidate and explain it by reference to the equally 
vague concept of benefit.
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many ordinary day to day transactions can result in at least some "advantage" 
(to take the broadest possible view of enrichment) to a particular party, and it 
will usually also be possible to identify someone who has suffered a 
corresponding deprivation.79 Many transactions then, are potentially open to 
question, and subsequent reversal, if it can be said that they were "unjust".
In Canada, the element of "unjust" has been formulated in terms of an 
"absence of any juristic reason" for the enrichment.80 '"Unjust" is thus sought to 
be given content by defining it negatively, that is, by seeking to identify criteria 
which establish when an enrichment is not unjust. Such an approach is not 
exclusively the province of Canadian jurists and commentators—others outside 
that country have articulated similar views81—but it is an approach which does 
appear to have the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of Canada. Hence, the 
formulation "unjust" becomes "the absence of any juristic reason" for the 
enrichment, and attempts are then made to identify the types of circumstances 
which amount to a sufficient juristic reason for the enrichment.82
Maddaugh and McCamus well exemplify the Canadian approach. They 
argue that once the three elements of the claim have been established, a 
"presumptive case of unjust enrichment" is made out. Such a claim will fail, 
however, if a general limiting principle—the officious conferral of a benefit—is 
satisfied .83 Similarly, outside of Canada, Goff and Jones have in the past 
advocated a "generalised right to restitution" ,84 and identified the "six broad
79 For example, if a contract is seen as a good or bad bargain according to some 
objective standard, then it might be said that there was an "enrichment" and corresponding 
deprivation. This highlights a significant difference between "unconscionable" and "unjust". 
Whereas unconscionable conduct is the concern of equitable doctrines such as estoppel, "unjust" 
qualifies the concept of enrichment, which does not refer to conduct but to a particular 
outcome. Consequently, an "enrichment" presumably must be identifiable with some certainty. 
This may not, however, be the case, as will be seen in Chapter 4.
80 This appears to add little without further clarification. Birks, P., "Review" (1991) 70 
Can. B. Rev. 814, 819, says of the Canadian formulation that it is "unhelpful. For an already 
dangerous abstraction, 'unjust', it merely substitutes an unintelligible legal construction."
81 Goff and Jones appear to be amongst them. They identify six limits upon the 
operation of unjust enrichment which will determine that a benefit "has not been unjustly 
gained." See Goff & Jones, 44, et seq.
82 Cf. Rathwell v. Rathwell (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289, 306, per Dickson Jr, who 
considered "contract or disposition of law" as two examples of a juristic reason for an 
enrichment.
83 Maddaugh & McCamus, 46. See generally, 45-9.
84 See Goff & Jones, 15-6, 29 (3rd ed., 1986), although they acknowledge the English 
courts' hesitancy in taking such a step. In the fourth edition, calls for the recognition of such a
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classes" of limits which "should alone mark the boundaries of the law of 
restitution and the principle of unjust enrichment."85 They include in this list 
the officious conferral of benefits by the plaintiff.
§ 3.3.2.1 Criticisms of the Canadian approach
There are a number of criticisms which can be made of any approach to 
define "unjust" by reference to limiting criteria which establish when an 
enrichment is not unjust. First, the limiting principles that are invoked often 
appear as vague and unhelpful as "unjust" itself. To take the commonly cited 
limiting principle of "officiousness": the use of the term of itself does not spell 
out the underlying ideas at issue. For example, the label "officious" appears to 
have been used at times to describe risk-takers who perform services in the 
hope that they will be paid for. To be sure, the consequences of their failed 
gamble ought to be borne by such risk-takers and such claims have thus been 
rightly rejected. But if such policy concerns go unstated and are not self-evident 
from the use of the term "officious" itself,86 one begins to sense that 
"officiousness" becomes merely a mantra to be uttered whenever relief is to be 
denied.87 Similar criticisms can be made of other limiting principles invoked, 
such as that "public policy precludes restitution ."88 Public policy 
considerations may well be a feature of the law generally. Usually, however, 
such considerations operate in combination with specific rules, rather than 
merely as part of a determination of unjustness.89 Otherwise, "public policy"
generalised right have been dropped.
85 Ibid, 29 (emphasis in text). See at 30 for the six limits. Even though Goff and Jones 
no longer write in terms of a generalised right of restitution, they still consider that the six 
limits which they describe will determine the boundaries of liability. The six limits are derived  
from the "subordinate" principle that the enrichment must be unjust (44, 4th ed.). Litman, 
supra n. 58, cites these limiting principles and indicates that these will have to be expanded and 
refined, having earlier stated that "[i]n the process of fleshing out the concept of juristic 
justification, the existing law of restitution should not be forgotten" (436)!
86 See, for example, an early, and entirely unsatisfactory attempt to explain the 
meaning of this term, by Hope, E.W., "Officiousness" (1929) 15 Cornell L.Q. 25; 205.
87 See generally, Sutton, supra n. 50,194-5.
88 Goff & Jones, 62-8.
89 Dawson has pointed out that, whereas defining "unjust" negatively may be a 
workable approach in European systems where other quite stringent restrictions on imposing 
liability exist, there is much danger in adopting such an approach in the common law. As 
Dawson indicates, the common law has not sufficiently advanced to have addressed some of 
the issues European systems have developed doctrine to deal with: Dawson, U njust Enrichment
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would operate as the sole criteria for determining whether liability arises once 
an enrichment at a plaintiffs expense is identified.
A second criticism that can be made of negatively defining "unjust" is 
that by commencing legal analysis by reference to a prima facie "right to 
restitution", subject to any contrary limiting principles, there is a strong 
suggestion that the onus is upon a defendant to justify the retention of the 
enrichment.90 This may perhaps even lead to a reversal of the onus of proof 
generally in Restitution cases, which some commentators, at least, appear to 
support.91 Yet this would be an extraordinary development, contrary to the 
whole tenor of a common law which makes it clear that advantages per se do 
not have to be justified. For example, in Ruabon Steamship Co. Ltd v. London 
Assurance,92 the Earl of Halsbury L.C. could not
understand how it can be asserted that it is part of the common law that 
where one gets some advantage from the act of another, a right of 
contribution towards the expense from that act arises on behalf of the 
person who has done it.93
A reversal of onus of proof would seem particularly undesirable given
120-7. In German law, for example, recovery is only possible in cases of direct enrichment, and 
this is stringently enforced. This concept of "'directness" has its own detailed jurisprudence. 
Dawson gives one example, in which a plaintiff by contract with X agreed to loan money to X 
to pay off a mortgage on X's land in return for assignment of the mortgage. As a result of a 
mistake of a notary, the mortgage was not assigned, but recorded as discharged. The plaintiff 
brought an action against a second mortgagee, whose mortgage had been promoted through 
the recorded discharge. The court refused relief, though it did not deny the defendant's 
enrichment. It considered that, instead, the plaintiff's claim lay against X for the defendant's 
gain was a result of the third party contract which governed the parties. In Dawsons' view 
(123), in the United States, the decision would almost certainly have been otherwise.
90 See, e.g., Litman, supra 58, 436 and generally, 431-4, who considers that "[a]n 
enriched defendant should only be able to retain a benefit if there are cogent and persuasive 
reasons for so doing." Yet this reflects a remarkable captivation with enrichment. One may 
understand the visceral appeal of an argument for the disgorgement of an unjust enrichment, 
which label includes, as it does, a moral conclusion as to the appropriateness of retaining that 
benefit in the particular circumstances. But this is far removed from an assumption that all 
benefits must be justified. For this seems to assume that all benefits are prima facie unjust. 
Litman never justifies this quite startling conclusion and thus appears to take it as an a priori 
position.
91 See Litman, ibid. See also Klippert, 43.
92 [1900] A.C. 6.
93 Ibid, 10, Similarly, Lord Macnaghten stated that "there is no principle of law which 
requires that a person should contribute to an outlay merely because he has derived a benefit 
from it" (15).
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that a defendant in a Restitution case will often merely be an innocent recipient 
of money or some other advantage, and may yet be asked to justify why he or 
she should not become the insurer of the plaintiffs loss.94 If a defendant is 
required to justify a benefit whenever received, claims could succeed where an 
enrichment is not unjust, in the non-technical sense, but the defendant cannot 
point to any reason for the enrichment95 Unjustness and the "absence of juristic 
reason" are not coextensive ideas.96
For the above reasons, the notion of "absence of any juristic reason" does 
not give any meaningful content to "unjust". Instead, it merely shifts the 
potential for discretionary decision-making one step along in the process of 
reasoning, to the point at which it is decided what amounts to "juristic reason".
94 This would be so where a defendant is an innocent "recipient" of mistakenly 
conferred services.
9  ^ This may be exemplified by the approach of Maddaugh and McCamus in relation to 
the United States case of Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (1888). The authors suggest that in that 
case "there is a strong argument in favour of restitutionary liability" (Maddaugh & McCamus, 
744). In this writer's view, however, such a conclusion is unjustifiable. In Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 
the defendant quarry owner received an advantage as a consequence of the drainage by the 
plaintiff of his own nearby quarry, at some expense. This resulted in the defendant's quarry 
also being drained, and he proceeded to work the quarry. The plaintiff sought a contribution to 
the costs of drainage, alleging a local custom to that effect. The plaintiff had acted entirely in 
self-interest and the court, for this reason and others, denied relief. Goff & Jones, 57, for 
example, would agree with this conclusion. See also the Restatement of Restitution, which states 
in §106 that:
A person who incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or 
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby 
entitled to contribution.
There are a number of reasons why recovery should have been denied: the self-interested 
actions of the plaintiff; the lack of an emergency, so that there was ample opportunity for the 
plaintiff to negotiate with the defendant (see Chapter 8 as to the requirements of a sufficient 
emergency to justify granting recompense for unsolicited services); and the defendant's lack of 
choice in the matter if forced to contribute to the plaintiff's cost. More importantly, however, 
what needs to be emphasised is not that there were reasons for denying recovery, but that there 
were no reasons for granting it. This fact is forgotten if one simply perceives the plaintiff's 
expenditure and the defendant's advantage (on a number of tests of "enrichment" to be 
considered in Chapter 4, it would be concluded that there was no enrichment: cf. Goff & Jones, 
57, but contrast Maddaugh & McCamus, 744), and then proceeds to ask whether there was any 
"juristic reason" for that advantage. Clearly, there was no reason, juristic or otherwise, for the 
defendant's advantage, it simply followed as a natural consequence of the plaintiff's action. But 
without some further factor, to impose liability in such a case seems inappropriate. As Birks has 
pointed out, supra n. 80, 819: "Almost anything can be made to add up to insufficient cause. 
This encourages intuitive decision-making, with ex post facto labelling of the results."
96 As Ulmer v. Farnsworth, discussed ibid, illustrates an enrichment may not be unjust 
and yet there may have been no juristic reason for it. But also, conversely, an enrichment may 
be held to be "unjust", as Stern v. McArthur (1988) 81 A.L.R. 463 illustrates, and yet there was a 
juristic reason for it. In that case, the contract itself provided for the forfeiture of the property.
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A recent Canadian case illustrates the difficulties inherent in legal 
decision-making on the basis of the "absence of any juristic reason" for a 
benefit. In Hill Estate v. Chevron Standard Ltd,97 the plaintiff estate of the 
deceased, Hill, brought an action for the return of mineral rights granted to the 
defendant oil company by the wife of the deceased under a power of attorney. 
The court held that the deceased was mentally incompetent at the time of the 
grant of the pow er, and that the pow er of attorney was thus void. 
Consequently, the mineral rights granted under that power were also void. The 
oil company cross-claimed, seeking a declaration of a constructive trust to 
remedy the plaintiff's unjust enrichment. The company had carried out work 
on the land, had paid rent to the estate of the deceased (who had died soon 
after the lease had been granted), and had proceeded to drill for oil, leading to 
the establishm ent of a producing well. The Manitoba Court of Appeal 
concluded that the estate had been enriched and that the company had suffered 
a corresponding deprivation, but concluded that there was a "juristic" reason 
for the enrichment, namely that the company was at all times a trespasser.
This reasoning is, w ith  respect, unhelpful. In relation to the 
im provem ents to the land, the company was acting under a m istaken 
assumption that it had a valid lease.98 It was thus a mistaken improver. The 
pejorative "trespasser" has in the past been used in cases denying relief,99 but 
this is hardly an adequate explanation, given that mistaken improvers are not 
entirely precluded from relief, as will be seen in Chapter 9.100 There may well 
have been legitimate grounds for denying relief in the circumstances,101 but
97 [1993] 2 W.W.R. 545.
98 This was the case, at least initially. Before they drilled for oil, the defendants were 
asked to surrender the lease by counsel for the estate, who considered the power of attorney 
void. The court did not, however, consider this request to be of significance, and in any case it 
does not suggest that the company did not legitimately continue to believe that it had a valid 
lease.
99 Brand v. Chris Building Co. Pty Ltd [1957] V.R. 625, 628.
100 In Canada, such relief would be available, either under various "Betterment 
Statutes" (see Maddaugh & McCamus, 291-301), or in the form of a passive claim—that is, as a 
set-off to claims for mesne profits earned by the trespasser, or for compensation for the value of 
improvements where the legal owner is seeking equitable relief. See Maddaugh & McCamus, 
284-8. In the view of Maddaugh & McCamus, there may also be an active claim on the basis of 
an unjust enrichment.
101 Specifically, the fact that the estate, as owners of the land, may have been required 
to pay for improvements that were not desired and may have been forced to "delve" into estate 
funds to pay for the oil companies expenses in improving the land.
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these were not discussed or explored. In the course of the judgment, the Court 
went close to acknowledging the discretionary nature of recovery. It stated:
Decided cases are of little assistance in determining what is meant by 
"juristic reason". It simply comes down to this: if there is an explanation 
based upon law for the enrichment of one at the detriment of another, 
then the enrichment will not be considered unjust and no remedy, 
whether by constructive trust or otherwise, will be available.1013
Another consequence of the Court's broad-brush approach to "unjust" 
was that conceptually, and previously doctrinally, discrete claims were dealt 
with as one. The Court did not deal separately with the question of whether 
lease rental payments made by the oil company could be recovered on the basis 
of either a claim for return of a mistaken payment, or for a total failure of 
consideration. In the past, a principled discussion of these quite different issues 
would have been necessary, given that the claim would have been framed in 
specific terms,102 but instead, the all-encompassing "unjust enrichment" claim 
led to merely a blanket approach. The Court's reference to the defendant's 
status as a trespasser, moreover, seems irrelevant to a consideration of a claim 
for the return of the money payments.
In this writer's view, decisions such as that in Hill Estate v. Chevron 
reflect an emerging trend in Canada, in which judges conclude that there is no 
juristic reason for an enrichment, without giving adequate reasons for such 
conclusions.103 The traditional criticism as to the uncertainty of invoking 
"unjustness", when made in the context of Canadian jurisprudence at least, 
continues to have considerable force.
1013 [199312 W.W.R. 545, 560.
102 For example, in the form of a claim for money had and received for the return of 
money paid under a mistake.
103 Perhaps Dickson J.'s seminal judgment in Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 
257, is itself an example. At 274, Dickson J. states that retention of the benefit must be "unjust" 
in the circumstances of the case." His Honour reaches the conclusion that the "unjustness" 
element has been satisfied, but gives little in the way of justification. Of course, this is not to 
deny that the law of Restitution has not progressed considerably in Canada, and that unjust 
enrichment has not given impetus to a renewed consideration of Restitution in conceptual 
terms, thus freeing the subject from its arcane and little understood origins.
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Chapter 4
IDENTIFYING ENRICHMENT
The term “benefit” has no single meaning in the law of restitution; instead, 
meaning will vary with the circumstances, especially with the ground for 
restitution-1
§4.1 INTRODUCTION
Unjust enrichment theory seeks to unite liability rules which are said to 
have the uniform purpose of the reversal of benefits or enrichments unjustly 
gained. As was seen in the previous chapter, speaking very generally, 
"enrichment" could be said to refer to any "better" outcome gained by a 
defendant, which outcome triggers an inquiry as to whether it was unjustly 
gained at the plaintiffs expense. Such a general description avoided a detailed 
consideration of the "enrichment" component of the unjust enrichment 
formulation. It is to such a detailed consideration that we now turn.
If the purpose of reversing enrichment is, according to unjust 
enrichment theory, the very crux of liability in Restitution,2 then logically, the 
existence of some benefit becomes a necessary condition or precondition for the 
operation of the liability rules claimed to be unjust enrichment-based.3 As 
Wade has said, "[a] benefit to the defendant is obviously necessary before he 
can be held liable" in Restitution.4 Not surprisingly, then, irrespective of how
1 Palmer, Vol. I, 44. See also Sullivan, T.J., 'The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi- 
Contract" (1975) 64 Geo. L.J. 1, particularly at 12.
2 This is subject to the qualification that some theorists concede other purposes may 
also be served by liability rules in Restitution. See § 1.3.2. and § 2.2.1.1.
3 E.g., Goff & Jones, 16; Burrows, 6-7; Garner, M., "The Role of Subjective Benefit in the 
Law of Unjust Enrichment" (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 42. See also Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada 
(1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140, 154: "At the heart of the doctrine of unjust enrichment ... lies the 
notion of restoration of a benefit which justice does not permit one to retain. ... Thus for 
recovery to lie, something must have been given, whether goods, services or money." See also 
at 155.
4 Wade, J., "Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request" (1966) 19 Vanderbilt
the component parts of unjust enrichment are formulated in different theories, 
all such formulations include an initial inquiry into whether a defendant has 
been enriched or benefited. But to be able to answer such an inquiry requires 
some means of identifying enrichment, at least with reasonable certainty. 
Without such means of identification, it is of course meaningless to describe 
liability in a given case as founded on a purpose of preventing unjust 
enrichment.
There is a further reason for requiring that a benefit be identifiable with 
reasonable certainty before unjust enrichment can be considered as a plausible 
explanation of liability in a given case. Given the supposed restitutionary 
purpose of liability rules in Restitution, theorists have stressed that the 
remedial response to the unjust enrichment gained at the plaintiffs expense 
m ust be restitution of that enrichment. As Birks has indicated, unjust 
enrichm ent (a causative or liability-creating event) and restitution (the 
response) "quadrate" with each other ,* 5 and "[a] restitutionary right is 
definitively and necessarily measured by the amount of the enrichment at the 
p la in tiffs  expense ." 6 Such an approach is implicit in most academic and 
judicial writing on the subject,7 though not universal.8
L.Rev. 1183,1186.
5 Birks, 17.
6 Ibid, 46
7 Cf. Smith, L., "The Province of the Law of Restitution" (1992) 71 Can. B. Rev. 672, 
682; Muir, G., "Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener" in Finn, 299; and see references 
supra n. 3.
8 Certainly, the Canadian courts appear to be far more flexible in their approach to 
remedy. In fact, unjust enrichment appears to function as a convenient conclusion which, rather 
than limit remedial relief to restitution, instead gives rise to a number of remedial options. 
Fridman has commented that the "law of restitution is an amalgam of common law and equity 
and under this law a court is permitted to invoke whatever type of remedy is appropriate to 
produce the desired result": Fridman, G.H.L. "The Nature and Scope of Restitution: Past, 
Present and Future" Unpublished Paper, at 20. The results in a number of Canadian decisions 
appear to justify such a conclusion. For example, Birks considers that both Pettkus v. Becker 
(1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 and Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986) 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1, are cases in which 
the parties' expectations were fulfilled, despite liability being founded on "unjust enrichment": 
Birks, P., "Review" (1991) 70 Can. B. Rev. 814, 817-9. These cases concerned property disputes 
arising after the breakdown of a domestic relationship of cohabitation. But contrast Fridman, 
G.H.L. "The Foundations of Restitution: A Canadian Perspective" (1989) 19 W.A.L.R. 131, 143, 
who says of the cohabitation property cases generally, that "[r]estitution is the aim, but 
compensation appears to be the result." See also Maddaugh & McCamus, 660-70. Some 
Canadian courts may have expressly accepted such remedial flexibility. In Atlas Cabinets & 
Furniture Ltd v. National Trust Co. (1990) 68 D.L.R. (4th) 161, the majority of the British Columbia
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Characteristically, then, unjust enrichment is perceived as being 
"remedy-specific". To the extent that the category of Restitution is unjust 
enrichment-based, it follows that it is inextricably linked with restitutionary 
remedial responses. It is worthwhile briefly to consider such a seemingly 
singular perception of Restitution: "singular", for in other broad categories of 
law, such as contract, a range of remedial responses to a single liability-creating 
event may be possible.9 And there are moves in the common law toward the 
availability of the full armoury of remedial responses to any given liability- 
creating event: a view encapsulated within, and given impetus by, the 
judgment of Sir Robin Cooke in Aquaculture Corporation v. New Zealand Green 
Mussel Co. Ltd.™ Such developments are no doubt of interest,11 but they are
Court of Appeal considered that once unjust enrichment had been established, the court had a 
choice of remedies. Alongside the constructive trust, these included "an order to pay money, as 
damages" and "other remedies stemming either from legal origins or equity origins, as the 
circumstances of the case may require" (174). It is unclear, however, whether the court was 
referring merely to the form of the remedy, with all such remedies still moulded by the extent 
of the defendant's enrichment, or whether the court was in fact suggesting that different 
remedial responses other than as measured by the defendant's enrichment may be pursued.
Outside Canada, cf. Finn, P.D., "Equity, Commerce and Remedy", Unpublished Paper 
delivered to the New Zealand Law Conference, 1993, 22: "An outcome may appear to create an 
unjust enrichment if, but only if, reparation in some form (not necessarily restitutionary) is not 
awarded." In the United States, in the case of U.S. Potash Co. v. McNutt, 70 F. 2d 126 (1934), 
although the action was in Restitution, damages were awarded and determined at a contract 
rate. This is not an isolated example. See generally Perillo, J.M., "Restitution in a Contractual 
Context" (1973) 73 Col. L.R. 1208; and Childres, R. and Garamella, J., "The Law of Restitution 
and the Reliance Interest in Contract" (1969) 64 N.W.U.L.Rev. 433.
It will be argued below, however, that if the remedial response to the application of a particular 
liability rule is not restitutionary—that is, measured by a defendant's enrichment, whatever 
conception of enrichment is adopted—then the purpose of such a liability rule cannot be said to 
be the reversal of enrichment.
9 As Birks notes in "The Independence of Restitutionary Causes of Action" (1990) 16 
Univ. Q.L.J. 1, 13: "[A]ny one cause of action may give rise to more than one remedy." An 
example is provided by the range of remedial responses which may follow a finding of 
fiduciary wrongdoing. See § 1.3.2.1. However, Birks does not apply this view, as a matter of 
definition, to causes of action explicable in terms of unjust enrichment.
111 [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299, 301, where Cooke P. states that, for a breach of duty of 
confidence, "a full range of remedies should be available as appropriate, no matter whether 
they originate in common law, equity or statute." Cf. Denning J. in Nelson v. Larholt [1947] 2 All 
E.R. 75.
11 There is much that appeals in a more liberal approach to the potential availability of 
differing remedial responses, though it need be added that this is not intended to suggest a 
judicial carte blanche. The question for the future becomes one as to which principles should 
govern the "appropriate" relief: Finn, P.D., "Mr. Beatson's TJnfinished Business'" Unpublished 
Paper delivered to the Restitution Group of the Society of Public Law Teachers Conference, 
Aberdeen, 1991, 24.
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peripheral to unjust enrichment theory, which excludes the possibility of such 
remedial flexibility. It is widely perceived, in this writer's view correctly, that 
the explanatory integrity of unjust enrichment is dependent upon its remedy- 
specific nature.12 Unjust enrichment theory draws an inevitable link with 
restitution and of necessity must do so. For if a wide range of remedial 
responses were available to meet the concerns of a given liability rule, it could 
hardly be said that the purpose of that liability rule is the reversal of 
enrichment. If restitution is merely one remedial option amongst others capable 
of satisfying the concerns of a liability rule, remedying unjust enrichment can at 
best only be one such concern and an unjust enrichment explanation of that 
liability rule becomes unsustainable.13 Unjust enrichment becomes descriptive 
of one remedy, but not the explanation of the liability rule itself.
Arguably, the remedy-specific focus of unjust enrichment theory 
suggests that such theory developed from a process of reasoning backwards. 
That is, where a remedy is restitutionary (recovery of money had and received 
is an obvious example) it might be said that a defendant would be unjustly 
enriched if restitution were not ordered. Such a conclusion, however, does not 
support the converse, that the reason for restitution is the "unjustness" of the 
enrichment and further, that the purpose of the liability rule is the reversal of 
the enrichment. To take such a step is to put the effect (the remedy) before the 
cause. There may be any number of other underlying causes for that 
restitutionary remedial response which fail to be addressed when the generic 
unjust enrichment is applied. The point is well made by Finn, writing in the 
context of equitable doctrine. Finn emphasises that although the particular 
remedial response to the application of an equitable doctrine may have the 
effect of denying an enrichment, few equitable doctrines will have the
12 See, for example, Birks' criticism of the Canadian Courts' seemingly non­
restitutionary remedial responses to unjust enrichment. Supra n. 8.
13 Even if the existence of some form of enrichment might still be said to be a 
precondition for liability, if the remedial response is not restitutionary, the purpose of the 
liability rule can hardly be said to be the reversal of enrichment. There is one possible 
exception. If one uses enrichment as merely referring to a defendant who has in some way 
gained a "better" outcome which must be avoided, then arguably any number of remedial 
responses other than restitution may be available to avoid such outcome. If this were so, then 
enrichment could still be said to be a precondition for liability and the fact that remedies other 
than restitution were available would not then be significant in challenging the validity of 
enrichment as a precondition for liability. No unjust enrichment theorist, however, has clearly 
articulated such an explanation of liability rules. Some such idea, however, has at times been 
hinted at. See, for example, the discussion supra n. 8, in relation to the Canadian Courts' 
approach to remedy.
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prevention of unjust enrichment as their "sole or principal purpose" .14 If this is 
indeed the case, it must be stressed that any theory which focuses on the 
remedial response of restitution and reasons backwards from such response 
cannot elicit principles, other than unjust enrichment, of relevance to the 
operation of a given doctrine.15
Irrespective of how unjust enrichment theory developed, however, vital 
to its operation is a concept of enrichment, firstly as a precondition for liability, 
and secondly as a measure of the remedial response which arises once liability 
has been established. But if enrichment is to perform such a vital function, it is 
clear that it must be capable of being identified. Previous decisions cannot be 
explained in terms of benefit disgorgement if no identifiable benefit capable of 
being returned has been received. As Muir has pointed out,
disgorgement is the only sanction for failure to return the benefit. It is
very difficult to disgorge what one has not first engorged.16
This is not intended to suggest, however, that enrichment need be a 
definable concept. Many useful legal concepts cannot be readily defined.17 
Nonetheless, some means of identifying or some test of enrichment must exist. 
To be sure, such tests could be very general identifying, say, merely the broad, 
distinguishing characteristics of enrichment. Perhaps even resort could be 
made to presumptions of law or deeming devices in order to establish 
enrichment.18 But it must be possible, after the application of an appropriate
14 Finn, supra 8, 22.
15 In this writer's view, a more appropriate process of reasoning progresses through 
two stages of inquiry: first, to determine the relevant causative events giving rise to liability, 
i.e., to elicit the purpose or purposes addressed by a liability rule; and secondly, and secondarily, 
to determine which remedial response best gives effect to the liability rule's purpose(s) in the 
particular case at hand?
16 Muir, supra n. 7, 299. The measure of recovery is a particularly crucial matter for 
any plaintiff seeking legal redress for an alleged "unjust enrichment". When such a plaintiff 
seeks legal advice, or further, initiates legal action, the response to his or her query of "to what 
am I entitled?" cannot be left in the realm of vague generality.
17 Commentators tend to avoid any definition of "enrichment", or define it in the 
broadest of terms. See, e.g., Davis, P., "Restitution: Concept and Terms" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 
1167, 1190, who states that enrichment "is a specific fact and might be defined as a receipt of 
something of value." It is unclear what this means. See also Rinker, G.A., Quasi-Contracts— 
Concept of Benefit (1948) 46 Mich.L.Rev. 543, 552. Similarly, Sullivan, supra n. 1, 25 considers 
that the concept of benefit is expressed "so generally that the definition becomes essentially 
meaningless as precedent."
18 Cf. the reference by Deane J. in Foran v . W ig h t (1989) 64 A.L.J.R. 1, 24E to 
"constructive enrichment", criticised by Birks, P., "In Defence of Free Acceptance" in Burrows,
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test, to determine with reasonable certainty that an enrichment exists.19
The importance of enrichment to the very explanatory integrity of unjust 
enrichment theory is well understood. Many academic commentators have 
sought to expound tests of enrichment; there are a variety of approaches as to 
its meaning and scope. These attempts to give content to enrichment have led 
to considerable debate, particu larly  in E ngland, focusing on the 
appropriateness of the various tests expounded .20 The literature is both 
voluminous and difficult. The significant differences of opinion reflected in the 
debate merely may be the product of healthy legal argum ent over the 
refinement of the im portant concept of enrichment. Alternatively, however, 
and in this w riter's view, the continuing debate may be evidence of the 
fundam ental problem s which arise when seeking to explain liability in 
Restitution in terms of benefit reversal. However conceived, it will be 
submitted, enrichment simply does not do the work asked of it.
Essays, 105, 130. But to deem something which is not actually an enrichment a “constructive" 
enrichment raises the question as to what purpose such a fiction serves. It could even be 
suggested that “[w]hen the law behaves like this you know it is in trouble, its intellect either 
genuinely defeated or deliberately indulging in some benevolent dishonesty." Cf. Birks, 
Introduction, 22, and his discussion of the use of “quasi" and "constructive" in Restitution.
19 There will, of course, always be hard, borderline cases, but there should 
nevertheless be a core of cases in which enrichment is readily identifiable.
20 English articles include: Beatson, ]., "Benefit, Reliance and the Structure of Unjust 
Enrichment" [1987] C.L.P. 71 (also in Beatson, Chp. 2); Burrows, A.S., "Free Acceptance and 
the Law of Restitution" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 576; Mead, G., "Free Acceptance: Some Further 
Considerations" (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 460; Garner, supra n. 3; Birks, in Burrows, Essays. See also 
Burrows, 7-16; and Birks, P., Restitution—The Future (1992), Chp. 4. In Canada, see Klippert, 
Chp. 3; and Mclnnes, M. "Incontrovertible Benefit and the Canadian Law of Restitution" (1991) 
12 Advocates' Quarterly 323. There are also numerous more general articles which consider in 
part the issue of enrichment.
In the United States, however, there has been relatively little detailed discussion of any 
generally applicable tests of enrichment. Palmer, for example, in his four volume treatise 
devotes less than three pages to benefit generally. Instead, he deals with benefit in great detail 
when considering individual topics. Palmer's approach is largely practical, identifying the 
different measures of enrichment adopted to suit specific liability rules applied to particular 
facts. This reflects Palmer's concession that the meaning of benefit varies according to the 
particular liability rules in question. It will be argued below, however, that this concession 
powerfully suggests against any explanation of a wide range of liability rules in terms of a 
purpose of reversing unjust enrichment.
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§ 4.2 VARIOUS APPROACHES TO IDENTIFYING 
ENRICHMENT
§ 4.2.1 Introduction
The concept of enrichment is elusive. Unfortunately, though not 
surprisingly, as with other fundamental legal concepts, "there is no generally 
accepted analysis, let alone definition [of enrichment], that may be cited as 
being authoritative."21 A number of different approaches therefore need be 
considered. For the most part, these various approaches bear upon the question 
of benefit in relation to the provision of services.22 In order to provide the 
reader with an overview of the available alternatives, this section will outline 
the more influential approaches that have been propounded by commentators. 
It must be stressed at the outset, however, that this task is made difficult by the 
absence in the literature of any uniformly accepted terminology.
The different approaches to identifying enrichment considered below 
are deliberately stated in broad and general terms. There are in fact a diverse 
range of possible views, many of which are expounded in considerable detail 
and which have been the subject of debate. Individual tests of enrichment 
advocated by commentators will be considered in the context of the broad 
approach within which such tests—at least in terms of their general thrust—can 
be subsumed. Three general approaches will be considered, each concerned 
with the issue of when services are enriching. In essence, these three are: (1) an 
objective approach, whereby services are considered enriching if they are 
capable of being objectively valued by reference to a market for such services; 
(2) a "receipt of wealth" approach, whereby services are considered enriching if 
they have increased the net value of a defendant's property or saved him or her 
necessary expenditure; and (3) a subjective approach, whereby services are 
considered enriching if some conduct of a defendant can be interpreted as an 
acknowledgment by that defendant of the value of such services
The resort to broad general approaches is necessitated by the continuing 
debate as to the scope of, and possible refinements to, the various tests 
propounded. But this resort to general approaches must not be allowed to 
obscure the fact that the issue of enrichment is one of considerable difficulty
21 Cf. Fridman, 30. Fridman is actually referring to unjust enrichment as a whole, but 
the view expressed is equally valid for enrichment.
22 What that term encompasses will be considered at § 4.2.1.1.2.
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and complexity.23 Although it was once said by Birks that the issue of 
enrichment is "simple"24—he appears since to have recanted25—this is in fact 
far from the case. For those unfamiliar with the debate, it may seem 
inaccessible, with much use made of technical, specialised terminology.26
Ultimately, the debate as to the meaning of enrichment will be seen to be 
an arid one. The very complexity one encounters, it is suggested, is evidence of 
the failure of enrichment intelligibly to explain many of the liability rules 
supposedly united by unjust enrichment. A consideration of the various 
approaches to enrichment will bear out this conclusion.
The issue which needs to be addressed by unjust enrichment theory is 
when it can be said that a defendant has been benefited. Burrows sums up the 
range of possible approaches facing unjust enrichment theorists and the choice 
that consequently needs to be made:
It is submitted that as a matter of fact a person may be benefited either 
negatively—that is by being saved an expense—or positively—that is by 
making a gain—and that as a matter of policy one may judge the issue 
on a range from total subjectivity (solely through the defendant's own 
eyes) through to total objectivity (solely through the eyes of the 
reasonable man, which in this context means the market).27
As already noted, the differences between the range of approaches to 
enrichment to be considered turn largely on the issue of when services are
23 For example, one specific concept to be considered below—"free acceptance"—is 
the subject of a number of long and detailed articles.
24 Birks, 131. Similarly, see Maddaugh & McCamus, 38: "the existence of a benefit is 
not likely, as a practical matter, to be a point of difficulty"; and Jones, G., in "The Law of 
Restitution: The Past and the Future", in Burrows, Essays, 3, considers the notion of benefit as 
the "least troublesome" of subordinate principles.
25 Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 127, states under the heading of "Establishing the 
Enrichment", that "[t]his is as difficult as it is important."
26 The use of the technical terminology and the complexity of much of the debate, it is 
suggested, is still a major barrier to the accessibility of the law of Restitution to the profession 
as a whole. The point is well made by Bryan, M., in a recent "Book Review" of Finn, P.D., Essays 
on Restitution (1990) in (1991) 18 M.U.L.R. 201:
[T]hose who regard restitution lawyers as a closed priesthood chanting repellent
refrains of 'subjective devaluation' and 'interceptive subtraction' will have their
prejudices reinforced rather than removed by some of the essays under review.
27 Burrows, supra n. 20, 579. See also Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 
D.L.R. (4th) 140,156.
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enriching. This invites a consideration of the nature of services and their 
distinguishing features when compared with money.
§ 4.2.1.1 Concerning money and services
§4.2.1.1.1 Money
The receipt of money by a defendant is generally assumed to be 
enriching,28 although, of course, subsequent events may result in the 
dissipation of that enrichment.29 This assumption is not usually questioned and 
is based upon the character of money as a universal medium of exchange.30 
Clearly, money has an objectively verifiable value. In fact, it is the very measure 
of other valuables.31 Property, goods, services and less tangible advantages 
such as the enjoyment of life and freedom from pain and suffering32 are 
quantified in terms of their monetary value.
Although, as will be seen, one may argue that services have or have not 
been of "advantage" according to differing individual, subjective preferences, 
arguments seeking to deny the value of money in recipients' hands on the basis 
of those recipients' subjective conception of "value" are difficult to sustain.33 
There are probably few who value money in and of itself, but money can be 
used to satisfy many of the preferences and choices of its recipient. The receipt 
of money, in that form, does not constrain recipients in their freedom to spend 
or invest as they see fit.34 This contrasts with the receipt of services, requiring
28 To some extent, the term "enriched" does have connotations that may be 
inappropriate in some contexts in which money has been received. This arises from the 
constant association of enrichment with "at the expense of", and that phrase's negative moral 
connotation that someone has suffered a loss as a result. Thus, where money is given as a gift, it 
may not be usual to say that the recipient has been "enriched", for this may connote a judgment 
as to the circumstances of the payment—that the recipient is not somehow entitled to keep the 
money.
29 Such dissipation may perhaps give rise to a defence of estoppel or change of 
position. See further, Chapter 9.
30 Goff & Jones, 17.
31 Cf. Birks, 109.
32 A damages award in tort for negligence, for example, may include sums for the loss 
of enjoyment of life or for pain and suffering resulting from the negligent act.
33 Cf. Maddaugh & McCamus, 38: The receipt of money "offers no scope for the 
subjective devaluation argument", as to which see § 4.2.2.1.
34 Maddaugh & McCamus, 38. And if a recipient is perverse and has absolutely no use 
for money, then any sums received can in any case simply be returned. Importantly, ordering
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payment for which obligates a defendant to allocate money in ways he or she 
may not have wished.
It is therefore uncontroversial to conclude that the receipt of money is of 
benefit to the recipient. Yet, whereas this seems rather trite, and unjust 
enrichment advocates point to the money cases as the strongest evidence for 
the existence of a principle against unjust enrichment (though, as will be seen, 
the status of unjust enrichment within money cases is also questionable),35 it is 
important to stress that a transfer of money is also of detriment to the party 
who has divulged it. Further, this detriment generally equates with the 
defendant's gain 36 Unjust enrichment theory presupposes this (for the benefit 
must have been gained by subtraction from the plaintiff),37 but also assumes 
that restitution in money cases arises from the application of liability rules 
having a restitutionary purpose. Yet this need not necessarily be so, for the 
purpose of the liability rules could equally be loss compensation. As Hedley 
has noted:
A substantial number of Restitution cases are situations which could 
equally be described as the recovery of a loss suffered or of a benefit 
gained. Neither can be made out as a better description than the other, 
for they both describe the same thing from two different viewpoints.38
Which description is appropriate depends ultimately upon the factors giving 
rise to the remedial right and these may vary considerably according to the
specific restitution of something need not follow from any perception that the recipient of that 
something money has been “enriched". This is an important point which will form the basis of 
the discussion of mistake in Chapter 9.
35 See further, § 4.4.3.4, where it will be argued that money and service cases ought not 
be artificially separated merely on the basis of unjust enrichment. See also Chapter 9. It will be 
suggested that where services cannot be considered to be enriching, but recovery is 
nevertheless allowed, explanations other than unjust enrichment must be sought. As will be 
seen in Part II of this thesis, such explanations may successfully explain liability in both money 
and service cases.
36 B.P. Exploration v. Hunt (No.2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 799, per Goff J. (as he then was).
37 Where unjust enrichment is said to constitute the causative event giving rise to a 
restitutionary remedial response, the "at the expense of" component part will be satisfied if the 
benefit was gained by subtraction from the plaintiff. Consequently, loss and gain are often 
equal and this "plus-minus" (or zero sum) equation has been emphasised. Cf. Muir, supra n. 7, 
303-4. Should the loss suffered by the plaintiff be less than the defendant's gain, then unjust 
enrichment theory argues that recovery will be limited to the loss suffered.
38 See Hedley, S., "Unjust Enrichment as the Basis of Restitution: An Overworked 
Concept (1985) 5 Legal Studies 56, 61-2.
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factual context within which a problem arises. We will return to this matter at 
various points.
§4.2.1.1.2 Services
Services raise greater difficulties for those seeking to incorporate the 
conferral of services within a conception of benefit. A "service" will be taken to 
include the expenditure of time, labour, skill, or materials, as well as the 
payment of money, other than the payment of money directly to the party from 
whom remedial relief is sought (that is, the defendant). Since in many cases the 
performance of work and the transfer of goods, especially in the form of 
materials, will inextricably be linked,39 any reference in this thesis to services 
will include the incidental transfer of goods as part of the provision of the 
service.40 Where goods alone are received by a defendant, they will not be 
considered to be a service, for unless they have been consumed or disposed of, 
such goods can be returned.41 This ability readily to return goods raises matters 
distinct from the receipt of services, which can never be "returned".42 Thus, 
"services" include improvements to land or goods; professional services; labour 
expended; tasks performed in employment; domestic chores; the payment to a 
third party of a defendant's debts (whereby the debt may potentially be 
discharged); or the performance of any obligation owed by a defendant to a 
third party. In short, any potential advantage to a defendant other than the 
personal receipt of money or goods (not incidental to a service), will be 
considered as services.
39 For example, where work is performed on a building site.
40 A distinction between the transfer of goods alone and the provision of services 
should be much easier to draw than the distinction in contract law between contracts for the 
sale of goods and contracts for the provision of services. The considerable body of contract law 
may, however, be of assistance.
41 Specific restitution of goods may be possible, either in a claim (1) in tort, in detinue 
or replevin, if property in the goods has not passed (Fridman, 419-21), or (2) in equity. See, e.g., 
McKeoum v. Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd. (1988) 13 N.S.W.L.R. 303. If the goods are specifically 
recoverable then the question of whether the goods are of benefit to a defendant would seem 
quite superfluous.
Land, although not necessarily of benefit to its recipient, can be returned specifically where title 
still resides in the recipient. Most Australian states have specific statutory provisions dealing 
with the rectification of an incorrect Registration of Title.
42 However, as will be seen in Chapter 9, the end-product of a service may well be 
goods capable of being “returned" to the party who performed the work which created the 
goods.
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There are significant differences between the receipt of money by a 
defendant and the conferral of services upon a defendant. The first is that 
whereas a like amount of money can usually be repaid,43 the same cannot be 
said of services, which, by their nature, cannot be restored 44 Any claim must 
always be for recompense for the value of those services, that is, a money claim.
A second significant difference between money and services is that 
services are not necessarily of any advantage to a defendant. For example, 
although considerable work and expense may go into the redecoration of a 
house, (a) whether the end-result is perceived to be advantageous is a highly 
subjective matter of personal taste;45 and (b) the end-result when measured by 
reference to its external market, may result in a loss rather than a gain.46
A third significant difference between money and services is that even 
where it may be said that the receipt of services has been of some benefit, 
measuring that benefit in money terms may not be easy. The courts may have 
to choose between a number of valuing options: a market determination of the 
reasonable value of such services, including, perhaps, a profit element; the 
market value of the recipient's accretion in wealth; the value of any necessary 
expenditure saved by the recipient; or even the amount a recipient of the 
services was prepared to pay.
Because of these differences between money and services, it is the 
conferral of services which raises most sharply the issue of whether a defendant 
has been enriched. Not surprisingly then, it is with services that competing 
approaches to enrichment concern themselves.
Let us proceed then to outline the possible approaches which may be 
utilised to determine whether a particular service can be said to be enriching. 
Importantly, in a given fact situations, the operation of different approaches 
may lead to quite different conclusions as to whether a service is of benefit. 
Within each broad approach it is proposed to consider some of the specific tests 
adopted by commentators. Such tests will be consistent with the general thrust
43 Subject to a defendant not being insolvent, for example.
44 Cf. B.P. Exploration v. H unt (No. 2) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 799; Goff & Jones, 18.
45 Cf. Buccini v. Paterno Construction Co., 170 N.E. 910 (1930).
46 The house may have a lower market value as a result of the service than it did 
before the work was done.
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of the approach within which they are considered, though not necessarily on all 
fours with that approach.
§ 4.2.2 An Objective47 Approach to Services as Benefit
One possible approach to enrichment is to treat any service conferred 
upon a defendant as enriching, provided such service is capable of being 
valued objectively by reference to a market.48 The mere conferral of the service 
may be seen to involve a transfer of time, labour, skill and so on, and as such, 
beneficial to a defendant who has been saved the expense of the reasonable 
value of such services 49 Of course, the service may not appear to be of 
particular benefit to the defendant, who may not have wanted the service 
performed and may not have been saved any necessary expenditure or 
received any wealth as a result. Nevertheless, once the service has been 
conferred and received by the defendant, he or she could be said to have been 
benefited by the amount of the expense saved. The requirement that services 
must have been received means that where a plaintiff has commenced services, 
such as writing a book,50 no parts of which are ultimately conferred upon a 
defendant, then such services cannot be considered objectively beneficial. The 
defendant must have received at least some of the product—the parts of the 
book—before he or she can be said to have been objectively benefited.51 A
47 The term "objective" can be used to describe two very different senses of benefit: (1) 
the objective or reasonable value of any service for which there is a market; and (2) the objective 
increase or net accretion in the value of given property if it were to be sold. For example, if a 
house is painted, we could objectively determine the reasonable value of such a service by 
reference to the market in house painting; or we could objectively measure the increase in 
market value of the painted house. See Dobbs, Remedies (1979) 261 (hereinafter: "Dobbs"). The 
term "objective" will be used here to describe the first sense of objective benefit. The expression 
the "receipt of wealth" will be used to include objective benefits in the second sense of 
"objective". Cf. Beatson, 29, (also in [1987] C.L.P. 71, 75). Some writers use the expression 
"objective" benefit in both senses and this may create confusion. See, for example, Birks, who 
usually uses "objective" in the first sense, but in "Unjust Enrichment: A Reply to Mr. Hedley" 
(1985) 5 Legal Studies 67, at 74 appears to use it in both senses. See also Goff & Jones. Compare 
their use of "objective" at 20, with its use at 21.
48 Given the diversity of choice available, even quite idiosyncratic services may have a 
market. Birks gives the example of fur-styling for poodles. See Birks, ibid, 74.
49 The defendant can thus be said to have received a form of negative enrichment.
50 Cf. Planche v. Colburn (1831) 8 Bing. 14, discussed § 4.3.2.
51 If a service has not been received, then unless there is some other applicable test 
which concludes such a service to be enriching, it cannot be considered to be an enrichment. 
There is no connection with the plaintiff's service and the defendant. See Burrows, 8-9. For 
example, as Burrows points out, if a plaintiff makes a made-to-measure suit it is not objectively 
beneficial to the defendant unless he or she receives it. This seems correct. Burrows perceives 
Birks as arguing the contrary, that requested services may be beneficial once performance
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plaintiff's purely self-inflicted losses could not be considered as objectively 
beneficial to a defendant, as no service will have been conferred.
Consistently with an objective approach to benefit, "pure" services, that 
is, services which do not leave any valuable end-product or save a necessary 
expense, would nonetheless be considered enriching.52 Examples of "pure" 
services are hair-styling or car-cleaning. Consequently, an objective approach is 
very broad: all services received and capable of being valued objectively are 
enriching.
§ 4.2.2.1 Countering an objective approach: "subjective devaluation"
As a generally applicable identifier of enrichment, most commentators 
reject an objective approach.53 They consider such an approach too wide and 
over-inclusive. Although particular services may be valuable in the market, it is 
argued that "the law must be concerned with the issue of benefit in relation to 
the particular defendant."54 Consistently with such a concern for a defendant's 
position, in the language of Birks, a recipient of services may raise an argument
commences. This appears to be part of Birks' subjective test, however—the performance, 
though not complete and not received by the defendant, must have been requested. There has 
thus been a "limited" acceptance of the partial performance by such a defendant. See in 
particular, Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 137-41. Burrows concludes that "[t]his seems an unrealistic 
and overinclusive notion of benefit" (9). Although this seems a fair comment, Birks reaches his 
contrary conclusion not by contradicting the view that services must be received to be 
"objectively" enriching, but via a subjective approach to benefit (to be considered further in § 
4.2.4). Although Burrows also adopts a subjective test (which he labels "bargained-for" benefit 
test) he takes the view that the operation of such a subjective test is dependent upon the 
enrichment first being "objectively" valuable: see particularly at 15. This does not appear to be 
the view of Birks. See also Goff & Jones, 21, whose conclusion may be consistent with Birks:
The concept of benefit is consequently extended to embrace services which have been 
requested but which have not been rendered. In our view, a defendant should be 
deemed to have received a benefit only if he has received an objective benefit, in the 
sense that he cannot deny that he has made a realisable gain or has been saved an 
expense.
With respect, however, the above statement is quite confusing to this writer.
52 Contrast Beatson, Chp. 2, who argues that "pure" services can never be enriching. 
Beatson considers this to be the case even where a subjective test might establish an 
enrichment. Beatson appears to favour a "receipt of wealth" approach considered in § 4.2.3.
53 Although some commentators accept that in some cases such an approach may be 
appropriate. Birks, for one, considers that cases exist which are only explicable on an 
"objective" identification of benefit, satisfied merely by the performance of the services (124-8).
54 Burrows, 9.
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from "subjective devaluation". Birks considers that benefits in kind (services 
and goods)
are less unequivocally enriching [than money] because they are 
susceptible to an argument which for convenience can be called 
'subjective devaluation'. It is an argument based on the premiss that 
benefits in kind have value to a particular individual only so far as he 
chooses to give them value. What matters is his choice. The fact that 
there is a market in the good which is in question, or in other words that 
other people habitually choose to have it and thus create a demand, is 
irrelevant to the case of any one particular individual.55
Birks argues that, in deference to a defendant's freedom of choice, the 
courts have developed two tests of enrichment—"incontrovertible benefit" 56 
and "free acceptance"57—which are "compatible with the basic acceptance of 
subjective devaluation."58 These tests will be considered below as part of two 
broader approaches—labelled the "receipt of wealth" and "subjective" 
approaches—which counter an objective approach to services as benefit. The 
broad thrust of both these approaches is widely accepted by commentators. On 
many theories, if either one of the two approaches is satisfied, then a defendant 
can be said to have been enriched.59 But the details of individual tes ts
55 Birks, 109.
56 Which test, according to Birks, 116, moderates the "greater absurdities of a 
subjective approach" and thus, when satisfied, overrides a purely subjective determination.
57 This is an essentially subjective approach. Garner, for one, does not consider it 
subjective enough. See infra nn. 87-103, and text thereto.
58 Birks, 124. But as will be seen, as formulated, the "incontrovertible benefit" test to 
some extent "trumps" subjective devaluation. Birks' third "test" of enrichment consists of 
miscellaneous cases that he cannot explain on the basis of these two tests.
59 Most commentators conclude that both types of test are applicable. Where the 
subjective test is not met, then a defendant will nonetheless have been enriched if there has 
been a receipt of wealth, usually in the form of an incontrovertible benefit. And if conversely, 
no incontrovertible benefit exists, then the defendant will nonetheless have been enriched if 
there has been some subjective benefit. See, e.g., Palmer, Vol. I, 45, who considers that the two 
most important meanings of benefit are
[F]irst, that there has been an addition to the defendant's wealth or an increase in his
estate; and second, that a performance requested by the defendant has been rendered.
Surprisingly, Palmer does not further elaborate on these meanings, but it would appear that the 
first corresponds with a receipt of wealth approach emphasising net accretion in wealth, and 
the latter with a subjective approach, particularly Burrows' bargained-for test of benefit 
considered below.
Beatson, however, rejects the view that a defendant can have been benefited if there is no 
receipt of wealth, in the form of a net increase in the value of property or saving of a necessary
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considered within each broad approach vary greatly. Indeed, there is much 
debate as to the exact scope of these tests. The differences will become evident 
when each broad approach is considered.
§ 4.2.3 A "Receipt of Wealth" Approach to Services as Benefit
A defendant may be said to have been enriched where he or she has 
received some "wealth" by virtue of the conferral of services, either (1) in the 
form of a net accretion in the value of the defendant's property (a "positive" 
enrichment), or (2) by being saved a "necessary" expense which would 
otherwise have been incurred by the defendant (a "negative" enrichment).60 A 
net accretion in value can be said to arise where the services have left some 
marketable residuum;61 that is, the provision of services has resulted either in 
some new end-product which can be converted into money or in an increase in 
the market value of existing property.62 A necessary expense may have been 
saved where, for example, a plaintiff pays an existing debt owed by the 
defendant.63
expense. In other words, according to Beatson, "pure" services are never considered enriching. 
Similarly, Muir, supra n. 7, 303, considers that enrichment is limited to "positive transfers of 
wealth". This would appear to exclude a subjective approach as giving rise to enrichment, but 
is consistent with the receipt of wealth approach.
60 The use of the term "wealth" is not therefore intended simply to include any 
interests capable of being given a monetary value. Contrast, however, Birks' use the of term: see 
Birks, 13, for example. Instead, wealth is used in the very specific way it has been defined here, 
in order that this approach coincide with the burden of the tests of enrichment encompassed 
within it.
61 Cf. Beatson, 23, also at [1987] C.L.P. at 72. According to Beatson, services which do 
not result in such a marketable residuum cannot be considered to have resulted in a benefit. 
Beatson, 32, also at [1987] C.L.P. 76, cites Alfred Marshall, Principles of Political Economy (8th ed., 
1947), 56: "services and other goods, which pass out of existence in the same instant that they 
come into it, are of course, not part of the stock of wealth."
62 In the words of Beatson, something which has "exchange-value" has been created. 
See Chp. 2.
63 Which debt presumably was discharged by the payment. If the debt was not 
discharged, then arguably the defendant has not been saved any expense at all. The question of 
when a debt is discharged and thus enriching where paid by a party other than the debtor 
causes considerable difficulty to unjust enrichment theorists and is the subject of much 
controversy. See, e.g., Goff & Jones, citations at 17, fn. 2. In this writer's view, the debate is an 
arid one. By focusing on whether or not a debt has been discharged one fails to address directly 
what, with respect, is the crux of the matter, namely, in which circumstances is it appropriate 
that a defendant should reimburse the plaintiff. This will depend largely on the reasons for the 
payment of the debt. See § 9.2.33. The issue of reimbursement for payment of another's debt 
will be addressed in individual areas throughout Part II of this thesis, rather than as a single
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Both a net accretion in the value of property and any saving of 
necessary expense must be determined objectively, so that resort needs to be 
had either to the market or the reasonable person.64
This is only a very general outline of the burden of a number of more 
specific tests. Generally, these specific tests are narrower in their operation than 
the receipt of wealth approach, though still consistent with its broad thrust.
One test, that of "incontrovertible" benefit, has been widely advocated, 
though only recently and very exceptionally has such language been adopted 
by the courts.65 There are, however, different views as to what precisely 
constitutes an incontrovertible benefit and the concept is consequently not easy 
to grasp.66
Characteristically, there are perceived to be two distinct ways in which 
incontrovertible benefit can be established. The first, of which there are three 
different formulations, is if there has been some positive accretion in wealth 
which (1) has been realised in money67 (for example, by the sale of an 
improved asset by its owner),68 (2) is "readily realisable" in money,69 or (3) is
topic.
64 When explaining his "incontrovertible" benefit test, considered below, Birks, 124, 
states that it will be satisfied whenever "no reasonable man would say that the defendant was 
not enriched".
65 See Monks v. Poynice Pty Ltd (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 662; Proctor & Gamble Philippine 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Peter Cremner GmbH [1988] 3 All E.R. 843; Cadorange Pty Ltd (In Liq) v. 
Tanga Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. 26, 35. In McKeown v. Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 
13 N.S.W.L.R. 303, Young J. concluded that the owner of a boat's hull to which substantive 
improvements had been made, had been "incontrovertibly benefited" by those improvements. 
Young J. adopted the tests of enrichment of Birks, but appears to have gone further than Birks 
himself does. Birks argues that only a realised net gain in the value of property amounts to an 
incontrovertible benefit, but in McKeown's Case, the yacht had not been sold. Young J. 
proceeded to order an inquiry into the "increased value of the yacht ... rather than the cost of 
providing such work" (at 314). His Honour therefore adopted a test of incontrovertible benefit 
as being satisfied by the yacht owner's net accretion in wealth. See also the discussion of 
incontrovertible benefit in Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140,158- 
61.
66 Contra, Burrows, 9. See the long and detailed analysis of incontrovertible benefit by 
Mclnnes, supra n. 20, which, with respect, merely bears out the complexities. And the 
differences in approach are often merely postulated as normative assertion rather than on any 
conceptual basis. See, e.g., Mclnnes, 346-7, and his list of propositions.
67 Birks, 121-4. Cf. Burrows, 10-1, and Burrows, supra n. 20, 579, and note the 
modification he makes to Birks' "realised" test. See infra n. 71.
68 Birks considers that Greenwood v. Bennett [1973] 1 Q.B. 195 may indirectly support
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simply realisable in money.70 The differences in these formulations are not 
merely linguistic: they lead to potentially different conclusions when applied to 
given facts.71 For example, if the accretion in wealth needs to have been 
realised, then whether a defendant has sold an asset at the date of trial becomes 
crucial in determining whether or not that defendant has received an 
incontrovertible benefit.72 This is not so with the other two formulations, but 
these have their own difficulties. For example, one must determine, seemingly 
arbitrarily, when a market increase in value is "readily" realisable or just 
realisable, since it is clear from the views of the commentators that not all 
increases in wealth are "realisable" .73 In other words, under all these
such an approach, but he has doubts and alternatively suggests that the case may simply have 
utilised an objective measure (121-5).
69 Goff & Jones, 178. Contrast at 23 (merely "realisable"), and compare also in their 
third edition, at 19, that the benefit be "immediate and realisable".
70 Maddaugh & McCamus, 42-4, consider that it is "perhaps" sufficient if the benefit is 
"realisable" in money. Accordingly, improvements made to a car, for example, would be 
enriching to the extent that such improvements increased the market value of the car. They cite 
Greenwood v. Bennett [1973] 1 Q.B. 195, and argue that the owner of the car had been enriched 
regardless of whether he had sold the car at the time or not. The authors qualify this 
"realisable" gain test, however, so that recovery will not be allowed in circumstances where "it 
would impose a hardship on a particular defendant to, in effect, force a sale" (44). As a general 
limitation on whether a defendant should be ordered to pay the increased value, this is 
understandable, but as a proviso forming part of a test of enrichment, it does seem a little 
curious.
71 According to Goff & Jones, 23, for example, an improvement to land increasing its 
value would not qualify as an incontrovertible benefit, as such a benefit would not readily be 
realisable, or even "realisable". To be sure, owners of land mistakenly improved by another are 
generally not required to pay for the increase in the value, but it seems odd to describe this 
phenomena by suggesting that the gains are not realisable. Contrast Maddaugh & McCamus, 
44, who would appear to go further than Goff and Jones in accepting that prima facie, an 
improvement to land may be an incontrovertible benefit being a realisable increase in value. Cf. 
Burrows, 10-1, who considers that some improvements to land may readily be realisable, 
depending on the circumstances of the individual defendant in question. But even where an 
increase in value is readily realisable, Burrows considers that a defendant need not have been 
benefited. This leads Burrows to accept Birks' "realised" test, but he adds "that the defendant 
will also be regarded as incontrovertibly benefited where the court regards it as reasonably 
certain that he will realise the positive benefit" (10). This modification overcomes one of the 
difficulties with the unmodified "realised" test, namely that the date of the trial is crucial in 
determining whether the defendant has been enriched.
72 This is so unless one accepts Burrows' modification of the realised test, ibid.
73 See supra n. 71. In some jurisdictions in the United States, it is suggested that any 
net increase in the value of land as a result of the services performed, say, by a mistaken 
improver, are enriching. See Palmer, §10.9 (e). This does not mean, however, that such an 
enrichment need be recoverable in all circumstances. Other limitations may be imposed where, 
for example, allowing recovery could cause hardship to a defendant.
114
formulations, the mere receipt of wealth is not sufficient.
Underlying such different formulations, it is suggested, are different 
views as to when a defendant should pay for services resulting in an increase in 
the value of property, where the defendant has not subjectively valued the 
services. But such differences of opinion, then, as will be seen, seem to flow 
from differing views of how competing interests should be balanced,74 rather 
than from different perceptions as to what amounts to an enrichment.
The second way of establishing incontrovertible benefit is where the 
plaintiff has anticipated, either legally75 or factually,76 necessary expenditure of 
the defendant. Although this test has not given rise to any significant 
differences of opinion amongst unjust enrichment theorists, it seems equally as 
unsatisfactory as the first. A legally necessary expenditure may well readily be 
identifiable,77 but when can an expenditure be said to have been factually 
necessary?78 Answering this question would seem to depend largely on 
differing individual interpretations. Of itself, this may not be problematic. The 
law often turns on subjective notions or even malleable notions such as the 
"reasonableness" of conduct. But if a test of enrichment is formulated thus, it 
appears to be functioning as a test of liability, whereby we determine whether a 
defendant should pay for services conferred, irrespective of whether we 
consider such a defendant thereby to have been enriched. This will be returned 
to below.
Apart from differences as to the exact content of incontrovertible benefit, 
other commentators reject such a test, or consider it too broad. Fridman, for
74 This will be seen in Chapter 9.
75 An example is said to be payment of the defendant's debts. Birks, 117-8, cites Exall 
v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308, in which a plaintiff compulsorily discharged the defendant's debt.
76 An example is said to be the performance of a company's director's duties. Birks, 
117-9, cites Craven-Ellis v. Canons Ltd [1936] 2 K.B. 403, a better explanation of which will be 
given in Chapter 6. Neither Craven, nor Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308, mention a concept of 
incontrovertible benefit.
77 There is, however, also an element of question-begging about such a test, as 
demonstrated by the issue of whether a debt anticipated by the plaintiff's payment is a legally 
necessary expenditure. For example, just because the plaintiff has paid a defendant's creditor 
and thereby, seemingly, saved the defendant a legally necessary expense, does not determine 
the issue. Whether the defendant has been saved such an expense appears to turn on whether 
or not the debt was discharged by the payment.
78 See discussion, § 4.3.4, as to whether an unsolicited service performed in an 
emergency can be said to have saved a necessary expense of the defendant.
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example, considers that incontrovertible benefit is "very questionable, both as 
to its scope and meaning and as to its acceptance as an explanation of 
liability."79 Another Canadian writer, Klippert, rejects incontrovertible benefit 
as a test of enrichment and postulates his own "irrebuttable" benefit test.80 
Irrebuttable benefit is limited in scope, encompassing only payments by a 
plaintiff which discharge a statutory obligation of the defendant. In the case of 
Klippert and others,81 the rejection of incontrovertible benefit appears to follow 
from a strong commitment to a "subjective" approach to enrichment, which 
approach invites further consideration.
§ 4.2.4 A Subjective Approach to Services as Benefit
The burden of a subjective approach to services as benefit is that it is 
necessary to identify some conduct of a defendant which can be interpreted 
(albeit objectively) as an acknowledgment by that defendant that the services 
are regarded as of value. Characteristically, this will be shown by a request for 
the services, or perhaps and more controversially within the unjust enrichment 
camp itself, by some form of acceptance of or acquiescence in the plaintiff's 
conduct by the defendant. A number of tests have been propounded the 
rationales of which are based on a subjective determination of benefit. Once one 
of these tests has been satisfied—they vary considerably in detail—a defendant 
is precluded from resorting to an argument of "subjective devaluation" .82
Importantly, under a subjective approach, services which do not result 
in any receipt of wealth (that is, "pure" services) could nonetheless be 
enriching. As Garner points out, a "subjectively determined benefit does not 
require an end-product."83 Poodle-styling (an example given by Birks) does 
have a market because some people choose such services: where solicited, the
79 Fridman, 32. The case usually cited as authority for such a concept, Craven Ellis v. 
Canons Ltd [19361 2 KB 403, can probably best be explained on other grounds, which will be 
considered in Chapter 6.
80 Klippert, 55. See Mclnnes, supra n. 20, for a summary of the views of Klippert and 
other commentators.
81 E.g., Gamer, supra n. 3.
82 Cf. Birks, 114-5; Goff & Jones, 18-20.
83 Garner, supra n. 3, 53, has called this the "subjective revaluation" of otherwise 
valueless services. See also 62-3. Jones, G., "Restitutionary Claims for Services Rendered" (1977) 
93 L.Q.R. 273, 275, says of freely accepted service: "Because this was [the defendant's] own 
unhampered choice, it is irrelevant to inquire whether or not he has obtained any real benefit 
such as a net increase in his assets, from their receipt."
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request indicates a preference for the services and supports the conclusion that 
the requesting recipient has been subjectively enriched.84 Conversely, the mere 
fact that a defendant has received some wealth does not mean that he or she 
has been subjectively enriched thereby. Consider, for example, unrequested, 
value-enhancing improvements to a defendant's land which a defendant does 
not consider of value.
It is necessary to canvass a number of the specific subjective tests which 
have been proposed. Birks and Goff and Jones, though they differ in some 
details, consider that an enrichment may be established according to a concept 
of "free acceptance". In the language of Birks, free acceptance "occurs where a 
recipient knows that a benefit is being offered to him non-gratuitously and 
where he, having the opportunity to reject, elects to accept."85 Thus, if 
receivers of services have requested them, they cannot deny that such services 
are of value to them. Further, a party who merely acquiesces in another's 
performance of services cannot subsequently turn around and resort to a 
subjective devaluation argument. Birks gives the example of a window cleaner 
who cleans X's windows in the hope of payment. X stands by, watching the 
window cleaner proceed. According to Birks, X cannot deny the value of the 
services if X has reason to believe that the cleaner would desist in his work if he 
knew that X did not intend to pay.86
The concept of free acceptance has led to considerable academic interest 
and has been much criticised. One line of criticism concurs with a subjective 
approach, but places a greater emphasis on a defendant's freedom of choice.87
84 A reasonable value of the services could be determined, even though there was no 
net accretion in wealth or saving of a necessary expense.
85 Birks, 265. See also 104, 114-6. Birks considers that free acceptance also goes to the 
question of "unjustness" and is therefore a ground for Restitution. According to Birks, a 
defendant who freely accepts services cannot deny responsibility for paying for such services 
(104). Free acceptance then, establishes both the enrichment of the defendant and that the 
defendant has been unjustly enriched. Cf. Goff & Jones, 18-9. But if conduct which amounts to 
free acceptance grounds a claim in Restitution, one may ask why it is necessary to go further 
and say that it also establishes an enrichment. In many cases, as we shall see, a plaintiff's 
detrimental reliance on a defendant's conduct which might be described as free acceptance will 
be sufficient to justify recovery, even where there is no corresponding benefit to the defendant 
on any test of enrichment other than free acceptance.
86 The example appears in Birks, 265. Note the modification to the example made by 
Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 115, 121-2, where, however, Birks is considering the issue of free 
acceptance as an "unjust" factor. See also 127-32.
87 See Burrows, supra n. 20; Gamer, supra n. 3; Mead, supra n. 20.
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Burrows, for example, offers detailed arguments as to why a test of free 
acceptance ought to be rejected as a determinant of enrichment.88 The 
gravamen of these arguments is that a freely accepting receiver is just as likely 
as not to be indifferent to the performance of the service: mere acquiescence 
does not of itself establish that the receivers of the services regard themselves as 
benefited thereby.89 Consequently, it is argued, requiring a defendant to pay 
for merely freely accepted services does not adequately protect the defendant's 
freedom of choice. In a similar vein is Garner, who considers that a subjective 
benefit can only be said to exist where a "defendant has manifested a 
willingness to pay for that benefit as a present priority ." 90 The critics of free 
acceptance would not consider that X, in Birks' window cleaner example, has 
been enriched. Although such critics accept a subjective approach, the burden 
of their criticisms is that a free acceptance test is not subjective enough.91
Birks, in a reply to these criticisms, maintains that whilst free acceptance 
does not establish that a recipient of services values them at a particular sum, it 
nevertheless does prevent that recipient from resorting to an argument based 
on the "subjectivity of value. " 92 Birks, in other words, stresses the 
"unconscientious" conduct of a defendant appealing to a subjective 
devaluation argument.93 Such unconscientiousness also justifies, according to 
Birks, valuing the services at the reasonable market rate.94 This focus on the 
unconscionability of the defendant's conduct95 may explain why he or she
88 Burrows, 11-4, rejects free acceptance as having any role to play in Restitution, even 
as an “unjust factor".
89 Burrows, supra n. 20. Garner calls this the "indifference" argument, supra n. 3, 50. 
Mead, supra n. 20, points out the difficulties inherent in answering the question of whether the 
defendant had an "opportunity to reject": what does this mean and what sort of test should be 
applied to determine the issue?
9  ^ Garner, supra n. 3, 65 (emphasis added). Would the defendant's active 
encouragement of the plaintiff's action, as opposed to mere acquiescence, meet this test? See 
also Mathews, P., "Freedom, Unrequested Improvements, and Lord Denning" (1981) 40 C.L.J. 
340.
91 It must be noted, though, that the respective position of the critics varies as well. 
Burrows, 13, for example, has said that "Garner goes too far to the other extreme: that is, he 
advocates too subjective an approach".
92 Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 128-9.
93 Id.
94 Ibid, 129-30.
95 Consequently, "unconscionability bear[s] on the enrichment enquiry": Garner,
118
ought to pay the reasonable price of the services, but it seems unconvincing to 
suggest that this is because it establishes the existence and value of the 
defendant's enrichment The defendant may well have accepted the service 
expecting to pay considerably less than the market rate.96 Birks tries to counter 
this difficulty by arguing that
[automatic market valuation of the freely accepted benefit is qualified to 
the extent that the free acceptance itself is qualified. For example, where 
a defendant accepted in the belief that the thing with a market value of 
£20 was being offered at £10, the valuation cannot exceed £10.97
One difficulty with this response becomes immediately apparent. How 
does one determine the "belief" of the recipient in circumstances other than 
where the work was requested for a fixed sum?98 The courts for the most part 
do not concern themselves with such matters and impose a reasonable market 
valuation of the services—see quantum meruit claims discussed below—and 
Birks, subject to the above proviso, would approve of this.
One of the difficulties with free acceptance, as with any subjective 
approach, is that the focus on the defendant's conduct may well isolate factors 
which determine when a defendant should pay for services, irrespective of 
whether he or she has been benefited thereby. This will be demonstrated below 
in two contexts: "precontractual" liability and proprietary estoppel. But for 
now, it suffices to say that acquiescence in another's detrimental conduct may, 
in equity or quasi-contract, give rise to an obligation to compensate a plaintiff
supra n. 3, 52.
96 Burrows, supra n. 20, 580, fn.18, briefly alludes to this point. Alternatively, the 
defendant may only value the services to the extent that they are freely provided, or to the 
extent that they enhance the defendant's wealth, say, by leaving a marketable residuum. To 
insist, then, upon a reasonable market valuation of the services would appear to contradict the 
very subjectivity which is said to justify a finding of enrichment in the first place.
97 Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 129.
98 A related criticism of Hedley, supra n. 38, 63, has much force. Work decreasing the 
value of a house clearly does not enhance a defendant's wealth, yet subjectively, according to 
Birks and those advocating a similar view, it could be enriching, if the owner thinks it is. 
Hedley states:
With the greatest respect to all concerned, this is nonsense. An enquiry into the owner's 
view of what constitutes a 'benefit' is neither practicable nor relevant. Can it be 
seriously suggested that it would make a difference if the owner's taste changed while 
the work was in progress, so that by the time it was complete he too was of the opinion 
that it did not constitute a benefit?
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for losses incurred in the form of services performed but never conferred upon 
the defendant, and which consequently cannot be said to be even subjectively 
enriching. A plaintiff who changes his or her position on the basis of certain 
conduct of the defendant may have legal recourse against such a defendant. 
Liability in such cases appears little different to those circumstances in which a 
defendant has acquiesced in the conferral of services and for which that 
defendant is required to pay a reasonable value." The point is highlighted by 
Birks' resort to the language of "unconscientiousness". His emphasis upon the 
probity of a defendant's conduct begins to mirror quite markedly the emphasis 
of equitable doctrines clearly and indisputably concerned with remedying 
detrimental reliance.100
Given the criticisms to which free acceptance has been subjected, 
alternative tests have been proposed. To take one example, Burrows suggests a 
"bargained-for" test of benefit. Burrows considers that:
[a] defendant can be regarded as negatively benefited where the plaintiff 
performs what the defendant bargained for. The reasoning behind this is 
that where the defendant has 'promised' to pay for a particular 
performance the outward appearance is that he regards that 
performance as beneficial, or, put in an alternative way, that he has been 
saved expense that he would otherwise have been willing to incur.101
According to Burrows, it follows that defendants will in general102 have 
benefited even where they have received only part of what was bargained 
for.103
"  in other words, such liability appears to be independent of any need to show that 
the defendant has been "enriched" by the services. Certainly, the defendant need not have 
received any wealth.
100 Equitable doctrines such as estoppel, at least in Australian law. See Commonwealth 
v. Verwayen (1990) 95 A.L.R. 321. Burrows, 13, considers that Birks
tends to merge the 'injustice' and 'enrichment' sides of free acceptance with both 
ultimately resting on the same supposed injustice—the unconscientiousness—of the 
free acceptor's conduct.
101 Burrows, 14.
102 This is a rebuttable presumption. Burrows, 14, considers that defendants who have 
received part of what they have bargained for will consider themselves benefited by "each part 
of that performance" even if the defendants had agreed to pay only on completion. The 
presumption is rebuttable: for example, where the cost of completion would be as much again 
as the agreed total price.
103 Contra Garner, supra n. 3,53.
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In summary, a number of subjective tests have been variously 
formulated. They all share a common concern with a defendant's entitlement to 
subjectively attribute value to services according to his or her own preferences. 
But in the absence of any widely accepted formulation it is proposed when 
considering the application of a subjective approach to adopt the broadest view 
giving the greatest possible scope to enrichment. This will preclude any 
argument by unjust enrichment theorists that any identified failings in 
enrichment analysis are the result of a too-restrictive approach to enrichment 
having been adopted.
§ 4.2.5 Exemplifying the Different Approaches
There is a range of views amongst commentators as to how the above 
approaches interact to provide the most accurate picture of liability in 
Restitution. For example, Birks argues that for the most part, a plaintiff can rely 
on either free acceptance (within the subjective approach) or incontrovertible 
benefit (within a receipt of wealth approach) to establish enrichment. Birks 
considers that an objective approach to benefit has generally been rejected as 
part of English law.104 Beatson, by way of contrast, rejects free acceptance as a 
test of enrichment105 and considers that services can only be of benefit where 
they are also incontrovertibly beneficial.106 Such differences of opinion are 
critical to the operation of unjust enrichment, for when applied to any one fact 
situation, varied approaches to enrichment can lead to dramatically different 
determinations, both as to the existence of an enrichment and, once identified, 
the value of that enrichment.
To take a simple example, let us say that P expends $400 to have repairs 
made to a car which P mistakenly believes to be his, but which in fact belongs 
to D. Let us say that the money spent was necessary to preserve the car in a 
workable state of repair. The value of the vehicle before the expenditure was 
$1000, and afterwards, $1200. D was unaware of P's actions and has since 
reclaimed the car, which she still owns. Has D been enriched and if so, to what
104 Birks, 110-14.
105 Beatson does not reject free acceptance as a factor establishing the unjustness of an 
enrichment otherwise established. Beatson, 38.
106 That is, the services result in a receipt of wealth to the defendant or in Beatson's 
own language, produce exchange-value. Beatson includes increases in "human capital" (such 
as a newly learned skill) as producing exchange-value. See Beatson, Chp. 2.
121
extent? Under an objective approach, services have been conferred upon D,107 
which services can objectively be valued at $400. Under a receipt of wealth 
approach, there has been an accretion in D's wealth of $200 or alternatively, 
and arguably,108 D has been saved a necessary expense of $400. Finally, on a 
subjective approach, D has not been enriched—there is no conduct to show D 
personally values the services. In summary:
Objective value of services conferred: $400.
Receipt of wealth:109 $200 or $400.
Subjective enrichment: $0.
These different results merely follow from the application of the broad 
approaches to enrichment. The intricacies of specific tests within each broad 
approach have been avoided. For instance, under the receipt of wealth 
approach, whether D has been incontrovertibly benefited by the accretion in 
her wealth depends upon whether the accretion needs to have been realised (D 
not enriched) or whether it need merely be realisable (D enriched by $200). All 
these possibilities arise in what is a simple example. The example would raise 
far more difficult issues if D was aware of P's mistaken conduct, but did not 
alert P to the mistake; or further, if the work had only been partially 
completed..110
The complexities which can result from the application of different tests 
of enrichment will be highlighted below, when we consider a number of topics 
in Restitution. If liability has been imposed in cases purportedly explicable in 
unjust enrichment terms, then an enrichment must exist, identifiable on at least 
one of the different approaches. Where necessary, specific tests, within an 
approach will also be considered. If liability rules operate irrespective of any 
enrichment, then their concern cannot be said to be the reversal of unjust 
benefits. This also follows even if an enrichment is identifiable, but the remedy 
granted is other than restitutionary. When applying the different approaches to 
enrichment, the most liberal test within each approach will be adopted, so as to
107 The value of D's property has been affected by P's services.
108 The issue depends upon whether one concludes that keeping a car in working 
order is a factually necessary expense.
109 One could label $200 as D's positive enrichment and $400 as D's negative 
enrichment.
110 These modifications would bring into focus the difference of opinion over the 
different subjective tests.
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give enrichment the maximum possible reach. Nevertheless, despite such a 
concession, it will be seen that many liability rules said to be unjust enrichment- 
based are not readily explicable in terms of the reversal of enrichment.
The areas of law which have been selected to test the operation of the 
different approaches to enrichment reflect the diversity of Restitution. It is 
proposed to consider:
(1) and (2) Two areas in which resort has traditionally, though not 
exclusively, been made to quasi-contractual liability rules: incomplete contracts 
and "defective" contracts.111 For convenience, a different type of case 
problematic for enrichment analysis will be dealt with in each area, though 
each type of problem case occur in both areas.
(3) An equitable doctrine now said to be explicable in unjust enrichment 
terms: contribution.
(4) An area consisting of miscellaneous doctrines utilised to facilitate 
recovery for unsolicited services, but which doctrines are now said to be united 
by unjust enrichment: necessitous intervention.
(5) An area in which recently, resort has been made to unjust enrichment 
by some courts to resolve a growing problem: property disputes arising on the 
breakdown of de facto marriage relationships.
Each of these areas will raise quite distinct problems for any analysis in 
terms of the reversal of enrichment.
§ 4.3 THE OPERATION OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
TO ENRICHMENT IN SPECIFIC CONTEXTS
§ 4.3.1 Incomplete Contracts: Precontractual Liability
An issue as to the potential liability of a defendant may arise where a 
plaintiff acts detrimentally by expending time, skill, money, materials and the 
like, in anticipation of a contractual relationship with a defendant which never
111 In Chapter 6, a detailed consideration will be given to the difference between 
incomplete and "defective" contracts. It suffices to say for now that they raise quite distinct 
problems for the law, though there are also considerable similarities between cases of either 
type.
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eventuates.112 For example, P performs preliminary planning work at D's 
request, under the expectation (created by D's conduct) that P will obtain a 
large and profitable building contract. P does not expect to be paid 
independently, given the prospects of the lucrative contract. But subsequently, 
when P is not granted D's contract, P may resort, amongst other claims, to 
quantum meruit in order to recover at least the costs incurred in the performance 
of any service.113
Precontractual liability is said to be a manifestation of unjust enrichment 
with relief aimed at the reversal of the defendant's enrichment.114 Can it be 
said, however, that precontractual liability is dependent upon a finding of 
enrichment? Certainly, in many cases, a gain will be identifiable on at least one 
of the approaches to benefit, but this is not true of all cases. A plaintiff may 
have relied upon the expectation of a future contract to rearrange his or her 
affairs detrimentally: incurring "costs" in time and money, or by changing his 
or her position or circumstances. For example, the plaintiff may have made 
alterations to his or her property in expectation of the future contract.115 
Despite the absence of any seemingly beneficial outcome for a defendant as a
112 That is, no enforceable contract is held to have arisen. Whether an enforceable 
contract exists or not is a determination of contract law. In many cases, it is merely a technical 
failing which precludes a finding of a contract. In Chapter 6 it will be argued that liability in 
cases of precontractual obligations is contract-like. That is, such obligations arise from 
circumstances which share with contractual liability all or most of the substantive (i.e. non­
technical) features which distinguish contractual obligations from other obligations. For some 
reason, however, the rules of contract do not allow a conclusion that there is a final contract, 
and quasi-contractual and equitable remedies have been resorted to in order to fill the gaps 
which would otherwise arise.
113 Commonly cited examples are William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v. Davis [1957] 2 All 
E.R. 712 and Sabemo Pty Ltd v. North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880. As will 
be seen in § 4.4.1, there are a number of possible measures of quantum meruit relief, including 
recovery for any costs incurred, or alternatively, the "reasonable value" of any services 
rendered. At times, the practical consequence of a quantum meruit award may also result in a 
plaintiff's actual (i.e. contractual) expectations being met.
114 See, e.g., Burrows, 293, et seq., Goff & Jones, Chp. 25, and Maddaugh & McCamus, 
Chp. 21, who all deal with the topic in this way.
115 E.g., Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 428.
result of such work, recovery may ensue, for at least the losses incurred,116 
even in quasi-contract (or Restitution).117 No services will have been conferred 
upon the defendant, so that neither an objective benefit, nor a receipt of wealth 
can be identified. At times, the plaintiffs may have acted in response to a 
request, which raises the possibility of a subjective benefit,118 but even this 
need not have been the case. There are examples of recovery for precontractual 
work which was not requested or freely accepted by the defendant, but merely 
carried out in detrimental reliance upon the expectation of the future contract. 
This is best evidenced by two types of cases: (1) those in which the plaintiff 
incurs expenses in preparation to performing the contract: such work will 
rarely have been requested by the defendant, at best only "encouraged or 
approved", and at other times, the performance of the work will only have
116 Recovery has at times been granted by resort to estoppel, with the effect of the 
remedy being either to compensate the plaintiff for reliance losses suffered, or even to make 
good the plaintiff's expectations. See, e.g., Waltons Stores v. Maher (1987) 76 A.L.R. 513 and Crabb 
v. Arun D.C. [19751 3 All E.R. 865. It will be argued in Chapter 6 that often, resort has been 
made to the different doctrines in order to grant relief to a plaintiff who has performed services 
or incurred expenses precontractually. But this ought not obscure the uniting features of all 
cases of precontractual liability. See also further, § 4.4.3.3.
117 E.g., Brewer v. Chrysler Canada [1977] 3 W.W.R. 69 and Maclver v. American Motors 
(1976) 70 D.L.R. (3d) 473, though in Brewer, the court referred to "an award by way of unjust 
enrichment or quantum meruit." For a discussion of these and similar cases, see Cauchi, G.F., 
"The Protection of the Reliance Interest and Anticipated Contracts Which Fail to Materialize" 
(1981) 19 U.W.O.L.R. 237.
118 The issue of whether such requested but unconferred services are enriching more 
commonly occurs in the context of contracts which are not enforceable, and will be discussed 
there. An example in the precontractual context is Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen 
Co. Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 428, in which preliminary work was performed by the plaintiffs on their 
own property. The work had been requested, but none of the results of work were ever 
conferred upon the defendant. Hence, no objective valuation of any benefit was possible and 
Burrows, 297-8, for example, considers that any benefit would be difficult to establish in that 
case. Contrast Birks, 283-4, who would consider that the defendant was enriched in that case, 
but with respect, his discussion is unconvincing and confusing to this writer. And see also the 
discussion of Goff & Jones, 555-63, particularly of William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v. Davis [1957] 1 
W.L.R. 932. In relation to Brewer St, they conclude at 562, fn. 49, that the defendant "had gained 
little real benefit from what the plaintiff had done." This conclusion is surprising, given that 
earlier, Goff and Jones take the view that where services are requested but "not rendered" they 
are nonetheless beneficial (see 21). In Brewer St., the work had been requested. On the widest 
possible conception of subjective benefit, the defendant could be said to have been enriched. 
But in any case, the remedy awarded in that case was measured by the costs incurred by the 
plaintiff. It will be argued at § 4.3.2 that even where costs are incurred at a defendant's request, 
it is artificial to consider recompense for such costs as a form of restitution. Further, judgments 
which have based their findings on enrichment often are unsure as to an appropriate test of 
enrichment. See, for example, the judgment in Deacon v. Adams (1982) 55 N.S.R. (2d) 218, which 
exhibits a confusion between objective and subjective measures of enrichment, and moves from 
one to the other without analysis (see at 231 & 235). Some cases, however, have equated 
requested work with benefit: Magical Waters Fountains v. Sarnia (1992) 91 D.L.R. (4th) 76.
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been reasonably foreseeable;119 and (2) cases in which the plaintiff performs 
work which would have benefited the plaintiff, had the contract proceeded, but 
which benefits do not flow to the plaintiff or the defendant because the contract 
does not eventuate.120 Recovery in either type of case is not justifiable on a
119 In Brewer v. Chrysler Canada [1977] 3 W.W.R. 69, the plaintiff actively began to 
recruit prospective staff, rented storage space and generally incurred expenses in preparation to 
commencing business, in expectation of being awarded a car dealership. The "benefit" of this 
work was ultimately either wasted, or went to a third party (the party eventually granted the 
dealership). Importantly, the plaintiff, succeeding in quantum meruit, was awarded not only the 
full expenses he had incurred, but also successfully recovered two months' salary, based on his 
previous earning rate, for the time spent organising the preparatory work. In Maclver v. 
American Motors (1976) 70 D.L.R. (3d) 473, recovery was allowed, amongst other expenses, for 
costs incurred by the plaintiff in moving his business to new premises owned by the defendant. 
Cf. Farnsworth, E.A., "Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and 
Failed Negotiations" (1987) 87 Col. L.R. 217, 237. See Hoffman v. Red Owl, 133 N.W. 2d 267 
(1965), in which the representations of the defendant could "reasonably be expected by 
promisor to induce action or forbearance" (267). As a consequence of representations by the 
defendant that a franchise would be granted, the plaintiff sold his business at a loss. He was 
able to recover the losses incurred in the sale. The case is discussed in Cauchi, supra n. 117, 257- 
62. Cf. Drennan v. Star Paving, 333 P 2d 757 (1958); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W. (2d) 93 (1966); and 
Goodman v Dicker, 169 F. 2d. 684 (1948), in which the plaintiff incurred preliminary expenses in 
preparation to commencing a franchise business, on faith of a promise that the franchise would 
be granted; the expenses were incurred with the knowledge and encouragement of the 
appellants. The court considered, at 685, that "[t]he true measure of damages is the loss 
sustained by expenditures made in reliance upon the assurance of a dealer franchise."
120 Although these cases usually involve work on the defendant's land (the subject of 
the incomplete contract), they are nevertheless particularly interesting, because in many 
examples the work will not have resulted in any objectively measurable benefit. A number of 
Canadian decision, of which Estok v. Heguy (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 88, is one, are of interest here. 
In Estok, the plaintiff fertilised land belonging to the defendant, in anticipation of a sale of the 
property to him. The contract was insufficiently certain to be enforceable, and the sale was 
never completed. The plaintiff claimed for the costs incurred by him and succeeded in the 
action, despite the fact that the work was not requested or accepted by the defendant with the 
knowledge it was to be paid for, and nor did the work enhance the value of the land, as the 
defendant was not intending to use the land for agriculture. Although the court ostensibly 
resorted to unjust enrichment, the remedy awarded was to compensate for expenses incurred. 
The plaintiff was held entitled to recover the money expended in depositing the fertiliser. 
Unjust enrichment theorists accept that in Estok v. Heguy no benefit arose. Consequently, the 
decision is criticised and the view taken that an obligation to compensate the plaintiff's loss 
should not have been imposed. See Goff «Sc Jones, 486, and compare the implicit criticism of this 
case and a number of others, in Klippert, 79. Cf. Maddaugh <Sc McCamus, 399, and see also 
Crawford, [1964] Can. B. Rev. 318. Yet if this case and similar ones are seen alongside other 
anticipated contract cases (such as ones in which estoppel is utilised, see further, Chapter 6), 
then the decisions are perfectly explicable. Reliance loss is sufficient to found recovery where 
such loss is incurred in expectation of a contract and is reasonably foreseeable by a defendant, 
and the risk of such loss lies with the defendant. Further, it appears that in all these cases, the 
defendants were at fault in the failure complete the contract. Although the judgment in Estok 
does not make this clear, it seems implicit from the facts that the defendant refused to proceed 
with the contract. Cf. Maddaugh & McCamus, 42, 289, 399. In other cases, the defendants were 
clearly at fault in the failure to proceed with the agreed sale. See Fridman, 337-8. And usually, 
these cases have resorted to the language of contract or estoppel in order to justify recovery. 
See, e.g., Preeper v. Preeper, (1978) 84 D.L.R. (3d) 74, which used the language of acquiescence. 
Cf. the similar facts of Lee-Parker v. Izzet [1972] 2 All E.R. 800, in which estoppel was argued.
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conception of benefit disgorgement.
Many commentators now accept that detrimental reliance is, or ought to 
be, the sine qua non for precontractual liability.121 Although in many cases the 
defendant will also have benefited, this is not a precondition for recovery. It 
might be argued that those cases in which no benefit exists are explicable in 
other terms, but that cases in which there is a benefit are explicable in terms of 
unjust enrichment. Such an argument will be rejected at § 4.43.3, where it will 
be suggested that to accept such an argument would result in cases of 
precontractual liability being divided on an artificial and ultimately 
uninformative basis. Instead, it will be seen in Chapter 6 that, irrespective of the 
specific liability rules utilised, cases of precontractual liability share a number 
of common essential features which provide the basis for an explanation of 
when liability will arise. The existence of an enrichment is not one such feature.
121 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra n. 119, 224. Cf. Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 
N.S.W.L.R. 880. See also Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, 420 P. 2d 713 
(1966), 729, per Traynor C.J.:
If in fact the performance of services has conferred no benefit on the person requesting 
them, it is pure fiction to base restitution on a benefit conferred. y[I]t is submitted that 
allowing a recovery in these cases on a theory of benefit conferred is purely fictional, 
and the real basis is a moral obligation to restore to his original position a party who 
has acted to his detriment in reliance on a representation, technically unenforceable, by 
another that he will give value for the detriment suffered.' (Note (1928) 25 Mich.L.Rev. 
942, 943.)
When two parties mistakenly believe that a contract exists between them, but the 
agreement is too uncertain and indefinite to be enforced, the one rendering 
performance and incurring expenses at the request of the other should receive 
reasonable compensation therefor without regard to benefit conferred upon the other. 
Such a rule places the loss where it belongs—on the party whose request induced 
performance in justifiable reliance on the belief that the requested performance would 
be paid for.
The case is discussed in Hutchinson, R.B., "The Necessity of Conferring a Benefit for Recovery 
in Quasi-Contract" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 1259. See also Earhart v. William Low, 600 P 2d 1344 
(1979). Beatson, J., in "Benefit, Reliance and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment" [1987] C.L.P. 
71, at 78 has said: "It is clear that a person who has rendered services requested, accepted or 
acquiesced in by the defendant is entitled to recompense whether or not the defendant has 
gained from the services." Consequently, he considers that to base cases such as Brewer St. and 
Sabemo on unjust enrichment involves "wholly fictitious reasoning". For a recent English 
decision in which it was suggested that for a quantum meruit claim, one need not show any 
benefit, see The Batis [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345, 353. See also Cauchi, supra n. 117, 269:
Unless the legal community in Canada is willing to accept the proposition that the 
underlying basis of restitutionary claims is not necessarily the "unjust enrichment" of 
the defendant, but the "unjust impoverishment" of the plaintiff at the hands of the 
defendant, then it would appear that the most glaring weakness of the law of 
restitution is its inability to deal with cases where the defendant has not been 
"incontrovertibly benefited".
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The features to be identified are common to cases imposing liability as a result 
of parties' precontractual dealings on the basis of quasi-contract or otherwise, 
for example, within doctrines such as estoppel. Of course, such different 
liability rules may give rise to diverse remedial responses beyond mere 
restitution, confirming that the purpose of the liability rules, even where an 
enrichment does exist, is not the reversal of such an enrichment.
§ 4.3.2 "Defective" Contracts
Resort has commonly been made to quasi-contract by parties who have 
acted on the basis of a contract, but who are unable to proceed in any 
contractual claim, though there is a completed agreement, because the contract 
is defective for some reason and thus not enforceable.122 As with cases of 
precontractual liability, recovery has been allowed even where a plaintiff has 
acted merely in preparation of performing the contract, at least in the United 
States: for example, buying machinery in order to fulfil a contractual 
obligation.123 As was argued above, such cases are inexplicable in terms of 
benefit disgorgement.
In the typical defective contract claim, however, a plaintiff will have 
performed services requested by a defendant, usually the contractually agreed 
upon obligation. Where such performance has been conferred upon the 
defendant, the issue of benefit is unproblematic. But at times, plaintiffs have 
successfully claimed for losses incurred where no part of their performance was 
ever received by the defendants. For example, an engineer builds specialised
122 The problem most commonly arises where a contract is unenforceable for want of 
some formality such as evidence in writing as required under a statute. The types of reasons 
which may preclude a contract being enforceable will be considered in Chapter 6.
123 Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 165 (1960), in which the court held, 
quoting from the headnote:
Where plaintiff purchased expensive equipment in good faith pursuant to defendant's 
specifications in fair endeavor to perform contract, even though executory portion of 
contract was unenforceable due to application of statute of frauds, plaintiff was entitled 
to recover loss in equipment which was not used by it for any other purpose.
See also cases cited in Palmer, §6.3 (a), and Fuller, L., & Perdue, W., "The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages" (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 57, 373, 392-4. Palmer concedes that such cases cannot be 
considered to be unjust enrichment-based, with the plaintiffs instead recovering their reliance 
losses. See further, Chapter 6. This writer is not aware of any English or Australian authorities 
allowing recovery for such preparatory work in quasi-contract or Restitution. But in principle 
such a claim should potentially be available, given that such claims have been allowed in the 
context of precontractual dealings, that is, where a contract is incomplete.
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vehicles which are never delivered to the defendant,124 or a writer completes 
half a book, no part of which is ever delivered.125 Burrows concludes that there 
can be no enrichment in such circumstances and that to argue the contrary 
would be to resort to an "unrealistic and overinclusive notion of benefit." 126 
Although this writer would concur with such a view, nonetheless, some 
commentators resort to subjective tests to argue that a defendant may have 
been enriched in such circumstances.127
An example, Planche v. Colburn,128 raises the issue most sharply; though 
it should be noted that that case actually concerned a claim under an enforceable 
contract terminated for breach. This fact is not relevant, however, to the issue of 
benefit. In Planche v. Colburn, the defendant requested the plaintiff to write one 
of a series of books. The author, having completed part of the work, was told 
the series had been abandoned. Rather than sue in damages, the plaintiff 
successfully sued in quantum meruit for the value of the work done. Perhaps 
because of the quasi-contractual form of the claim,129 the case has been said by 
some to be based on unjust enrichment. Birks, for example, seeks to explain the 
decision and, presumably, similar cases130 by arguing a defendant's request for 
the work precludes a resort to subjective devaluation, because it would be 
unconscientious for a defendant to raise such an argument.131 Consequently, a
124 Cf. Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc., 420 P. 2d. 713 (1966), 
per Traynor C.J. (dissenting). The majority held that a contract existed and thus allowed a 
contractual claim. Traynor C.J. would have allowed a claim in quasi-contract. The views of 
Traynor C.J. have been followed in Earhart v. William Low Co., 600 P. 2d 1344 (1979).
125 Cf. Planche v. Colburn (1831) 8 Bing. 14, a case in which the claim was under an 
enforceable contract terminated for breach, but this fact does not affect the issue of benefit.
126 Burrows, 9. Cf. Beatson, ]., "Unjust Enrichment in the High Court of Australia" 
(1988) 104 L.Q.R. 13, 16. No wealth will have been received by the defendant in the form of 
valuable property or saving of a necessary expense.
127 Burrows, 8-9, does not consider a subjective approach to be appropriate if services 
have not been received by the defendant, as no objective benefit can be said to have been 
received. Cf. at 15.
128 (1831) 8 Bing. 14.
129 Note, however, Goff & Jones, 426, fn. 35.
130 There is, however, relatively little authority outside the United States (see Goff & 
Jones, 425-6). In the United States, see the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts (1932) at §348, comment a. And see Palmer, §4.2 and the cases cited therein.
131 Birks, 126, 286-7, attempts to show how the enrichment issue is satisfied. Contra 
Burrows, 267. See also Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 127-32. Birks formulates the argument thus: 
that either a market valuation of the services rendered may be applicable against a wrongdoer,
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market valuation of such services, though never received by a defendant, is 
justified.132 This is despite the fact that the defendant never requested nor had 
the opportunity to accept or decline an incomplete book.
Examples of the Planche v. Colburn type, though rare in Anglo-Australian 
law, are not isolated in the United States.133 On Birks' very broad and 
controversial134 views of subjective enrichment, liability in all such cases could 
be said to be explicable in terms of the reversal of unjust enrichment. But this 
seems an odd description of cases such as Planche v. Colburn. We could say that 
a defendant in such circumstances was enriched by the plaintiffs actions, that it 
would be unjust for such a defendant to retain that benefit.135 And we could 
describe the plaintiff's recovery of his or her reasonable costs as restitution of
or alternatively, that a concept of "limited acceptance" may apply. In relation to the latter 
concept, Burrows, supra n. 20, 584-5, 588, considers that "limited acceptance" "is a further and 
equally unwarranted step down the line from free acceptance." See also Gamer, who questions 
the validity of such an approach. See supra n. 3, 50-52, and particularly his discussion of Van 
den Bergv. Giles [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 111.
132 Birks, id. Note also the British Columbia Frustrated Contracts Act 1974, s. 5(4), 
which deems that a benefit means "something done in the fulfilment of contractual obligations, 
whether or not the person for whose benefit it was done received the benefit." But the purpose 
of this provision is to allow a party to be indemnified against their reasonable costs, so as to 
distribute both losses and gains between the parties. See Stewart, A., & Carter, J.W., "Frustrated 
Contracts and Statutory Adjustment" (1992) 51 C.L.J. 66, 82. Hence the reference to "benefit" is 
a blatant fiction, as evidenced by the obviously different use of the term within the section.
133 See discussion generally and cases cited in Childres & Garamella, supra n. 8; 
Hutchinson, supra n. 121, 1260; Perillo, supra n. 8; Sullivan, supra n. 1, at 11, fn. 69. A most 
striking example of such claims succeeding is where builders have performed work to alter an 
existing building. Such builders may recover for the work done even where the building has 
subsequently been destroyed. See Dawson, J.P., "Restitution Without Enrichment" (1981) 61 
B.U.L.R. 563, 586-7. He notes that "restitution is used in such cases to transfer losses, indeed to 
add one more to the losses that the owner has already incurred." As Childres and Garamella 
show, many cases of quasi-contractual relief in a contractual context, though cloaked in 
restitutionary terms, are in fact protecting the reliance interest of the plaintiff. Sullivan sums up 
the difficulty with these cases when he states, supra n. 1, at 12, that
any inquiry into the definition of benefit must account for those cases ostensibly
decided on quasi-contractual grounds that permit recovery without requiring a finding
of gain.
An Australian example is Riches v. Hogben [1986] 1 Qd.R. 315, though liability was imposed 
here on grounds of estoppel. English authorities are not common, but see those cited by Goff & 
Jones, 425, fn. 31, in which cases the contracts were discharged through breach.
134 Note the criticisms considered above, § 4.2.4.
135 The unjustness arising from the total failure of consideration for the enrichment.
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the defendant's enrichment. But with respect, this seems a fictional136 and 
unhelpful description of such cases. In this writer's view, such cases are far 
more informatively described as ones in which a plaintiff, in reliance on the 
defendant's "contractual" promise to act in a certain way, has commenced 
performance and hence incurred losses. Quantum meruit relief to allow a 
plaintiff to recuperate such reliance losses will follow where a defendant 
refuses to perform as promised and seeks to rely on the unenforceability of the 
contract to avoid any obligation.137 In other words, liability is based on a 
defendant's "conduct", given the plaintiff's performance.
In the United States, even cases ostensibly based on "unjust enrichment" 
have allowed plaintiffs to recover their reliance losses, employing "obfuscating 
logic" in order to "satisfy" the need to show a defendant's benefit.138 The 
courts for the most part appear to have recognised that to insist that a 
defendant has been genuinely benefited in such circumstances could result in 
injustice.139 This is because the defendant's unacceptable conduct is the direct
136 Contrast Palmer, who has sought to explain these cases on the basis of a 
bargained-for benefit approach. At Vol. II, 19, fn. 6, he states that it is "not a fiction to find 
benefit in the performance of services on which the defendant placed value by agreeing to 
provide compensation in a free exchange." But Palmer later concludes that:
Ultimately, in a case such as that described, liability rests upon the belief that it is 
unconscionable for a person to bargain for the services of another and escape paying 
the value of services rendered by repudiating the agreement, even though the 
agreement is oral and lays no basis for a damage claim (19-20).
This "unconscionability" appears to be the crux of the matter, so that it seems quite 
unnecessary to engage in a complex debate about what constitutes the benefit.
137 For a fuller consideration of the parameters of liability of a defendant who has 
"breached" an unenforceable contract, see Chapter 6.
138 Perillo, supra n. 8, 1221, considers general statements describing all quasi- 
contractual claims as turning on the recovery of benefits, and concludes:
One difficulty with statements of this nature is that they do not accurately state the law. 
Another disturbing fact is that the courts have tended to accept these generalizations as 
accurate but have, in a quest for justice, been forced to use obfuscating logic to explain 
their decisions. Particularly popular has been the "Pickwickian" technique of defining 
the plaintiff's reliance expenditures as a benefit conferred upon the defendant. Only 
occasionally has a court utilized the forthright approach of declaring the inapplicability 
of the unjust enrichment theory (footnotes omitted).
Instead of a genuine concern with reversing enrichment, it is usually a defendant's 
unacceptable conduct which appears to trigger liability. As Rinker states, supra n. 17, 548,
in all these cases, it is clear that the element of fault is as much a factor in determining 
recoverable benefit as is actual gain or advantage to [the defendant].
139 Cases which have insisted that a defendant must have been genuinely benefited
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cause of the plaintiffs losses. This will be considered further in Chapter 6.
§ 4.3.3 Contribution
Largely originating in equity,140 the modern doctrine of contribution has 
been claimed to be unjust enrichment-based.141 The doctrine has a long 
history142 and has manifested itself in a number of fields including the law of 
sureties and guarantees, insurance law and land law.143
An example will illustrates the operation of the contribution doctrine, 
specifically in its application to the law of sureties. If two or more sureties 
guarantee the same debt owed by a principal, any one of those co-sureties 
called upon to pay, say, the whole of the debt, will have a right of contribution 
from the other co-sureties. Such a right will arise whether the co-sureties 
guaranteed the debt jointly, or jointly and severally, on the same or different 
instruments, and even if unknown to each other.144 Where all the co-sureties 
have guaranteed the debt to the same extent, the right of contribution will arise 
where anyone of them is called upon to bear a greater than equal share of the
before recovery will be allowed have been criticised. See Hutchinson, supra n. 121, 1266-7, and 
his discussion of Boone v. Coe, 154 S.W. 900 (1913). In that case, the plaintiff had incurred great 
expense in moving his family to Texas in reliance upon an oral promise by the defendant to 
lease certain lands in that state. The contract was unenforceable and the defendant reneged on 
his agreement. The plaintiff's action to recover his expenses incurred failed. The court 
emphasised that the plaintiff had failed to show that any benefit had been conferred on the 
defendant.
140 Note, however, the right of contribution amongst co-sureties at common law and 
the right of general average contribution in maritime law. The equitable right to contribution 
itself appears to owe its origins to the maritime law doctrine: infra n. 142.
141 E.g., Goff & Jones, 304; Simpson, On Suretyship (1950), 242; The Restatement of 
Restitution, 364; Birks, 192-3; Burrows, 219 et seq.; Maddaugh & McCamus, Chp. 9. Cf. Phillip, 
J., & O'Donovan, ]., The Modern Contract of Guarantee (2nd ed., 1992), 526-7. There has been some 
judicial support for the view that maritime average contribution is based on unjust enrichment. 
See Fletcher v. Alexander (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 375, 381, per Bovill C.J.
142 In Albion Insurance Co. v. G.I.O. of N.S.W. (1969) 121 C.L.R. 342, 350, Kitto J. 
considered that the right of contribution originated in the maritime law of general average 
contribution. See further, Chapter 7. For a recent consideration of the law of contribution, see 
Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 A.L.R. 285, per Cooper J.
143 A claim for contribution by a plaintiff amounts to a claim for services rendered, as 
defined, as the money paid by the plaintiff will have gone to a third party, rather than to the 
defendant.
144 Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 270; 126 E.R. 1276. See also 
American Jurisprudence (2d) Vol. 74,145.
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burden.145 Thus, A, B and C all agree to guarantee a debt owed by D to E of, 
say, $12000. If E should call upon A to pay this sum, as a result of D's default, 
then A will have a right of contribution of $4000 each from B and C.
Can it be said that co-sureties called upon to make contribution have 
been enriched? Since the co-sureties may have been unaware of the existence of 
other co-sureties, even until the time they are called upon to make contribution, 
a subjective approach to enrichment cannot in such circumstances be 
satisfied.146 The issue of enrichment then, turns on whether a defendant (the 
co-surety called upon to contribute) has been objectively enriched by being 
saved an expense, "necessary" or otherwise.
To answer this question, the nature of the obligation of each co-surety to 
the creditor needs to be considered. Payment by a co-surety of the guaranteed 
debt is dependent upon two contingencies. First, the principal debtor must 
have defaulted. If this has occurred, then the co-surety is under an obligation to 
pay up to the full amount of the guaranteed debt if called upon. Secondly, the 
creditor must have called upon the co-surety to pay, or at least, the co-surety 
must have voluntarily paid in anticipation of being called upon. If the first 
contingency is satisfied, then it could be said that a co-surety not called upon to 
pay has been saved an expense. But the expense saved is up to the full amount 
of the debt, not just the co-surety's "share" of that debt. If one focuses on the 
second contingency, this will not have been satisfied in relation to the co-surety 
from whom contribution is sought. One might say (but for the doctrine of 
contribution) that such a co-surety has been lucky: another has been called 
upon to bear the burden. The expense saved is therefore nil. Given the doctrine 
of contribution, however, each co-surety is required to contribute equally to the 
total liability. There is a presumption of equal sharing of the burden. One could 
argue that each of the co-sureties who has not paid is enriched as to their 
proportionate share of the debt. But this presumes a status of equality between
145 Simpson, On Suretyship (1950), 240. See also the Restatement of Restitution, §81. 
Normally, the principal debtor should be made a party to the action (as the sureties would be 
subrogated to the creditor's rights) but his or her insolvency may be inferred from the 
circumstances. See Hay v. Carter [1934] 1 Ch D. 397. If the sureties have guaranteed a debt to 
different amounts, then the right to contribution will arise proportionately, according to the 
sums guaranteed: Albion Insurance v. G.I.O. (1969) 121 C.L.R. 342, 350; Ellesmere Brewing Co. v. 
Cooper [1896] 1 Q.B. 75, 80-81; Godin v. London Assurance Corp. (1758) 1 Burr. 489; 97 E.R. 419; 
Steel v. Dixon (1881) 17 Ch D. 825.
146 There could not be any acquiescence in, or request for, the co-surety's "services" in 
paying the creditor. This is reflected in the fact that the right of contribution is not dependent 
upon any express or implied contractual relationship between the parties.
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the co-sureties without explaining why such a presumption should exist. The 
reason for the presumption cannot be the co-sureties' enrichment. Such an 
argument would be circular.147 The most one could say is that because of the 
presumption of equality, each non-paying co-surety has been enriched to the 
extent of an equal share of the entire debt. Liability then, is not dependent upon 
any finding that a co-surety called upon to contribute has been enriched, but on 
the basis of some other underlying reason which justifies the presumption of 
equal sharing. This underlying reason rests on the parties common interest in 
the matter and their failure to provide for the particular contingency, and will 
be considered in Chapter 7.
§ 4.3.4 Necessitous Intervention in Another's Affairs
In limited circumstances, the law allows reimbursement for expenses 
incurred and, more exceptionally, remuneration for services rendered, where a 
plaintiff has unsolicitedly intervened in another's affairs. Many of these cases 
concern actions undertaken in the context of an emergency, to preserve 
another's life or property or well-being.148 In one example, a plaintiff who 
incurred expenses in "preserving" the defendant's horse where it would 
otherwise have been endangered was entitled to compensation for the expenses 
incurred.149 Other circumstances in which common law courts have allowed 
recovery for unsolicited services include the salvage of ships and cargo in 
maritime law; the supply of necessaries to legally incapacitated parties;
147 Cf. Abbot, E.V., "Keener on Quasi-Contract" (1896) 10 Harv. L.R. 209; 479, at 506. It 
should also be noted that as the party seeking contribution has voluntarily assumed the risk of 
liability to pay the whole debt, he or she has not suffered a corresponding detriment. See Butler,
P. , "Viewing Restitution at the Level of a Secondary Remedial Obligation" (1990) 16 Univ.
Q. L.J. 27, 40-41. Consequently, it cannot be said that any "benefit", even if it could be shown, 
was at the expense of the plaintiff.
148 Admittedly, liability in such cases is rare and some commentators are dismissive 
of such claims. See, e.g., Dawson, 60, who considers negotiorum gestio (the civil law doctrine of 
justifiable intervention in another's affairs) to be a "body of doctrine that contradicts almost 
totally the conclusions of modem American law." See also Buckland & McNair, Roman Law and 
Common Law (2d ed., 1952), 334; Hope, E.W., "Officiousness" (1929) 15 Com. L.Q. 25; Long,
R. A., "A Theory of Hypothetical Contract" (1984) 94 Yale L.J. 415, 418. Such sweeping 
dismissals of claims for unsolicited intervention in another's affairs appear to be overstated. See 
Stoljar, S.J., "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603, 611, and Chapter 8, 
for a further and more detailed consideration. As will be seen in that chapter, intervention in an 
emergency to aid another are not the only possible claims for unsolicited intervention. There 
are also cases in which self-interested actions may give rise to liability imposed upon another to 
bear the costs of such actions.
149 Great Northern Railway v. Swaffield (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 132. Acts done for the 
protection of another's property have only rarely, however, resulted in liability being imposed 
upon the recipient of such services. Cf. Mathews, supra n. 90, particularly at 349-50.
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intervention to effect burial of the dead; and the saving of human life.150 Of the 
few successful claims outside of maritime law, resort has been made to quasi­
contract and a number of other doctrines,151 often quite imaginatively, to allow 
recovery in such cases.
Can it be said that successful claims are explicable in terms of a purpose 
of reversing benefits gained by defendants? In all cases of necessitous 
intervention, some service has been conferred. Provided such a service can be 
valued, the defendant will have been objectively benefited152 to the extent of 
the reasonable market value of such service. On this approach, an enrichment is 
identifiable in all cases of necessitous intervention. For reasons already noted 
above, however, unjust enrichment theorists reject such a liberal test of 
enrichment as having any general application in the law of Restitution.153 But 
even if one adopts such an objective approach, contrary to most unjust 
enrichment theorists, so that the existence of an enrichment is consequently not 
at issue, it still needs to be ascertained whether the existence of the enrichment 
translates into a restitutionary remedy, so that the liability rule could be said to 
have a purpose of reversing enrichment. We will return to this shortly, after a 
consideration of a subjective approach and a receipt of wealth approach.
Any subjective approach to enrichment would be inapplicable in this 
context. The very distinguishing feature of cases of necessitous intervention is 
the unsolicited nature of the services. The defendant is either legally or 
factually incapacitated154 or absent, or it is not practicable to communicate with 
him or her. This leaves the receipt of wealth approach, which will be satisfied if 
a defendant has been saved a necessary expense.155 Arguably, such a 
conclusion may be appropriate where the intervention was successful—a life or 
property was saved or disaster was avoided—but if the intervention was
150 Although there appear to be no English or Australian cases on point, the right has 
not been disputed in English or Australian law. See, e.g., Goff & Jones, 375-8.
151 Inter alia, the law of agency, giving rise to the "agency of necessity" doctrine, 
implied contract, subrogation and contract law. See further, Chapter 8.
152 The defendant has been saved the expense of the objectively valuable services.
153 See § 4.2.2.1.
154 For a case of factual incapacity, see Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787 (suicide 
attempt, patient unconscious). For a case of legal incapacity, see Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch.D. 94 
(mental disorder).
155 There can have been no accretion in the value of a defendant's property.
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unsuccessful, it does seem inappropriate to talk of the saving of a necessary 
expense.156 Yet successful claims outside of maritime salvage do not appear to 
be dependent upon a successful intervention.157
Alternatively, one could argue that unsuccessful acts of rescue, provided 
they are reasonable, still save a necessary expense. That is, on a reasonable 
person test, the necessity of the expense at the time it was incurred does not 
require a guaranteed successful outcome.158 On such a conception of benefit, 
the "recipient" of emergency services, even where those services were 
unsuccessful, could be said to have been enriched. But as Stoljar points out, 
such a conclusion
would not only be odd, it would not be very relevant. For [the plaintiffs] 
recompense is calculated by the normal worth of his services or supplies, 
not by their actual benefit to [the defendant].159
Indeed, recompensing a plaintiff for the reasonable value of the services 
is only one possible remedy. Instead, a plaintiff may be reimbursed merely for 
expenses incurred (thus compensating his or her losses), or at the other 
extreme, he or she may even be granted a reward.160 This highlights the
156 Cf. Burrows, 247, fn. 2, who considers that a “reasonable man could say that he 
would only have been willing to pay for a result not an attempt" and that there can have been 
no incontrovertible benefit.
157 Even where a rescued party ultimately dies, recovery may still ensue. See Matheson 
v. Smiley, [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787. In the United States, see Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (1907) 
which expressly rejected the need to show a benefit, provided the intervener exercised due care 
and skill; and see The Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W. (2d) 907 (1961). Similarly, even if property 
sought to be saved is destroyed, reasonable expenses incurred by the intervener may be 
recoverable. See the example from German law in Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 99. Admittedly, 
there appear to be no common law decisions. Goff & Jones, 375, accept the principle, however, 
in those limited cases in which recovery for interveners saving property is allowed. Contrast 
Rose, F., “Restitution For The Rescuer“ (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 167, 173. Cf. Birks, P., "Negotiorum 
Gestio and the Common Law" [1971] C.L.P. 110,114.
158 The argument would be, in effect, that "it is proper to assume that the defendant 
would have authorised this expenditure if he had been given the opportunity of doing so": 
Goff & Jones, 375, arguing that the lack of success of an intervention ought not necessarily to 
preclude recovery. Contrast Burrows, supra n. 20. Goff and Jones appear to be applying a 
reasonable person test. One of the features of such test is that it ignores the idiosyncratic desires 
of the defendant and therefore Goff and Jones are not making a determination as to whether the 
defendant would have paid for or sought the services, but whether he or she should pay. Such a 
conclusion, it is suggested, is based upon unstated policies other than a need to reverse the 
defendant's enrichment. Asking whether a defendant has been enriched in such cases seems 
quite removed from the real determinative factors governing recovery. Indeed, it may 
obfuscate those other relevant issues.
159 Stoljar, supra n. 148, 612.
160 Cf. Goff & Jones, 374. See further Chapter 8. Certainly, no attempt has ever been
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problem with any unjust enrichment analysis of necessitous intervention cases. 
Even accepting that an enrichment is identifiable in all such cases, there are a 
number of alternative remedial responses not all of which can be considered 
restitutionary. Given the diversity of such remedial responses, it is difficult to 
argue that the purpose of recovery is benefit disgorgement to prevent unjust 
enrichment. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, many unjust enrichment theorists 
concede that cases of recovery for necessitous intervention are not unjust 
enrichment-based.161
§ 4.3.5 Property Disputes Upon a Breakdown in De Facto 
Relationships
After a breakdown in a domestic relationship, such as marriage or de 
facto marriage, claims may be made by one party to property legally owned by 
the other. Where no statutory provisions govern, which is commonly the case 
in the context of the breakdown in de facto relationships,162 common law rules 
will govern the resolution of such claims. The basis of liability in such cases will 
be considered in Chapter 7. In Canada, the courts have resorted to unjust 
enrichment to resolve such property disputes.163 Clearly, in the vast majority of 
cases, one party may indeed have benefited, on at least one approach to 
enrichment, at the expense of the other.164 For example, one party (the 
defendant) may retain full legal ownership of real property, despite 
contributions of income, resources, domestic services or materials by the other
made to determine whether a defendant has received any wealth. As Goff and Jones have 
noted, "it has never been contemplated that the value of [the rescuer's] services should be 
deemed to be the value of the life or property which he has saved": Goff & Jones, (3rd ed., 
1986), 29. Cf. (4th ed., 1993), 30-1.
161 Cf. Goff & Jones, 26; Birks, supra n. 43, 75, who concedes that claims by "agents of 
necessity" and salvors may not be based on unjust enrichment. Contrast Burrows, 247, who 
does not consider an analysis in terms of benefit disgorgement to raise any difficulties in most 
cases of necessitous intervention. At fn. 5, however, Burrows suggests that Matheson v. Smiley 
[1932] 2 D.L.R. 787, is a case concerning loss recovery.
162 In most common law jurisdictions, statutory provisions apply for the resolution of 
property disputes upon the breakdown in a relationship of marriage
163 And note the possible support for such a development in Australia. See 
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 87, per Toohey, J.
164 In most relationships, however, this will usually be mutually so. That is, the other 
party will almost invariably at the same time also have benefited at the other's expense. The 
Canadian courts have not explained how the different "benefits" of each party are to be 
balanced.
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party, to the relationship as a whole, or specifically for the maintenance, 
improvement or purchase of the property itself. In other words, one party may 
have made contributions to the relationship, of which a disproportionate share 
has inured to the benefit of the defendant. But importantly, the remedy in 
response to the defendant's "unjust enrichment" in many Canadian cases 
cannot be related back to any measure of the defendant's enrichment. At times, 
the remedy granted effects the fulfilment of the plaintiff's expectations, rather 
than merely the restitution of benefits received by the defendant.165 The point 
has been noted by Birks, for example, who has criticised the use of unjust 
enrichment to achieve such results.166
The point is simple but critical. There are cases in Restitution, including 
ones even specifically justified in terms of unjust enrichment, in which the 
remedy granted is not restitutionary. This suggests that the liability rule giving 
rise to the obligation in such cases is not aimed at reversing unjust enrichment. 
It may well be that restitution is the usual remedial response, but nevertheless, 
the liability rule's purpose extends beyond mere benefit disgorgement. At best, 
then, explanations based on unjust enrichment may tell us little about the 
rationale for liability in such areas of law. At worst, they may positively 
mislead.
§ 4.3.6 Summary
To this point, specific problems arising from the use of an enrichment 
analysis in various topics in Restitution have been highlighted. Advocates of 
unjust enrichment might reply that such problems are not of themselves 
insurmountable or necessarily detract from unjust enrichment theory as a 
whole. It might be argued that all legal concepts must deal with borderline and 
"hard" cases, that problems at the fringes of legal doctrine must always be 
overcome. Further, it might be argued that some of the difficulties noted above 
merely suggest that overzealous claims have at times been made for unjust 
enrichment—that the reach of unjust enrichment is more limited—but that 
unjust enrichment is still the crux of a significant body of law. It should be 
noted, though, that some of the problems highlighted above arise in the very
165 Cf. Sorochan v. Sorochan (1986) 29 D.L.R. (4th) 1, and Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 
D.L.R. (3d) 257.
166 See Birks, supra n. 8, 817-9, and discussion supra n. 8. Cf. Maddaugh & McCamus,
660-70.
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heartland of Restitution, that is, cases in which resort traditionally has been 
made to quasi-contract.
Arguments such as those above fail to address a number of fundamental 
problems with any analysis emphasising the existence of enrichment as a 
precondition for remedial relief. The difficulties highlighted above, it is 
suggested, are merely symptomatic of these more fundamental problems, 
which will now be considered.
4.4 FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF ENRICHMENT 
ANALYSIS
§ 4.4.1 The Nature of Remedial Relief Where Services Have Been 
Rendered
As is evident from the above discussion of cases in which services have 
been rendered, quasi-contractual relief characteristically takes the form of a 
quantum meruit for the "reasonable value" of the services. Unjust enrichment 
advocates have suggested that quantum meruit awards equate with the value of 
defendants' enrichment in such cases,167 so that quantum meruit relief is 
therefore restitutionary. Purely as a matter of logic, if one accepts the equation 
of the reasonable value of a service with benefit received, such a conclusion is 
indisputable. And consistently with the tendency of the courts to eschew other 
measures of recovery168 in many areas of law,169 theorists have not generally
167 See, e.g., Jones, supra n. 83, 289; Goff & Jones, 28-31. See also Deglman v. Guaranty 
Trust Co & Constantineau [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785. Indeed, it is said that where services have been 
freely accepted, such a measure of "benefit" is preferable to an award based on the receipt of 
wealth, for example, by measuring any net market increase in the value of property. Cf. Goff & 
Jones, (3rd ed.) 143 and (4th ed.) 171. This reflects the overwhelming tendency of the case law in 
awarding the reasonable value of services. See, however, commentators cited infra n. 179, who 
treat quantum meruit as a form of loss recovery.
168 In relation to necessitous intervention, for example. See supra n. 160.
169 But note that in the United States, in cases of the mistaken improvement of land, 
recovery tends to be limited to the increase in market value of land or costs incurred by the 
plaintiff, whichever is the less. See Palmer, §10.9(e) and the Restatement of Restitution, §42. See 
also Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. I l l ,  in which the plaintiff had improved the 
defendant's land under a mistaken belief (induced by the defendant) that a contract to purchase 
would be granted. Recovery based on the increased market value of land was awarded. Such a 
measure of recovery is criticised in Chapter 6, n. 310.
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advocated other possible measures of "benefit" in service cases.170 But as has 
already been suggested, a description of quantum meruit relief as a 
restitutionary remedy, that is, as effecting benefit disgorgement, is open to 
question. It is necessary, then, to explore the nature of quantum meruit relief.
Quantum meruit means "as much as he earned",171 or "as much as he 
deserved".172 As McKendrick has pointed out, however, it is possible to 
identify three different valuations of a quantum meruit claim:173 (1) the "market 
value" of the service;174 (2) the cost to the seller of providing the service, with 
an allowance for profit;175 and (3) the cost to the seller, with no allowance for 
profit.176 McKendrick considers that the courts have shown "no clear 
preference" for any of these measures.177
These are quite different methods of valuation, representing quite 
different measures of recovery. But whichever method of valuation is adopted, 
it seems artificial to describe any of these measures as having a restitutionary 
effect. If a plaintiffs costs or expenses are recoverable, without any profit 
element, the remedy compensates the plaintiff for his or her losses incurred;178 
and many commentators perceive quantum meruit precisely as a loss recovery
170 E.g., supra n. 160.
171 Bird, R. (ed) Osborne's Concise Law Dictionary (7th ed., 1983).
172 Saunders, J.B. (ed) Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (7th ed.).
173 McKendrick, E., 'The Battle of The Forms and The Law of Restitution" (1988) 8 
O.J.L.S. 197, 218. Cf. Dobbs, 260-9.
174 "[T]he sum which a willing supplier and buyer would have agreed upon.": Goff & 
Jones, 28. Given that suppliers in the market are generally motivated by the pursuit of profit, 
such a valuation will usually include a profit element. Cf. The "Batis" [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345, 
353; Lodder v. Slowey [1904] A.C. 442,444,453.
175 Hence, again, the plaintiff receives at least a reasonable profit. Cf. Gino 
D'Alessandro Constructions v. Powis [1987] 2 Qd.R. 40,43.
176 E.g., as in Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909) according to Goff & Jones, 492, fn. 
62, but the report does not make this clear. See infra n. 200. In cases of necessitous intervention, 
recovery will more likely merely be for expenses incurred rather than either the reasonable 
value of services, or costs incurred plus a profit element. See Chapter 8.
177 Contrast Carter, J.W., "Ineffective Transactions" in Finn, 206, 235, who considers 
that valuation is a "very straightforward process."
178 In precontractual liability cases, this appears to be the measure of relief where 
work on a defendant's land was not requested or acquiesced in by the defendant, such as in 
Estok v. Heguy (1963) 40 D.L.R. 2d. 88.
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mechanism.179 Alternatively, the reasonable value of services usually includes 
a profit element, as services on the market are not usually provided at cost 
price.180 Similarly, a "cost plus profit" valuation includes a reasonable profit 
element. In both these methods of valuation, then, a plaintiff is awarded what 
he or she might reasonably be entitled to expect, the profit element being 
determined at a market rate rather than according to a plaintiff's own or 
"actual" expectations. Further, and perhaps surprisingly given that many 
quantum meruit cases arise in the context of incomplete or defective contracts, 
the practical consequence of many quantum meruit awards is to fulfil a 
plaintiff's actual, usually "contractual" expectations. For example, as will be 
seen in Chapter 6, where a plaintiff performs services under a contract 
unenforceable for want of formality, the courts may refer to the contract price 
as evidence of the reasonable value of such services. It is not unusual for that 
contract price to be adopted as the measure of relief.181
A plaintiff awarded a quantum meruit, then, recovers at the very least his 
or her losses incurred and, commonly, a further element of reasonable profit. 
The very focus of quantum meruit is on a plaintiff, and what that plaintiff is 
reasonably entitled to expect, rather than on the extent to which a defendant 
has obtained a benefit. As one case expressed it, a plaintiff is remunerated 
"according to his deserts".182 Given this emphasis, to adopt a very wide 
conception of benefit and concomitantly, a wide conception of restitution, 
seems merely a convenience or fiction rather than an accurate reflection of the
179 See, e.g., Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio 10; Dobbs, 792, but cf. at 261; Fuller & Perdue, 
supra n. 123, 394; McKendrick, supra n. 173, 218; Henderson, S.D., "Promises Grounded in the 
Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts" (1971) Va. L.R. 1115,1147,1150- 
1; Perillo, supra n. 8; and Beatson, Chp. 2, though it would seem only in relation to quantum 
meruit awards for "pure" services. Contrast Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 125 P. 860 (1912), 863, 
which suggests that a quantum meruit claim for reasonable value will not equate with the loss 
suffered by the service provider. Commentators who see quantum meruit as a loss-recovery 
mechanism, however, tend to ignore the profit element included in many such awards.
180 See supra n. 174.
181 See further, Chapter 6. Examples are Scarisbrick v. Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T.R. 175; 
and Ward v. Griffiths (1928) 28 N.S.W.L.R. 425.
182 Scott v. Pattison [1923] 2 K.B. 723, 727, per Salter J. See also Pavey & Mathews v. Paul 
(1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 600. In The "Batis" [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 345, 353, Hobhouse J. considered 
that the
relevant type of quantum meruit, implied agreement to pay reasonable remuneration, 
does not depend upon an assessment of the gain to the person who has made the 
request for the services but upon assessing the proper remuneration for the person who 
has, at the other's request, rendered the services.
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remedial effect of quantum meruit awards. The artificiality is even more 
apparent if one goes on to suggest that the purpose of the liability rules is 
benefit disgorgement. The point is well made by Fuller and Perdue:
As the "benefit" received by the defendant becomes more ethereal, the 
role in the total judicial motivation which is properly assignable to a 
desire to prevent the defendant from keeping an unjust gain becomes 
increasingly less, until the point is finally reached where it must be 
assumed to disappear altogether. An attenuation of the concept 
"benefit" means, therefore, at least an increasing emphasis on the 
reliance interest (making the plaintiff whole), and it may mean that the 
protection of that interest has become the exclusive raison d'etre of 
judicial intervention.183
In the United States, at least, the use of quasi-contract or Restitution to 
effect loss-recovery has been persuasively demonstrated and the cases 
comprehensively documented.184 Many of these cases may be explicable on a 
wide conception of benefit as preventing unjust enrichment. But the inutility of 
such an explanation is further highlighted by the fact that in many of these 
cases, quantum meruit is utilised in the context of contracts which are
183 Fuller & Perdue, supra n. 123, 393. At 394 they stress the point again:
When the benefit received by the defendant has become as attenuated as it is in some of 
the cases cited, and when this benefit is "measured" by the plaintiff's detriment, can it 
be supposed that a desire to make the defendant disgorge is really a significant part of 
judicial motivation? When it becomes impossible to believe this, then the courts are 
actually protecting the reliance interest, in whatever form their intervention may be 
clothed.
Some American courts have recognised that the motivation behind recovery is the 
compensation of losses incurred as a result of the defendant's conduct. The point is made in 
Kearns v. Andree, 139 A. 695 (1928), 697 (recovery under an unenforceable contract, for services 
in the form of work and modifications to the plaintiff's own property):
The basis of that implication [of a contract! is that the services have been requested and 
have been performed by the plaintiff in the known expectation that he would receive 
compensation, and neither the extent nor the presence of benefit to the defendant from 
their performance is of controlling significance.
The point has also been made by Getzler, J., "Unconscionable Conduct and Unjust Enrichment 
as Grounds for Judicial Review" (1990) 16 Monash U.L.R. 283, 313:
It is difficult to see how clarity of analysis is advanced by describing the value of a 
detriment resulting from reliance as an objective 'enrichment' on the basis of free 
acceptance. ... [I]t makes better sense to state that by inducing or accepting 
expenditures and services, a defendant becomes liable to remedy any corresponding 
detriment because he is responsible for that detriment per se;
184 See, e.g., Dawson supra n. 133, particularly at 588, 621; and generally Perillo, supra 
n. 8; Childres & Garamella, supra n. 8.
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incomplete or defective. Plaintiffs' losses will have been caused by their 
reliance upon the defendants' representations or conduct and the defendants' 
subsequent refusal to perform as promised. As will be seen in Chapter 6, this 
clear causal link between such plaintiffs' losses and the defendants' conduct 
allows us to draw comparisons with liability in contract and suggests that a 
requirement that defendants have benefited as a result is unnecessary and 
unwarranted. The existence of loss alone will be sufficient to trigger liability. 
This means that in many areas of law where the issue of enrichment is most 
troublesome to unjust enrichment theorists, such enrichment is not 
conceptually relevant to the operation of the liability rule.185
§ 4.4.2 "Enrichment" as a Conclusion of, as Opposed to Precondition 
for, Liability
As has been seen, a number of different approaches to enrichment are 
possible. Within each general approach, a number of specific tests formulated 
by various commentators were considered. Yet none of these specific tests, or 
even general approaches, are capable of universal application, explaining 
liability in all Restitution cases. A particular approach may "work" in one area, 
but clearly be inapplicable to others. For example, in cases of necessitous 
intervention, a subjective approach is inapplicable, a receipt of wealth approach 
faces difficulties, leaving only an objective approach to identify an enrichment 
in all cases. Yet such an objective approach has been widely rejected as having 
general application in the law of Restitution. In other areas of law, no approach 
to enrichment explains liability, with no enrichment being identifiable, or else 
the remedial response to an identifiable enrichment being one other than 
restitution of that enrichment.
If no approach to enrichment is of universal application, one might 
resort to a combination of the different approaches and the refinements and 
qualifications thereto in order to explain liability in most (though still not all) of 
the topics claimed for Restitution. Some commentators advocate such a flexible 
conception of enrichment.186 One may then say that most cases can be seen as 
conforming to an enrichment analysis, or more accurately, to several 
enrichment analyses. But rather than seeing this as a vindication of an 
explanation based on enrichment reversal, it must be seen as evidence of its
185 The cases considered in § 4.3.1 and § 4.3.2 provide good examples. See further, 
Chapter 6.
186 See infra n. 189.
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failure. The crux of this failing is that such a flexible conception does not 
answer the question as to which approach to enrichment should be utilised in a 
given case. Since different approaches to enrichment can lead to radically 
different conclusions as to whether a defendant has in fact been enriched, there 
must be some reason for choosing one approach over another. Merely to do so 
either to make past decisions conform with an unjust enrichment analysis, or 
alternatively, to solve future problems in accordance with certain unstated 
objectives, suggests strongly against enrichment reversal as the underlying 
motivation for recovery. As Sutton has correctly pointed out, if benefit is 
capable of being given so many different meanings,
[ljogically, the 'principle of unjust enrichment' cannot determine which 
of these meanings of 'benefit' are selected in any particular case, since 
'benefit' is one of the elements of the principle itself. So some other 
policy or principle must also be at work here, the term 'benefit' being left 
ambiguous to allow for this.187
Without the supplementation of the notion of benefit by such other 
policies or principles, enrichment merely becomes "a conclusory label that 
judges affix when they have decided, for whatever reason, to allow the plaintiff 
to recover" .188 No advocate of enrichment theory has yet adequately identified 
any systematic or principled basis upon which to determine when and why a 
particular test of enrichment is more appropriate than another in a given fact 
situation. For example, Palmer has stated that
the term benefit has no single meaning in the law of restitution; instead, 
meaning will vary with the circumstances, especially with the ground 
for restitution.189
This is a remarkable concession, for Palmer does not provide us with any 
guide, other than sui generis conclusions, as to why one approach is appropriate 
in one case, but not in others. This suggests other legal or moral principles or 
policies are being applied. To say a defendant was "enriched" appears to be the
187 Sutton, R., "Unjust Enrichment" (1981) 5 Otago L.R. 187,194.
188 Long, supra n. 148,418.
189 Palmer, Vol. I, 44. See also Sullivan, supra n. 1, at 12, who considers that "the 
definition of benefit has varied depending upon the exigencies of a particular case." Also, at 25: 
"[Clourts often express the concept of benefit so generally that the definition becomes 
essentially meaningless as precedent." Dobbs, 260, states that the measure of restitution should 
reflect the substantive law purposes that call for restitution in the first place. This, of course, 
means that such "substantive law purposes" cannot simply be described in terms of unjust 
enrichment. Similarly, see Rinker, supra n. 17, 553: "Ideally, perhaps, benefit in each case 
should be determined on its particular facts, and the remedy moulded accordingly."
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end result of the application of such other factors. Consequently, it would seem 
that "enrichment" is not the precondition for liability.
An example will illustrate the point. If P mistakenly improves D's 
property, without D's knowledge, a number of approaches are possible. 
Theorists who emphasise the law's deferral to a subjective approach190 would 
suggest recovery may be precluded. Theorists who stress a receipt of wealth 
approach would support recovery of, say, any increase in the market value of 
D's property. Both results are possible under unjust enrichment theory which, 
without more, does not indicate why one approach is to be preferred over the 
other. Of course, each theorist may argue that his or her approach is the correct 
one; either normatively, or as a description of past decisions. But in canvassing 
one approach in preference to another, one needs to resort to arguments of 
policy and principle unrelated to any concept of enrichment. The debate about 
"enrichment" becomes merely the pretext for promoting other principles.191 
The circularity in reasoning is obvious if one states that the crux of the liability 
rule determining the rights of the mistaken improver is benefit disgorgement.
The considerable detail and complexity of tests of enrichment 
propounded by some commentators suggests that such commentators192 have 
attempted to incorporate the nuances and subtleties normally found within 
liability rules into the definition of enrichment. Perhaps no better example is 
provided by the concept of "free acceptance"—said to establish the issue of 
benefit—the very elements of which focus on a defendant's conduct. Indeed, 
Birks considers a free acceptance test will be satisfied where it would be 
unconscionable for a defendant to resort to subjective devaluation. Yet the type 
of conduct thus focused upon, such as the creation of false expectations, or 
acquiescence in certain detrimental actions of a plaintiff, may well justify relief 
irrespective of any enrichment of the defendant, that is, even where a plaintiff 
merely has incurred foreseeable losses in reliance upon such conduct.193
190 English law has been described as deferring to a subjective approach: e.g., Birks, 
109-14, particularly at 110-1.
191 Consider, for example, the debate as to what incontrovertible benefit encompasses. 
The differences of opinion are particularly relevant to a determination of when a mistaken 
improver may be entitled to some form of relief.
192 Birks appears to be a particularly notable example
193 Beatson, 34-9, (also at [1987] C.L.P. 78-82), highlights this when he states that free 
acceptance is established by factors (“consent", “reliance", etc.) which independently give rise 
to obligations and therefore render such claims as dependent upon liability creating factors
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One might reply that the complexities associated with enrichment could 
be avoided if the nuances and subtleties of the liability rules are reflected in the 
“unjust" part of unjust enrichment. As Fridman has pointed out,
[t]he unjustness of the enrichment, or perhaps of the conduct of the 
defendant, seems to be of greater relevance than the question of 
benefit.194
Such an argument does not erase, however, the difficulties created by the 
connection of the epithet "unjust" with enrichment. For a restitutionary 
purpose is still said to be the crux of the matter. And not all cases, even on the 
widest possible approach to benefit, can be described as having a purpose of 
the reversal of enrichment.
There remains a further difficulty for any enrichment-based analysis of 
Restitution problems. Even accepting that a defendant has been enriched in a 
given case, which measure of enrichment should form the basis of any 
restitutionary remedy? As the measure of benefit can vary considerably 
according to which approach to enrichment is used, so too can the measure of 
restitution.
An example, a variation on the facts of the American case Vickery v. 
Ritchie,195 illustrates the difficulty. Two parties agree that the plaintiff should 
build a swimming pool on the defendant's land. As a result of a mutual 
misunderstanding, the fault of neither party, the defendant believes she is to 
pay $5000 for the work; and the plaintiff believes he will receive $9000 for the 
work. The mistake is discovered after the completion of the swimming pool. 
The "contract" is held void, due to the parties mutual misunderstanding as to 
price.196 The plaintiff seeks recovery, but the defendant refuses to pay more 
than $5000. If unjust enrichment analysis is applied, what is the measure of the 
defendant's enrichment?
A number of possible measures could be adopted. First, there is the
other than unjust enrichment.
194 Fridman, 36.
195 88 N.E. 835 (1909).
196 Cf. Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909), in which the mistake was the result of the 
fraud of a third party.
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reasonable value of the services conferred, objectively measured at, say, 
$8000.197 Secondly, the net accretion in the value of the defendant's land (which 
may be an incontrovertible benefit), might be, say, $6000.198 Thirdly, if one 
adopts a subjective approach, there is some debate as to what the appropriate 
measure should be. Clearly, the defendant has indicated that the pool is of 
value to her, but she was only prepared to pay $5000. Some commentators 
would argue this to be the appropriate subjective measure.199 In contrast, 
others have argued that the reasonable value of the services ($8000) is the 
appropriate measure of subjective enrichment, given that the work was 
accepted and that the plaintiff could not have known of the defendant's 
expectation of only paying $5000.200 In fact, some unjust enrichment theorists 
has advocate "loss-splitting" as an appropriate alternative remedial response to 
this sort of problem.201 Applying unjust enrichment does not provide a 
solution as to which measure ought to be adopted. This is evidenced by the 
range of views as to the correct conclusion in examples such as this.202
If unjust enrichment is abandoned, however, it may well be possible to
197 Leaving aside whether this includes a profit element or not.
198 Williston, Contracts (3rd ed., 1970) §1485, 314-5, appears to support such a measure 
of recovery in circumstances such as those in the above example where such a measure is 
greater than the sum which the defendant expected to pay.
199 Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 129,136-7.
200 Cf. Goff & Jones, 29. This last measure accords with the actual result in Vickery v. 
Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909), which adopted such a reasonable value. There is some doubt as to 
whether or not the sum awarded in that case included a profit element. Goff & Jones, 492, fn. 
62, assert unequivocally that the plaintiff recovered only his "total cost". In this writer's view, 
however, the report suggests that the sum awarded was the reasonable value, including a profit 
component. Such an interpretation would seem to have the support of Kos, S., & Watts, P., 
"Unjust Enrichment—The New Cause of Action" New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 1990, at 
140. Cf. Palmer, Vol. Ill, 453.
201 Palmer, Vol. Ill, 453, advocates such a solution to Vickery v. Ritchie-type problems. 
In that case, a rogue was responsible for the mistake. In Palmer's view, loss-splitting (the loss 
being the difference between the reasonable value of the work and the increased value of the 
land) is not precluded in Restitution, for it is open to a court to "determine the fairest way to 
measure that benefit in money." Palmer, 454-5, suggests such a solution wherever neither party 
was responsible for the misunderstanding, but this appears to contradict an earlier expressed 
view that in cases of mutual misunderstanding, a "reasonable" value is appropriate: 452. Kos & 
Watts, supra n. 200, 140, consider a loss-splitting solution as an "attractive one", but concede 
difficulties of "making this solution compatible with the concept of enrichment generally 
accepted." Goff & Jones, 492, also consider loss-splitting as one possible solution in cases such 
as Vickery v. Ritchie, but finally support the "reasonable value" solution actually adopted in that 
case.
202 See supra nn. 197-200.
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postulate other explanatory ideas which also suggest the appropriate measure 
of recovery. It will be argued in Chapter 6 that in cases of contracts which are 
defective or incomplete, the basis for imposing liability rests on the existence of 
most or all of the essential (that is, substantial as opposed to technical or 
formal) elements of an ordinary contract. Recovery is contract-like in 
appearance. To take the above example, the defendant has requested services in 
circumstances where she clearly expected to pay for such services. The plaintiff 
performs and completes the non-gratuitously conferred services. But the parties 
are not ad idem as to the appropriate price. Indeed, there is no way of 
ascertaining a mutually agreed upon price. The solution which flows from such 
an analysis is one the courts have traditionally resorted to where price is 
uncertain or left unspecified. The defendant is required to pay, perhaps in 
contract,203 but more usually in quasi-contract, a reasonable price for the 
services. Such a reasonable price may be more than one party expected to pay, 
or less than the other party expected to receive, but there is no reason, ceretis 
peribus, why the court should prefer one party's expectations over those of the 
other. Such a solution accords with results in cases raising the same problem as 
the above example.204
In summary, different approaches to enrichment can lead to different 
conclusions as to the existence of a benefit and its appropriate measure. Unjust 
enrichment theory does not provide any guidance as to why and when one 
approach is to be preferred over another. Consequently, “enrichment" does not 
appear to be the precondition for liability in many cases said to be explicable in 
terms of benefit disgorgement, but instead appears to be a conclusion reached 
after a process of reasoning quite unrelated to the issue of benefit.
§ 4.4.3 The Problem of Doctrine Excision
Undoubtedly, there are difficulties in applying unjust enrichment 
analysis to as wide a range of topics as have at times and by different
2°3 Chapter 6, where the possibility of an implied term as to price in an otherwise 
complete contract will be considered.
204 E.g., Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909). See also Meem Haskins Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 
187 S.W. 2d. 435 (1945). In Vickery v. Ritchie, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff the 
"fair value of his labor and materials." Goff and Jones suggest that the plaintiff received only 
the "total cost" of the work, excluding the usual profit element. Although this view was 
doubted, supra n. 200, even if correct, the slightly lower award, still within one possible 
quantum meruit valuation, may be justifiable because the mutual misunderstanding was the 
result of a third party's fraud. Perhaps the court considered that the plaintiff ought not profit 
from that fraud by making a profit, even only a reasonable one, on the contract.
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commentators been claimed for unjust enrichment. This is acknowledged by 
most participants in the current debate over the exact reach of unjust 
enrichment.205
One way in which theorists respond to such difficulties is to argue that 
particular cases or specific liability rules or doctrines ought to be excluded from 
unjust enrichment and, perhaps, Restitution.206 Consequently, for example, 
cases of precontractual liability in which merely reliance losses have been 
recovered, have been conceded by some to have a purpose other than the 
reversal of enrichment.207 In relation to necessitous intervention, it has been 
said that some cases allowing recovery "may simply reflect society's concern to 
encourage intervention in an emergency rather than its desire to deprive a 
defendant of an unjust benefit."208 Outside the realm of specific doctrine, a 
general competing theory of "unjust sacrifice" has been developed to explain 
recovery for those services which are not considered enriching .209 
Alternatively, it has been argued, recovery for "pure" services reflects, inter alia, 
notions of "reliance" .210
Such theoretical developments are in one sense commendable. Such 
developments either concede the difficulties inherent in a concept of "benefit"
205 As evidenced by concessions by various commentators noted throughout this 
chapter, that individual cases, particular liability rules, or even parts of Restitution, are not 
concerned with the disgorgement of enrichment. The context which necessitates such 
concessions is described by Beatson, 21:
For restitution lawyers the temptation is artificially to enlarge the category of
obligations which are based on the defendant's unjust enrichment at the expense of the
plaintiff by an overinclusive concept of enrichment.
206 Those who perceive Restitution as being itself defined by unjust enrichment would 
be in this camp. Others perceive Restitution as a subject extending beyond unjust enrichment.
207 See, e.g., Goff & Jones, 554-63, particularly at 557, in relation to William Lacey 
(Hounslow) Ltd v. Davis [19571 2 All E.R. 712. Contrast Birks, in Burrows, Essays, 141-3.
208 Goff & Jones, 26. Cf. Burrows, 247.
209 Stoljar, S.J., "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603. See 
also Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 8-17, for a more detailed discussion. Muir, supra n. 7, has 
developed these ideas.
210 Beatson, Chp. 2. Birks, Restitution—The Future, 101-2, and Garner, supra n. 3, point 
out that "reliance" does not specify the doctrinal vehicle for recovery and in Birks' view, this 
supports his argument that such cases are examples of unjust enrichment. But Beatson appears 
to concede that Restitution extends beyond unjust enrichment and that hence, quasi-contractual 
remedies, amongst others, may be used to recover reliance-losses.
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generally211 or at least concede that unjust enrichment is more limited in its 
operation than has at times been claimed.212 But there is a fundamental 
problem which results from such reasoning. The problem, to be labelled 
perhaps somewhat uninformatively as "doctrine excision", calls for 
consideration in some detail. The problem of doctrine excision manifests itself 
as two closely related consequences which follow from distinguishing between 
cases in which restitution of a benefit, on at least one approach, is 
discernible,213 and cases in which no benefit is conceded to exist. These two 
consequences are as follows:
(1) Coherent and intelligible, individual doctrines would be divided 
artificially into two doctrines. One of these "new" doctrines will then be said to 
be explicable in terms of unjust enrichment,214 simply because the remedy 
utilised is restitutionary in all cases incorporated within the new doctrine. Such 
a conceptualisation would ignore the previously single doctrine's coherent 
explanation which recognises the possibility of a number of remedial responses 
(including restitution) to fulfil the doctrine's purpose.
(2) Separate doctrines, operating in one subject area raising similar 
problems (for example, precontractual dealing),215 would be given disparate 
treatment, despite such doctrines being unified by the existence of common 
underlying principles other than unjust enrichment. Some doctrines would be 
treated as unjust enrichment-based and others would be left for consideration 
elsewhere.216 Such a disparate treatment would follow despite the fact that 
certain common elements necessary for relief can be identified, allowing for 
recovery in one or other of the doctrines. The existence of a benefit may at most 
merely influence which doctrine appropriately should be utilised.
211 Cf. also Fridman, 33-6.
212 E.g., Beatson, Chp. 2.
213 Although the remedial response may thus be restitutionary, either indisputably so, 
or at least on a wide conception of that remedy, it does not follow that the liability rules giving 
rise to liability necessarily have a restitutionary purpose, a point which will be illustrated here.
214 Whereby unjust enrichment is the "underlying principle" of that doctrine, or else 
the doctrine is a specific manifestation of a generic cause of action in unjust enrichment.
215 In which type of case estoppel, quasi-contract, or even "implied contract" have 
variously been utilised.
216 And, as Hedley points out, supra n. 38, 60, perhaps to "drop out of sight again" 
and be ignored.
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The burden of the problem has been summed up by Finn, when 
considering the appropriateness of unjust enrichment as an explanation of 
particular equitable doctrines:
[Those] doctrines are to be explained, and can better be explained, in 
other ways which reveal their essential purpose, their vital ingredients, 
as also their relationship with other bodies of law. There seems to me to 
be little useful purpose to be served in dismembering presently 
intelligible doctrines to satisfy restitution's imperialism (or perhaps to 
assuage its self-doubts) merely because those doctrines in some factual 
contexts can secure restitutionary results.217
As will be seen, the problem of doctrine excision arises essentially 
because formalistic distinctions are being adopted as part of the 
conceptualisation of much of what is now Restitution. Such formalistic 
distinctions are not ones which enlighten our understanding of liability rules 
and doctrines. Such formalism must be rejected. As Birks has said, "[nlobody 
would wish to encourage the inconvenience of dispersing in different books the 
different species of similar responses to a single event."218 Yet, as will be seen, 
this is a perhaps inevitable consequence of any theory which isolates benefit 
disgorgement as the critical factor in understanding liability rules.
To fully explain and illustrate the problem of doctrine excision, a 
number of specific examples will be considered: proprietary estoppel; the 
notion of duress, manifesting itself in the operation of a number of doctrines; 
and liability arising from precontractual dealing. As well, a more general 
manifestation of the problem of doctrine excision—a division between money 
and service cases—arising potentially in all areas of Restitution, will be 
considered.
§ 4.4.3.1 Proprietary estoppel
Australian law appears to be moving toward a recognition of "one 
concept of estoppel common to, or straddling, common law and equity" ,219 
which concept is unified by an "over-arching" concern of preventing detriment 
to a plaintiff who has relied on the correctness of an assumption or expectation,
217 See Finn, supra n. 11,15-6. See also, Finn, supra n. 8, 22.
218 Birks, 33.
219 The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason, 'The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in the 
Common Law World: An Australian Perspective" in Waters, D.M., Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(1993), 19. See also Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394.
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encouraged or at least acquiesced in by the defendant.220 The estopped party 
will be prevented from denying the correctness of the assumption by insisting 
on his or her legal rights or resiling from an assumed state of affairs, where it 
would be unconscionable to do so. Should such a recognition of a unified 
estoppel take root, then the historically distinct category of proprietary estoppel 
would be seen as but one species or manifestation of a single doctrine. 
Alternatively—and this still appears to be the case in England—proprietary 
estoppel may itself be seen as a single doctrine.221 In either case, proprietary 
estoppel has certain features distinguishing it as a discrete body of specific 
rules governing recovery within a particular factual context.222
The operation of proprietary estoppel can be exemplified by the case of 
Hamilton v. Geraghty 223 In that case, X built a small dwelling on a block of land 
owned by the defendant, under the mistaken belief it was his own. The 
defendant, knowing of X's mistake, allowed him to persevere in his error and 
subsequently took possession of the land and refused the plaintiff, the assignee 
of X's interest, entry. The plaintiff was held to be entitled to a lien for the 
expenditure incurred.224 There are numerous similar cases, either where a 
landowner has stood by, knowing of a plaintiff's mistake,225 or alternatively, 
actively created expectations upon which a plaintiff has detrimentally relied.226
220 Cf. Mason, id, that the concept of equity
seeks to avoid detriment to a party who has acted upon the correctness of an 
assumption or state of affairs which the party estopped has encouraged or expected or 
ought reasonably to have expected.
221 Cf. Gray, K., Elements of Land Law (2nd ed., 1993), 312-4, and generally Chp. 11.
222 These specific rules are nonetheless ones consistent with the unifying concerns of 
estoppel as a whole.
223 [1901] 1 N.S.W.R. 81
224 This was the remedy sought by the plaintiff in Hamilton v. Geraghty [1901] 1 
N.S.W.R. 81, though the court made it clear that the plaintiff would have been entitled to the 
transfer of the defendant's interest if such a remedy had been sought.
225 E.g., Huning v. Ferrers (1711) Gilb. Rep. 85; Taylor's Fashions v. Liverpool Victoria 
Trustees [1982] 1 Q.B. 133; Jackson v. Gator (1800) 5 Ves. Jun. 688; Stiles v. Cowper (1748) 3 Atk. 
692; Dann v. Spurier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun. 231.
226 E.g., Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (1862) 4 De G.F. & J. 517, 45 E.R. 1285; Plimmer v. Mayor of 
Wellington (1884) L.R. 9 A.C. 699.
Initially, it was considered that there were two separate lines of authority: "acquiescence" 
cases, and "active encouragement" cases. It has been said that "[t]he historical justification for 
their particular dichotomy is negligible" and that "the acquiescence and the encouragement
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The remedy arising from the estoppel may vary according to the circumstances 
giving rise to the equities in the plaintiffs favour.227 At times, defendants have 
been required to compensate the plaintiffs for their losses, for example, by 
means of a lien for expenditure incurred.228 At other times, defendants have 
been required to fulfil a plaintiffs expectations, for example, by transferring 
their interest in land to the plaintiffs.229
The coherence of proprietary estoppel stems from a plaintiffs reliance 
upon a belief or expectation encouraged or acquieseced in by the defendant as 
to an existing or future interest in land, which belief or expectation is 
subsequently falsified. The plaintiffs reliance would result in detriment if a 
defendant who acquiesced in or encouraged the plaintiffs behaviour is allowed 
to insist on his or her strict legal rights to deny the correctness of the plaintiffs 
belief or expectation.230
Often, defendants will be asserting their strict legal rights in order to
cases are each but emanations of the 'wider equitable jurisdiction'": Finn, P.D., "The Making 
Good of Expectations" in Finn, P.D. (ed.), Essays in Equity (1985), 70, citing Taylor's Fashions v. 
Liverpool Victoria Trustees [1982] 1 Q.B. 133, 147. It will be seen below that a consequence of 
unjust enrichment analysis could be to revert to such a separation of acquiescence and 
encouragement cases.
227 In Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington (1884) L.R. 9 A.C. 699, 714, it was stated that "the 
Court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity may be 
satisfied."
228 Such as in Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association v. King (1858) 25 Beav. 72; 53 
E.R. 563. And note Hamilton v. Geraghty [1901] 1 N.S.W.R. 81, itself.
229 Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington (1884) L.R. 9 A.C. 699. And see the differing views 
of the majority and minority in Jackson v. Crosby (1979) 21 S.A.S.R. 280, as to the measure of 
recovery.
230 Cf. Ward v. Kirkland [1967] Ch. 194, 235, per Ungoed-Thomas J. Courts have 
emphasised the need to show "bad faith" or a "bad conscience" on the part of the defendant. 
Where, however, there has been no acquiescence in, or active encouragement of, a plaintiffs 
actions, so that the defendant's insistence on his or her strict legal rights cannot be said to have 
been "unconscionable" in some way, a plaintiff will generally be denied relief. This will be so 
even where a plaintiff has acted under a mistake. Thus, in Brand v. Chris Building Co. Pty Ltd 
[1957] V.R. 625, the plaintiffs mistakenly built a house on the defendants' vacant lot without the 
knowledge of the defendants. They were refused any recovery. In Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 
1 H.L. 129 and Willmott v. Barber (1880) L.R. 15 Ch.D. 96, two significant cases in establishing 
the principles of proprietary estoppel claims, the courts found that the defendants in each case 
were not aware of the plaintiffs' mistakes. Consequently, no rights arose. In both cases it was 
concluded that the defendants' lacked the requisite degree of knowledge of the plaintiffs' 
mistaken assumption. In Ramsden v. Dyson, this seems a very harsh finding of fact and the 
dissenting conclusions of fact of Lord Kingsdowne appears preferable.
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seize an advantage, such as improvements made to their property.231 But this 
will not be so in all cases and the receipt of a benefit is not a pre-requisite for 
the operation of proprietary estoppel. Thus in Crabb v. Arun District Council,232 
the plaintiff acted on the faith of representations made by the defendant and 
subsequently unfulfilled,233 in a way which affected the value of the plaintiffs 
own property.234 Nevertheless, the court was prepared to grant relief, by 
requiring the defendants to make good their representations, thus fulfilling the 
plaintiffs expectations.235
Given the absence of any benefit and the nature of the relief in cases such 
as Crabb v. Arun, Birks has argued that cases which fulfil a plaintiffs 
expectations cannot be considered restitutionary and thus based on unjust 
enrichm ent.236 Doubtless, this is correct. But Birks goes on to argue, 
nevertheless, that acquiescence cases are explicable in terms of unjust 
enrichment, with the defendant's benefit established by his or her free 
acceptance of the plaintiffs services. Birks thus suggests a possible division of 
proprietary estoppel cases into two distinct doctrines. Cases in which a 
defendant has acquiesced in a plaintiffs conduct are said to be based on unjust 
enrichment, giving rise to a restitutionary remedy. Those cases in which a 
plaintiff relied on an expectation created by the defendant as to some existing 
or future interest in the defendant's land are enforceable on the basis of "a 
doctrine of promissory estoppel" .237
231 Thus, in Hurting v. Ferrers (1711) Gilb. Rep. 85, 85, the court noted that the 
plaintiff's repairs on the land were carried out whilst the defendant stood by "with a design to 
reap the whole benefit thereof."
232 [19751 3 All E.R. 865
233 Representations were made that an easement would be granted over the 
defendant's land.
234 The plaintiff subdivided his land, leaving part of the subdivision without any road 
access. The defendant's refusal to grant the easement seriously affected any possible use to be 
made of the land.
235 Defendant was required to grant an easement to the plaintiff, to provide him with 
access to his land. In Crabb v. Arun, the defendant did not intimate any acceptance of a benefit 
and in fact, they were not even aware of the plaintiff's detrimental actions, although such 
actions were foreseeable. No "service" was performed that could be "freely accepted." The 
plaintiff's actions solely produced a loss.
236 Birks, 290-4. Birks' ideas are discussed and criticised by Getzler, supra n. 183.
237 Birks, 290-1:
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The effect of such a division would be entirely deleterious, 
"dismembering" 238 proprietary estoppel ultimately along irrelevant lines. 
There are, for a start, a number of criticisms of detail which can be made of 
such a division. For example, it may be difficult in some circumstances to draw 
a clear factual distinction between conduct which is merely acquiescent on the 
one hand and conduct which actively creates expectations on the other, such as 
where a plaintiffs assumption is "only tentatively held" so that the defendant's 
acquiescence confirms and "in a sense, positively generates that 
assumption."239
More importantly, the basis for Birks' division rests purely on the 
remedial response to given facts. But in some acquiescence cases, the courts 
have been prepared to fulfil expectations.240 In Australia, the weight of 
authority appears to favour a view of estoppel as a doctrine aimed at averting 
or reversing a plaintiff's detriment. But at times, the only way in which this 
may be possible is by the fulfilment of the plaintiff's expectation.241 Often, such 
expectation-fulfilling remedies may be necessary where the plaintiff's 
detriment resulted from reliance upon a positive expectation (e.g., "I will 
receive an interest in D's land") as opposed to a negative expectation (e.g., "I 
will not be harmed by D insisting on her strict legal rights"). Although a
The [proprietary estoppel] doctrine in Ramsden v. Dyson has a dimension to it which 
has nothing to do with restitution/unjust enrichment. On some facts the courts will 
respond in a way which gives the plaintiff far more than he would get if he could claim 
only the enrichment obtained by the defendant at his expense. The variety of response 
is at present treated as a matter of discretion, not as something controlled by 
identifiable differences between one class of fact-situation and another. This makes for 
deplorable uncertainty. It may later turn out to be possible to predict, with better 
accuracy, which facts will give only restitution and which will give more. If so, the 
exercise will be tantamount to a recognition that The doctrine in Ramsden v. Dyson' was 
really not one doctrine but two. And the dividing line which is most likely to be drawn 
is between a doctrine of free acceptance (or, acquiescence) and a doctrine of promissory 
estoppel.
238 Finn, loc. cit., text to supra n. 217.
239 Getzler, supra n. 183, 312. Such problems may also arise as a matter of evidence, 
as in Denny v. Jensen [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 635, in which case it was unclear whether an oral 
promise to sell land had in fact been made.
240 Hamilton v. Geraghty [1901] 1 N.S.W.R. 81, being one, though note the actual 
remedy granted in that case. Bath and Montague's Case (1693) 3 Chane. Cas. 55; 22 E.R 963, and 
E.R. Ives Investment Ltd v. High [1967] 2 Q.B. 379, appear to be other examples.
241 See, e.g., Waltons Stores v. Maher (1987) 76 A.L.R. 513, and Commonwealth v. 
Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394.
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positive expectation will usually result from a defendant's active 
encouragement, it may also be sustained by acquiescent conduct. And, 
conversely, a plaintiff's negative expectation may have resulted from a 
defendant's active encouragement such as a promise.
Undoubtedly though, the most serious problem with Birks' division of 
proprietary estoppel is that the doctrine may be activated, even in acquiescence 
cases, despite the absence of any benefit obtained by the defendant.242 Indeed, 
the very formulation of liability for acquiescence extends to cover a plaintiff's 
detrimental conduct in relation to his or her own land.243 The commonly 
accepted probanda governing liability would thus need to be changed, or else, 
a further division within acquiescence cases would need to be made.
The possibility of liability arising despite the absence of benefit, even in 
acquiescence cases, goes to the crux of the matter. In all proprietary estoppel 
cases,244 the estoppel arises where the plaintiff would suffer detriment were the 
defendant not estopped. Detriment is a sine qua non for liability. Often, of 
course, a defendant will also have received a corresponding benefit. But not in 
all cases. Thus, to divide proprietary estoppel cases according to whether a 
benefit has been received is to ignore the unifying rationale of preventing 
detriment. It would be to divide estoppel according to what in explanatory 
terms is an irrelevant consideration.
§ 4.4.3.2 Duress
The legal phenomenon of duress is concerned with illegitimate pressure 
exercised by a defendant in order to obtain some benefit through coercion.245 
Such pressure must indeed have been coercive, in the sense that it caused or 
contributed to246 a plaintiff acting in a way he or she otherwise may not have
242 E.g., in E.R. Ives Investment Ltd v. High [1967] 2 Q.B. 379, it was held that estoppel 
could arise from a defendant's acquiescence in a plaintiff's expenditure on his own land. These 
are similar facts to those in Crabb v. Arun [1975] 3 All E.R. 865. See Getzler, supra n. 183, 312. 
For a consideration of the issue of benefit in relation to proprietary estoppel cases generally, see 
Gamer, supra n. 3, 45-52.
243 See \Millmott v. Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96, 105-6, in which Fry J. considered that a 
plaintiff's detrimentally reliant action need not necessarily relate to the defendant's land.
244 This includes those in which an expectation remedy is granted.
245 Cf. Seddon, N., & Hall, P., "Duress" in Laws of Australia, 35.7, 7; Crescendo 
Management Pty Ltd v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R. 40, per McHugh J.A., 
45-6; Birks, P., 'The Travails of Duress" [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 342, 343; Burrows, 161.
246 Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v. V\lestpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R.
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and which denies the plaintiff reasonable alternatives. Often, the issue of 
duress arises in the context of contractual relations entered into by the plaintiff 
and defendant, where the plaintiff alleges that his or her consent was vitiated 
by the illegitimate pressure.247
Duress draws on various and diverse historical sources such as tort law, 
contract law and equitable doctrine, and its present operation defies simple 
explanation.248 There is a tendency today, however, to treat duress as an 
"amalgam" of principles derived from these various historical sources.249 In 
particular, it is argued that the "divide between common law and equity" 
should not "drive a wedge through uniting principle."250 In Australian law, at 
least, unconscionability has been identified as such a unifying principle.251
The crux of duress is the issue of what amounts to illegitimate pressure 
and which pressure denies a plaintiff reasonable alternatives. Overwhelmingly, 
this issue is raised by parties seeking to avoid transactions allegedly entered 
under duress. Commonly, such a transaction will take one of two forms:252 (1) 
the transfer of money or property to a defendant without consideration;253 or
40. The pressure need not be the "sole" or "overwhelming" reason for the plaintiff's actions: 
Birks, ibid. Cf. Seddon & Hall, ibid, 11.
247 Cf. Burrows, 162; Birks, ibid, 344. Vitiation here does not mean that the plaintiff's 
will was overborne. In the words of McHugh J.A. in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v. Westpac 
Banking Corporation (1988) 19 N.S.W.L.R. 40, 45-6: "[T]he subject of duress usually knows only 
too well what he is doing. But he chooses to submit to the demand or pressure rather than take 
an alternative course of action". For a persuasive criticism of a requirement of coercion of the 
will, see Birks, supra n. 245.
248 There has also been considerable statutory "intrusion" in the area. See Seddon, N., 
"Compulsion in Commercial Dealings" in Finn, at 138. As Seddon notes, merely one category 
of duress, "economic" duress, has been shown by Dawson to have been shaped by the common 
law of duress, undue influence, the expectant heir cases and equity's concern for the adequacy 
of consideration. See 144, fn. 34, citing Dawson, J.P., "Economic Duress—An Essay in 
Perspective" (1947) 45 Mich.L.Rev. 253.
249 Cf. Seddon & Hall, supra n. 245, 7.
250 Burrows, 161.
251 See Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v. Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 
N.S.W.L.R. 40.
252 Cf. Palmer, Vol. II, 257-8.
253 Benefits in kind, that is, services, theoretically could also be conferred under 
duress. Burrows, 164, states that there are no reported English cases, but notes the Canadian 
case, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co of Canada v. Eakins Construction Ltd (1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d.) 465. In that
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(2) entry into or variation of a contractual relationship, between the plaintiff 
and defendant.
In either case, where the transaction is successfully avoided, the remedy 
can be seen as restitutionary. Typically, in the first case, where money has been 
transferred under duress, a quasi-contractual claim for money had and received 
will succeed.254 Typically, in the second case, contract avoidance at common 
law or in equity and further, restitution of any benefits conferred under the 
contract, are the appropriate remedial responses. Given such remedial 
responses, most writers focus on the procurement of benefit as an essential 
feature of duress. Certainly a party exerting illegitimate pressure seeks some 
advantage, making demands to which the plaintiff must have acceded for there 
to have been coercion. But is it helpful to go on to say, as many commentators 
do,255 that the purpose of duress is to prevent a defendant's unjust enrichment?
Certainly, in most cases, a defendant will have obtained a benefit as a 
result of the exercise of the illegitimate pressure: money or goods received 
without consideration, or the advantage of a contractual relationship, the 
plaintiff's obligation under which is of itself of benefit, irrespective of whether
case, a plea that services had been conferred under duress was rejected by the Supreme Court 
of Canada.
254 Morgan v. Ashcroft [1938] 1 K.B. 49, 76-7. See generally, Winfield, P.H., "Quasi- 
Contract Arising From Compulsion" (1944) 60 L.Q.R. 341. For an early history, see Jackson, 
R.M., The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law (1936), 7, 64-72. Historically, a distinction 
existed between duress and compulsion. Although the origins of the former are far more 
ancient, the latter was far more broadly based and technically easier because the applicable 
action was for money had and received: Stoljar, 59-61. Strictly speaking then, quasi-contractual 
claims would have been for compulsion and not duress, but "duress" is the term which has 
prevailed as the generic title of this area of law.
Traditionally, under the established categories of quasi-contractual claims for duress, such a 
claim would lie where money was paid, for example, under threat of an improper application 
of the legal process (e.g., The Duke de Cadaval v. Collins (1836) 4 Ad. & E. 858) or under threat of 
retention of the plaintiff's goods (e.g., Astley v. Reynolds (1731) 2 Str. 915). There appear to be no 
cases allowing a claim for money had and received where the duress was alleged to have taken 
the form of actual or threatened violence against a plaintiff, or his or her near relatives. Goff & 
Jones, 234, speculate that this may be because of the alternative remedial options available in 
the criminal law and the law of torts. The authors consider, however, that in principle such an 
action should lie.
255 Cf., e.g., Palmer, §9.4; Burrows, 161-5; Dawson, supra n. 248, 282 et seq. Dawson 
considers, at 282, that the prevention of unjust enrichment is the "main function of duress 
doctrines."
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the defendant obtains an "inequality in the agreed exchange of values" .256 It 
must be stressed, however, that in all such cases, the plaintiff will have incurred 
a corresponding and equal loss.257 Any restitutionary remedies then, always 
have the effect of returning plaintiffs to their status quo before the transaction 
was entered. Such plaintiffs' losses are effectively compensated. This is an 
important point, to be returned to shortly.
Although it has been stressed that restitution is the usual remedial 
response to duress, this is not always so. Often, illegitimate pressure amounting 
to duress and giving rise to avoidance remedies may also constitute an 
independent wrong, such as a specific tort,258 or breach of contract.259 
Damages may thus be an available remedy to compensate a plaintiff for any 
loss suffered.260 Clearly such a remedy is not restitutionary, but since liability is 
founded on the independent wrong, this does not seem problematic for an 
unjust enrichment explanation of duress when utilised as a transaction 
avoidance mechanism.
It has even been suggested, however, by Lord Scarman in Universe 
Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. I.T. W.F.,261 that
256 Palmer, Vol. II, 260-1, and see §9.4 generally. Cf. Dawson supra n. 248.
257 Entry into the contract by the plaintiff being an equal detriment to the defendant's 
gain of the right to enforce the contract (were the contract not voidable).
258 See Equiticorp Financial (NSW) v. Equiticorp Financial (NZ) (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 260, 
296, per Giles ]., who considered the effect of a finding of duress to be that:
The transaction will be voidable rather than void ... so that if the transaction is avoided
there may be a claim to return of money paid as money had and received but if it is not
avoided the claim will be for damages where the economic duress is a to rt....
There are a number of economic torts which may be infringed—conspiracy, intimidation, 
interference with contractual relations and perhaps, interference with trade or business by 
unlawful means.
259 See Seddon, supra n. 248, 158-63, and Seddon & Hall, supra n. 245, 51. And as 
economic duress commonly occurs in the context of an existing contractual relationship, it has 
been suggested that only by reference to the terms of the contract sought to be rescinded, or the 
original contract which has been modified, can the elements of duress properly be brought out. 
See Stoljar, 78-83, particularly 82-3.
260 Such damages may also, more controversially, be available in equity. See 
discussion by Seddon, supra n. 248, 161-2. Damages may also be available under statutory 
provisions. In Australia, a number of sections of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) potentially 
app!y.
26  ^ [1983] A.C. 366. The action in that case was for money had and received for
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[i]t is ... already established law that economic pressure can in law 
amount to duress; and that duress, if proved, not only renders voidable 
a transaction into which a person has entered under its compulsion but 
is actionable as a tort, if it causes damage or loss.262
This statement suggests that any duress sufficient to justify a contract 
being avoided (or benefit being recovered) is itself a tort where it causes loss.263 
This view is not uncontentious, however. Lord Diplock, in the same case, took 
the view that "[t]he use of economic duress to induce another person to part 
with property or money is not a tort per se" .264 The same point has been 
argued strongly by Birks.265
The law may not go down the road of recognising all cases of duress as 
amounting to tortious conduct. If it does not, then coercion which gives rise to a 
right to have a transaction avoided will not necessarily infringe a duty in tort, 
in which case, if no other independent wrong has been committed, damages 
will not be an available remedy. Would this, however, be a desirable state of 
the law? The focus of duress is upon the conduct of a defendant which is 
unacceptable in law: exerting illegitimate pressure in order to obtain some 
advantage. Perhaps implicit in Lord Scarman's statement is a recognition that 
coercive conduct may be unacceptable in law, not only where a defendant has 
benefited as a result, but also in any circumstances in which a plaintiff has 
acceded to the defendant's demands and suffered a loss as a result.
Let us consider an exceptional case. A defendant exercises illegitimate 
pressure upon a plaintiff, which coerces that plaintiff to confer a benefit to (pay
restitution of payments made as a result of economic pressure. The claim thus fell within the 
complex and developing category of duress known as "economic" duress. Initially, the law of 
duress focused upon threats to one's person, but has since developed to recognise threats to 
one's property and more recently, threats to one's business or trade (i.e., economic interests) as 
giving rise to actionable duress. See Lord Scarman, 400.
262 Ibid, 400.
263 Seddon, supra n. 248,160, has interpreted Lord Scarman's statement as supporting 
the view that duress itself constitutes a tort.
264 [1983] A.C. 385. And Lord Diplock, alongside Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord 
Cross of Chelsea, formed the majority in the case. The difference between the minority and 
majority did not, however, turn on this question. Lord Russell concurred with this part of Lord 
Diplock’s judgment, but Lord Chelsea did not express an opinion on the precise point being 
discussed. More recently, see Lord Goff in The Evia Luck [1992] 2 A.C. 152,166.
265 Birks supra n. 245, 348-9.
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money to, or enter into a contract with) a third party. It may be possible to 
avoid the transaction with the third party,266 but if not, should the plaintiff be 
precluded from recovering his or her losses from the defendant in those cases 
in which the defendant's conduct did not constitute an independent tort? In 
this writer's view, the answer should be no: the wrongful, unacceptable 
conduct should not go unremedied. This should be so, even though the 
defendant will in no way have been enriched.267 There is some judicial support 
for such a view. In Fedon v. Fedon, O'Sullivan J.A. considered that:
Where a person induces another wrongfully to part with his money, 
even though the money does not go to the inducer, so that it cannot be 
said that the inducer is enriched, there may well be a case for imposing 
on the inducer an obligation to indemnify his victim 268
The law, it is suggested, faces an important choice in relation to duress. 
It could focus on unjust enrichment as the explanation of duress where it gives 
rise to transaction avoidance remedies.269 We would thus need to consider
266 Where the benefiting third party was innocent of any involvement in the duress, 
that is, did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the duress, then avoidance of the 
transaction would only be available in limited circumstances. Cf. American Jurisprudence (2d) 
Vol. 25, "Duress and Undue Influence" §21. See also Corpus Juris Secondum Vol. 70, §109, 90: 
"The compulsion or coercion must come from the party to whom or by whose direction the 
payment is made" (emphasis added).
267 In such circumstances, the defendant will not have been enriched regardless of 
which approach to enrichment is adopted. Although the defendant has been advantaged by the 
fact that the plaintiff has done what the defendant requested, there could not be said to have 
been a benefit under any conceptions of that term. Merely acceding to the demand does not 
confer a benefit. Even if we consider that it does, the remedial purpose of any relief cannot be 
restitutionary, for such a nebulous, indeed, metaphysical "benefit" cannot be disgorged as 
such. Even if a restitutionary remedy were available vis a vis the third party, this could not be 
said to constitute restitution of the defendant's "benefit".
268 [1978] 2 W.W.R. 723, 740. Note, however, that Goff & Jones, 235, appear to disagree 
with this conclusion. In relation to cases of the improper application of the legal process, they 
write that "where the payment has been made not to those responsible for the irregular arrest 
but to a third party, no action is available against the former for the recovery of the money, for 
the good reason that they have not received it." They cite O'Connor v. Isaacs [1956] 2 Q.B. 288. 
But that case involved a magistrate who, in good faith, but incorrectly for want of jurisdiction, 
ordered the plaintiff to pay maintenance to a third party (his wife). The case thus raises a 
number of policy grounds which may justify the decision. They include the bona ßdes of the 
magistrate and the need to protect the integrity of the court, so that mistakes of law, as in that 
case, are rectified by resort to the usual judicial process. As a general rule, the lack of the receipt 
of the money ought not be a prohibition. Arguably, (cf. Goff & Jones, 235, and Winfield, supra 
n. 254, 342) the money had and received action would not have allowed such a claim, but the 
forms of action no longer govern. Remedial relief could be formulated on equitable grounds, or 
as Fedon v. Fedon suggests, in Restitution.
269 Although in cases in which disgorgement is the remedy, to say that the basis of 
that remedy is one of unjust enrichment appears to be little more than a statement of 
conclusion. At the "unjust" phase of the inquiry, the focus would be on those issues common to
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separately, at least conceptually, cases in which duress constitutes an 
independent wrong and gives rise to non-restitutionary remedies, with the 
defendant perhaps not even having obtained a benefit.270 Yet such a distinction 
would be made despite the fact that in all cases in each category, a plaintiff will 
have suffered a loss, so that cases in the "restitution" category could equally be 
described as having a purpose of preventing "unjust" losses.
Alternatively, the law could focus on a defendant's unacceptable 
conduct—illegitimate pressure exercised to obtain an advantage—which 
coerces a plaintiff to act in a way other than he or she may have done. Such 
conduct, with its tort-like appearance, would give rise to a number of possible 
remedial responses whenever a plaintiff has suffered a loss as a result. Of 
course, in most cases, the defendant will have received a corresponding benefit, 
but such benefit would not be a precondition for relief. Such a less-formalistic 
approach would see duress as one doctrine—that is, there would be one law of 
duress—concerned with the exercise of illegitimate pressure that coerces.271 
The focus then, would remain on what in this writer's view is the real burden 
of duress: determining when indeed, illegitimate pressure can be said to be 
coercive.
§ 4.4.3.3 Precontractual liability
As has been seen, some cases of precontractual liability cannot be 
described as giving rise to a restitutionary remedy, even on the widest possible 
approach to enrichment. Relief may nonetheless ensue in such cases, in quasi-
all duress cases. These issues include the nature of the pressure or threats applied, the factual 
context of those threats, the affect of those threats on the plaintiff's available choices, and the 
plaintiff's consequent actions. Such inquiries as to the legitimacy of the defendant's pressure 
and the consequences of that pressure are the feature of any claim based on notions of duress, 
whether the claim is for the return of money, the rescission of a gift or contract, or for losses 
incurred on the basis of one of the economic torts of conspiracy, intimidation, or interference 
with contractual relations.
270 A view with which Burrows, 163, would appear to concur:
Even if duress were itself a tort, one would still need to recognise that benefits 
conferred because of illegitimate pressure could be recovered in unjust enrichment by 
subtraction albeit that in practice a plaintiff would then almost always choose to sue in 
tort for compensatory damages (footnotes omitted).
271 Such a unity may be evident even in the earliest development of duress. As Stoljar 
has pointed out, after a consideration of early cases of compulsion, that "procedure apart" the 
conceptual problems of what sort of pressure amounts to compulsion "hardly differ whether 
they arise in quasi-contract or tort." Stoljar, 63. See also 61-4, 78-9.
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contract, Restitution or estoppel. Many have acknowledged that such cases, 
given that they often concern detrimental reliance, cannot be incorporated 
within unjust enrichment.272 Thus, where a plaintiff performs detailed 
planning work never ultimately of any use to the defendant, in the (as it turns 
out) false expectation of receiving a major building contract,273 Beatson, for 
example, accepts that recovery in such a case is for a plaintiffs reliance loss and 
outside the reach of unjust enrichment.274 Yet, as will be seen in Chapter 6, 
recovery of a plaintiffs reliance loss will follow on the same basis as recovery 
for services performed and which might275 be considered to be of benefit to the 
defendant. To generalise somewhat, it will be seen that a defendant may be 
liable where a plaintiff has incurred losses as a result of his or her detrimental 
reliance upon an expectation of a future contract, in circumstances in which the 
risk of such a contract not eventuating lies with the defendant. Where the 
plaintiffs detrimental reliance is in the form of a service performed, quantum 
meruit is commonly awarded, irrespective of whether a defendant has benefited 
as a result of the plaintiffs actions. If unjust enrichment is utilised to explain 
those cases in which a defendant's enrichment plausibly may be identified, 
then an artificial division will be created. Essentially similar cases, in which a 
plaintiff has suffered losses ultimately as a result of the defendanf s conduct, 
will be considered separately, entirely on the basis of whether or not the 
defendant has been enriched.
At times, a plaintiff may have suffered a loss in the form of a pre­
payment of money to the defendant,276 in anticipation of a contract never 
completed. Since money, unlike services, can be "returned",2763 a plaintiff may 
be entitled to recover such pre-payment without needing to show the same 
elements of "wrongful" conduct of a defendant as is necessary in cases of 
recovery for services. Simply put, no new burden or obligation is being 
imposed when a defendant is asked merely to return money received. Hence, 
restitution of money payments made in anticipation of a contract may be
272 See §4.3.1
273 Cf. Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880; William Lacey (Hounslow) 
Ltd v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712.
274 Beatson, Chp. 2. And see § 4.3.1.
275 This depends on the approach to enrichment which is considered applicable.
276 An act which unequivocally enriches the defendant.
276a More acurately, in most cases only the equivalent value can be returned.
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possible on more liberal grounds than recovery for services rendered. But 
conversely, a change of position defence may be available to a defendant who 
no longer has the economic advantage of the money.277 These ideas will be 
considered further in Chapter 9. The point that needs to be made here, 
however, is that if a defendant's conduct is "wrongful", that is, sufficient to 
justify reliance loss liability in the form considered in precontractual dealing 
cases, then such a change of position defence ought not be available.278 The 
unifying idea of liability founded on the plaintiff's detrimental reliance ought 
not to be obscured by the fact that the plaintiff's detriment takes the form of an 
unequivocally enriching payment of money to the defendant.
This raises a point of more general concern extending beyond 
precontractual liability: the need to avoid similar cases being treated separately 
merely on the basis of whether factually they concern the payment of money as 
distinct from the performance of services. This distinction calls for further 
consideration.
§ 4.4.3.4 Maintaining unity between money and service cases
Much of this chapter has concentrated on services and specifically, on 
the issue of when services can be considered to be enriching. As has been seen, 
in many cases in Restitution, plaintiffs may recover for services rendered by 
them which are not of benefit to the defendant receiving them. The receipt of 
money, however, is unequivocally enriching. But to persist with an unjust 
enrichment explanation of money cases within areas of law in which recovery 
is also possible for services performed in detrimental reliance, would result in a 
division of such topics between money and service cases. In this writer's view,
277 Unjust enrichment advocates, such as Birks, Restitution—The Future, Chp. 6, 
perceive a change of position defence (now recognised by the High Court of Australia in David 
Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57; by the English House of 
Lords in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10) as embodying enrichment ideas. 
Consequently, liability will be reduced where the defendant's surviving enrichment is reduced 
or dissipated. In this writer's view, change of position has a subtly different significance. See 
Chapter 9.
278 In cases in which conduct on the defendant's part gives rise to the claim in 
Restitution, a change of position defence seems inapplicable. Cf. Beatson, 38-9, who queries 
whether change of position defence should ever be a defence where there has been "free 
acceptance". This would exclude all the consensual, acquiescence, and estoppel-type cases. This 
limits the change of position defence to conceptually narrow circumstances, including mistaken 
payments of money. Where no such defence is available, this suggests that even where a 
defendant is no longer "enriched", he or she will still be liable. The matter is considered further 
in Chapter 6 and the Canadian case of Conmac Western Industries v. Robinson [1993] 6 W.W.R. 
375, will be criticised for ignoring this point.
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such a divergence would be unwarranted; like cases would be treated 
differently. Birks has said that to argue that the grounds of Restitution differ 
according to the form in which the value is received (money or services) is 
"plainly nonsense" .279 This writer's point is similar: to suggest that the grounds 
of recovery differ according to the form of the plaintiff's detrimental reliance 
(that is, payment of money or provision of services) is unacceptable in those 
topics in which a plaintiff's detrimental reliance may be sufficient to justify 
recovery. In other words, a distinction should not be drawn solely between 
those cases in which a plaintiff's detrimental reliance results in a benefit to the 
defendant (typically, money payments) and cases in which the plaintiff's 
detrimental reliance does not result in any benefit to the defendant (many 
service cases).
In Part II of this thesis, a division of the subject-matter of Restitution will 
be proposed which does not distinguish between money and services cases, but 
which concentrates on the causative events which form the basis for imposing 
liability. The causative events of Restitution will be identified and grouped 
according to the different types of conduct and circumstances that give rise to 
liability, irrespective of whether the plaintiff's actions have taken the form of 
money payments, the transfer of goods, or the rendering of services.280
279 Cf. Birks, P., Restitution—The Future, 86; see also 91. See also Birks, in Burrows, 
Essays, 111-2 and 127; and Birks, "Review" (1991) 70 Can. B. Rev. 814, 820. Contra Stoljar, supra 
n. 148, 613, who clearly draws such a distinction between money and services. This follows 
logically from Stoljar’s rejection of the relevance of unjust enrichment in service cases. Birks 
acknowledges that if unjust enrichment is narrowly confined, then "asymmetry" between 
money and service cases will become a real problem (Restitution—The Future, Chp. 4). Perhaps 
the best way of avoiding this problem is to reject unjust enrichment.
280 A good example may be provided by cases of frustration of contracts. Let us say X 
commences work, at considerable cost to himself, in performance of a contract between X and 
Y, which is subsequently frustrated through no fault of either party. If the work performed in 
no way advantages Y, X has suffered loss and Y, assuming she has not paid any money under 
the contract, is in the same position as before the contract was entered. It will be argued in 
Chapter 7 that the purpose of legal intervention in such an example ought to be the sharing of 
the losses and gains of both parties and some statutory schemes now expressly adopt such an 
approach. This could be achieved here by requiring Y to pay X for half his losses incurred, 
despite the lack of any enrichment on Y's part. If, however, X had paid Y $1000 under the 
contract whilst neither X nor Y have incurred any other expenses, then the same purpose of loss 
and gain apportionment could be achieved simply by a restitutionary remedy. Such a remedy 
should not detract, however, from the essentially similar rationale for imposing that remedy in 
the circumstances. The different form of the transaction (money or services) should not alter the 
basic similarities in the justification for imposing the remedy.
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§4.5 CONCLUSION
The issue of enrichment is not an easy one. But the complexity of the 
issue is itself a product of unjust enrichment theory. In attempting to make 
enrichment work, in attempting to show that liability rules in Restitution 
indeed have a purpose of benefit disgorgement, different tests of enrichment 
have been propounded, debated and refined. Despite these efforts, many topics 
in Restitution cannot satisfactorily be explained in terms of benefit 
disgorgement.
The problems arising from an enrichment-based analysis of Restitution 
have taken a variety of forms. There have been quite specific problems of detail 
as to the meaning and scope of individual tests of enrichment. Specific 
problems have also been highlighted in applying these various tests of 
enrichment to topics which prove difficult for unjust enrichment. And finally, 
more general and fundamental problems have been isolated, suggesting that 
the very focus on benefit disgorgement is seriously flawed.
It is not possible to sum up these criticisms in simple, overarching terms. 
The problems with enrichment are too diverse. Ultimately, it is the sheer 
complexity of the issue which stands out. In seeking to take a very abstract 
notion of unjust enrichment and give it explanatory force and further, to utilise 
it as a concrete mechanism for solving problems in Restitution, commentators 
have presented us with diverse, detailed and often inconsistent conceptions of 
enrichment. The very diversity of views encountered suggests that at best, 
unjust enrichment can be used selectively to explain parts of Restitution; but 
this runs counter to the very generality of claims made for unjust enrichment, 
for example, that unjust enrichment is the only explanation for a large body of 
law.
To attempt to rationalise all the different conceptions of enrichment and 
thus obtain an overall workable framework would be a difficult, perhaps 
impossible task. This writer has made no attempt to do so. The problems with 
enrichment, it is suggested, cannot be solved by resort to unjust enrichment 
itself, or within the parameters of the debate set by unjust enrichment theorists. 
This writer has another agenda. For if nothing else, the complexity of the issue 
of enrichment suggests that alternative ways of thinking about Restitution, 
beyond unjust enrichment, are warranted. It may be possible—indeed, it would 
seem necessary—to conceptualise Restitution in new and more informative 
ways. That is the agenda for Part II of this thesis.
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PART II
Chapter 5
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON 
RESTITUTION
Demonstrably, there are problems with unjust enrichment 
jurisprudence. The endeavours of the theorists to give content to unjust 
enrichment are less than convincing. Such theorists seek to utilise unjust 
enrichment in a critically important way—as a tool for analysing liability rules 
in Restitution—despite the many problems of attempting to give content to the 
most important constituent parts of the unjust enrichment formulation: those of 
"unjust" and "enrichment". Such problems were highlighted in Part I. It is not 
the purpose of this thesis to attempt to solve such problems, nor even to 
analyse Restitution within the conceptual confines of unjust enrichment theory. 
Instead, in this writer's view, such problems invite a consideration of 
alternative theoretical frameworks for Restitution. It is time to consider 
Restitution from a new and different perspective.
To prepare the ground for such a reconsideration of Restitution, it is 
important to remind ourselves of the critical focus of unjust enrichment, 
namely, on the restitution of an "enrichment" gained by a defendant. Unjust 
enrichment theory seeks to deduce the reason for, or cause of, that remedial 
response of restitution from the very fact of the remedy itself. The cause (unjust 
enrichment) is deduced from the effect (restitution) in a process of reasoning 
backwards from that remedy. The argument is, in effect, that a defendant who 
has been required to disgorge a benefit must have been unjustly enriched and 
that it is such unjust enrichment which justifies and explains the remedy. In 
seeking an alternative framework for Restitution, this writer has approached 
the liability rules under consideration from a different perspective. Instead of 
reasoning backwards from remedy, this writer has sought to identify in the 
cases1 those events or causes, such as particular conduct of a defendant or 
plaintiff, or the relationship of the parties, or some external factor, which 
activate individual liability rules. Different liability rules activated by the same
1 By looking "down to the cases and statutes", as Birks, 99, would have us.
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or essentially similar causative events can be considered together to identify 
recurring themes common to such rules. Such themes may allow us to organise 
Restitution in better ways. To take one example, a number of liability rules and 
doctrines may be activated in circumstances very near, but not within, 
contract.2 Such rules and doctrines, be they equitable (say, proprietary 
estoppel) or quasi-contractual (say, quantum meruit for services rendered under 
an unenforceable contract), will be seen to share certain common themes which 
provide a basis for explanation and analysis of liability in such cases.
Arguably, the concept of enrichment has been formulated by some 
theorists to focus on those causative events giving rise to an obligation, rather 
than on an outcome in the form of a defendant's enrichment. For example, as 
has already been seen,3 "free acceptance" appears to identify very particular 
conduct of a defendant which justifies an obligation being imposed on a 
defendant irrespective of any benefit gained. But as has been noted, it does so 
behind the facade of identifying enrichment so that it seems a circuitous and 
even artificial approach.4
This writer's focus upon the recurrent general themes of liability rules 
activated by similar causative events, has resulted in the identification of four 
broad categories within which liability rules claimed for Restitution can be 
grouped. These four categories, to be considered in this Part of the thesis, have 
been identified by the writer on the basis of observable common themes, rather 
than on any a priori rationalisation.5
Of course, no process of categorisation in law can ever be, or should seek 
to be, definitive. It is not suggested that the four categories identified provide 
the only method of organising liability rules in Restitution, nor that there may 
not be other possible concerns in Restitution not addressed within any of the
2 For example, a plaintiff detrimentally changes his or her position as a result of 
reliance on an unenforceable "contract. The defendant refuses to perform as agreed and as 
reasonably expected by the plaintiff, relying on the unenforceability of the contract to deny any 
contractual liability.
3 See §4.4.2.
4 The debate as to what are the relevant identifiable causative events occurs in the 
context of word games as to the meaning and scope of "free acceptance". The arguments are 
put in terms of whether or not a defendant has indeed been "enriched" in the particular 
circumstance.
5 Cf. Sutton, R.J., "Unjust Enrichment" (1981) 5 Otago L.R. 187,198-9.
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four categories. Conceivably, some liability rules in Restitution may not sit 
comfortably within any of the categories to be identified. Furthermore, it is not 
intended to suggest that the categories to be considered have sharply defined 
boundaries. Undoubtedly, borderline cases may arise which conceivably could 
straddle the boundaries of two or more categories. There will always be points 
at which one category shades into another.
None of these limitations of categorisation should detract, however, 
from the overall value of identifying groups of liability rules which share 
common themes. Such common themes may provide us with a basis for 
rationalising the law of Restitution in an intelligible way. No system can 
perfectly describe or account for the observed outcomes, but it is suggested that 
the categories which follow do offer a more satisfactory basis for analysing 
most of the liability rules in Restitution than does unjust enrichment.
The broad concerns of each of the four categories appear to be quite 
distinct from the concerns of the other categories. Importantly, in at least three 
of the four categories, the reversal of unjust enrichment does not appear to be a 
significant concern.6 But if this is correct, then it follows that Restitution can no 
longer be seen to be a single, unified subject, exclusively explicable in unjust 
enrichment terms. This ought not to surprise: the very diversity of topics that 
have been sought to be incorporated within Restitution's bounds rebels against 
such unity. Nevertheless, many of the liability rules in all four categories do 
share one common feature, namely, that the origins of such rules can be traced 
to a function of gap-filling. Few proponents of unjust enrichment cavil with a 
view of Restitution as gap-filling in the law; in fact, some highlight it.7 But this
6 Of course, restitution may be one means of giving effect to the still to be identified 
broad concerns of each category.
7 See, e.g., Laycock, D., "The Scope and Significance of Restitution" (1989) 67 
Tul.L.Rev. 1277, 1278. See also Fridman, G.H.L., "The Reach of Restitution" (1991) 11 Legal 
Studies 304: "Canadian judges have been willing, even anxious, to bring into play restitutionary 
principles to fill gaps left by the original common law."
Perhaps such proponents perceive that there was only ever one, or only one major, gap to be 
filled in the law of obligations; a gap which unjust enrichment is now considered to have 
closed. Such a perception of liability rules in Restitution was rejected in Chapter 1. Some unjust 
enrichment advocates, such as Birks, accept that there may be miscellaneous sources of 
personal obligations other than contract, tort or unjust enrichment, but do not perceive this to 
be a large group. Certainly, most topics that do not sit easily within contract or tort and, as will 
be seen in Chapter 6, even some that do on any non-formalistic approach to such categories, are 
claimed by proponents of unjust enrichment. By way of aside, it need only be repeated that the 
"neat" tripartite division of the law of obligations thus created tends to sideline those equitable 
liability rules not claimed to be unjust enrichment-based. This tripartite division also tends to 
down play the close links with property law that parts of Restitution undeniably have.
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essentially equitable role of the liability rules does not of itself provide a 
sufficient link to justify treating Restitution as a conceptual whole. "Gaps" in 
the law undoubtedly have diverse origins and are located amongst and 
between many different categories, doctrines and liability rules.8 Hence the 
very different concerns of the four categories to be considered.
It is proposed now to outline the four categories, each of which will be 
considered in detail in the four following chapters.
(1) Conduct Giving Rise to Liability To Another. In the first category, 
to be considered in Chapter 6, liability rules are activated by conduct of the 
defendants. In all such cases, a defendant's conduct can be said to have resulted 
in some detriment to a plaintiff, who may have incurred financial losses, 
performed services, paid money, entered a contractual relationship he or she 
may otherwise not have, or in some way changed his or her position 
detrimentally. Such detriment is a precondition for an obligation being 
imposed upon a defendant. But the remedial responses to such detriment are 
not limited to compensation of losses and may vary considerably as to the 
measure of the defendant's liability. A plaintiff's reasonable or actual 
expectations may be fulfilled, or restitution may be awarded. Where restitution 
is awarded, however, it should be noted that since losses and gains will usually 
be the same, the effect of a restitutionary remedy will be to return the plaintiff 
to his or her previous position .
Within this broad category, it is possible to identify two sub-categories 
of liability rules. Although there are considerable points of overlap,9 the
8 Given the equitable function of the liability rules under consideration, indeed, their 
very utilisation as a result of the failings of other existing legal categories, doctrines and rules, a 
note of caution about any categorisation needs to be sounded. Certainly, it suggests against 
dogmatic assertions being made as to the boundaries of a particular category and its contents.
9 The two sub-categories of liability rules—encompassing tort-like conduct causing 
loss and conduct which, contract-like, amounts to an assumption of obligation or risk—share 
many similarities to contract and tort. Consequently, as with contract and tort, there may be 
considerable areas of overlap. There may be cases in which a defendant's conduct may well 
give rise to liability which could be described as falling into either sub-category. For example, 
in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, the plaintiffs detrimentally relied upon an 
expectation that a contract with the defendant would be completed as a matter of course. The 
contract was never completed, however, with some formalities still outstanding and the 
defendant having reconsidered the project. The plaintiffs were allowed to recover damages on 
the same basis as if the defendant had breached a valid contract. Estoppel was used, in effect, to 
enforce the incomplete contract. But Deane J. considered that the plaintiff may also have had an 
action in negligence, for the defendant's breach of duty of care. The defendant had failed to 
intimate its reservations about proceeding with the contract in circumstances in which it was 
foreseeable that the plaintiffs would suffer loss as a result of the defendant7s failure.
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liability rules within each sub-category emphasise different types of conduct 
giving rise to an obligation.
The first sub-category of liability rules is principally concerned with 
conduct which, contract-like, amounts to an assumption of an obligation or of a 
risk by a defendant. Characteristically, the parties will have reached some 
mutual agreement or at least tacit understanding which results in a plaintiff 
acting upon an expectation as to the defendant's future conduct. Although such 
an agreement or understanding may not in law amount to a legally enforceable 
contract, the courts will nevertheless give at least limited recognition to the 
relationship should the defendant subsequently breach his or her agreement 
resulting in losses to the plaintiff as measured by reference to the plaintiff's 
original position. The term "limited" recognition highlights the fact that in 
many of these cases, a completed agreement is non-contractual because some 
statutory or common law rules preclude the contract being enforced.10 
Consequently, in order to give effect to the policies of such statutory or 
common law rules, the courts may limit recovery to the restoration of the 
plaintiff's status quo ante, by means of compensation or restitution. In some 
cases, the relevant policy may preclude any remedy—restitutionary, 
compensatory or otherwise—being granted. The operation of "illegality" in 
some contexts best demonstrates the latter type of case. In other cases, however, 
full recognition of the parties' agreement may ensue, with a plaintiff's 
expectations being fulfilled. In effect, a full "contractual" remedy may be 
awarded. In such contract-like cases of liability, then, the reason for the contract 
not being enforceable will be a significant factor in shaping the availability and 
extent of remedial relief.
In this sub-category, both equitable and quasi-contractual liability rules 
may give rise to the obligation. Examples of the former include many cases of 
proprietary estoppel; and examples of the latter include most cases of quasi- 
contractual relief arising from unenforceable, or anticipated contracts, both for 
services rendered (quantum meruit), goods delivered (quantum valebat) and 
money had and received.
In the second sub-category, the principal concern is with tort-like
10 A failing which prevents a contract being enforced may, technically, render the 
contract "void", "voidable", "illegal" or "unenforceable". These terminological distinctions, it is 
suggested in Chapter 6, are not helpful. Instead, the crucial factor appears to be the underlying 
policies of the rules rendering the agreement defective and how such policies are best given 
effect.
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conduct causing loss to a plaintiff. Consistently with the tort-like nature of a 
defendant's conduct—examples might be conduct akin to negligence or fraud, 
or which is an abuse of position or power—the remedy in such cases, as in tort 
proper, characteristically aims at restoring the plaintiff to his or her status quo 
ante. This end may be achieved by means of either compensatory remedies, the 
specific restitution of money or property, or the rescission of contracts entered 
into.
Tort-like conduct may be caught by equitable11 or less typically, quasi- 
contractual12 doctrines or rules. In such cases, the law in effect appears to be 
expanding legal notions of what amounts to a breach of duty to one's 
neighbours: a defendant has acted or omitted to act as a reasonable person 
ought to have done in the circumstances, given the detrimental consequences to 
the plaintiff which foreseeably could follow such act or omission. Although 
there will have been no breach of duty in tort, nonetheless an obligation to 
remedy the plaintiff's loss will be imposed.
(2) The Consequences of Unprovided For Contingencies on Parties 
With a Common Interest. In the second category of liability rules, obligations 
may arise despite the absence of any conduct on a defendant's part which can 
be said to have caused the problems which a plaintiff seeks to have remedied. 
But where a plaintiff and defendant share a "common interest", or perhaps a 
"community of interest",13 they may owe a responsibility to share losses and 
gains arising as a result of some unprovided for contingencies which affect 
their common interest. The meaning of "common interest" and what amounts 
to an unprovided for contingency will be explored in detail in Chapter 7. But a 
variety of factual assumptions are envisaged. For example, the parties may be 
linked in a common endeavour, such as a commercial joint venture or domestic
11 Many equitable doctrines such as unconscionability and actual undue influence 
could be said to fall within such a sub-category of liability rules. As a general rule, the remedy 
to such unacceptable conduct takes the form of the avoidance of any transaction entered into, 
thus restoring the plaintiff to his or her status quo ante.
12 An example of quasi-contractual relief for tort-like conduct might be where, for 
example, a defendant induces another into a "contractual" relationship, takes advantage of the 
plaintiff's performance and then seeks to deny an obligation to pay for the plaintiff's 
performance by relying on some legal technicality which renders the contract unenforceable. 
Most cases of relief for "ineffective" contracts, however, will not exhibit such fraudulent 
intentions and may be seen as examples of the courts giving a limited recognition to consensual 
relationships where the parties have agreed to assume particular obligations. On which, see the 
second sub-category below.
13 Goff & Jones, 301.
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relationship, which endeavour fails, breaks down or is frustrated; or the parties 
may be involved in a contract which is frustrated; or the parties may be linked 
fortuitously by a common interest, such as where strangers all own cargo being 
carried on the same ship14 which is wrecked. Likewise, two co-sureties, 
unknown to each other, may have guaranteed the same debt, yet only one co­
surety is called upon to pay the debt. In such an example, the unprovided for 
contingency is that recourse has only been had against one of the co-sureties, 
when both were liable to meet the obligation.
In all such cases, the unprovided for contingency, whether it be a 
frustrating event, a failure of a relationship or some other unforeseen event, 
results in burdens being borne by one party but not the other, or benefits being 
obtained by one party but not the other. Given the parties' common interest, 
the law characteristically responds by imposing a principle of just sharing. 
Burdens and benefits resulting from the contingency are required to be 
distributed justly, which often means proportionally, according to each party's 
contribution to the matter in which they have the common interest.15 Although 
restitutionary remedies may be utilised to effect loss and gain sharing, 16 
nonetheless, it will be argued that benefit disgorgement is not, or ought not to 
be, the main purpose of the liability rules under consideration and that unjust 
enrichment is therefore an inappropriate rubric for such liability.
These liability rules are diverse. Topics to be considered include the 
dissolution of partnerships and joint ventures; the frustration of contracts;17 the 
division of de facto and (where no statutory scheme governs) marital property 
upon the break-up of the relationship; the doctrine of contribution between co-
14 Consequently, the "strangers" have a common interest in the safe completion of the
voyage.
15 Characteristically, losses and gains will be calculated by comparing the parties' 
position before the endeavour was undertaken, with their position after the frustrating event, 
but this may not always be the case.
16 If X pays Y $100 under a contract which is subsequently frustrated and neither party 
has done anything further in performing the contract, then the simplest way of equalising the 
losses and gains in this example would be by requiring Y to make restitution of $100.
17 Admittedly, a governing principle of loss and gain sharing has not been openly 
recognised in the common law relating to the frustration of contracts; nevertheless, most 
decisions are consistent with such a principle. Many decisions which are not consistent with a 
principle of sharing have been subjected to academic and, at times, judicial criticism. Further, 
recent statutory regimes introduced in a number of jurisdictions are based on principles of loss 
and gain sharing.
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sureties and co-insurers; and the doctrine of general average contribution in 
maritime law.
(3) Allocating the Costs of Justifiable Conduct. In the third category, to 
be considered in Chapter 8, liability rules are activated in circumstances in 
which the law considers that a plaintiff's unsolicited intervention in another's 
affairs is justifiable. Consequently, any reasonable "costs" incurred by the 
plaintiff whilst intervening are allocated to the defendant where the law 
considers the defendant to be the more "appropriate" party in the 
circumstances to bear those costs. Thus, the salvor of a sinking ship and its 
cargo, or the rescuer of an accident victim, may be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs incurred. The recovery of reasonable "costs" incorporates both 
reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred by a plaintiff, the most common 
remedial response, but also in more exceptional cases, remuneration for 
services rendered.18
Liability in cases of justifiable intervention does not depend on any 
culpable or wrongful conduct on the defendant's part. Instead, a plaintiff's 
costs will be allocated to the defendant in those limited circumstances in which 
a plaintiff's actions are considered to be consistent with the promotion of 
certain desirable social goals and policies. Social policy considerations are at the 
crux of liability in this category. Although in many cases, the defendant will 
have received some benefit as a result of the plaintiff's actions, such a benefit is 
not a precondition for liability.
Although the common law courts have accepted that certain unsolicited 
interventions are justifiable and ought not be discouraged, liability in such 
cases has not been recognised as part of a single, coherent doctrine of justifiable 
intervention, or negotiorum gestio, as is recognised in civil law. Instead, liability 
arises for the most part in a diverse but numerically small collection of 
seemingly anomalous decisions and isolated instances.19 Nevertheless, one can 
draw from these instances sufficient common principles to provide us with 
some guidelines as to the limits of available relief. Liability rules to be 
considered within this category include recovery for a plaintiffs intervention to 
effect burial of the dead or to supply necessaries to (legally or otherwise)
18 In maritime salvage cases, such remuneration for services rendered may also 
include a reward.
19 The obvious exception is maritime salvage, an ancient and well-developed doctrine 
involving much detailed learning.
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incapacitated parties, and recovery by "agents of necessity" who intervene to 
save another's life or property. Also to be considered are cases of self-interested 
intervention by a plaintiff, say, to pay a defendant's debt in order to protect the 
plaintiff's own property interests. Significantly, a distinguishing feature of the 
concerns addressed by the liability rules in this category is their very unlikeness 
to other concerns recurrent in property law, contract, tort or equity.
(4) "Innocent" Recipients. The fourth category of liability rules, to be 
considered in Chapter 9, is perhaps the most difficult. Whereas in the above 
three categories, the conduct of a defendant, the common interests of a plaintiff 
and a defendant, or the promotion of desirable social goals provide the 
foundations for the imposition of an obligation upon a defendant, this fourth 
category is characterised by the absence of any of the above factors. The 
concern here is with circumstances in which money, goods or services of a 
plaintiff have been conferred on an "innocent" defendant not legally 
responsible for such conferral. Where no requisite intention existed or now 
exists on the part of the plaintiff to "transfer" to the defendant such money, 
goods or services, a plaintiff may seek to undo the consequences of the 
"transfer" and seek to impose liability of some kind on the defendant, even 
despite the innocence of that defendant. One type of case, though not the only 
one to be considered, in which liability is sought to be imposed on an innocent 
defendant is where a plaintiff has acted under a mistake. As a result of a 
mistaken belief, a plaintiff may have entered or completed certain transactions, 
or modified his or her existing position or status, in a way in which he or she 
would not have done but for the mistake. But our discussion is limited to 
mistakes of a very specific kind: "spontaneous" mistakes of a plaintiff,20 as they 
will be called, in no way created by or knowingly allowed to continue by the 
defendant. Thus, we are not here concerned with cases where, for example, a 
plaintiff's mistaken belief was the result of representations or acquiescent 
conduct of the defendant: proprietary estoppel cases provide a good example 
of this type of mistake and would fall within the first category of liability rules 
considered above.
To be included for consideration in this fourth category of liability rules 
are the topics of mistaken payments of money, the mistaken improvement of 
another's land or goods and the mistaken payment of another's debt or 
performance of another's duty.
20 This is the language of Birks, 147.
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This category presents considerable difficulties for any generalisation 
seeking to encompass the rules governing these topics. Certainly, in the 
mistaken payment of money cases, the "siren song" 21 of unjust enrichment 
sounds its most persuasive. For clearly, the defendant will have been enriched 
at the time of the receipt. In many circumstances, the receipt of such money and 
its retention,22 barring some countervailing consideration such as a change of 
position, would appear "unjust". Hence, unjust enrichment may well prove to 
be a rationalising idea of continuing force and some utility in this area. It 
should be noted, though, that unjust enrichment still appears to be a statement 
of conclusion (albeit an appealing one), which does not indicate the processes 
of reasoning followed to reach that conclusion. Since not all mistaken payments 
are recoverable, it must still be determined when, indeed, the receipt and 
retention of the money is "unjust".
Substantial conceptual difficulties arise, however, if unjust enrichment is 
sought to be used to explain not only money cases, but also non-money (that is, 
service) cases as well. Mistaken "transfers" of things other than money are 
often difficult to analyse in terms of the receipt of a benefit and, where recovery 
is allowed, in terms of benefit disgorgement. One could overcome this difficulty 
by searching for a different conceptual basis for service cases. Yet a division 
between money and service cases does not seem desirable given the common 
event, the spontaneous mistake, which creates the problem. Thus it is proposed 
to suggest an alternative explanation to unjust enrichment which seeks to 
encompass all cases of spontaneous mistake.
The starting point for this alternative explanation is the absence, 
seemingly, of any independent reason for imposing an obligation on the 
innocent defendant. Although the plaintiff has suffered loss as a result of the 
mistake, the risk of such loss must surely lie with the party responsible for the 
loss, the plaintiff. It may be argued, however, that it is quite a different matter 
to ask the defendant to return gains he or she still retains. Certainly, money 
(more accurately, the economic advantage such money represents) or specific 
property still retained can be returned, but services cannot be "returned" as 
such, though the law can impose an obligation to pay for them. But given that 
the defendant has done no wrong and the plaintiff's losses are entirely the 
consequence of his or her own actions, why should the defendant pay?
21 Re Byfield [1982] Ch. 267, 276.
22 In the absence of an obligation to repay.
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For the most part, the law's response to this question is that the 
defendant ought not to pay and in many cases, courts have refused recovery to 
a plaintiff for services rendered under mistake, even where a defendant has 
clearly been benefited by those services. Nevertheless, even in service cases, it 
may be possible to undo the effects of the mistake in a way which does not in 
any way leave the defendant at a disadvantage when compared with his or her 
position before the plaintiffs mistaken conduct. Thus, taking a United States 
example, the mistaken improver of another's land may be entitled to remove 
the improvements, even though technically, they are fixtures.23 The burden of 
the case law appears to be that the courts will seek to restore plaintiffs to their 
previous status quo, as far as it is possible to do so, without requiring 
defendants "to reach into their own pockets".24 Such remedial relief effects a 
"fair outcome", in that recovery does not disadvantage the defendant but goes 
at least some way to restoring the plaintiff to his or her status quo ante. The 
defendant, however, will not be required to be an insurer of any of the 
plaintiff's losses remaining after such remedial relief.
The notion of fair outcomes provides a means of uniformly analysing all 
spontaneous mistake cases. A fair outcome will be readily achievable where, in 
effect, the specific restitution of land, goods or money is possible. Recovery of 
mistaken payments of money provides the most generous scope for recovery 
because the receipt of money is best seen as a receipt of an economic advantage, 
rather than merely a form of personal property. Consequently, "specific" 
restitution of that economic advantage may be possible even where, for 
example, a defendant no longer has the money received. As with goods or land, 
a refusal by the defendant to part with the economic advantage which he or she 
still retains will amount in a broad sense to a retention of the plaintiff's 
"property". Consequently, many mistake cases have a strong proprietary 
flavour. But as the service cases will demonstrate, recovery is not limited to 
specific restitution. It may be possible to achieve a fair outcome by means of 
imaginative remedies which, like specific restitution, still do not disadvantage 
the defendant. A detailed consideration of the cases follows in Chapter 9.
23 See Chapter 9 for a consideration of these cases. United States courts have at times 
utilised some quite imaginative remedies in such circumstances.
24 See Dawson, J.P., "Erasable Enrichment in German Law" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 271, 
272, who points out that this phrase is commonly used by German lawyers to describe the rule 
which protects innocent recipients of a benefit from surrendering more than their "surviving 
net gain."
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* * * *
If one surveys these four categories of liability rules, it is interesting to 
note that, from one category to the next, there is a lessening of the potential 
onerousness of the obligation which may be imposed upon a defendant. This 
reflects, perhaps, the degree of responsibility to the plaintiff which a defendant 
can be said to owe, given the circumstances. To take the two extreme categories 
of cases, in the first category, a defendant's conduct has caused a plaintiff some 
detriment and such conduct may even be described as wrongful. Consequently, 
a full range of obligations, including fulfilment of a plaintiff's expectation, may 
be imposed. By contrast, in the fourth category, a defendant is entirely innocent 
of any wrongdoing in relation to the plaintiff's detrimental position25 and, 
generally speaking, will consequently only be required to, in effect, make 
specific restitution of any "property" of the plaintiff the defendant still retains.
Another interesting point to note is that some of these categories share 
common organising ideas with other established legal categories. For example, 
the first category addresses concerns essentially the same as those of 
established categories such as contract and tort law. Conversely, other 
categories operate uniquely outside of well recognised and established 
classifications, addressing concerns not openly recognised in other areas of the 
law. The unsolicited intervention cases in the third category provide a good 
example of this.
In many ways, the four suggested categories seem rather obvious. Their 
burden is familiar. Certainly, elements of each category have been discussed by 
other commentators. But it is their aggregation, providing us with an overall 
view of Restitution as consisting of four groups each unified by common 
features, which offers a new perspective on Restitution. In the writer's view, the 
very obviousness of the categories suggests their burden is consistent with a 
legal method which for the most part has emphasised the causative events 
giving rise to certain outcomes (conduct, relationships of parties, procedural 
matters), rather than those outcomes themselves, in order to determine when 
obligations should be imposed.
25 A subsequent refusal to return a mistaken payment of money, for example, may be 
described as wrongful where the defendant still has the economic advantage of such a payment 
and is aware of the circumstances justifying the plaintiff's claim for the return of the money. 
But this does not explain the reason for the obligation, which arises at the time of receipt of the 
money and is not dependent upon a "wrongful" refusal by the defendant to return it.
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Chapter 6
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO 
LIABILITY TO ANOTHER
It is only where behaviour which is regarded as unreasonable or improper 
threatens or impairs legitimate interests that legal remedies are and should be 
available-1
§6.1 INTRODUCTION
Many liability rules claimed for unjust enrichment are activated by 
particular conduct of a defendant, specifically, conduct which justifies the 
imposition of legal liability because it is possible to draw a link between that 
conduct and some harm or detriment incurred by the plaintiff. Although unjust 
enrichment theory suggests that it is the receipt of a benefit which is the 
precondition for the activation of such liability rules, to be considered in this 
chapter, the important feature of these rules is that a defendant need not have 
obtained a benefit corresponding to the plaintiff's detriment in order for legal 
liability to arise. For this reason, the liability rules are better explained by 
reference to the particular qualities of a defendant's conduct activating those 
rules.2 For example, conduct such as a defendant's breach of an agreement with
1 The Hon. Sir Anthony Mason & Gageier, S.J., "The Contract" in Finn, P.D. (ed.), 
Essays on Contract (1987), 1, 32. As the authors go on to emphasise, however, the term 
"legitimate interests" deliberately leaves for further examination the issue of "which interests 
are to be regarded as legitimate in any given case".
2 Although in many of the cases to be considered the defendant will have gained some 
benefit, liability is not preconditioned upon such benefit and the liability rules thus are not 
explicable in terms of a purpose of reversing unjust enrichment. This was demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, where a number of the liability rules to be considered in greater detail in this chapter 
were discussed specifically with regard to benefit. Be that as it may, it should be noted that 
even if one were to accept an unjust enrichment analysis of Restitution generally, it would still 
be possible to separately identify some liability rules in which the "unjust" factor could be said 
to have been satisfied by reference to the defendant's conduct. So, for example, Birks considers 
that concepts such as free acceptance and compulsion identify distinct unjust factors justifying 
liability in Restitution. These concepts isolate conduct on the part of the defendant, whereas, by 
way of contrast, liability in Restitution said to be founded on a mistaken transfer is justified 
because of the state of mind of the plaintiff at the time of the transfer. Consequently, even 
under an unjust enrichment scheme, it would be useful to identify cases in which particular 
conduct of a defendant constituted the unjustness of the "enrichment". Interestingly, according
the plaintiff or the exercise of undue pressure on the plaintiff may result in the 
plaintiff suffering some detriment. Liability rules of both quasi-contractual and 
equitable origin may thus be activated; in the former example, despite and 
because of the absence of an enforceable contract. Any liability which arises, 
however, need not necessarily be to restore the plaintiff to his or her position 
before the defendant's harm-inducing conduct occurred. The different 
doctrines and rules activated by a defendant's conduct may give rise to a 
number of different remedial outcomes. The burden of this chapter is to 
consider the broad, underlying rationale which explains at a general level the 
individual doctrines and rules under consideration.
As will be seen, the subject-matter of this chapter is diverse, covering a 
broad range of topics. In spite of this diversity, however, the liability rules 
under consideration manifest familiar concerns. Indeed, they share 
considerable affinities with liability rules encompassed by mainstream contract 
and tort. Consequently, the cases can be divided into two broad sub-categories: 
cases in which a defendant's conduct gives rise to "contract-like" liability and 
cases in which a defendant's conduct gives rise to "tort-like" liability. These 
sub-categories will be elaborated upon below. But first, it is necessary to 
consider the common characteristics of the cases in either sub-category, which 
characteristics justify their inclusion in a single, conduct-related category.
§ 6.1.1 The Common Characteristics of the Cases
The burden of the cases under consideration is that they share three 
characteristics which justify their common inclusion in one category. These 
characteristics are that (1) the plaintiffs have incurred some detriment as a 
result of conduct of the defendants, (2) which conduct does not give rise to 
liability in contract or tort, but (3) which conduct is contract-like or tort-like.
§ 6.1.1.1 Detriment incurred by a plaintiff as a result of the 
defendant's conduct
The first common characteristic of the cases is that they involve plaintiffs 
who have incurred some detriment as a result of conduct of the defendants.
to Birks' schema, free acceptance is also a test of enrichment, so that the conduc t  which is 
determinative of liability also establishes, though seemingly superfluously, the factor which is 
supposedly the precondition for liability: a defendant's enrichment.
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Detriment is measured by reference to a change in a plaintiffs position from 
that subsisting before the defendant's "offending" conduct occurred.3 Thus, for 
example, a plaintiff may have acted in reliance upon the existence of a contract 
with the defendant which proves to be unenforceable, say, by rendering 
services or paying money in part performance of the contract. The defendant's 
subsequent refusal to perform as agreed under the contract leaves the plaintiff 
worse off. Without such detriment, relief will be denied4—a point, it need only 
be noted again, conceded by unjust enrichment theory in its requirement that 
any enrichment be at the expense of the plaintiff.5 Of course, in many cases a 
defendant will also have received some benefit as a result of the plaintiff's 
detrimental actions, and the existence of such benefit may aggravate the sense 
of loss, so that intuitively the plaintiff's claim against the defendant appeals 
more strongly than otherwise. But the existence of such benefit, conceptually, 
does not add anything and is not a necessary element of or precondition for 
establishing the plaintiff's claim. Loss on its own is sufficient to trigger the 
liability rules under consideration.
Although detriment to a plaintiff is thus a precondition for liability, the 
defendant's obligation to the plaintiff need not necessarily be one to restore the
3 In other words, detriment is measured by reference to the plaintiff's previous status 
quo. Detriment is thus not being measured by reference to any (subsequently unfulfilled) 
expectations generated by the defendant's conduct.
4 Thus, unlike in contract, entirely executory unenforceable contracts, where the 
plaintiff has not commenced performance of the contract nor done acts in preparation to 
performance, will not give rise to liability.
5 Most unjust enrichment theorists concede that in cases in which unjust enrichment is 
said to form the basis for the imposition of liability there is a need to demonstrate some 
detriment. This is encapsulated within the formulations of the component parts of unjust 
enrichment, which include the need to show that the enrichment was "by subtraction from" the 
plaintiff or that the plaintiff has suffered a "corresponding deprivation". See § 3.2.1.
Consequently, unlike some types of wrongs, such as breaches of fiduciary duties, the liability 
rules under consideration are not activated in circumstances where a defendant has profited as 
a result of wrongdoing, but the plaintiff has not also suffered any corresponding detriment. 
There are, of course, doctrines and rules which may allow disgorgement of a benefit obtained 
as a result of a defendant's wrongdoing even where there is no corresponding detriment. 
Examples are breaches of fiduciary duties and duties of confidence. But according to a widely 
accepted view, it is recognised that in such cases of independent wrongs unjust enrichment is 
not the explanation of the liability rule: liability rests on the independent wrong and the 
restitution of benefits is only one possible remedial response. Consequently, such wrongs— 
including a number of equitable rules and doctrines—are not claimed for unjust enrichment (as 
a liability-creating principle) and are thus not considered in this chapter. Other equitable rules 
and doctrines, however, such as undue influence, are claimed as examples of unjust enrichment 
by subtraction from the defendant. In other words, liability is said to be based on notions of 
unjust enrichment and can only be established by showing a benefit to a defendant as well as a 
corresponding detriment to the plaintiff.
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plaintiff to his or her previous position. Certainly, the compensation of losses 
incurred by the plaintiff or, where benefits and gains are equal, restitution of 
benefits conferred on the defendant, will have a restorative effect. But other 
remedial responses are also common, including (1) enforcing a defendant's 
promise by specific performance, (2) damages to satisfy a plaintiffs actual 
expectations under an agreement, and (3) damages measured by what the 
plaintiff may reasonably be entitled to expect to receive in the circumstances.6
§ 6.1.1.2 Defendant's conduct does not give rise to liability in contract
or tort
The second common characteristic of these cases is that although a 
plaintiffs detriment was the result of conduct of the defendant, such conduct 
generally falls short of conduct which establishes a cause of action in contract 
or tort. The plaintiff may not be able to satisfy some substantive element of a 
cause of action in contract or tort. For example, the parties may not have been 
ad idem as to some essential term of a contract so that the contract is 
"incomplete",7 or the defendant's conduct may not come within common law 
conceptions of fraud, so as to found a tort claim in deceit. Alternatively, 
specifically in contract-like cases, some formal or technical requirement of 
contract law may not have been met. A good example is provided by contracts 
caught by Statute of Frauds-type legislation, where the parties have finalised a 
sufficiently certain, mutual agreement, but the contract is "defective",8 a want 
of formality rendering it unenforceable.9
6 If, for example, X contracts with Y to perform certain services, in return for the 
transfer of Blackacre, then X's actual expectation is that the property will be transferred. If the 
contract is unenforceable, however, say, for want of some formality, X may only be entitled to a 
quantum meruit award for the reasonable value of his or her services. As such an award will 
usually include a reasonable profit element, it may go beyond compensation for losses or 
expenses incurred and may thus be characterised as the fulfilment of what X is reasonably 
entitled to expect in the circumstances. See § 4.4.1. Reasonable expectations in this sense must 
be distinguished from actual expectations which are reasonably held.
7 The meaning of this term will be clarified below.
8 The meaning of this term will also be clarified below.
9 In Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, for example, the plaintiff performed 
building work under an oral agreement rendered unenforceable by a failure to comply with 
certain statutory requirements governing the building industry. The defendant subsequently 
relied on the technical failure to justify her refusal to pay for the work carried out by the 
plaintiff.
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§ 6.1.1.3 Conduct which gives rise to liability is contact-like or tort­
like
The third common characteristic of these cases is that a defendant's 
conduct which gives rise to liability is contract-like or tort-like. In a very 
general sense, then, we can describe the liability which arises as contract-like or 
tort-like, by which is meant that the rationale for liability can be found in the 
ideas and concepts of contract and tort respectively. This does not mean, 
however, that liability is contract-like or tort-like in the sense that it necessarily 
gives rise to remedial responses typically associated with contract and tort. 
Contract-like liability characteristically arises in the context of facts very near 
contract, as the unenforceable contract example demonstrates. Tort-like liability 
is characteristically activated by conduct which causes harm and which 
infringes legal standards of acceptable conduct toward our "neighbours". For 
example, equitable and quasi-contractual liability rules or doctrines may be 
activated where a defendant exercises duress upon a vulnerable plaintiff in 
order to extract some advantage from that plaintiff.
A division of the cases into two sub-categories based on the traditional 
distinction in law between contract and tort is not intended to suggest that 
discrete boundaries can be drawn between contract and tort. Modern 
developments demonstrate the difficulties in drawing boundaries between any 
legal categories and contract and tort provide a cogent example of this.10 
Undeniably, there is a considerable overlap and commingling of ideas between 
contract and tort. Nevertheless, there are also undeniably differing core 
concerns of each category. Thus, it may be possible to identify some ideas
10 Mason & Gageler, supra n. 1, 34, point out that "a rigid distinction between contract 
and other legal categories can no longer be drawn." See also Hawkins v. Clayton (1988) 78 A.L.R. 
69, 93 et seq., per Deane ]., particularly at 101:
The law of contract and the law of tort are, in a modern context, properly to be seen as 
but two of a number of imprecise divisions, for the purpose of classification, of a 
general body of rules constituting one coherent system of law.
A number of modem decisions, such as Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [19641 
A.C. 465, and Junior Books Ltd v. Veitchi Ltd [19831 1 A.C. 520, have been "perceived as blurring 
the differences between contract and tort and their respective obligations." See Coote, B., "The 
Essence of Contract" Pts I & II (1988-9) 1 J.C.L. 91; 183, at 93, and cases and references cited at 
fnn. 16-8. See also Chapter 5, n. 9, and the discussion of Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 
513. Some commentators have gone so far as to advocate the absorption of contract into tort, or 
the absorption of contract, tort and Restitution into a single law of obligations. See, e.g., 
Gilmore, G., The Death of Contract (1974); Fuller, L.L., & Perdue, W.R., "The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages" (1936) 46 Yale L.J. 52, 373, at 419; Atiyah, P.S., "Contracts, Promises and the 
Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 193.
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fundamental to contract which can be distinguished, though not delineated 
absolutely, from ideas fundamental to tort. Such a separation of the core 
concerns of contract and tort allows us to make the convenient division of the 
liability rules adopted herein.
For now, it suffices to say that liability is contract-like or tort-like 
because the conduct activating the liability rules is essentially similar to that 
which gives rise to liability in contract and tort, respectively. Hence, the 
underlying foundations for imposing liability in each type of case are 
essentially similar to those justifying liability in contract and tort, with concepts 
and ideas familiar to the law being utilised to solve problems near contract and 
near tort. Indeed, in cases near contract, this familiarity of concepts and ideas 
has traditionally manifested itself in the idiom of the courts, with liability 
founded in ''quasi-contract7', "implied contract" or "contract implied in law".
That there are recurrent themes in the law generally and Restitution 
particularly ought not to surprise, given the gap-filling and ameliorative role 
which liability rules in Restitution have historically performed (and still 
perform). Where a defendant's conduct appears to have resulted in harm to 
another, causes of action in contract or tort will often be available to remedy the 
consequences of such conduct; but clearly, this will not always be the case, even 
where there is a perceived need for the imposition of liability in some form. 
Contract and tort are categories self-limited by certain historical and conceptual 
criteria. Gaps consequently arise and gap-filling rules and doctrines develop. It 
is not surprising that rules utilised for gap-filling characteristically draw on 
concepts familiar to the law rather than on entirely new concepts, such as 
unjust enrichment. The point is perhaps best illustrated by equity as a whole, in 
its metamorphosis and development of ideas already familiar to the common 
law as part of its well-recognised ameliorative function. Notions such as 
common law fraud have been refined and given greater scope by the growth 
and development of notions of fraud in equity. It is proposed to illustrate this 
point at some length, by reference to one quintessential and wide-ranging 
equitable gap-filling technique: estoppel, which operates at the periphery of 
both contract11 and tort and covers a diverse range of subject-matter, much of 
which is not claimed for unjust enrichment. Estoppel is a useful illustration, 
however, of gap-filling between and around contract and tort, by reference to
11 As Stoljar has put it, in "Estoppel and Contract Theory" (1990-1) 3 J.C.L. 1, 1, 
estoppel is "continually winding in and out of contract".
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ideas and concepts found within those categories.12
§ 6.1.2 Gap-filling between and around contract and tort: an 
illustrative example, estoppel
Estoppel does not operate in a doctrinal vacuum—it draws many of its 
ideas from the familiar categories of contract and tort. Estoppel, with its 
"underlying rationale of good conscience and fair dealing" , 13 aims at 
preventing an "unjust" 14 or "unconscionable" 15 departure by the defendant 
from an assumption held by the plaintiff, encouraged or acquiesced in by the 
plaintiff, where such departure would result in detriment to the plaintiff. 
Despite this "underlying rationale", however, historically, estoppel has 
manifested itself in distinct doctrines both at common law and in equity.16 
Although we appear to be moving towards a unified view of estoppel,17 we are 
not yet at the stage where we can, with certainty, talk of a single doctrine.18
Irrespective of whether one perceives a single doctrine of estoppel or 
not, it is clear that despite certain "common threads" ,19 an estoppel may arise 
from a very diverse range of facts. This was highlighted by Dixon J. (as he then 
was) in Thompson v. Palmer,20 who identified the variety of conduct which can
12 As has been noted in Chapter 1, gaps do not just occur between and around contract 
and tort and this will be illustrated by the three categories to be considered in the three 
subsequent chapters.
13 Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, 546, per Deane J., who appears to have 
been referring to both equitable and common law estoppel doctrines. See also his Honour's 
judgment in Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394, 431-46.
14 See, e.g., Thompson v. Palmer (1933) 49 C.L.R. 507, 541.
15 See Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513.
16 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 405, talk of "various distinct species of estoppel".
17 See Mason C.J.'s identification of the trend of recent authority in Commonwealth v. 
Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394, 410-3, and his conclusion that the authorities point to "the 
emergence of one overarching doctrine of estoppel rather than a series of independent rules." 
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 430-3, appear to be critical of this view.
18 The diversity of opinion in Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R. 394, and the 
plethora of subsequent commentary (see, e.g., references cited in Meagher, Gummow & 
Lehane, 405, fn. 1) offering differing interpretations of that case, precludes a view of the law of 
estoppel as yet settled.
19 Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, 524, per Mason C.J. and Wilson J.
20 (1933) 49 C.L.R. 507.
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lead to the conclusion that a defendant's departure from an assumption held by 
the plaintiff is unjust. Such conduct "depends on the part taken by [the 
defendant] in occasioning [the] adoption [of the assumption] by the other 
party". It can range from that which has a strongly contractual flavour, such as 
where an assumption "formed the conventional basis upon which the parties 
entered into contractual or other mutual relations"; to tort-like conduct, such as 
where imprudence or carelessness are the proximate cause of the plaintiff's 
reliance on an assumption.21 Although other conduct may not be so readily 
classified as contract-like or tort-like (exhibiting elements of both, for example), 
it is nevertheless proposed to consider briefly the use of estoppel in each of 
these ways.
Applications of estoppel in circumstances near contract, giving rise to 
contract-like liability, may be illustrated by cases in which a defendant is 
estopped from denying the existence of a formal, enforceable contract where a 
plaintiff detrimentally relies upon an assumption that the contract will be 
finalised. In Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Waverly Transit Pty Ltd,22 for 
example, the plaintiff (Waverly Transit) "incurred substantial expenditure" in 
the expectation that its contract with MTA would be renewed. This expectation 
arose as a result of repeated assurances to this effect by MTA and was 
consistent with the terms of the contract allowing for automatic renewal subject 
to notice of termination. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held 
that MTA was estopped by its conduct from relying on their refusal to renew 
the contract. Significantly, the court ordered that the contract be renewed for 
two years: the plaintiff received the very contract it had expected. This remedial 
response is consistent with other authorities in which the courts have been 
prepared to fulfil expectations in situations near contract.23
21 Ibid, 547. Dixon J.'s full statement reads:
Whether a departure by a party from the assumption should be considered unjust and 
inadmissible depends on the part taken by him in occasioning its adoption by the other 
party. He may be required to abide by the assumption because it formed the 
conventional basis upon which the parties entered into contractual or other mutual 
relations, such as bailment; or because he has exercised against the other party rights 
which would exist only if the assumption were correct...; or because knowing the 
mistake the other laboured under, he refrained from correcting him when it was his 
duty to do so; or because his imprudence, where care was required of him, was a 
proximate cause of the other party's adopting and acting upon the faith of the 
assumption; or because he directly made representations upon which the other party 
founded the assumption.
22 [1991] 1 V.R. 181.
23 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 423, emphasise this point by considering these types
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Applications of estoppel in circumstances near tort, giving rise to tort­
like liability, may be illustrated by cases of acquiescence encompassed within 
proprietary estoppel. In such cases, a plaintiff detrimentally relies on a 
mistaken assumption as to an existing or future interest in property whilst the 
defendant stands by knowing of the plaintiffs mistake. Consequently, the 
defendant's assertion of rights contrary to the plaintiff's assumption may 
amount to unconscionable conduct.24 For the most part, cases of acquiescence 
appear tort-like in that characteristically they involve defendants who are in a 
better position, vis-ä-vis the plaintiffs, to avert the harm, but despite this, 
intentionally25 or irresponsibly26 fail to warn the plaintiffs against the 
reasonably foreseeable harm.
Consistently with the tort-like appearance of acquiescence cases, one 
might expect remedies to aim essentially at compensation of the losses 
suffered .27 This is not always the case, however, with compensation being 
merely one of two usual remedial responses. The other is the fulfilment of a
of cases under the heading of "Acquisition by estoppel". See also Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 
76 A.L.R. 513, and Collin v. Holden (1989) V.R. 510. This is despite the view, expressed by some 
in the High Court, that the underlying purpose of estoppel is to prevent detriment. See 
particularly Mason C.J. in Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 C.L.R., 411-3; cf. Brennan J. 
(454-5), Dawson J. (428-9), and contrast Deane J. (441-3). Such a view seems to ignore the weight 
of authority in cases of proprietary estoppel, in which expectations are commonly fulfilled. See 
also Crabb v. Aran District Council [1975] 3 All E.R. 865, arising in the context of incomplete 
negotiations as to an interest in land. Mason C.J. and Wilson J. in Waltons Stores v. Maher 
perceive those cases in which plaintiffs acquired an interest in land as an example of "merely 
one way of doing justice between the parties" (524), but this statement seems to ignore the 
strong bias of these decisions to fulfil expectations even where an equitable lien for expenses 
incurred might have proved an appropriate remedy.
24 See Ward v. Kirkland [1967] Ch. 194, 235, per Ungoed-Thomas J. Historically, the 
operation of the doctrine was based on "bad faith" or "bad conscience" on the part of the 
defendant. See, e.g., East India Co. v. Vincent (1740) 2 Atk. 83; Stiles v. Cowper (1748) 3 Atk. 692; 
Jackson v. Cator (1800) 5 Ves. Jun. 688; Dann v. Spurier (1802) 7 Ves. Jun. 231; and see the 
comments of Scarman L.J. in Crabb v. Arun District Council [1975] 3 All E.R. 865, 877.
25 An example might be where a defendant is motivated by fraudulent designs to take 
advantage of the plaintiffs likely improvement of the defendant's land.
26 Where a defendant is careless, for example.
27 As in Unity Bank v. King (1858) 25 Beav. 72, 53 E.R. 563; Morris v. Morris (1981) 1 
N.S.W.L.R. 61; Raffaele v. Raffaele [1962] W.A.R. 29.
In another sphere, estoppel was held by the majority in Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 
C.L.R. 394, to give rise to a claim for damages incurred in reliance upon the defendant's 
representation. Cf. Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465.
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plaintiffs expectations.28 There is, then, some uncertainty as to the appropriate 
remedy29 in cases of acquiescence, with this remedial schizophrenia suggesting 
that the courts may not be "entirely sure" of the purpose of legal intervention.30 
Perhaps expectations are fulfilled in cases in which such a remedy is perceived 
to be the only way of relieving detriment. Leaving this remedial uncertainty 
aside, however, the tort-like nature of the defendanf s conduct in acquiescence 
cases seems clear.
§ 6.1.3 The Division of This Chapter
Liability near contract and near tort appears to be imposed in 
circumstances where a defendant's conduct is very similar to that which gives 
rise to contractual and tort liability. It is proposed now to consider in some 
detail liability rules in Restitution which can be said to be contract-like or tort­
like in operation. The emphasis, however, will be on cases of contract-like 
liability, and this is reflected in the space allocated to each sub-category. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, much of Restitution consists of rules and 
doctrines of quasi-contractual origin and much of quasi-contract operates in 
circumstances near contract.31 Secondly, many of the doctrines claimed for 
unjust enrichment which appear tort-like in their concerns originate in equity: 
for example, undue influence, unconscionability, non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation and other doctrines generally concerned with transaction- 
avoidance. Not only is the inclusion of such doctrines within Restitution more
28 E.g., Bath v. Montague's Case (1693) 3 Chanc.Cas. 55, 22 E.R. 963. In Hamilton v. 
Geraghty [1901 ] 1 N.S.W.S.R. 81, the court was prepared to fulfil the plaintiff's expectation 
interest but ordered only a reliance loss remedy as that was all that had been sought.
29 "lT]he court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the 
equity may be satisfied": Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington (1884) L.R. 9 A.C. 699, 714.
30 Jones has said that the flexibility of equity's remedies may indicate "that judges are 
not entirely sure why they are intervening": Jones, G., "Restitutionary Claims for Services 
Rendered" (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 273, 283-4. And there is considerable uncertainty generally as to 
what the remedial focus of estoppel should be, an uncertainty highlighted by the divisions in 
Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 95 A.L.R. 321. Given that cases such as Waltons Stores v. Maher 
have brought some underlying unity to estoppel, "one might see in future more attention 
directed to examination of the remedy which is appropriate to the particular case": The Hon. 
Sir Anthony Mason, "Foreword" (1989) 12 U.N.S.W.L.J. 1, 2.
31 As Dawson, 112, has noted, "[m]odem restitutionary remedies are chiefly employed 
for the unwinding of contracts." Similarly, see Patterson, E., "The Scope of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment" (1936) 1 Mo.L.Rev. 223, 233: "The law of quasi-contract is the hospital of 
frustrated plans and expectations." This is not the case with all of quasi-contract, however, as 
illustrated by quasi-contractual relief for compulsion (i.e. duress), considered within tort-like 
liability rules.
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controversial, they are also treated fully in standard equity texts. Hence, it is 
not proposed to detail the operation of such doctrines, but merely to highlight 
their tort-like nature and that consequently, the restitutionary remedies often 
utilised in such cases principally aim at restoring plaintiffs to their status quo 
ante, rather than the disgorgement of defendants' benefits.
§ 6.2 CONTRACT-LIKE CONDUCT AND LIABILITY: The 
Assumption of Legal Obligations
A reexamination of the fundamentals of restitution may reveal that rules of 
quasi-contract, as well as rules governing other forms of restitution, when 
employed in the context of the "unwinding of contracts" are analytically, as 
well as functionally, contract rules akin to those governing contract damages32
§ 6.2.1 Introduction
Typically, cases of contract-like conduct arise in factual contexts where 
parties are in close relationships which are almost contractual. The parties may 
have reached or are in the process of reaching a bargain or an agreement about 
matters (often of a commercial nature) and will usually have gone so far as to 
render services, pay money, or in some way detrimentally change their position 
on the basis of a defective or incomplete contract. Of itself, however, a near­
contract factual context does not necessarily mean that a defendant's conduct 
and any resulting liability which may arise is contract-like.33 Both contract-like 
liability and tort-like liability may arise in such contexts, but it is only the 
former which is of interest for now.
It is not very useful to describe conduct or any liability resulting from 
such conduct as contract-like if we do not know what contract is. The question 
"what is contract?" is not easily answered. Much has been written in the search 
for a "general" theory of contract, providing lawyers with "a basis for 
predicting in a given situation whether a contract will arise or what the law of
32 Perillo, J.M., "Restitution in a Contractual Context" (1973) 73 Col. L.R. 1208, 1210. 
This is an excellent treatment of liability in Restitution in cases of near-contract.
33 For example, fraud is often perpetuated in a bargaining or commercial context, 
giving rise to tortious liability.
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contract will be."34 Clearly, a consideration and discussion of the relative worth 
of the various contract theories is outside the scope of this thesis. This is 
particularly so given that no one theory has captured the field, or has on its 
own proved entirely satisfactory in accurately describing the boundaries of 
contract law.35 Professor Atiyah has gone so far as to state that contract theory 
today "is a mess."36 Regardless of whether this view is perhaps too damning, it 
is clear that there is much disagreement as to the relative worth of the various 
contract theories.
The absence of any unifying theory of contract, however, may not be a 
problem. For despite all of the theoretical uncertainty, it has been suggested 
that contract law "has rarely been questioned in its fundamentals."37 Certainly, 
it is possible to identify fundamental features at the core of contract law38 and 
make observations about the essential nature of contractual liability.
A useful starting point is provided by "the undoubted fact that the law 
of contract does enable people to impose obligations on themselves."39
34 Coote, supra n. 10, 97. As Coote points out, contract theories may have other, 
varying purposes as well, for example, providing justification for recognition and enforcement 
of contract, or purporting to "explain the role of contract in society".
35 See generally Coote, supra, n. 10, for a discussion of various, quite diverse theories 
and their failings. Perhaps the main failing of such theories is that they seek to be exclusive 
principles, or even to provide definitions of contract. According to Coote, they seek to make 
generalisations founded on too narrow a conceptual base (111). Coote considers that finding a 
theory of contract cannot be achieved by resort to
generalisation from any one type of contract, such as an agreement, or from the 
contracts of a single system, such as the common law. In other words it must be 
directed to the essence of contract rather than to developments from, or elaboration of, 
it.
36 Atiyah, P.S., Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987), 173, as cited in Coote, 
supra n. 10,94.
37 Mason & Gageler, supra n. 1,1.
38 If one avoids the search for unifying principles, it is possible to identify concepts 
which are undeniably core concerns of contract, provided it is recognised that such concerns 
are not necessarily hallmarks of all of contract and that other concerns may also be central to 
contract. To this end, traditional theories of contract provide a useful guide, for as Coote has 
pointed out, supra n. 10, 191, they "must contain much of the truth or they would not have 
drawn the support they have."
39 Atiyah, P.S., An Introduction to the Law of Contract (4th ed., 1989), 2 (hereinafter: 
"Atiyah"). Earlier on the same page, Atiyah states:
Broadly speaking, the law of contract is that part of the law which deals with 
obligations which are self-imposed. ... [But distinctions with other parts of the law of
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Contract law provides one mechanism40 whereby individuals can voluntarily41 
assume or undertake both a particular obligation intended to have legal effect, 
and the risk of the legally significant consequences resulting from a failure to 
meet such an obligation. Contract law also sets the boundaries within which 
one exercises the powers and responsibilities which arise from a contractual 
obligation or which are incidental to it,42 and provides a vehicle for the 
allocation of risks generally.
One way in which parties can assume a particular obligation (as well as 
the risk of the consequences of not meeting that obligation), is by reaching an 
agreement intended to be legally binding. Agreements take the form of a
obligations] are by no means clear-cut, and one of the most striking phenomena of 
modern times has been the gradual blurring of the lines between the law of contract 
and other parts of the law of obligations. In particular,... it will be suggested that many 
of the obligations recognized by the law of contract cannot be realistically thought of as 
self-imposed.
40 It is not the only legal mechanisms by which an individual may voluntarily assume 
a legal obligation. The law of trusts provides another example. Cf. Coote, supra n. 10, 197-8. If 
one accepts that contract is essentially concerned with assumption of legal obligations, then 
deeds, or "contracts" under seal, can be seen to be genuine contracts. This contrasts with 
writers who, emphasising the idea of bargain as fundamental to a concept of contract, reject 
deeds as being contracts. See, e.g., Starke, J.G., Seddon, N.C., & Ellinghaus, M.P., Cheshire & 
Fifoot's Law of Contract (6th Australian ed., 1992), 46-7, (hereinafter: "Cheshire & Fifoot (Aust. 
ed.)"). Contrast Carter, J.W., and Harland, D.J., Contract Law in Australia (2nd ed., 1991), 89, 
(hereinafter "Carter & Harland") who distinguish deeds as formal contracts enforceable despite 
the absence of consideration. They suggest the "solemnity of 'form' may be seen as a 
justification for enforcement of a promise [under seal]."
41 "Voluntary" here is not intended to suggest that the parties have necessarily 
assumed the obligation as a conscious act of will, that is, have a subjective intention to do so. 
The use of an objective test to determine whether a contract exists (i.e, an objective 
interpretation of the parties' intentions as demonstrated through their outward conduct) means 
that this need not necessarily be the case. But the assumption of an obligation needs to be 
voluntary in the sense that it must not have been the result of some unacceptable influence 
upon the parties freedom to choose, for example, the result of pressure or undue influence 
exercised on the plaintiff, and that such choices must have been sufficiently informed, for 
example, not induced by a misrepresentation.
42 That is, persons can assume "legal contractual responsibility" only "to the extent 
and under the conditions which the law allows": Coote, supra n. 10,194. Parties may take upon 
themselves legal contractual obligations merely by adhering to any particular legal system's 
formal processes of contract. Different legal systems at different stages of development may 
thus have different requirements as to what amounts to a commitment to contract. Coote 
argues that this view of contract as an assumption of legally enforceable obligations provides a 
theoretical explanation of contract law distinguishing it from other areas of law. For a criticism 
of this view, see Drahos, P., & Parker, S., "Critical Contract Law in Australia" (1990-1) 3 J.C.L. 
30.
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mutual exchange of undertakings and promises.43 Most contracts are 
agreements, involving some bargain or exchange between the parties.44 An 
important aspect of agreement is its emphasis upon the parties' intentions, both 
to be legally bound to an agreement and as to the actual terms of that 
agreem ent.45 Significantly, however, the existence of the agreement is 
objectively identified, by reference to the parties' objectively determinable 
intentions—by "inferences drawn from what they said and did"46—rather than 
the subjective intentions of the parties 47 The objective approach to intention 
means that parties may contract by engaging in conduct perceived by the world 
at large as displaying an intention to do so, even though such parties may not 
have had an actual or subjective intention to do so. The parties contracting can 
be taken to have said, as a result of their conduct, "I assume an obligation in 
these terms."48
43 And some have argued that "promise" provides the moral basis for enforcing 
contracts. See, e.g., Fried, C., Contract As Promise (1981). There are difficulties with such a view, 
including the obvious observation that not all promises are enforceable.
44 Cf. Atiyah, 10: "Very many, perhaps most, contracts are created as a result of the 
agreement of the parties, at all events, as to the essentials." The requirement of bargain or 
exchange highlights the need for some consideration for a contract to be, as a general rule, 
legally enforceable.
45 Agreement and the intentions of the parties are central to both the will theory of 
contract (in which contracts are seen as expressions of the will of the parties to the agreement), 
and to the bargain theory of contract (emphasising the mutuality or reciprocity of obligations). 
On the bargain theory, see Farnsworth, Contracts (2nd ed., 1990) (hereinafter: "Farnsworth"), 
43-5. For examples of transactions lacking bargained-for exchange, which may nevertheless be 
enforceable as contracts, see at 49-68. Although a formulation of contract as merely giving effect 
to the parties' intentions does not explain the present state of the law, as Mason & Gageler, 
supra n. 1, 31, have noted, "[t]his is not to deny that intention, where it is discernible, must 
remain a relevant and frequently decisive consideration in contractual analysis."
46 Coote, supra n. 10,100.
47 See Farnsworth, 118-22, for a consideration of the dominance of the objective theory 
of assent. The Fligh Court of Australia has pointed out that the objective theory appears to have 
"command of the field" in the debate in the decided cases and academic writing between the 
objective and subjective theories. See Taylor v. Johnson (1983) 151 C.L.R. 422. In the words of 
Atiyah, 10, "it matters not whether the parties have really agreed in their innermost mind." See 
discussion in Mason & Gageler, supra n. 1, particularly at 8, where they point out that the 
parties' subjective intentions are not without relevance, as evidenced by the development of an 
"expanded jurisdiction in equity to grant relief against mistake", including the unilateral 
mistake of one party. See also discussion in Air Great Lakes Pty Ltd v. K S Easter (Holding) Pty Ltd 
(1985) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 309.
48 Consequently, the assumption of an obligation is not dependent upon any version 
of the will theory for its validity. For the parties' intentions are not important because of the 
primacy of the parties' will, but because they have engaged in conduct which they intended as 
an assumption of obligation in certain terms. Hence, a party may become bound by the
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An objective determination of intention does not guarantee, however, 
that a contract can be ascertained in all particulars. Often, although the parties 
will have a clear intention that an obligation is being assumed, their intention 
as to all the terms of that obligation are not discernible from their words and 
conduct. In such cases, the courts may be prepared to imply reasonable terms49 
in order to give '"business efficacy" to the parties' agreement.50 Consequently, 
parties may be bound to an obligation which they have not in fact assumed but 
which they will be taken to have assumed. Clearly, this may involve imposition 
of a reasonable obligation on the parties, that is, one which operates reasonably 
and equitably between the parties. As will be seen below, the imposition of 
reasonable obligations to complete an otherwise incomplete agreement is also 
of considerable significance in circumstances near contract.
One reason why contracts are enforced is that persons to whom an 
obligation has been assumed may well order their affairs on the basis of their 
expectations as to the assuming party's51 future conduct. Such reliance may 
prove detrimental if the party having assumed the obligation fails to act in 
accordance with the assumed obligation. On some theories detrimental reliance 
is said to form the basis of all contractual liability.52 Since, however,
"common practice of assuming obligation in ignorance of its full extent as, for example, by a 
contract the terms of which are contained in an unread ticket or other common form": Coote, 
supra n. 10,199.
49 See infra nn. 228-40, and text thereto, concerned specifically with the implication of 
reasonable terms as to price.
50 See Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v. State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 
C.L.R. 337, 347.
51 This includes parties whose conduct might be interpreted objectively as evincing an 
intention that they have assumed an obligation
52 It has been suggested that detrimental reliance is the basis of all contract, or ought 
to be. See Atiyah, supra n. 10, for example, whose views are summarised by Coote, supra n. 10, 
105, as suggesting that "a contract arises (or should arise) whenever a promisee has relied upon 
a promise in a way which would cause detriment if it were not kept." See also Fuller & Perdue, 
supra n. 10. As an explanation of contract as a whole, however, this reliance theory has serious 
limitations and has not gained widespread acceptance. As will be seen, however, reliance is of 
significant relevance to contract and near contract. Contracts otherwise defective may become 
effectively enforceable if a defendant has allowed a plaintiff to rely on the defective contract. 
Interestingly, however, it appears that early enforcement of contracts was dependant upon 
some part performance by one party, so that merely executory contracts were not remediable. 
The significant breakthrough in the development of contract law, then, occurred when it 
became possible to enforce executory promises. See Farnsworth, 16-8, and 9, fn. 3.
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detrimental reliance is neither a sufficient53 nor necessary54 condition for the 
existence of a contract, liability rules in contract may prove an insufficient 
protection for plaintiff's acting on the basis of other's seemingly assumed 
obligations undertaken a certain actions.
In what way do these observations about contract suggest that there are 
liability rules in Restitution which give rise to contract-like liability? In essence, 
in much of Restitution, liability which can be described as contract-like is 
imposed on defendants who either (1) had the actual intention to assume an 
obligation or risk, or (2) who can be taken to have assumed an obligation or risk 
because they have conducted themselves in a way that can be interpreted by a 
reasonable person as suggesting that such obligation or risk has been or will be 
assumed. In either case, the plaintiffs are entitled as a consequence of such 
conduct to order their affairs in reliance thereon. Although in the 
circumstances, the rules of contract say that no enforceable contract exists, not 
uncommonly simply because there has been some technical defect, nonetheless 
liability may attach to a defendant's conduct, provided the plaintiff has relied 
detrimentally on it. Such liability is very similar to contractual liability and is 
established by proving, in essence though not in form, similar elements. In 
effect, though there may not have been an assumption of a contractual 
obligation, nonetheless there was an assumption of some other, collateral 
obligation, on which reliance is justified.
There tend to be two reasons as to why a contractual obligation will not 
be enforced, reasons which form the convenient basis of a division of the case 
law. First, although parties have reached what is a completed and objectively 
clearly discernible agreement, they may have failed to comply with a statutory 
or common law rule which renders what would otherwise be a complete 
contract "unenforceable", "illegal", "void"55 or, more exceptionally in the cases 
under consideration, "voidable".56 The term "defective" contract will be used
53 A promise may still be binding even where the promisee does not expect it to be 
fulfilled.
54 Much social interaction gives rise to reasonable expectations as to future conduct 
which nonetheless do not form the basis of any contractual obligation.
55 "Void" contracts are often so because of incompleteness, coming within the second 
type of ineffective contract considered below. However, a complete contract may also be void 
for illegality or incapacity.
56 Contracts which are "voidable" are usually so as a result of some procedural 
unfairness arising at the time of formation, for example, duress or undue influence, and such 
cases will be considered within tort-like liability below. However, perhaps in exceptional cases,
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to encompass all these variations. In cases of defective contracts, parties to the 
agreement characteristically believe they have a binding contract, at least at the 
time they enter into the agreement.57 Secondly, in some cases it may not be 
possible to discern any concluded agreement at all between parties. For 
example, negotiations may have been incomplete; some essential terms may 
have been left for future agreement, or were vague or uncertain; or the parties 
may have been mistaken as to some vital matter. Consequently, no sufficiently 
certain and concluded agreement can be identified by the courts. In short, the 
"contract", even if the parties had a final intention to contract, is incomplete .
It is proposed now to consider each of these two types of case—defective 
and incomplete contracts—in turn. This is not intended to suggest that a 
contract may not fail on both counts, or that a distinction between defective and 
incomplete contracts can always sharply be drawn .58 Nonetheless, it is a 
distinction which will be seen to provide a useful basis for dividing the case 
materials. In considering defective and incomplete contracts respectively, both 
quasi-contractual and equitable liability rules and doctrines will be discussed, 
including doctrines—such as part performance—which are not claimed for 
unjust enrichment, but which have been utilised to resolve the types of factual 
problems encountered. A consideration of such other doctrines is necessary 
because they are activated by essentially similar causative events which also 
activate doctrines claimed for unjust enrichment.
With the emphasis being on defective and incomplete contracts, it is not 
proposed to consider cases of the restitution of benefits conferred under
a complete contract not the subject of any procedural unfairness arising in formation may be 
voidable, for example, as a result of one party's incapacity.
57 Cases of fraud are the obvious exception.
58 See, e.g., Deacon v. Adams (1982) 55 N.S.R. (2d) 218, in which the parties had an oral 
"agreement" for the purchase of a house, the terms of which were very vague and perceived 
quite differently by the parties. One could consider such a case as either an incomplete 
agreement, for uncertainty or want of a final agreement on all terms, or alternatively, it could 
be seen as a complete but defective agreement, the contract rendered unenforceable by the 
want of writing.
A distinction between defective and incomplete contracts is not the only possible way in which 
the cases could be distinguished. For example, cases of contracts incomplete for uncertainty 
could be considered with defective contracts, linked by the common feature that in such cases 
the parties characteristically believe they have a valid contract. A distinction could thus be 
drawn with cases of anticipated contracts, in which the parties expect that a contract will be 
concluded.
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enforceable contracts discharged for breach. The reason for this can be stated 
shortly. An innocent party's right to restitution59 arises as a result of the breach 
of the contract and can be seen as an alternative remedy available alongside 
other remedies such as damages.60 Like damages, the mere discharge of the 
contract ought not to obscure the fact that the remedial right of restitution 
accrues as a result of the breach of contract.61 Given that restitution is merely 
one alternative remedial response, a plaintiff will generally be precluded from 
obtaining both damages and restitution, as this would amount to double 
recovery for the same loss.62 Hence, one can perceive restitution in such a 
context as a secondary right arising from the breach of contract, rather than as 
being founded on some other primary basis of recovery or causative event such 
as unjust enrichment.63
59 Where a party in breach of a contract seeks restitution of benefits conferred, the 
basis for the claim does not rest on any conduct on the defendant's part. The defendant is 
innocent of any unacceptable conduct and, consequently, restitution would appear to follow 
only on a similar basis as is allowed against recipients of mistaken services or payments of 
money. See further, Chapter 9.
60 As Perillo, supra n. 32,1214, has pointed out:
We generally think in terms of damages as the normal remedial right [for breach of
contract], with restitution and specific performance as alternatives in special situations.
Two leading scholars—Woodward and Corbin—have recognised that in the context of
breach of contract, restitution is not quasi-contractual but is a contractual remedy.
(emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
See also Stoljar, 222-6, particularly at 223, where he makes it clear that restitution here is a 
remedy within contract, in contrast with restitution for compulsion or mistake, for example, 
based on other grounds than breach of contract.
61 Cf. Baltic Shipping Company v. Dillon (1993) 111 A.L.R. 289, 297, per Mason C.J., 
Toohey J. concurring, Brennan J. concurring with this part of his Honour's judgment.
62 Id.
63 See Perillo, supra n. 32,1213-9. See also De Bernardy v. Harding (1853) 8 Ex. 822, 824. 
Contrast most Restitution texts, however, which consider such a claim as being available on an 
alternative unjust enrichment basis, that is, that a right to restitution can arise on the primary 
basis of unjust enrichment by subtraction from the plaintiff. See, e.g., Birks, 334. Such a view 
may have the imprimatur of the High Court, although the position is uncertain. Cf. the 
judgment of Mason C.J. with that of Deane and Dawson JJ., in Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon (1993) 
111 A.L.R. 289, particularly at 312-3, who state that restitution of payments made under a 
discharged contract is “not a claim on the contract." Given that it will be demonstrated in this 
chapter that quasi-contractual claims even under defective or incomplete contracts are 
essentially founded on contractual notions, usually by reference to the parties' breached 
agreement, such a view seems, with respect, artificial. This is reinforced by the fact that in 
establishing a restitutionary remedy to money payments, it is necessary to show a total failure 
of consideration and this is inextricably linked with the terms of the particular contract itself.
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§ 6.2.2 Defective Contracts
Where a contract is defective, the parties to the particular transactions 
have agreed with sufficient certainty on all the essential terms so that a 
finalised agreement can be said to subsist. Although usually the parties believe 
they have an enforceable agreement64 and conduct themselves accordingly, 
nevertheless a contractual claim may not be possible because some statutory or 
common law rule renders the contract "unenforceable", "illegal", "void" or 
"voidable". Apart from the fact that a "voidable" contract is enforceable until 
an election to set it aside, a description of a contract in one of these terms does 
not reflect consistent outcomes as to the availability and nature of relief to a 
party suffering detriment in reliance upon such a contract.65 Consequently, the 
focus will be on the reasons for why a contract is considered defective, rather 
than the shorthand legal summary of the effect of a particular rule.
Contracts may be defective for a number of different reasons:66
(1) A contract may fail to meet some formal, technical requirement, such 
as that it must be evidenced in writing,67 or comply with a prescribed 
standard form.68 Contracts defective as a result of some such failing as to
64 One exception is where a defendant is aware of the intervening failing which 
renders the contract defective, but has been engaging in acts of deliberate fraud, whereby he or 
she induces the plaintiff to "contract" and perform his or her part of the agreed bargain. The 
defendant at all times intends to appropriate the advantages of the plaintiff's performance by 
refusing the reciprocal performance by relying on the absence of an enforceable contract.
65 Where a contract is void ab initio, it is said that there was never any contract at all. 
Where a contract is unenforceable, however, the deficiency is merely procedural and does not 
deny the existence of the contract. Such distinctions are not particularly helpful, however, in 
determining whether recovery in some form will be permitted. Contract-like legal liability may 
at times arise from a "void" contract (consider, e.g., Craven-Ellis v. Canons Ltd [1936] 2 K.B. 403). 
Conversely, at times no liability may arise even though the parties have acted under a contract 
which is merely "unenforceable". Consequently, all such cases will be considered together 
under the rubric of defective contracts, even though some of these are technically, void, and 
thus not contracts at all.
66 It is not proposed here to consider contracts voidable as a result of some procedural 
unfairness (these will be considered under the heading of tort-like liability), or contracts 
unenforceable because of a frustrating event (frustration will be considered in Chapter 7), or 
contracts unenforceable because of the expiry of a limitation period.
67 Statute of Frauds-type legislation has historically been the most significant source of 
cases. See § 6.2.2.2. There are numerous modern examples, particularly of statutory or 
regulatory schemes which require written contracts or memoranda of contracts in order to 
protect consumers and other vulnerable classes of people. See, e.g., Pavey & Mathews v. Paul 
(1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, concerning legislation covering building contracts.
68 A common requirement of much hire purchase and credit legislation is that 
agreement be in a certain form, or that consumers be supplied with "plain" language
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form will be classed as cases of "want of formality", and are said to be 
unenforceable. Unenforceable contracts form by far the most significant 
group of cases.
(2) A contract may be expressly or impliedly prohibited or proscribed by 
statute,69 or have a purpose which is contrary to public policy at 
common law. Examples of the latter include agreements to commit a 
crime70 and agreements which are an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Such contracts will be classed as cases of "illegality", though the term 
raises difficulties both of meaning and of classification.71 These 
difficulties can largely be avoided if one uses the term "illegality" in an 
all encompassing way to refer to all cases in which contracts are 
defective as a result of either the subject-matter of the agreement, the 
purpose of the agreement, or the manner of its performance, as distinct 
from the form which that agreement takes.
(3) A contract may be entered into by parties who lack the legal capacity 
to contract. Examples include contracts entered into by minors, the 
mentally disordered, corporations acting ultra vires of their powers,72 or
summaries of the nature of the financial obligations incurred.
69 A particular agreement may incur a statutory penalty and thus be considered to be 
impliedly prohibited by the statute.
70 Such as a contract to commit a murder.
71 See Dickson, B., "Restitution and Illegal Transactions" in Burrows, Essays, 171,171- 
3, for a summary of the different approaches to the treatment of illegality, specifically the 
process of classification and differentiation of illegal contracts. See also Carter & Harland, 477- 
8. Such difficulties led Farnsworth to prefer the label "unenforceability on grounds of public 
policy". See Farnsworth, 345-8.
Some commentators, such as Atiyah, draw a distinction between contracts void as contrary to 
public policy or interest on the one hand and "illegal" contracts on the other. See, e.g., Atiyah, 
Chps XVII & XVIII respectively. Similarly, see Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, Law of Contract 
(11th ed., 1986), and Cheshire & Fifoot (Aust. ed.), Chps 9,10,11 & 12. This would appear to be a 
difficult distinction to maintain and the approach is not followed by most commentators. See, 
e.g., Carter & Harland, 477-8 and Farnsworth, 345-50. Burrows, 333, states:
In this book a broad view of what is meant by illegality is adopted, which includes not 
only conduct which is sometimes described as 'contrary to public policy7. In particular 
it is believed that, in line with Anson and Treitel, the distinction drawn by Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston between illegal contracts and contracts that are void on grounds 
of public policy is unhelpful." (References are in Burrows, fn.l).
72 The ultra vires doctrine has been abolished (see the Corporations Law, ss. 160 (5), 162), 
so that for practical purposes, the previous law on this is largely irrelevant. But contrast
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by purported agents lacking authority to bind the principal or alleged 
principal.73 In all such cases the concern is with a legal deficiency of the 
parties to an agreement and they will be classed together as cases of 
"incapacity". The effects of incapacity will not be considered here, for 
reasons which will be spelled out below.
Despite the contracts being defective in all these cases, but depending 
upon the reason for the contract not being enforceable,74 a range of remedies 
may be available to a plaintiff who has paid money to the defendant, incurred 
expenses, performed services or in some way detrimentally relied on the faith 
of a subsisting agreement.75 The range of available remedies stems from the 
variety of liability rules which may potentially be activated. A plaintiff may 
claim in quantum meruit (doubts as to whether such a claim is available where 
an unenforceable contract has not been completely discharged have been laid to 
rest in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul76) or for money had and received, as well as
Burrows, 457. In cases of mental disorder and drunkenness, for a contract to be voidable, the 
party alleging incapacity must show that the other party knew or ought to have known of the 
other's mental incapacity. Hence, such cases can be seen as a specific type of unconscionability. 
See Hart v. O'Connor [1985] A.C. 1000.
73 It could be said that the agent lacks capacity to bind the principal to the agreement 
in question. See, e.g., Craven Ellis v. Canons Ltd [1935] 2 K.B. 403. A similar problem is raised 
where a defendant company was unincorporated at the time of the contract. See, e.g., Re Bancjue 
de Moscou v. The Liquidator [1952] 1 All E.R. 1269. Pre-incorporation contracts are dealt with in 
Australian law under statute.
74 We are only concerned with voidable contracts which have been avoided.
75 Cf. Fridman, G.H.L., "Reflections on Restitution" (1976) 8 Ottawa L.R. 156,174, who 
makes a similar point:
the judges are ... permitting recovery of money, or payment for services rendered, in 
the absence of a contractual relationship in the strict sense, whenever ... one person has 
acted to his financial detriment and ought to be restored to his previous financial 
position.
76 (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577. Previous doubts about the availability of a quantum meruit 
claim arose because it was perceived that a contract could not be implied where the express, 
though unenforceable, contract remained on foot, but this appears to have been a temporary 
aberration. Many of the earlier cases are inconsistent with the preclusion noted above, allowing 
a quantum meruit when a defendant had breached the unenforceable agreement, even though 
such a breach may not have been sufficient to discharge the contract. See discussion of the 
Australian cases in Cheshire & Fifoot (Aust. ed.), 262-5. The effect of these decisions (though not 
necessarily the reasoning, but see infra n. 116), as will be seen, was to allow the express contract 
to be enforced where it was not inconsistent with the policy of the rule rendering it 
"unenforceable". Consequently, the reasoning of the High Court, in Pavey & Mathews, that the 
basis of the claim was independent of contract and that the Court was consequently not 
enforcing the contract, will be questioned below.
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resort to equitable doctrines such as estoppel,77 constructive trust78 and part 
performance.79 Historically, a number of other actions have also at times been 
utilised.80 As will be seen below, which of these options will be available in a 
given case depends largely81 on the reason for the contract being defective and 
the cases will be considered accordingly under the headings of want of 
formality and illegality. But first, it is proposed to consider the contract-like 
nature of liability in all such cases in which relief is granted.
§ 6.2.2.1 The contract-like nature of liability
The contract-like nature of liability stems from three observation which 
can be made about the cases.
(1) In all the cases, the parties have taken some steps towards the 
assumption of a contractual obligation, but have failed to satisfy all 
requirements necessary to give rise to an enforceable contract. Nonetheless, the 
parties generally will have conducted themselves as if they are legally bound 
and that certain obligations have in fact been assumed. At the very least, the 
plaintiff will have relied on the expectation that a legal obligation exists and 
will usually have partly82 or completely performed his or her part of the
77 E.g., Riches v. Hogben [1986] 1 Qd. R. 315. Such relief is particularly common in the 
United States. See particularly §129 and §139 of the American Law Institute's Restatement of 
Contracts, Second, (1981).
78 That is, when utilised as a substantive source of legal liability, rather than merely a 
remedial device. See, e.g., Bannister v. Bannister [1948] 2 All E.R. 133; Ogilzne v. Ryan [1976] 2 
N.S.W.L.R. 504.
79 This operates in relation to contracts unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and 
derivative legislation. In England, amendments to the Law of Property Act 1925, according to 
Goff & Jones, 469, have rendered the part performance doctrine a "relic of the past". In 
Australia, this is not the case, though estoppel may largely supersede the doctrine. See infra n. 
98.
80 An example is an action in debt arising from a fully executed contract, as in Fablo v. 
Bloore [1983] 1 Qd.R. 107. See also Turner v. Bladin (1951) 82 C.L.R. 463. Such a claim may still be 
available today, though Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, has cast doubt on this. See 
particularly Deane J. at 602-3. Contrast the judgment of Dawson ]., and see the detailed 
discussion of this point as well as the earlier authorities in Cooper, G., "The Statute of Frauds 
and Actions in Restitution and Debt" (1989) 19 W.A.L.R. 56. Other actions which have in the 
past been utilised include actions for money paid at the request of the defendant (Knowlman v. 
Bluett (1874) 9 Ex. L.R. 307), and for "account stated" (Cocking v. Ward (1845) 1 C.B. 854; 135 
E.R. 781).
81 The historical development of doctrines and causes of actions is also of undeniable 
significance in determining whether a given liability rule is available.
82 Part performance will only give rise to recovery where the failure to complete the
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agreement. The defendant, however, refuses to perform as agreed, in other 
words, "breaches" the defective contract so that the plaintiffs reliant actions 
prove detrimental.83 The requirement that the plaintiff has detrimentally relied 
on the defective contract is essential, for where a plaintiff has not performed 
any part of the contractual obligation and the contract remains fully executory, 
no remedial relief will generally be available.84 This is, of course, different to 
the position where a contract is enforceable and this difference will be returned 
to shortly. The point also needs to be stressed that it is only where the 
defendant has breached the assumed obligation that a plaintiff typically seeks 
relief. Indeed, if the agreement has been fully executed, then no liability, in 
Restitution or otherwise, is generally available even if the contract is illegal.85
(2) Irrespective of the liability rules relied on to seek remedial relief, 
constant references need to be made to the defective contract to establish the 
necessary elements of a plaintiff's claim. It is the existence of and terms and 
conditions of the defective contract which ultimately determine whether a 
plaintiff can establish liability on the part of the defendant.86 This suggests that
plaintiff's agreed performance is the fault of the defendant, such as where a breach of the 
contract has occurred or is anticipated. If the plaintiff does not complete, but the defendant is 
ready, willing and able to proceed, then no claim will succeed. See Triple "C" Holdings Ply Ltd v. 
Hogan (1983) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 252, and Gino D'Allesandro Constructions v. Powis [19871 2 Qd.R. 40, 
58. Examples include Thomas v. Brown (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 714 (a claim for the recovery of money), 
and McCollum v. Mackenzie (1979) 100 D.L.R. (3rd) 229.
83 If the defendant fulfils his or her agreement, or is prepared to do so, the plaintiff 
will have his or her expectations under the agreement met.
84 This is subject to the possibility of claims for work done in preparation of the 
performance of the contract. Such expenses may be recoverable in the United States. A good 
example is Riley v. Capital Airlines, 185 F. Supp. 165 (1980), allowing recovery in Restitution. See 
also McDaniel v. Hutcherson, 124 S.W. 384 (1910), overruled in Boone v. Coe, 154 S.W. 900 (1913). 
See Palmer, §6.3, who concedes that such cases are not benefit-based, and Fuller & Perdue, 
supra n. 10, 392-4. Cf. Stevens v. Good Samaritan Hospital & Medical Ctr, 504 P. 2d 749 (1972), 
though note the vigorous dissenting judgment. The writer is not aware of any English or 
Australian authorities allowing the recovery of preparatory costs in Restitution under a 
defective contract, but there are numerous examples of recovery for such reliance loss where a 
contract is incomplete, such as for work done in anticipation of an expected contract. See, e.g., 
Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880, and generally, § 6.2.3 below.
85 For example, property can pass under an illegal contract: see Singh v. Ali [1960] A.C. 
167; Leonard v. Booth (1954) 91 C.L.R. 452, 483. Thus, if both parties have done everything 
required under the agreement, the courts will not usually upset the transactions. See Tinsley v. 
Milligan [1993] 3 W.L.R. 126,143, per Lord Chauncey of Tullichettle.
86 Mason and Wilson JJ. acknowledge as much in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 
A.L.R. 577, 583-4, ("[p]roof of the oral contract may be an indispensable element in the 
plaintiff's claim") but consider that "the purpose of proving the contract is not to enforce it but 
to make out another cause of action having a different foundation in law." For a criticism of this
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the responsibility of the defendant to the plaintiff stems directly from the 
defendant's intention to assume an obligation evidenced by the parties' mutual 
agreement and the subsequent breach of that agreement if relied upon.
(3) Reflecting the wide range of potential actions to which a plaintiff may 
resort, there are a variety of remedial responses to a defendant's breach of an 
unenforceable contract. Some of these remedies are typically contractual, 
whereas others are not. But even in the latter case, the basis for the remedial 
relief is still the contract-like conduct of a defendant. Remedies which have 
been granted include the fulfilment of what a plaintiff can reasonably be 
entitled to expect87 and compensation of a plaintiff's reliance losses.88 In some 
cases, notably illegality, the court's response to the defective contract may be to 
preclude any remedial relief, even restitution of a benefit, such as money paid 
to the defendant. Most significantly, however, it is not uncommon for a plaintiff 
to be awarded the quintessential contractual measure of recovery, namely, to 
have his or her contractual expectation fulfilled. This will usually be by means 
of specific performance or damages measured to achieve this.89 The effect of 
such remedies is to place the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had 
been enforced.
The reasons for the different remedial outcomes may not always be easy 
to identify—there is no simple formula for accurately predicting a court's 
response to a defective contract. One stated reason, however, features 
prominently in many of the decisions: the courts, in granting or refusing a 
remedy, often claim to be giving effect to the true underlying purposes and 
policies of the statutory90 or common law rule rendering the contract defective.
view, see § 6.2.2.2.
87 Where, for example, a quantum meruit for the value of services rendered includes a 
reasonable profit element. See § 4.4.1 as to the different possible measures of a quantum meruit 
claim.
88 Such compensation may be by means, for example, of a quantum meruit as measured 
by reference to expenses incurred; or by restitution of money paid under contract, in a claim for 
money had and received.
89 Other means used to enforce the plaintiff's full contractual expectations include the 
remedy of the constructive trust (supra n. 78) and the action in debt for the contract price (see 
supra n. 80). Significantly, the practical consequence of a quantum meruit award is often the 
fulfilment of a plaintiff's full contractual expectations. This will be discussed further below.
90 Where the rule is statute based, its underlying purpose may not always be 
discernible from the language of the statute itself, which may, if literally applied, suggest quite 
different consequences. The fact that the courts will often shun a literal application of statutory
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Consistently with this view, the remedy granted in many cases will be seen 
generally to promote, or at least not to contravene, the policy of the rule in 
question. Hence, the division and consideration of the cases in terms of the 
reasons for a contract being defective, which reasons are crucial in establishing 
why and to what extent a defective contract will give rise to legal consequences.
§ 62.2.1.1 One significant difference between contract-like liability and 
contractual liability: the requirement of detriment
Despite the above similarities of claims under defective contracts to 
claims in contract, there is one significant difference. It is possible to establish 
an action if a defendant should breach an enforceable contract even where the 
contract is entirely executory and neither party has gone anyway toward 
performing his or her part of the agreed transaction. In such a case, it may be 
possible for the innocent party to enforce the contract either specifically, or by a 
claim for damages calculated by reference to the plaintiffs (unfulfilled) 
contractual expectation. However, a claim to enforce an executory contract is 
not possible when that contract is defective, even if the defect stems from a 
minor technical failing only. Despite their complete bargain, the parties have 
not in law taken all the steps necessary to assume a legally enforceable 
contractual liability. Before a claim can arise, a plaintiff must have relied on the 
existence of the defective contractual obligation in a way which proves 
detrimental when the defendant subsequently refuses to complete his or her 
part of the agreed bargain.91
provisions again demonstrates the gap-filling and ameliorative role of relief in Restitution—the 
courts will try to avoid unjust consequences that would flow if such provisions were given 
literal effect. Instead, the courts seek to promote the underlying purposes of the statutory 
provision. The most trite example of this can be seen in the Statute of Frauds cases, to be 
considered below.
91 As with the cases considered in this chapter generally, a defendant's enrichment is 
not a prerequisite for successful recovery under a defective contract. As will be recalled from 
Chapter 4, pure reliance losses will justify the imposition of an obligation even where the 
defendant has not received any of what was bargained for. See Riches v. Hogben [1986] 1 Qd.R. 
315, in which case estoppel was the doctrinal vehicle for recovery. Work preparatory to 
contractual performance may be recoverable. See supra n. 84. In the United States, recovery has 
not been precluded even where a contract requires the transfer of benefits to a third party. 
Perhaps the most telling example is provided by Clement v. Rowe, 146 N.W. 700 (1914), 
seemingly an action in quantum valebat. The defendant had orally promised to transfer stocks to 
the plaintiff if the plaintiff transferred certain farmland to a third party. The plaintiff did so, but 
the defendant refused to perform as agreed, relying on the Statute of Frauds. The court 
considered that as "[t]he plaintiff had irrevocably surrendered the farm, relying upon 
defendant's promise, [the] defendant must therefore put him back as nearly as possible in statu 
quo" (703). Although note that earlier the court considered that:
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Does this added requirement of detrimental reliance by a plaintiff 
detract from the contract-like nature of liability under a defective contract? 
Certainly, enforcement of entirely executory contracts appears to be the 
crowning achievement of contract law92 and, not surprisingly, the law will only 
grant such remedial relief where all legal formalities of contract law have been 
fulfilled. But this is only one, albeit an important, aspect of contract. If one 
focuses on contract as an assumption of obligation by means of agreement—the 
causative event, rather than the remedial response—then cases of defective 
contracts can also be described as involving an assumption of obligation by 
means of agreement. The parties will have reached a sufficient consensus, 
though according to the formal rules for identifying contracts, no legally 
binding contract arose. Once a plaintiff relies on the "contract" to his or her 
detriment, contract-like liability would appear to be justified, the plaintiffs 
actions being precisely what the defendant should have anticipated—if not 
invited—because of his or her agreement with the plaintiff. The plaintiffs 
detrimental reliance is always caused by or at least referable to the albeit 
defective contract. Consequently, the courts treat the defendant's conduct, in 
failing to fulfil his or her agreement subsequent to the plaintiffs reliance, as 
giving rise to rights consistent with the policies of the legal rule rendering the 
contract defective. The individual and distinct doctrines and rules to be 
considered provide the vehicles for liability in a given case; and these doctrines 
and rules often have their own substantive elements and features. But 
importantly, the rationale for such doctrines and rules lies in ideas at the core of 
contract law. This will be demonstrated as we now consider the case law in 
some detail.
§ 6.2.2.2 Contracts unenforceable for want of formality
Statutory requirements that contracts comply with certain formalities are 
not uncommon or new and a failure to comply invariably renders the contract
So far as the relations between plaintiff and defendant are concerned, the situation was 
the same as though the land really became the property of the defendant; but by his 
direction the title was taken in the name of a third person. In such a case the law will 
presume that the benefit of the transaction inured to the defendant (emphasis added).
When the law resorts to presumptions such as these, one can only suspect that policies other 
than the disgorgement of gains are at the back of recovery.
92 It should be noted, though, that this is rarely done via specific enforcement (specific 
performance) of the contract, but instead merely by awarding a substitute remedy of damages 
measured by reference to what a plaintiff's position would be if the contract had been enforced.
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unenforceable. Yet despite this unenforceability remedial relief may be 
available to plaintiffs who have acted to their detriment on the faith of the 
agreement, where defendants have breached such an agreement.
One of the most fertile grounds for such claims has proved to be the 
Statute of Frauds9^  and derivative legislation. Legislation requiring that certain 
contracts be evidenced in writing in order to be enforceable94 is still 
commonplace. Such legislation may evince a variety of policy concerns. The 
Statute of Frauds has been interpreted as being specifically aimed at the 
prevention of fraud: contracts must adequately be evidenced in order to avoid 
the difficulties of proving or disproving potentially fraudulent allegations of 
oral agreements. Much of the case law concerns the Statute of Frauds, though 
cases arising under more recent provisions which evince other, quite different 
policy objectives95 and utilise quite different language, will also be considered.
Although the Statute of Frauds provided that no causes of action could be 
brought on contracts caught within its provision, its effect was not as far- 
reaching as the clear language of the Act would at first suggest. For
[n]o sooner had the Statute of Frauds been enacted in 1677 than the courts 
set about relieving persons of its effect in cases where it was thought that 
the legislation could not have been intended to apply. In general terms, 
it was said that the courts would not allow the Statute of Frauds to be 
made an instrument of fraud, and that it did not prevent the proof of the 
fraud.96
It was evident that if the Statute were strictly applied, then contractual 
claims based on genuine agreement could be defeated by unscrupulous 
defendants, even where a plaintiff had acted detrimentally in reliance upon the 
agreement. Thus, the Statute would protect dishonest conduct. The courts of 
both equity and common law did not perceive such results as desirable, and 
consequently a number of doctrines and remedies developed to circumvent the
93 Passed in 1677; 29 Car. II C 3.
94 The Statu te of Frauds, s. 4, provided that "[n]o action shall be brought" upon certain 
agreements unless evidenced in writing.
95 Different policy objectives may consequently give rise to different remedial relief.
96 Last v. Rosenfeld [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 922, 927, per Hope J. Put more succinctly, it is 
said that "the purpose of the S ta tu te  is to prevent fraud rather than to foster it": Hutchinson, 
R.B., "The Necessity of Conferring a Benefit for Recovery in Quasi-Contract" (1968) 19 Hastings 
L.J. 1259, 1266, citing H uey v. Frank, 182 111. App. 431 (1913). And see Meagher, Gummow & 
Lehane, 347, 514-5, as well as references cited § 1.4.3.2 and references infra n. 122.
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strict application of the Statute. Many of these mechanisms for such 
circumvention are still relevant today and include97 the doctrine of part 
perform ance98 and actions for money had and received99 and quantum 
meruit.10°
Since an oral contract caught by the Statute of Frauds is unenforceable, 
actions for the specific performance of such a contract or for damages for a 
failure to perform will fail where the contract is entirely executory.101 Similarly, 
actions for breach of specific terms of the contract will fail.102 Where, however, 
a plaintiff has relied on the existence of the oral contract and has partially or 
completely performed his or her part of the agreed bargain or, perhaps,103
97 It is uncertain whether an action in debt, where one party has fully executed his or 
her contractual performance, is still available. See supra n. 80. A number of other remedies have 
also been used in the past, but are no longer available as a result of the abolition of the forms of 
action. See supra n. 80.
98 Although note the position in England, supra n. 79. The doctrine has a long 
historical lineage. Early cases include Butcher v. Staeley (1685) 1 Vem. 363, and Lester v. Foxcroß 
(1701) Colies Par. Cas. 106. The courts intervene by granting specific performance to a plaintiff 
who has partially performed his or her part of the alleged oral contract where such part 
performance was referable to "some such contract" as alleged: Steadman v. Steadman [1976] A.C. 
536. The cases generally only apply to contracts transferring interests in land, though 
theoretically, the doctrine may not be so limited. See Carter & Harland, 167, and generally, 
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 515-22. Arguably, part performance may be superseded by 
estoppel, which is becoming an increasingly significant mechanism used to provide relief in 
cases of unenforceable contracts and may be more broadly based. See, e.g., Collin v. Holden 
[1989] V.R. 510, and Riches v. Hogben [1986] 1 Qd.R. 315. Some commentators have cautioned 
against the displacement of part performance by estoppel. See Nicholson, K.G., "Riches v. 
Hogben: Part Performance and the Doctrine of Equitable and Proprietary Estoppel" (1986) 60 
A.L.J. 345.
99 See, e.g., Green v. Saddington (1857) 7 El. & Bl. 503; Gosbell v. Archer (1835) 2 A. & E.
500.
100 See, e.g., Scarisbrick v Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T.R. 175; Ward v. Grifßths (1928) 28 
N.S.W.S.R. 425, though note discussion, supra n. 76.
101 See Carter & Harland, 162. Where a party to a contract has partially performed the 
obligations under the contract, this will not remove the contract from the Statute (unless the 
part performance doctrine applies) and no action can be maintained for the executory part of 
the contract. See McBride v. City of McCook, 321 N.W. 2d 905 (1982); cf. Harman v. Reeve (1856) 18 
C.B. 587.
102 Britain v. Rossiter (1879) 11 Q.B.D. 123 (action for damages for wrongful dismissal 
unsuccessful); see also Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 6 A.L.R. (2d) 1045 (1948), (bonus under an 
employment contract not recoverable). Contrast Scott v. Pattison [1923] 2 K.B. 723, in which the 
court considered that a claim for payment of sick leave might be maintainable where contracts 
of the type in question customarily included such a provision. This was despite the 
unenforceability of the contract itself.
103 Acts done in preparation to commencing contractual performance may also, 
according to a number of American authorities, give rise to recovery in estoppel and even
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merely done acts preparatory to such performance, a defendant who breaches 
his or her agreement may be liable to the plaintiff on the basis of a number of 
liability rules. The reasons for such liability appear contract-like, although the 
formal explanations given are not contractual.
Consistently with the contract-like qualities of the liability rules, the 
remedial responses often reflect this quality and appear contract-like. The 
plaintiff may be awarded what he or she may be reasonably entitled to expect 
in the circumstances, by means of a quantum meruit for services rendered, 
incorporating a reasonable profit component.104 For our purposes, however, 
the most notable feature of Statute of Frauds cases (and want of formality cases 
generally) is that often the courts have been prepared to protect a plaintiffs 
actual expectations under the unenforceable contract. Alternatively, at times, 
the remedial responses are not typically contractual. For example, a defendant's 
liability to the plaintiff may take the form of an obligation to return the plaintiff 
to his or her previous status quo, by means inter alia, of the restitution of money 
paid under the unenforceable contract105 or compensation for expenses 
incurred by the plaintiff.106 Nonetheless, the basis for liability even where the 
remedial response is not contract-like, is still the contract-like conduct of the 
defendant.
historically, the most significant mechanism for the protection of a 
plaintiff's actual expectations has been equity's part performance doctrine.107
quasi-contract. See supra n. 84.
104 This is a common practice in cases involving building or construction work. See, 
e.g., Gino D'Allesandro Constructions v. Powis [1987] 2 Qd.R. 40, in which $6000 was included as a 
profit component above the expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Cf. Pavey & Mathews v. Paul 
(1987) 69 A.L.R. 577.
105 Although the form of relief is restitutionary, it should not be seen as motivated by 
a desire to disgorge unjustly gained benefits, for to do so would be to isolate money cases from 
other forms of relief. Instead, it can be seen as a restitutionary remedy arising from breach of 
the unenforceable contract, aimed at restoring the plaintiff to his or her previous position.
106 Recovery of the costs incurred by a plaintiff, without any profit element, is one 
measure of quantum meruit. See § 4.4.1 and cases such as Estok v. Heguy (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 88, 
(expenses incurred in improving defendant's land in belief that an enforceable contract to 
purchase the land existed); and Riley v. Capital Airlines, 185 F. Supp. 165 (1960) (where 
preparatory expenses were recompensed).
107 Note Fuller & Perdue, supra n. 10, 391, fn. 140, who concede that recovery under 
part performance normally is of the expectation interest, but nevertheless consider that the 
"various doctrines of 'part performance' are phrased broadly enough to furnish a substantial 
vent for the judicial impulse to compensate detrimental reliance." Where available, a claim for a
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Where a plaintiff has performed services, paid money or in some other way 
acted in part performance of an oral contract transferring an interest in land108 
courts will grant specific performance of the contract where it would be 
fraudulent or unconscionable for a defendant to rely on the Statute. 
Interestingly, a plaintiff's actual expectations may also be protected by means 
of quantum meruit for services rendered .109 This follows as a practical 
consequence of the view—for which there is considerable authority110—that 
recourse may be had to the oral agreement as evidence of the reasonable value 
of the work performed. In many cases, the courts have simply accepted the 
contract price as the reasonable value of the services.* 111
References to the oral contract, however, are not limited to determining 
the reasonable value of services. Indeed, repeated references need to be made 
to the unenforceable contract in order successfully to formulate a claim for 
relief in Restitution or equity. For example, where the claim is for a quantum 
meruit for services rendered, it is necessary to prove, inter alia, that the services 
were not conferred at the plaintiff's own risk ("officiously", as the cases would 
have) and were not intended to be gratuitous.112 But proof of these factors, and
debt arising from the completion of one party's performance results in an award of that party's 
actual expectations under the contract. See, e.g., Fablo Pty Ltd v. Bloore [1983] 1 Qd.R. 107. 
Expectation interests may also be protected by resort to estoppel or constructive trust.
108 Note, however, that part performance perhaps also extends to other types of 
contracts. See supra n. 98.
109 Interestingly, most commentators perceive quantum meruit generally as a reliance 
loss remedy, but this ignores the practical consequences of many of the decisions. See § 4.4.1.
110 See, e.g., Scarisbrick v. Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T.R. 175, 177, where the court 
considered that the jury "might have recourse to the agreement for the purpose of seeing what 
the defendant himself had valued the services at." This principle was affirmed by the High 
Court in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 605. See also Tipling v. T.P.R. Printing Co. 
Ltd [1955] N.Z.LR. 136. For United States decisions, see cases and references cited in Perillo, 
supra n. 32,1216, fn. 55.
111 E.g., Scarisbrick v. Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T.R. 175; Tipling v. T.P.R. Printing Co. Ltd 
[1955] N.Z.LR. 136. In Ward v. Griffiths (1928) 28 N.S.W.S.R. 425, the jury awarded a plaintiff 
£200 over and above what he had already received under an oral contract as the reasonable 
value of the work carried out; this sum was the same as that still outstanding under the oral 
contract.
112 Historically, to pursue a quantum meruit claim successfully it was necessary to 
show a request (either express or implied from the circumstances) for the services by the 
defendant, that the work was not intended to be gratuitous and that the requested services had 
in fact been performed. Cf. Cauchi, G.F., "The Protection of the Reliance Interest and 
Anticipated Contracts Which Fail to Materialize" (1981) 19 U.W.O.L.R. 237, fn. 23, and 
references cited therein, and Birks, P., "Restitution for Services" [1974] C.L.P. 13, 30. The first
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others, 113 is only possible by reference to the oral contract. To utilise the 
language of unjust enrichment, the unjustness of the "benefit" is constituted by 
the defendant's failure to meet his or her agreed obligation. As Stoljar has 
indicated,
If P asks D to pay him for his executed services on the basis of 
restitution, D can say the services are officious; and if P rejoins the 
services cannot be officious because solicited by an agreement, D replies 
that the agreement is unenforceable. The restitution argument is thus 
caught in a vicious circularity, going round and round.114
And historically, although pleading the contract was unacceptable given its 
"unenforceability", at trial repeated references were nevertheless made to the 
oral agreement. Perillo has concluded that this highlights the contractual nature 
of claims under unenforceable contracts:
At every step and turn questions of fact and questions of law are 
definitively or partially resolved by reference to the contract. Yet we are 
still asked to believe that the action is non-contractual because in 
pleadings, but not in trials, centuries ago reference to the contract was 
taboo.115
two of these requirements were in turn satisfied by proving the oral contract. Given these 
elements of the quantum meruit claim, the attraction of an implied contract theory is not 
surprising: the basis of liability being that requested services were performed in the expectation 
that they were to be paid for. See, e.g., Kearns v. Andree, 139 A. 695 (1928), 697.
113 For example, the terms of the oral contract might be raised by a defendant in order 
to show that a plaintiff claiming under the contract had breached the agreement, thereby 
raising a possible defence.
114 Stoljar, 195-6. See generally his discussion of these issues, 192-6, 231-45.
115 Perillo, supra n. 32, 1216. Also note the judgment of Cardoza CJ. in Buccini v. 
Paterno Construction Co., 170 N.E. 910, 911 (1930), who makes a similar point.
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Despite these observations, the courts have for the most part116 refused 
to concede that they are, even in effect, enforcing contracts when imposing 
liability. Thus in cases of equitable relief (under the doctrine of part 
performance or estoppel, for example), it is said that the defendant is not 
charged upon the contract, but upon the equities which arise where the 
circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the defendant to plead 
the Statute. Similarly, it has recently been stressed that a quasi-contractual claim 
for quantum meruit is an independent restitutionary claim. In the view of Deane 
J., for example:
the claim in restitution involves not enforcing the agreement but 
recovering compensation on the basis that the agreement is 
unenforceable.117
Admittedly, unlike for a contractual claim, it is necessary to show some 
detriment to the plaintiff; and further, the individual elements of each specific 
liability rule need to be met. Thus, in estoppel for example, the
116 Some early authorities took the view that where a plaintiff had fully performed his 
or her part of the contractual obligation and proceeded in an action for debt, the Statute simply 
did not apply to the contract. See, e.g., Simon v. Metivier (1766) 1 Black W. 599; cf. Souch v. 
Strawbridge (1846) 2 C.B. 808; Green v. Saddington (1857) 7 El. & Bl. 503. This view was rejected in 
Australia in Hodge v. Rudd (1902) 19 W.N. (N.S.W.) 119. See Cooper, supra n. 80, 58-9. 
Nevertheless, the courts continued to allow such actions in debt, but resorted to the fiction that 
such actions were not ones to enforce the contract: Turner v. Bladin (1951) 82 C.L.R. 463, 474-5. 
Such a debt action may no longer be available in the light of Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 
A.L.R. 577. See supra n. 80. In the United States, the position appears to be that complete 
performance by one party of some types of contracts takes such contracts outside the Statute, so 
that such a party is entitled to sue on the contract. See Corpus Juris Secondum, Vol. 37, 762. Cf. 
Farnsworth, 443-4.
117 Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 607. Cf. the views of Mason and 
Wilson JJ. at 583:
Once the true basis of the action on a cjuantum meruit is established, namely execution 
of work for which the unenforceable contract provided, and its acceptance by the 
defendant, it is difficult to regard the action as one by which the plaintiff seeks to 
enforce the oral contract. True it is that proof of the oral contract may be an 
indispensable element in the plaintiff's success but ... [tlhe purpose of proving the 
contract is not to enforce it but to make out another cause of action having a different 
foundation in law.
The various judges seem almost at pains to stress this point, despite its seeming artificiality, but 
contrast the dissenting judgment of Brennan J. See also Gino D'Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd 
v. Powis [1987] 2 Qd.R. 40, 58 (claim for damages for loss of profits for breach of contract would 
involve enforcing the contract, whereas a quantum meruit claim would not). Although these 
cases did not concern Statute of Frauds-type legislation, they proceeded by considering Statute of 
Frauds authorities alongside other authorities concerning different legislative provisions. It was 
accepted in Pavey & Mathews, however, that differing statutory purposes would have to be 
taken into account in deciding whether relief was consistent with such purposes. In Canada, see 
Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. [1954] 3 D.L.R. 785.
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unconscionability of a defendant's conduct needs to be shown. But such 
elements are proved, invariably, by reference to the unenforceable contract and 
its terms.118 One can conclude that the reason underlying the imposition of 
liability is a plaintiff's entitlement to expect that some obligation has been 
assumed and his or her reliance on the strength of such an assumption.119 But 
if this is so, one may ask whether Australian law ought not to be rationalised in 
the same way as has occurred in the United States, where detrimental reliance 
has been recognised as giving rise to a contractual claim in some cases.120 In 
effect, a plaintiff's reliance on the agreement overcomes the want of 
formality,121 so that the parties can be taken to have assumed an obligation
118 Cf. Stoljar, supra n. 11,17, discussing Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513:
Behind all the talk of estoppel, what really did inform the whole inquiry was whether 
an agreement could be properly inferred, an agreement, more exactly, which whatever 
its incompletenesses was still sufficiently firm in outline to allow one party to act under 
it while the other, aware of what was happening, could no longer withdraw, not 
having retained a clear option to that effect (footnote omitted).
119 One could say that the defendant has a clear intention (as objectively determinable 
from the defendant's conduct) to assume an obligation and has subsequently breached that 
assumed obligation.
120 See §90, §129 and §139 of the Restatement of Contracts, Second (1981). See also 
Farnsworth, §2.19. The effect of §90 is to overcome a want of consideration, but it has also been 
utilised in circumstances when an unenforceable contract is relied upon. In the past, §90 
reliance was invoked to overcome the statutory bar to enforceability, even where reliance 
occurred in relation to promises supported by consideration. See Farnsworth, §6.12. Hence, 
§139 was added to the Restatement of Contracts, Second, in response to such cases. §139 reads
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the 
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if justice can 
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be 
limited as justice requires.
Consistently with this view, definitions of contract in the United States would include claims 
under "unenforceable" contracts. See, e.g., Farnsworth, 3: A contract is "a promise, or set of 
promises, that the law will enforce or at least recognise in some way" (emphasis in original). 
Similarly, see the Restatement of Contracts, Second §1: a contract is a "promise ... for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as 
a duty." Clearly, even in Australian law, breach of many types of unenforceable contracts does 
give rise to some remedy. Cf. Stoljar, supra n. 11, 17, writing in relation to Waltons Stores v. 
Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, 537:
[E]ven if [the parties'] agreement was but an informal one (a formal exchange not 
having taken place) the plaintiff's part performance ... easily eked out this deficiency, 
such that a binding contract resulted to be remedied either by specific performance or 
by damages.
121 Cf. Stoljar, quoted ibid.
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which is legally enforceable, that is, gives rise to remedial rights, when 
breached.
The enforceability of a contract, of course, will be limited to the extent 
that it is consistent with the policies of the statutory or common law rule that 
has been contravened. Thus, the courts will not allow the avowed purpose of 
the Statute of Frauds to be defeated by permitting it to be made an instrument of 
fraud,122 but this may justify in appropriate circumstances the protection of a 
plaintiffs full contractual expectations.
Other statutory schemes may have quite different purposes to the Statute 
of Frauds. Consequently, different considerations must apply in determining 
whether a particular remedy will offend the purpose of the provision in 
question. Although the part performance doctrine does not apply to provisions 
other than the Statute of Frauds and derivative legislation, relief under other 
equitable doctrines and Restitution has been allowed, and usually such relief is 
consistent with the policy of the statute in question. As Mason and Wilson JJ. 
indicated in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul, "[a]n interpretation that serves the 
statutory purpose yet avoids a harsh and unjust operation is to be 
preferred."123
Pavey & Mathews v. Paul provides a good example of the significance of 
the relevant statutory provision in determining whether relief should be 
allowed. In that case, a builder had completed construction work under an oral 
contract, rendered "unenforceable" by s. 45 of the Builder's Licensing Act 1971 
(N.S.W.). The High Court allowed the builder's quantum meruit claim for the 
completed work.124 The Court considered that although on one view, the
122 See, generally, Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 521-2. Under the part performance 
doctrine, the plaintiff must show that he or she "would suffer an injury amounting to fraud by 
the refusal to execute that agreement": Frame v. Dawson (1807) 14 Ves. Jun. 386, 386. Cf. 
Maddison v. Alderson (1883) 8 A.C. 467, 474, 476. The maxim that "Equity does not allow a 
Statute to be made an instrument of fraud" has been identified as the historical source of 
equitable intervention: Caton v. Caton (1866) 1 Ch.App. 137,148. For an estoppel case, see Riches 
v. Hogben [1986] 1 Qd.R. 315; and for a case in which a constructive trust was utilised to prevent 
a fraudulent retention of property, see Rochefoucauld v. Boustead [1897] 1 Ch. 196, 206. All of 
these equitable doctrines can be seen as giving effect to the view that the Statute was not 
intended "to prevent the Court of Equity from giving relief in a case of a plain, clear and 
deliberate fraud": Haigh v. Kaye (1872) L.R. 7 Ch. App. 469, 474, per James L.J. In the United 
States, a similar rationale for equitable recovery is usually cited. See, e.g., Howland v. Iron 
Firemans Mfg Co., 213 P. 2d 380 (1950), 382. On occasions, common law courts have also made 
reference to the purpose of the Statute. See, e.g., Souch v. Strawbridge (1846) 2 C.B. 808, a 
common law claim in which Tindal C.J. canvassed the objects of the Statute.
123 (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 584.
124 This also equated with the actual contractual remuneration provision agreed upon
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policy of the Act was to protect "the building owner against spurious claims by 
a builder" ,125 to preclude a builder claiming for work done under the contract 
would be a consequence so "draconian that it is difficult to suppose that [it 
was] intended" ,126 whereas allowing recovery would not "frustrate the 
purpose" of the provision.127 The approach of the High Court is consistent with 
the view that the "whole crux of the problem ... is to determine whether the 
purpose at the base of the statutory prohibition of the contractual action would 
be frustrated by the allowance of the restitutionary remedy" ,128 or, it should be 
added, any other remedy.
An emphasis on the purpose of a statutory prohibition and recognition 
of the essentially contractual nature of liability where allowed will also assist in 
resolving a persistent problem in this area, namely, the relevance of the total
by the parties, in which the price was to be determined on a quantum meruit basis. This was, 
however, only coincidental, and the court emphasised that the builder would only have been 
entitled to the "fair" value awarded, even if the oral contract had provided for a greater sum. 
For the position if the contract had provided for a lesser sum, see below.
125 69 A.L.R., 584; on an alternative view, the Court considered that the purpose of the 
Act was (citing Gino D'Alessandro Constructions Pty Ltd v. Powis [1987] 2 Qd.R. 40) "to ensure, so 
far as possible, that a degree of precision is introduced into house building contracts, so that it 
can be readily determined what is the work to be done and whether loss or damage has been 
suffered".
126 Id.
127 In the view of Deane J. at 609:
the survival of the ordinary common law right of the builder to recover, in an action 
founded on restitution or unjust enrichment, reasonable remuneration for work done 
and accepted under a contract which is unenforceable by him does not frustrate the 
purpose of the section to provide protection for a building owner. The building owner 
remains entitled to enforce the contract. He cannot, however, be forced either to 
comply with its terms or to permit the builder to carry it to completion. All that he can 
be required to do is to pay reasonable compensation for work done of which he has 
received the benefit and for which in justice he is obligated to make such a payment by 
way of restitution.
The High Court contrasted various money-lender provisions which were held to preclude any 
claim by a money-lender for money loaned in contravention of such provisions. The Court did 
not consider them "really in point." See Deane J., at 608, and Mason and Wilson JJ. at 584-5, 
who could see no "compelling analogy" between those provisions and the ones under 
consideration in Pavey & Mathews. In the view of Mason and Wilson JJ., "[i]t is not possible to 
interpret [the money-lending] provisions so that they left on foot any quasi-contractual causes 
of action on the part of the lender."
128 Ibbetson, D., "Implied Contracts and Restitution: History in the High Court of 
Australia" (1988) 8 O.J.L.S. 312,326.
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contract price as a ceiling upon quantum meruit recovery. If a plaintiff has 
rendered services reasonably valued at, say, $6000, under an unenforceable 
contract providing for payment of $5000 for such services, should the plaintiffs 
claim be limited to $5000? Although there is some uncertainty as to the state of 
the authorities,129 in principle, the total contract price ought to provide a 
ceiling to any claim.130 In relation to unenforceable contracts, arguably, the law 
is now settled in favour of such a view in Australia.131 Perhaps the most 
persuasive reason for such a view follows from the very basis of liability. It is 
the parties' express assumption of an obligation and consequently, their 
express allocation of risk, which justifies holding a defendant liable when he or 
she breaches the agreement.132 Without such assumption of the obligation, 
there appears to be no basis for imposing liability. The agreed price represents 
the reasonable expectation which formed the basis of the plaintiff's detrimental 
reliance. The parties allocation of risk ought to be respected, especially given 
that if the contract price did not provide a ceiling to recovery, a plaintiff who 
has failed to meet the formalities of contract law could in theory recover more 
on the unenforceable contract than a plaintiff suing on an enforceable contract. 
In most cases, such recovery must be contrary to the policy of the rule 
rendering the contract unenforceable, especially if its purpose is to protect 
persons in the class of the defendant. None of the above, however, need 
suggest that a proportion of a contract price necessarily ought to provide a 
ceiling to a quantum meruit where only a proportion of the contract work has 
been performed.133
129 See, for example, the debate between B. Walker and J.W. Carter in (1990-1) 3 J.C.L. 
158-62; cf. Hunter, H.O., & Carter, J.W., “Quantum Meruit and Building Contracts“ (1989-90) 2 
J.C.L. 95,189, at 195.
130 Cf. Jones, G., “Restitution: Unjust Enrichment as a Unifying Concept in Australia“ 
(1988) 1 J.C.L. 8,13-4. Cf. Scarisbrookv. Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T. 175.
131 See Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 A.L.R. 577, 605, per Deane)., and see Carter, 
J.W., (1990-1) 3 J.C.L. 161. Contrast Jones, ibid, who points out that the issue was only 
addressed by Deane J. in Pavey & Mathews, and remains open. Where however, the claim is by 
an innocent party for a quantum meruit for services rendered under an enforceable contract 
which has been breached, the contrary, that is, that no contract ceiling operates, appears to be 
the case, in New South Wales at least. See Renard Constructions (ME) v. Minister for Public Works 
(1992) 26 N.S.W.L.R. 234 (Court of Appeal).
132 Cf. McKendrick, E., “The Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution" (1988) 8 
O.J.L.S. 197, 206: “English law generally does not allow a party to reverse the contractual 
allocation of risk by proceeding in quantum meruit rather than contract."
133 This raises different issues. For example, performance of the contract may involve 
a disproportionate initial set-up cost, so that even if performed efficiently, 50% of the work
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Does the above emphasis on the contract-like nature of liability represent 
a reversion to an implied contract theory of obligation? Such a theoretical 
explanation of claims on unenforceable contracts creates problems. For it is 
argued (and logically this view has some appeal) that a contract cannot be 
implied while an express one subsists.134 There is no need, however, to resort 
to an implied contract135 once it is realised that the courts have consistently 
been prepared to give a limited recognition to the "unenforceable" express 
contracts. The contract is enforced in the sense that remedial consequences 
attach to the breach of such contract (1) where the contract has in fact been 
relied on and provides the explanation for that reliance and (2) where such 
recognition promotes or at least does not contravene the purposes of the rule 
rendering the contract unenforceable.136 The "unenforceability", of course, bars 
relief where a contract is executory and also bars actions for breaches of specific 
terms of an agreement. But as a general proposition, the cases suggest that 
prima facie, a plaintiff who has detrimentally relied on the contract should be 
entitled at least to be returned to his or her status quo ante as well as any further 
remedy which does not contravene the policy of the particular rule. Such a 
proposition, however, though it appears to be a reasonably accurate summary 
of the law in relation to want of formality, cannot be made as a general 
proposition covering all types of defective contracts. Where the defect in a 
contract is the consequence of a more "serious" failing than a want of formality, 
the results of the cases cannot be so easily reconciled. It is submitted, however, 
that such a proposition may prove to be a useful starting point for analysing 
remedial relief available under contracts which are defective for illegality.
under a contract may cost 75% of the total cost of performance. Only once a plaintiff has 
exceeded the bargained-for price is it possible to say with any certainty that a losing bargain 
has been entered into by the plaintiff.
134 See Britain v. Rossiter (1879) 11 Q.B.D. 123, 127, per Brett L.J.: "It is a proposition 
which cannot be disputed that no new contract can be implied from acts done under an express 
contract which is still subsisting." See also Brennan J. in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 69 
A.L.R. 577, 588-9; Denning L.J. in James v. Thomas H Kent [1951] 1 K.B. 551, 556; and Cooper, 
supra n. 80, 67. This is not a problem in cases of anticipated contracts, where there is no 
completed agreement to preclude the courts implying a contract. See § 6.2.3.
135 Contrast Stoljar, 234, who still perceives that a separate implied agreement can be
found.
136 In effect, one could say that irrespective of the doctrinal vehicle for recovery, a 
defendant is precluded from raising the want of formality as a defence. See Perillo, supra n. 32, 
1218, who has said in relation to the Statute of Frauds: "today we are perfectly willing to estop a 
party entirely from raising the defence of the Statute, and we can understand the remedy of 
restitution as based upon a partial estoppel."
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§ 6.2.2.3 Contracts defective for illegality
The subject of illegality is complex.137 As a general rule, the courts will 
not assist parties engaged in contracts either having an illegal purpose138 or 
which are expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute. Such contracts will 
generally not be enforced. Examples are a contract to commit a crime and a 
contract, of itself to perform a lawful act but forming part of an overall illegal 
purpose such as tax fraud.139 Unlike the cases considered above, the courts are 
also far less willing to countenance relief in equity or Restitution where one 
party has relied to his or her detriment on an illegal contract. Thus, money 
paid140 or property transferred141 under an illegal contract is not generally 
recoverable and claims for services rendered under such an agreement will also 
usually fail.142 Despite the parties' attempted assumption of an obligation, as a 
general rule, no liability on that obligation will be recognised to have arisen in 
law.
The historical basis for the proscription against relief under an illegal 
contract is the view that the law will not assist a party who founds his or her 
claim on an illegal or immoral act.143 But if the legal policy behind the general
137 And in the view of Carter & Harland, 477, it is "one of the least satisfactory 
branches of contract law."
138 Stewart, A., "Contractual Liability and the Recognition of Proprietary Interests" 
(1988-9) 1 J.C.L. 134, 134. The general legal position is summed up by the Latin maxim in pari 
delicto potior est contidio defendentis: "where tx)th parties have acted illegally, the position of the 
defendant is strongest". See CCH, Macquarie Dictionary of Law (2nd. ed., 1993), 89. This rule has 
been "consistently applied" in the view of Goff & Jones, 499, but given the number of 
exceptions to the rule (see below) it is not easy to find a consistent rationalisation of the 
decisions. Significantly, even under an illegal contract, property can still pass: Singh v. Ali [1960] 
A.C. 167; Leonard v. Booth (1954) 91 C.L.R. 452, 483. Consequently, if both parties have 
performed everything required by the agreement, then the courts will not usually upset the 
transaction.
139 Cf. Weston v. Beaufils (1994) 122 A.L.R. 240.
140 E.g., Kearley v. Thomson (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 742; Berg v. Sadler & Moore [1937] 2 K.B. 
158. For a more recent example, see Bon Street Developments Ltd v. Terracan Capital Corp. (1992) 
76 B.C.L.R. (2d) 90.
141 E.g., Bigos v. Boustead [1951] 1 All E.R. 92; M’Cahill v. Henty (1878) 4 V.L.R. (E) 68.
142 E.g., Bensley v. Bignold (1822) 5 B. & Aid. 335, 340, per Bayley J.: "a party cannot be 
permitted, in a Court of Law to recover for work and labour done in direct violation of the 
law." See also Wild v. Simpson [1919] 2 K.B. 544.
143 Cf. Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341, at 343; 98 E.R. 1120, 1121, per Lord 
Mansfield.
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proscriptive rule is to promote lawful conduct, then an absolute bar to any 
remedial relief may lead to results "contrary to the real justice" of the situation, 
a point conceded by Lord Mansfield when articulating the general rule.144 
Nonetheless, the general rule of non-recovery145—of not enforcing contracts 
nor of unwinding them—does effect the public policy of not assisting parties to 
an illegal transaction albeit by means of a '"blunt instrument". The difficulty is 
that the rule does so indiscriminately, operating irrespective of the gravity of 
the illegality in a given case and the consequences which follow from its 
application.146
Perhaps because of the potentially harsh consequences which can follow 
from the application of the general illegality rule, a number of exceptions to it 
have developed. One of these exceptions seeks to protect parties who are not 
equally culpable in the illegality.147 Another exception permits recovery where 
a plaintiff has "repented" of the illegality before the illegal purpose is carried 
into effect.148 It is outside the scope of this thesis to attempt to rationalise and 
catalogue all the different applications of the rule against illegality and its 
exceptions. It has been argued, however, and certainly the exceptions to the 
rule lend support to this view, that
the courts have always based, and will always base, their decision upon 
covert perceptions of justice and policy, a process naturally reflected by 
the contradictory, ambiguous or at best complicated state of the 
authorities.149
14  ^ Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341,343.
145 The rule is sometimes stated in terms of "letting an estate lie where is falls": cf. 
Muckleston v. Brown (1801) 6 Ves. Jun. 52, 69, per Lord Eldon L.C.
146 See generally Enonchong, N., "Illegality: The Fading Flame of Public Policy" (1994) 
14 O.J.L.S. 295, and particularly 297-300.
147 Plaintiffs may recover where they can show that they were not in pari delicto in the 
commission of the illegality by demonstrating, for example, that they belong to the class of 
persons sought to be protected by a particular statute rendering the contract illegal. See, e.g., 
Kiriri Cotton Co. v. Dewani [1960] A.C. 192. See generally, Goff & Jones, 505-12.
148 The "repentance" exception appears to have been revived in Taylor v. Bowers (1876) 
1 Q.B.D. 291. Its purpose appears to be the discouragement of an illegal purpose, but its scope is 
uncertain. See Goff & Jones, 512-5, for some of the difficulties. For a detailed consideration of 
repentance, see Beatson, J., "Repudiation of Illegal Purpose as a Ground for Restitution" (1975) 
91 L.Q.R. 313.
149 Stewart, supra n. 138, 135. The view is supported by the observation of 
Watermeyer J. in Jajbhay v. Cassim [1939] A.D. (S.A.) 537, 550: "the courts will discourage illegal 
transactions ... the exceptions show that where it is necessary to prevent injustice or to promote
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The thrust of much of the debate in the literature appears to support the 
view that illegality should be no absolute bar to recovery, but that allowing or 
disallowing relief should give effect to a substantial public policy of 
discouraging dishonest and illegal conduct,150 specifically, by promoting or at 
least not contravening the policies of the particular rule rendering the contract 
illegal. The writer concurs with such views. Rather than apply an 
indiscriminate rule which at best only promotes public policy in a crude way, 
courts should balance concerns of justice and policy. A number of factors could 
be taken into account, including the consequences of non-recovery, the gravity 
of the illegality as a whole and each party's involvement in it. Importantly, if a 
contract is illegal as contrary to a specific statutory provision, then the policies 
of that particular provision should be sought to be given effect.151 On balancing 
such considerations, remedial responses either of enforcing a contract to a 
limited extent, or perhaps of unwinding the transaction (restitution) may be 
seen to be appropriate. Consistently with cases of unenforceability above, the 
basis of liability is the albeit limited recognition of the defendant's assumption 
of obligation and plaintiff's detrimental reliance thereon. Where the remedy is 
restitution, it is nonetheless usually152 a remedial response arising from the 
defendant's breach of the illegal contract.
In Australia at least, there appears to be some judicial support for the 
suggested approach, of treating illegality as a form of unenforceability and 
tailoring any remedial response to the policy of the rule rendering the contract 
unenforceable.153 It seems unlikely that there will be a repetition of some of the
public policy, they will not rigidly enforce the rule."
150 See generally, Goff & Jones, 519-22. The authors have summed up one range of 
solutions as being "prompted by a desire to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant 
through the capricious application of the maxim in pari delicto ... and, nevertheless, to 
discourage illegal transactions where there is a serious moral turpitude" (520). In this writer's 
view, and in line with the discussion of earlier topics, the motivating policy ought to be at least 
to prevent a detriment to the plaintiff where the defendant has assumed an obligation to the 
plaintiff and where recovery would not promote an illegal purpose.
151 Cf. Enonchong, supra n. 146, 299-302.
152 The exception would appear to be the repentance doctrine, whereby a plaintiff 
may gain restitution if he or she repents before the illegal purpose is fully effected and despite 
the fact that the defendant may have been willing to continue with the illegal transaction.
153 In Hurst v. Vestcorp Ltd (1988) 12 N.S.W.L.R. 394, for example, the N.S.W. Supreme 
Court considered that although the contract in question was "illegal" this did not necessarily 
preclude restitutionary relief where such relief was consistent with the intention of the 
legislation as a whole. McHugh J.A. appears to have treated the case on a par with
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particularly harsh strict applications of the illegality rule that have occurred in 
the past.154
In England, the Court of Appeal has accepted that justice and policy 
considerations need to be balanced to give effect to an overall policy of 
promoting lawful conduct. This appears to be the essence of the "public 
conscience" test.155 The public conscience test, however, or indeed any other 
flexible principle of illegality, has been unanimously rejected by the House of 
Lords in its decision in Tinsley v. Milligan.156 Although the result of that case is 
consistent with the application of a flexible principle, the reasoning of the 
majority, and both the reasoning and actual decision of the minority, is open to 
criticism.
In Tinsley v. Milligan, the majority of the House of Lords accepted a view
unenforceable contracts. See 445. See also Weston v. Beaufils (1994) 122 A.L.R. 240. In Canada, 
see Vandekerhovev. Litchfield [1994] 1 W.W.R. 596 (B.C.S.C.).
Early examples of the application of the illegality doctrine shows that the courts were not 
prepared to preclude recovery in any circumstances, without regard to the nature of the 
illegality and the purpose and policies of the relevant statute. In Williams v. Paul (1830) 6 Bing. 
653, for example, a contract was illegal, having been concluded on a Sunday. Nevertheless, the 
plaintiff was entitled to recover on a quantum meruit for the value of the goods sold, as the 
defendant had retained the goods and had subsequently again promised to pay for them, so 
that his later refusal to pay was "not consistent with the practice of a very sincere Christian." 
Given the very "Christian" purposes the relevant statute was seeking to promote, the result 
seems perfectly appropriate.
154 See, e.g., Bigos v. Boustead [1951] 1 All E.R. 92. The plaintiff, who had commenced 
an action on an illegal contract which had been abandoned at the start of the hearing, had 
deliberately sought to profit from the breach of a currency regulation by entering a contract 
with the defendant to supply currency illegally. The plaintiff never performed her part of the 
agreement. The defendant had deposited a share certificate with the plaintiff as security and 
subsequently sought to recover the certificate when the plaintiff had failed to provide the 
prohibited currency. The plaintiff pleaded the illegality. Although the court considered that her 
defence to the defendant's claim was "devoid of all merit" (96), nevertheless the plaintiff 
succeeded. It is difficult to see how this result could promote the policy of the regulation in 
question, given that the more culpable party was allowed to retain the benefit of her deliberate 
breach of the regulations.
155 The "public conscience" test was accepted by the majority in the Court of Appeal 
in Tinsley v. Milligan [1992] 2 W.L.R. 508, but rejected by the House of Lords, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 
126. The public conscience test precludes any relief to a party under an illegal contract only 
where such relief would be "an affront to the public conscience if by affording him the relief 
sought the court would be seen to be indirectly assisting or encouraging the plaintiff in his 
criminal act": Thackwell v. Barclays Bank pic [1986] 1 All E.R. 676, 678, per Hutchison J.
156 [1993] 3 W.L.R. 126. For example, in the view of Lord Goff, at 140, such a test 
would result, in effect, in "discretion being vested in the court to deal with the matter by the 
process of a balancing operation, in place of a system of rules".
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expressed in earlier decisions that illegality is inapplicable where a party can 
assert a claim which does not, as a matter of procedure, make reference to the 
illegal transaction. So, for example, if a person is asserting a legal157 or 
equitable proprietary interest on the basis, say, of a contribution to the 
purchase price,158 then such an interest will be protected even when acquired 
under an illegal transaction. But a view of illegality as a substantive doctrine 
promoting lawful conduct and the public interest suggests against a technical 
application of the illegality rule, whereby the plaintiff's success or otherwise 
depends upon whether he or she is able to assert the claim without reference to 
the illegal purpose. Such reasoning appears to reduce the notion of illegality to 
no more than a point of pleading.159 The minority, rightly in this writer's view, 
rejected such an approach. But in so doing, the minority were prepared to 
apply strictly the rule of non-recovery in all cases where a transaction is tainted 
by illegality, disregarding the fact that in the circumstances, its application 
would have had a punitive effect on one party going well beyond the penalties 
provided for under the statute infringed by the parties' illegal conduct. Indeed, 
arguably, the minority view would promote fraudulent conduct, given the 
windfall which one of the parties to the illegal transaction would have 
received.160
157 See, e.g., Bowmakers Ltd v. Barnet Instruments Ltd [19451 1 K.B. 65.
158 See Tinsley v. Milligan [1993] 3 W.L.R. 126.
159 Cf. Berg, A.G.J., "Illegality and Equitable Interests" [1993] Jo. of Bus. Law 513, 518. 
As Enonchong, supra n. 146, has stated, the Bowmaker rule applied in Tinsley v. Milligan "is a 
rule neither of justice nor of policy, it is merely a rule of procedure" and "rests on mere 
technicalities" (299).
160 Cf. Tinsley v. Milligan [1993] 3 W.L.R. 126, 145, per Lord Lowry. In Tinsley v. 
Milligan, the parties jointly bought property, but the title was placed only in the name of one 
party, the plaintiff, in order to facilitate fraudulent social security claims by both parties. The 
defendant subsequently admitted her fraud, was successfully prosecuted and paid back the 
money received. Nevertheless, the plaintiff sought possession of the property and sought to 
deny the defendant her share in the property, citing the illegal purpose of the transaction. The 
majority of the House of Lords allowed the defendant's counter claim, asserting her half-share 
interest in the property. The result seems appropriate, given that the illegality was quite trivial 
when compared with the fraudulent nature of the defendant's conduct in denying the plaintiff 
a share in the property purchased by both parties. Given that the illegality had been admitted 
and already rectified through legal channels, allowing the equally culpable party to retain the 
property would be to impose a further, harsher punishment upon the plaintiff than was meted 
out under the provisions of the relevant legislation. Lord Goff, in the minority, conceded the 
harshness of such an outcome, but felt bound to apply the in pari delicto rule without making an 
exception, seemingly ignoring what would appear to be that rule's underlying principal 
purpose of discouraging illegal and dishonest conduct generally. It is ironic, given Lord Goff's 
championing of unjust enrichment, that the case is one in which, as a shorthand conclusion of 
the moral basis of the defendant's claim to her share of the property, unjust enrichment seems 
an appropriate description. Cf. Berg, id. For a criticism of the reasoning of the House of Lords,
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§ 6.2.2.4 Contracts defective for incapacity
It is not proposed in this thesis to consider the rules relating to the effects 
of incapacity. Although this is undoubtedly an important area, the 
consequences of a contract being rendered defective for want of capacity cannot 
usefully be rationalised in a summary way. Indeed, and especially so given that 
common law rules have been supplanted by statutory provisions,161 the 
remedial responses available to parties who have detrimentally relied on 
contracts which are defective for incapacity are diverse and at times granted 
seemingly inconsistently. Speaking very generally, rules of incapacity aim at 
protecting from the consequences of their own actions the class of persons162 
said to lack legal capacity to contract.163 It is arguable, and in this writer's view 
conceptually appealing, that an incapacitated party's assumption of liability 
(that is, his or her contract-like conduct) should be given limited recognition 
where such recognition (in the form of remedial rights arising against the 
incapacitated party) does not contravene the policy underlying the incapacity 
rules, that of protecting persons of a particular class.164 Consequently, the
see Enonchong, supra n. 146, and Stowe, H., 'The 'Unruly Horse' has Bolted: Tinsley v. 
Milligan" (1994) 57 M.L.R. 441. Despite the shortcomings of the House of Lord's approach, Hill 
J. of the Federal Court of Australia, in obiter dicta in Weston v. Beaufils (1994) 122 A.L.R. 240, 
appeared to favour such an approach and suggested that the adoption of such a "narrower" 
view of illegality is not precluded on the Australian authorities.
161 For example, minor's contracts are now largely governed by statute.
162 Including corporations, in relation to the ultra vires doctrine. Minors, drunkards 
and the mentally disordered are other persons said to lack legal capacity to contract. One could 
also perceive of want of authority cases as protecting certain parties, in this case principals, 
who are seeking to avoid the consequences of their "agent's" unauthorised acts. Where a 
plaintiff has not performed any part of the alleged contract, this seems a plausible concern of 
the rules disallowing claims against such principals: the plaintiff has simply sued the "wrong" 
defendant.
163 In relation to the purpose of incapacity rules in relation to minors, cf. Chaplin v. 
Leslie Frewin (Publishing) Ltd [1966] Ch. 71, 90, and Carter & Harland, 251 et seq. Given that 
incapacity renders certain contracts defective because of the status of at least one of the parties 
to the contract—rather than because of the form or substance of the agreement—one can say 
that the law does not allow certain persons to assume such legal obligations despite even a 
clear intention to do so.
164 Included here are cases of want of authority. Consider, e.g., Craven-Ellis v. Canons 
Ltd [1935] 2 K.B. 403, in which the plaintiff was appointed managing director of the defendant 
company by directors who had no authority to do so. The plaintiff had performed the duties of 
a managing director for some time. The defendant company refused to pay for such services, 
claiming the contract was void. The court noted that this was purely a "technical defence" and 
that the company would not be allowed to avoid paying for services which it had received and 
accepted. Both the reasons for liability and the remedial response appear contract-like. The 
decision seems explicable on the basis of the courts refusal to allow the technicalities of
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remedial responses may range from the full enforcement of contracts, to 
recovery of expenses or losses incurred, to the restitution of benefits, to 
absolute bars to any form of recovery in some cases.
Clearly not all cases can be rationalised in this way. One exception is 
where contracts are ultra vires a party's powers and thus "void". In cases of 
ultra vires contracts, where parties are incapable of entering or even ratifying 
such contracts in any circumstances, the liability rules do not appear contract­
like, but instead aim at restoring parties to their status quo ante, on similar 
principles as govern recovery against recipients of mistakenly conferred money 
or services, considered in Chapter 9.164a This exception aside, however, it is 
suggested unjust enrichment offers no better explanation as to when liability 
will be imposed and the limits of such liability than does an explanation based 
on the limited recognition of the parties assumed obligation, where such 
recognition is consistent with protecting the party lacking capacity.165
company law to preclude what was essentially a contractual relationship, that is, a ratification 
by the company of the defective contract, not enforceable against it until such ratification. See, 
e.g., Greer L.J., at 409. See Fridman & McLeod, Restitution (1st ed., 1982), 438-9; cf. Fridman, 
(2nd ed., 1992) 309. Perhaps generally speaking, whether any contract-like liability arises in 
want of authority cases turns on whether the defendant can be said to have "ratified" the 
contract by any act amounting to an acceptance of the contract, rather than on whether the 
defendant can be said to have been unjustly enriched. Although the formalities of ratification 
may not have been fulfilled, or may even have been incapable of being fulfilled because of 
some technicality, nevertheless, such formalities will not be allowed to stand in the way of 
recovery where the defendant has effectively, by words or conduct, assumed a legal obligation. 
Such an analysis also avoids difficulties in identifying a benefit, which may not be readily 
possible: see Stoljar, 236-9. See also the discussion in Burrows, 306-7, who suggests an 
incontrovertible benefit was received in Craven-Ellis, the company having been saved a 
factually necessary expense. No reference to "incontrovertible" benefit was made in the case 
itself. Cf. Monks v. Poynice (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 662, in which Young J. resorted to an 
incontrovertible benefit analysis to allow recovery on facts very similar to those of Craven-Ellis.
16^a Consider, e.g., Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398.
165 See, e.g., R. Leslie Ltd v. Sheill [1914] 3 K.B. 607, in which a minor fraudulently 
misrepresented his age in order to obtain a loan of a substantial sum of money. The plaintiff 
sought to recover the money, but failed both in a contractual and quasi-contractual claim. The 
decision is criticised by unjust enrichment theorists. Certainly, the decision seems harsh. The 
rule of incapacity, the purpose of which is to protect minors against exploitation, was utilised 
by a minor as a mechanism for fraud. In the writer's view, the plaintiff should have been 
entitled to recover the money paid to the defendant. Such recovery would in no way impugn 
the policy of the incapacity rule. Cf. Burrows, A., "Public Authorities, Ultra Vires and 
Restitution" in Burrows, Essays, 39, 69, who considers disgorgement of the benefit in that case 
would not have infringed the policy of the incapacity rule protecting minors. Burrows 
considers, however, that a change of position defence should be available in such a case, so that 
only the defendant's surviving enrichment is returnable. In this writer's view, a defendant such 
as the minor in R. Leslie Ltd ought not be allowed to set up the incapacity policy to defraud the 
plaintiff and hence, such a defendant should be liable to make good any losses incurred. This
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§ 6.2.3 Incomplete Contracts
In a world of increasingly complex transactions, claims often arise for 
the payment of work performed, expenses incurred, or money paid,166 in a 
context in which a contractual relationship is believed to exist, or is anticipated 
by the parties, but doubts arise as to whether any concluded agreement has 
ever eventuated, either because negotiations were never completed,167 or 
because no sufficiently certain agreement can be identified by the courts.168 
Often, the parties may have expected a contract to eventuate "as a matter of
would preclude a change of position defence: the injustice in R. Leslie Ltd lies not in the fact that 
the defendant was "unjustly enriched", but because the plaintiff incurred losses in 
detrimentally relying on the defendant's assumption of an obligation with an intent to defraud.
166 The main cases of dealings in the context of incomplete contracts involve the 
performance of services rather than the payment of money to a defendant. Cf. Burrows, 293. 
Consequently, discussion will generally concern cases of recompense for services rendered, 
though special issues raised by claims for money paid will also be considered briefly below. 
Money paid cases arise more commonly in relation to complete, but defective contracts, which 
were considered above. For a Canadian case involving payment of money in anticipation of a 
contract which was never finalised, see Conmac Western Industries v. Robinson [1993] 6 W.W.R. 
375.
167 The parties may still be in disagreement over some essential term of the contract, 
as in Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 428 (disagreement as to 
an option to purchase term in a lease), and Austotel Pty Ltd v. Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 
N.S.W.L.R. 582 (rent not finalised). Alternatively, all terms may have been agreed, but formal 
exchange or execution of the contracts is still to occur, as in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 
A.L.R. 513 (exchange of contracts still to occur). In the latter type of case, one party at least, 
despite the completed agreement, has held back from taking a step necessary in law to indicate 
the assumption of a legal contractual obligation. Distinguishing the latter type of case from 
those of complete but defective contracts may not always be easy.
Bare "agreements to agree" do not generally give rise to contractual obligations. See Coal Cliff 
Collieries v. Sijehama (1991) 24 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 40, per Handley J.A., for a useful summary of the 
authorities. See also Walford v. Miles [1992] 2 W.L.R. 174, and a criticism of the decision in that 
case, Buckley, R.P., "Walford v Miles: False Certainty About Uncertainty—An Australian 
Perspective" (1993) 6 J.C.L. 58.
168 For example, an essential term of the agreement may be vague, such as in 
Stinchcombe v. Thomas [1957] V.R. 509 (agreement to "well reward" the plaintiff held too 
uncertain to create legal obligations); Shiels v. Drysdale (1880) 6 V.L.R. (E) 126; and Horton v. 
Jones (1935) 53 C.L.R. 475. Contrast Wakeling v. Ripley (1951) 51 N.S.W.S.R. 183. Alternatively, 
the parties may have acted under a mistake, or may not have been ad idem as to some essential 
matter (often price). See, e.g., Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909), and Turner v. Webster, 36 
Am.Rep. 251 (1880) (parties having different beliefs as to contract price). See also Kearns v. 
Andree, 139 A. 695 (1928), and Preeper v. Preeper (1978) 84 D.L.R. (3d) 74. Alternatively, 
consideration adequate in law may not have been provided by one party to the agreement. See, 
for example, Kirby P.'s interpretation of the agreement in Beaton v. McDivitt (1987) 13 
N.S.W.L.R. 162, and contrast the interpretation of the agreement by Mahoney and McHugh 
JJ.A.
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course" , 169 or alternatively, at least one party believed a contract had been 
finalised , 170 but despite such a belief, traditional contractual analysis171 
suggests that no sufficiently certain or completed agreement is identifiable. It is 
the lack of an objectively discernible, complete and reasonably certain 
agreement which provides the link between uncertain contracts and anticipated 
contracts to be dealt with together under the rubric of "incompleteness" .172
Despite the incompleteness of the contract, the parties may have gone 
some way toward assuming an obligation, and in some circumstances the 
courts, by resorting to, inter alia, equity and Restitution, are prepared to provide
169 Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513.
170 Given fact situations may be amenable to either interpretation. Consider for 
example, the complex facts in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513. A majority of the 
judges (Mason C.J, Wilson and Brennan JJ.) proceeded on the basis that the plaintiffs believed 
an exchange of contracts, and thus a final and binding agreement, would take place as a matter 
of course. Deane and Gaudron JJ. proceeded on the assumption that the plaintiffs believed that 
a binding agreement was already in existence. The fact that these differing views did not result 
in a differing outcome in the decisions reached by the judges suggests that this distinction is not 
particularly significant.
171 For a comparison of the traditional view of contract negotiations derived from 
nineteenth century contract analysis, with the reality of modern day commercial relationships, 
see Farnsworth, E.A., "Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and 
Failed Negotiations" (1987) 87 Col. L.R. 217, 218-9. It is arguable that the types of problems 
encountered in the cases included for consideration here stem largely from the application of 
contract rules developed specifically for determining when unexecuted agreements or promises 
should be enforced as contracts, to cases in which agreements or promises have been partly 
executed.
172 Cf. Carter & Harland, 67-8. The view that such cases should be treated together is 
supported by the judgment of Barry J. in William Lacey (Hounslozu), Ltd v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 
712, 719:
I am unable to see any valid distinction between work done which was to be paid for 
under the terms of a contract erroneously believed to be in existence and work done 
which was to be paid for out of the proceeds of a contract which both parties 
erroneously believed was about to be made.
Contrast Goff and Jones, who treat contracts void (for mistake and uncertainty) and anticipated 
contracts separately (Chps 21 & 25 respectively). Burrows, 294, considers that such a distinction 
"seems so thin" as to warrant a combined consideration of these topics. This seems valid, given 
the sufficient similarities between these two types of cases and the difficulties inherent in 
drawing a distinction between circumstances in which parties believe a contract will be 
completed in the ordinary course of events and those in which parties mistakenly believe a 
contract has been completed: see discussion, supra n. 170, in relation to Waltons Stores v. Maher 
(1988) 76 A.L.R. 513.
Contrast incomplete contracts with contracts which are complete (in the sense that a final and 
sufficiently certain and precise agreement has been reached between the parties) but which are 
otherwise defective.
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relief to a plaintiff who has acted on the basis of an obligation having been 
assumed. In many of these cases, the courts in effect complete the parties' 
incomplete bargains by imputing that an obligation which is reasonable in the 
circumstances has been assumed.
The circumstances in which liability may arise under an incomplete 
contract is best brought out with particular emphasis on the law relating to 
precontractual dealing. Cases of precontractual dealing—that is, in which 
services are performed, money is paid, or parties have in some way changed 
their position in anticipation of a contract which never eventuates—highlight 
most sharply the circumstances in which the courts will, despite the 
incompleteness of the contract, impose contract-like obligations on the parties. 
In recent times, the "courts have shown an increasing willingness to impose 
precontractual liability." 173 Such "willingness" exists despite the courts' 
continued adherence to a general common law rule protecting the freedom of 
parties to negotiate contracts without the risk of incurring legal liability,174 a 
view well encapsulated by Sheppard J. in Sabemo v. North Sydney Municipal 
Council:
It has long been the law that parties are free to negotiate such contract as 
they may choose to enter into. Until such contract comes about, they are 
in negotiation only. Each is at liberty, no matter how capricious his 
reason, to break off negotiations at any time. If that occurs that is the end 
of the matter and, generally speaking, neither party will be under any 
liability to the other.175
Given that precontractual dealing cases are numerous, exhibit essentially 
similar facts patterns and are largely consistent in their results, much of the 
discussion will concern such cases, though the points to be made appear to be 
of general application to incomplete contracts. A good starting point will be to 
outline the preconditions for, or common elements of, liability under 
incomplete contracts, elements which need to be established irrespective of the 
doctrinal vehicle used to obtain relief.
173 Farnsworth, supra n. 171, 222. Farnsworth's comment, in relation to United States 
courts, seems equally valid for Anglo-Australian jurisdictions. See also Jones, G., "Claims 
Arising Out of Anticipated Contracts Which Do Not Materialize" (1980) 18 U.W.O.L.R 447, 448.
174 Farnsworth, supra, n. 171, 221.
175 [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880, 900. Cf. Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, 537, 
per Brennan J.
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§ 6.2.3.1 Common elements of liability
§ 6.2.3.1.1 Belief that a contract exists, or expectation of a future contract
Despite the absence of a complete agreement, the plaintiff176 (or more 
usually, both parties)177 believes that an agreement or contract already subsists, 
or expects one will be finalised in the future. In cases of anticipated contracts, 
the parties are often at an advanced stages of negotiating a contract and the 
plaintiff's expectation that the contract will be concluded "in due course"178 is 
the result of the defendant's conduct,179 the circumstances surrounding the 
negotiation process,180 or the parties' mutual understandings.181 This 
expectation need not be one that the contract is an absolute certainty.182 It is 
sufficient that the plaintiff expects the contract to proceed in the ordinary 
course of negotiations.183 In Waltons Stores v. Maher,184 for example, the
176 E.g., Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. I l l ;  Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 
A.L.R. 513.
177 E.g., Brewer Street Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 428, 429, 
(in which case there was a “mutual confidence" that a lease would be granted); British Steel 
Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd [1984] 1 All E.R. 504, 505 (the parties 
“confidently expected a formal contract to be concluded"); Stinchcombe v. Thomas [1957] V.R. 
509; Sabemo v: North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880.
178 Turriff Construction Ltd v. Regalia Knitting Mills Ltd [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 234, 259: 
“[B]oth parties expected that a formal contract would in due course be executed."
179 The conduct will often be in the form of representations to the effect that the 
contract is “as good as" the plaintiff's. See, e.g., MTA v. Waverly Transit Pty Ltd [1991] V.R. 176. 
The representation need not equate with a contractual representation, (at 209), a point similarly 
made in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965). Sometimes the representations 
may have an almost fraudulent underlying intent. In Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 111, 
the defendant's conduct was directly responsible for the plaintiff's expectation that a contract 
for the sale of land (which the plaintiff was leasing and improving) would eventuate. At 120, 
Jeffries J. considered that the defendant “misled and inveigled the plaintiff into spending very 
considerable sums of money on her property" by repeatedly assuring the plaintiff that the 
property would be sold to him.
180 For example, there may have been a request that the plaintiff commence the work 
which forms the subject of the contract under negotiation, as in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v. Ex- 
cell-0 Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R. 401, (but in which case the court found a 
contract despite clear differences between each party's form of agreement, discussed further, § 
6.2.3.2), and British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co. Ltd [1984] 1 All E.R. 504.
181 In William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, 719, preliminary work was 
performed “under a mutual belief and understanding ... that the plaintiff's were obtaining the 
contract."
182 Cf. Cauchi's formulation of a “legitimate expectation" of a contract, supra n. 112,
268.
183 The parties may even be aware that the contract is subject to a contingency, such as
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respondents commenced demolition and construction work on their own 
premises on the assumption that the exchange of leasing contracts185 with the 
appellant was a mere formality. Unbeknownst to the respondents, however, 
and despite the fact that all outstanding terms of the agreement had been 
agreed, the appellant had instructed its solicitors to delay the exchange of 
contracts until further notice.
At times, a request by a defendant that substantial preliminary work be 
carried out by the plaintiff may raise, or contribute to, an expectation that the 
main contract will be concluded. This was emphasised in William Lacey 
(Hounslow) Ltd v. Daze's186 and Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C.187 The facts in both 
were similar, but taking Sabemo briefly, the plaintiff was requested to prepare 
considerable planning work after it had "successfully" tendered for a contract 
for the lease and redevelopment of certain land. The defendant decided not to 
proceed with the project, but was held liable to compensate the plaintiff for the 
work carried out. Sheppard J. pointed out that as
substantial and continuing work had been done over a period of three 
years ... [it would] be unthinkable that the plaintiff would have been 
prepared to do what it did, if it thought that the defendant might change 
its mind about proceeding with the proposal.188
As this statement of Sheppard J. suggests, the fact that substantial work has
a third party's approval, as in William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712. Where, however, both 
parties appreciated that they were free to withdraw at any time, then they may do so. See 
Brennan J. in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, 537. The parties' "freedom to 
withdraw" was one of the main reasons for the failure of the appellant's claim in Attorney 
General v. Humphreys Estate (Queens Gardens) Ltd [1987] 1 A.C. 114. The appellant's attempt to 
raise an estoppel against the respondents withdrawal from an agreement in principle failed, as 
the appellants were "fully aware and intended that either party could at any time and without 
any reason withdraw from the agreement in principle" (121). Further, the respondents "did not 
encourage or allow a belief or expectation on the part of the [appellants] that [the respondents] 
would not withdraw." Contrast, however, Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd 
[1954] 1 Q.B. 428, 433, per Somervell L.J. In that case, both parties knew that either could resile, 
but nevertheless the defendant was liable as it had expressly undertaken responsibility for the 
work, so that the risk of the contract not eventuating fell on the defendant.
184 (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513.
185 This was a necessity for a binding contract to be finalised.
186 [1957] 2 All E.R. 712.
187 [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880.
188 Ibid, 901.
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been requested is also relevant in determining with whom the risk should lie of 
no contract eventuating, a point to which we will return below.
§ 6 .2 3 .1 .2  Plaintiff's detrim ental reliance
In reliance upon an expectation that a contract exists or will be finalised, 
a plaintiff might change his or her position, such as by abandoning an existing 
legal right,189 outlaying considerable expenses, performing substantial work, or 
paying money to the defendant.190 Where a contract is anticipated, a plaintiff's 
reliant actions may involve work that is preliminary to the performance of an 
expected main contract, such as detailed planning work191 or cost estimates,192 
or the preparation of buildings for future occupancy under an expected 
lease .193 At other times, a plaintiff's actions will be unrelated to the 
performance of the expected contract, such as where a plaintiff improves the 
defendant's land in the expectation that a binding contract for its sale will 
ensue194 or exists195 and that the work will thus benefit the plaintiff. 
Occasionally, the plaintiff will have completed the very performance which 
forms the subject-matter of the incompletely negotiated contract.196 Completed 
performance of the contract is the usual form of reliance where the plaintiff 
believes a contract already exists, but such contract is nonetheless insufficiently 
certain or complete.197
189 See Avondale Printers Stationers Ltd v. Haggie [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124.
190 See Digiacinto et al. v. Aircadia Ltd (1978) 21 N.B.R. (2d) 366. In order to recover such 
money payment, however, it would seem that there must have been a total failure of 
consideration, that is, the plaintiff must not have received any benefit in return for the 
payment. See also Palmer, §15.11.
191 Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880.
192 William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712
193 E.g., Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [19541 1 Q.B. 428; Waltons 
Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513. These cases also show that the plaintiff need not have 
completed the work, even where it was requested.
194 Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 111.
195 E.g., Estok v. Heguy (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 88; T. & E. Developments v. Hoornaert (1977) 
78 D.L.R. (3d) 606; Reeves v. Abraham (1957) 22 W.W.R. 429; Preeper v. Preeper (1978) 84 D.L.R. 
(3d) 74. Some proprietary estoppel cases also turn on similar facts.
196 E.g., British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. Ltd [1984] 1 All E.R. 504. 
Cf. Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd v. Ex-cell-0 Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R. 401.
197 See cases cited supra n. 168. If the work under the incomplete contract has not been
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In all these cases, a plaintiff's reliance proves detrimental when the 
defendant refuses to complete the agreement or accept any responsibility to the 
plaintiff who has changed his or her position on the faith of the incomplete 
contract.198 This element of detriment is highlighted by the belief of the 
plaintiff that the reliant action was not, ultimately, intended to be gratuitous. 
Even where the plaintiff does not expect the work to be paid for separately,199 
such a plaintiff must have expected remuneration in some form, for example, 
that the benefit of the work would inure to the plaintiff once the contract was 
completed,200 or that the plaintiff would be adequately compensated for the 
work by the defendant's performance of the expected contract.201
§ 6.2.3.13 Defendant's conduct is such as to suggest either that an obligation 
has been or will be assumed or else that the risk of no completed agreement eventuating 
rests with the defendant
This element is stated very generally in order to encompass a variety of 
fact situations. Where, for example, a contract is uncertain in its terms, or the 
parties were not ad idem as to some essential matter, both parties will have
completed, then successful recovery may be dependent upon whether the defendant prevented 
the completion of the work or whether there was an anticipated "breach" by the defendant. 
Where the defendant was not responsible for the failure to complete the work (and excluding 
cases of frustration), then recovery in any form would not appear to be allowed. See Triple "C" 
Holdings Pty Ltd v. Hogan (1983) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 252, 257, a case of an unenforceable contract, and 
supra n. 82. The same principle should nevertheless apply to incomplete contracts. Where, 
however, there was an anticipated breach by the defendant or the defendant prevented the 
completion, then a plaintiff may be entitled to recover for the partially completed work or 
performance. Cf. Planche v. Colburn (1831) 8 Bing. 14, 131 E.R. 305, a case of breach of an 
enforceable contract; and Mavor v. Pyne (1825) 3 Bing. 286, in which the defendant "breached" 
an unenforceable contract and was held liable for those goods already delivered. Cf. the 
discussion by Carter, J.W., "Ineffective Transactions" in Finn, 206, 231-35.
198 For example, in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, there was a period of 
inaction on the part of the appellant during which time the respondents changed their position 
considerably by commencing work on their land in a way which proved detrimental once the 
appellant refused to complete the agreement, having decided not to proceed with the project.
199 Most cases in which a plaintiff believes the work is being done in performance of 
an existing contract would be of this type. In some cases, however, even where work is done 
merely preliminary to an anticipated contract, separate payment may have been expected. See 
Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [1954] 1 K.B. 428.
200 For example, improvements made to land: Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 
I ll ;  Estok v. Heguy (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 88.
201 Where work is preliminary to an anticipated contract, a plaintiff may have 
expected adequate compensation from the profits of the "main" contract: Sabemo v. North 
Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880; William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712.
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conducted themselves as if an obligation has been assumed, though on an 
objective interpretation, the exact nature of their agreement and hence 
obligation is unclear and incomplete. But despite the incomplete agreement, it 
is nonetheless possible to discern some "underlying measure of agreement" .202 
Thus, in Vickery v. Ritchie,203 the plaintiff made improvements to the 
defendant's house, but the parties were not ad idem as to the price to be paid. 
The defendant in that case had requested the work intending to pay for it and 
the plaintiff had performed the work expecting payment. Undeniably, the 
parties had agreed that the work performed was to be paid for. Such an 
underlying consensus is significant in determining the courts' response to such 
a factual problem and also highlights the contract-like nature of liability. This 
will be returned to below.
In cases of precontractual dealing, liability will be imposed where a 
defendant has expressly, or by implication from his or her conduct, assumed 
the risk of a contract not being completed. The express or implied assumption 
of risk by the defendant appears to be the crux of many of the decisions and 
allows the courts to answer the question: who should bear the risk of the 
consequences of no contract being completed. Usually, the risk of negotiations 
failing will be on both parties, so the question is really whether there exists any 
reason for shifting the balance of the risks.
Whether a defendant can be said to have assumed a risk depends, of 
course, on the facts of each case. Certain conduct has been held to amount to an 
assumption of risk such as where a defendant has expressly or impliedly 
requested (or at least actively encouraged) either preliminary work or 
commencement of the performance of the anticipated contract.204 In such cases, 
work of a substantial nature, which consequently raises or reinforces an 
expectation of the future contract being completed and which goes beyond 
what is performed at the risk of the plaintiff, must be contrasted with the type
202 Fridman, 301.
2°3 88 N.E. 835 (1909). See also discussion of the case at § 4.4.2.
204 where a defendant requests substantial work, not normally performed 
gratuitously, this suggests that the defendant must be aware of the plaintiff's expectation to be 
remunerated in some way. To an objective bystander, a request in such circumstances would 
give the impression the work was to be paid for, so that perhaps even a legal presumption to 
this effect might be said to arise.
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of work a plaintiff may "be expected to do without charge when tendering."205 
In the tendering process, a tenderer should be well aware that the work is 
performed and expenses are incurred at his or her own risk.206
Other conduct which may be said to amount to an assumption of risk 
includes a defendant's acquiescence in the plaintiff's reliant actions, with 
knowledge of the plaintiff's assumption in so acting.207 Some cases have gone 
so far as to impose liability on defendants who could at least have reasonably 
foreseen that the plaintiff would act detrimentally in anticipation of the 
contract. There are a number of United States decisions208 as well as isolated 
Anglo-Australian authorities to this effect.209 These cases, however, though 
occurring in a near-contract factual context, appear not so much to impose 
liability because of a defendant's active assumption of the risk (and can thus be 
described as contract-like), but simply appear to allocate the risk to a defendant 
who was in a better position to avert the risk of loss or who has indulged in
205 William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, 716. The work performed by the 
plaintiff in William Lacey fell
clearly outside the type of work which any builder would be expected to do without 
charge when tendering for a building contract. The plaintiffs are carrying on a business 
and, in normal circumstances, if asked to render services of this kind, the obvious 
inference would be that they ought to be paid for so doing.
Cf. Magical Waters Fountains Ltd. v. City of Sarnia (1990) 73 D.L.R. (4th) 734, 742, and Cauchi, 
supra n. 112, 242-3.
2°6 wiiiiam Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, 715: where work is carried out by a 
party tendering for a contract, "there is no implication that he will be paid for the work, which 
is sometimes a very considerable amount of work ... he undertakes this work as a gamble."
207 In Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, the respondents' assumption that 
the contract would be completed as a matter of course was a result of the appellant's 
acquiescence in the respondents' commencement of the demolition work required to be done 
under the contract. See 526, per Mason C.J. and Wilson J.; 542-3, per Brennan. Deane and 
Gaudron JJ. proceeded on the basis that the respondents assumed that the contract had in fact 
been finalised, but again this assumption arose as a direct consequence of the appellant's 
conduct. Gaudron J. (568) stated that the "appellant's imprudence in failing to inform the 
respondents that the exchange [of contract] might not occur" was responsible for the 
respondents' detrimental conduct on the assumption that exchange had in fact occurred.
208 E.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965).
209 Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, could be seen as an example. Note, for 
example, comments by Deane J. at 561, that a negligence claim may also have been a possibility 
in that case. A number of Canadian cases may also involve similar concerns: see supra n. 195.
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socially unreasonable conduct. Consequently, such cases are perhaps best seen 
as examples of tort-like liability.210
To conclude that a defendant has assumed the risk of a contract not 
being completed leaves unanswered, however, the question of the exact scope 
of that assumed risk. Presumably, the risk assumed will not extend to cover all 
possible contingencies (for example, frustrating events) which might prevent 
the contract eventuating. Consequently, the scope of the assumed risk will 
determine whether liability in fact arises and will perhaps also determine the 
remedial response following the occurrence of a contingency within the 
assumed risk. For example, a defendant's conduct may be such as to show that 
he or she has in effect guaranteed that a legally enforceable obligation has been 
assumed (the content of which obligation is dependent upon the particular risk 
assumed). In such a case, provided the parties agreement is also certain, the 
courts may be prepared to grant the plaintiff the very contract anticipated,211 or 
otherwise protect the expectation interest.212 Alternatively, the risk assumed 
may merely be that work done preliminary to and in anticipation of the 
expected contract will be paid for at a reasonable value, or that at least expenses 
incurred will be met.
A defendant will generally not be taken to have assumed in absolute 
terms the risk of no contract being completed, so as to include the possibility of 
the plaintiff breaking off negotiations. In cases in which a plaintiff was at fault 
in the failure to complete the contract, recovery has generally been denied, with 
the courts often highlighting the plaintiff's fault in the breakdown of the 
relationship before the contract was completed.213 Similarly, where it appears
210 It would seem that in these cases a defendant must have been at fault in the failure 
of the contract to proceed. If neither party was at fault, then the defendant has not been the 
cause of the plaintiff's losses, even where they were reasonably foreseeable by him or her. It 
might be said in such circumstances that the plaintiff could equally have safeguarded his or her 
interests by not proceeding with the work. Such a requirement of "fault" on the part of a 
defendant contrasts with cases in which the defendant has actively assumed a risk which 
includes the risk of a contract not being completed without fault.
211 As in MTA v. Waverly Transit Pty Ltd [1991] V.R. 176.
212 The expectation interest could be protected, for example, by an award of damages 
on that basis, as in Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513.
213 E.g., see Construction Design & Management Ltd v. New Brunswick Housing Corp. 
(1973) 36 D.L.R. (3d) 458, Austotel v. Franklins (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 582, and Jennings & Chapman 
Ltd v. Woodman, Mathews & Co. [1952] T.L.R. 409. In the latter case, the plaintiff was at fault as it 
had failed to obtain the permission of its landlord to enter into a sub-lease. As this was entirely 
within the control of the plaintiff, it failed in its claim. There is also obiter dicta in a number of 
cases which suggests that if the plaintiffs had been at fault, they would not have succeeded.
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from the facts that a plaintiff was merely gambling as to the future outcome of 
contract negotiations, then recovery will not generally ensue.214 A number of 
cases, however, have held that liability can arise where the failure to finalise the 
contract was neither parties' fault,215 with the issue ultimately dependent upon 
whether a defendant can be taken to have assumed the risk of such 
contingency.216
§ 6.2.3.2 The contract-like nature of liability under incomplete 
contracts and the remedial consequences
Once a plaintiff has established the three elements considered above, a 
defendant may be held liable despite the contract being incomplete. But there 
are a variety of rules and doctrines which have been utilised by the courts to 
impose liability and consequently, a variety of remedial responses may follow. 
Before we turn to consider one such remedial response in some detail, it is 
important to note that the courts often deal with the types of factual problems 
encountered in the cases under consideration by resort to contractual notions,
See, e.g., Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [19771 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880, and Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. 
Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [1954] 1 K.B. 428, per Römer & Somervell JJ.
214 This was perhaps the main reason for the plaintiff's failure to recover in Austotel 
Pty Ltd v. Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 582. At 621, Rogers A-J.A. considered 
that the plaintiff's "deliberate and conscious decision to refrain from coming to agreement" on 
an essential term was a gamble which had failed, and the risk of such failure consequently lay 
with the plaintiff. See also Construction Design & Management Ltd v. New Brunswick Housing 
Corp. (1973) 36 D.L.R. (3d) 458, 462.
215 E.g., British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co. Ltd [1984] 1 All E.R. 504. 
In William Lacey v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, it is unclear whether the fault of the defendant 
was a deciding factor or not. See also the judgment of Lord Denning in Brewer St. Investments 
Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. Ltd [954] 1 K.B. 428, as well as comments of Somervell J. In the United 
States, see Earhart v. William Low, 600 P. 2d 1344 (1979). See also Independent Grocers v. Noble 
Lowndes (1993) 60 S.A.S.R. 525, in which the court determined liability for work done, not in 
anticipation of a contract which never eventuated but in anticipation of a superannuation 
scheme which never came to fruition, by reference to which party was the appropriate risk 
bearer.
216 YVhere work is specifically requested, for example, in circumstances in which it 
was not intended to be gratuitous, the defendant ought to be (and the cases suggest he or she 
will be) liable to remunerate the plaintiff, irrespective of whether the defendant was at fault. 
The parties may well break off negotiation by mutual agreement and yet it would be legitimate 
for the plaintiff to demand payment for work done in reliance upon expectations created by the 
defendant's request. However, the position is not entirely certain. Sheppard J. in Sabemo's case 
took the view that if neither party in that case had been at fault in the breakdown in contractual 
negotiations, the plaintiff would not have recovered. This emphasis upon the defendant's fault 
has lead some to interpret the judgment of Sheppard J. as supporting the notion of an implied 
term or duty to bargain in good faith and that this duty must have been breached before one is 
entitled to recover. See infra n. 249.
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that is, a complete contract (either that intended or a collateral one) is found to 
exist, despite some difficulties in discerning a certain and complete agreement.
An example is provided by Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v. Ex-cell-0 
Corporation (England) Ltd.217 This case involved a so-called "battle of the 
forms", in which each party to the transaction utilised its own standard forms, 
despite the inconsistency of the terms of those forms as to the vital matter of 
price.218 Nevertheless, each party proceeded on the basis that its terms and 
conditions governed the agreement to construct and sell a machine tool and the 
court held that a contract existed on the terms of one of the party's forms. This 
case, as well as similar decisions,219 has been criticised as artificial in its finding 
of a contract.220 With respect, such criticisms are unjustified, for clearly the 
parties in Butler's case at all times proceeded on the assumption that they had a 
binding agreement221 and, in the case of one party, performed the contractual 
obligation under that agreement. The court simply recognised that the parties 
entered into a consensual relationship intended to have legal force—that work 
was to be performed by one party and paid for by the other—and sought to 
give effect to those intentions. The artificiality of the reasoning in Butler's case 
occurs in resorting to traditional offer and acceptance analysis to try to 
overcome the difficulties of the incompatible terms.222 Other mechanisms
217 [1979] 1 W.L.R. 401.
218 The inconsistency is highlighted by the occurrence of the dispute itself.
219 For further references to cases raising similar facts, see McKendrick, supra n. 132, 
197, particularly fn. 2. For a "battle of the forms" case in which the court considered that no 
contract arose, see O.T.M. Ltd v. Hydraumatics [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 211. Instead, a quantum 
meruit was awarded, but without any analysis as to its basis.
220 See Rawlings, "Note" (1979) 42 M.L.R. 715, 717. See also Birks, P., "Restitution for 
Services" [1974] C.L.P. 13, and his discussion of Peter Lind v. Mersey Docks [1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
234, at 26 et seq. McKendrick, id, suggests that the solution should have been found in the law 
of Restitution. As will be argued below, this is hardly useful given that the law of Restitution in 
this field has only operated by using essentially a contractual analysis. The approach of 
McKendrick has been criticised by Carter, J.W., "Contract, Restitution and Promissory 
Estoppel" (1989) 12 U.N.S.W.L.J., 30,41, and see infra n. 222.
221 See Atiyah, P.S., in Jowell & Auslan, (eds), Lord Denning: The Judge and The Law, 32.
222 Carter, supra n. 220,41, considers that
it seems wrong to conclude ... that the decision whether or not there is a contract may 
be made by a simple application of the rules of offer and acceptance. That would 
elevate concepts which are merely tools of analysis to the status of essential contractual 
requirements.
As Mason & Gageler, supra n. 1, 10-1, point out, "[t]he formation of a contract by offer and 
acceptance has long been a source of conceptual difficulty." In their view, in cases such as
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could have been utilised to produce a satisfactory result, such as a 
consideration of the transaction as a whole in order to imply a reasonable term 
as to price.223
Another example of solutions to this type of factual problem found 
within contract can be seen where the courts have enforced an express or 
implied contract ancillary to the incomplete main contract, to pay for any 
services rendered. Thus, in Brewer St. Investments Ltd v. Barclays Woollen Co. 
Ltd,224 for example, the defendant's (express) undertaking to pay for alterations 
made by the plaintiff to its own property was held to be enforceable, despite 
the fact that a contract for the lease of the plaintiffs' premises was never 
finalised.225
Butler Machine Tool, resort to the formal rules regulating offer and acceptance may produce 
“unsatisfactory results" turning "on formal, rather than substantial matters, and in particular 
on matters that were not in the minds or expectations of the parties. The risk is that although 
the parties consider that there is a contract, the court will rule otherwise." As the authors go on 
to emphasise, at 31, the
insistence on complete agreement on all essential matters may still operate in many 
instances to frustrate, rather than effectuate, the expectations or intentions of the 
parties, the more so when they produce an all or nothing result.
These difficulties may be the result of the inapplicability of classic contract theory to modern 
business conditions. See Farnsworth, supra n. 171, 222: "the classic sequence of offer and 
acceptance is often absent in important contract negotiations." See also generally, Ball, S.N., 
"Work Carried out in Pursuance of Letters of Intent—Contract or Restitution?" (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 
572, 581-2, and his criticism at 576-9 of the findings of Goff J. in British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland 
Bridge & Engineering Co. Ltd [1984] 1 All E.R. 504, that no contract ever arose in that case.
223 Cf. the approach of Lord Denning in the Butler Machine Tool case. See also Mason & 
Gageler, supra n. 1,11, for other possible solutions.
22  ^ [1954] 1 Q.B. 428. Similarly, see Turriff Construction Ltd v. Regalia Knitting Mills Ltd 
[1972] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 234, in which an ancillary contract to pay for work preparatory to a 
building contract was implied by the court, from the defendant's provision to the plaintiff of a 
letter of intent to grant the main contract. On letters of intent generally, see Ball, supra n. 222.
225 See the judgments of Somervell and Römer L.JJ., and a consideration of their 
judgments in Stoljar, 240-5. Cf. the judgment of Denning L.J., who considered that the plaintiffs 
were precluded from a contractual claim because of their failure to complete the agreed 
alterations once the negotiations for the lease broke down. Instead, Denning L.J., at 436, 
considered that the plaintiffs could succeed in their claim on the basis of a "request implied in 
law ... on a claim in restitution." Cf. Burrows, 297-8, who considers that in Brewer St., "[t]he 
majority's apparent preference for contractual rather than restitutionary reasoning ... seems 
justified," given that there was no benefit to the defendant in that case. See also Burrows, A.S., 
"Free Acceptance and the Law of Restitution" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 576, 597-8. See also Jennings & 
Chapman Ltd v. Woodman, Mathews & Co. [1952] 2 T.L.R. 409, in which the plaintiffs failed to 
recover from the defendant payment for alterations made to their building at the defendant's 
request and for which he had agreed to pay. The difference between Jennings & Chapman, and 
Brewer St., is that in the former, the failure to finalise the lease agreement was the fault of the
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The effect of decisions such as these is that either the parties' "main" or 
the parties' collateral agreement, as is objectively determined, is enforced. But 
such a remedial response may even occur outside of contract. For example, a 
defendant may be estopped from denying that a complete contract exists 
because of his or her acquiescence in the plaintiffs reliance on the existence of a 
completed contract.226 The plaintiff's expectations under the incomplete 
contract may thus be fulfilled.
In many cases, however, the parties will not have reached any 
agreement sufficiently certain for the courts to enforce. Although an obligation 
may clearly have been intended to be assumed, it may not be possible to 
determine the exact terms of such obligation. For example, a vital term has not 
been agreed, is ambiguous or uncertain, or the parties' offer and acceptance do 
not correspond. Where a plaintiff has nonetheless relied on an obligation 
having been assumed, it may be possible to restore the plaintiff to his or her 
previous position by ordering, for example, restitution of money paid by a 
plaintiff to a defendant.227 Of greater interest, however, and worthy of some
plaintiffs in not procuring the necessary consent to sub-let. The defendant was unaware of the 
fact that such consent was necessary.
226 See Waltons Stores v. Maher (1988) 76 A.L.R. 513, and MTA v. Waverly Transit Pty 
Ltd [1991] V.R. 176. For an early example, see Gregory v. Mighell (1811) 18 Ves. 328. For an 
example in which a plaintiff failed in its bid to raise such an estoppel, see Austotel Pty Ltd v. 
Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 582. Estoppel prevents a defendant from 
asserting the lack of a final, binding agreement in circumstances in which it would be 
"unconscionable" for the defendant to do so. Waltons Stores is an extreme example. Everything 
had been agreed by the parties and the respondents proceeded with their contractual 
performance whilst the appellant deliberately held back from taking the final step necessary for 
assumption of the contractual obligation. In the United States, there are many examples, 
including Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W. 2d 267 (1965), and Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F. 
2d 684 (1948).
One of the significant features of estoppel is its emphasis upon the plaintiff's detrimental 
reliance, which is a necessary and sufßcient basis of liability, so that no benefit need have 
accrued to the defendant. The point is stressed by Cauchi, supra n. 112, 238.
227 E.g., Fowler v. Scottish Equitable Life Insurance Society (1858) 4 Jur. (N.S.) 1169. The 
claim could be for money had and received, but also, for example, for recovery of money lent. 
See Re Vince [1892] 2 Q.B. 478, and Goff & Jones, 483. It would appear that consideration for the 
payment must have wholly failed for recovery to be allowed: Goff & Jones, 483, 488. But such a 
requirement has often been criticised and in this writer's view ought not be insisted upon. Two 
types of circumstances may arise. First, the defendant's conduct may be such as to justify 
liability to compensate the plaintiff for his loss: a breach of an assumed obligation on which the 
defendant has detrimentally relied. See further, § 6.2.3.3. Secondly, there may be no such 
conduct, but the contract being "void", a plaintiff may be able to claim restitution in order to be 
restored as near as possible to his or her previous status quo. Such recovery will be on the same 
principles as govern the recovery of mistaken payments (i.e., irrespective of any conduct on a 
defendant's part). Again, an insistence on total failure of consideration may defeat the purpose
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consideration, are cases in which such a remedy is not possible, where, for 
example, services have been performed. Perhaps the most common problem 
arises where services have been performed under an agreement which is 
incomplete as to price.228 In such circumstances, the courts are usually 
prepared to impose an obligation that a reasonable price is payable for work 
performed by means of quantum meruit. In effect, it will be argued, once there 
has been detrimental reliance, the courts are completing the incomplete 
agreement by resort to reasonable implied terms.229
Although also used in respect of non-consensual transactions,230 of 
interest here is the liberal utilisation of quantum meruit in circumstances near­
contract to allow recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered where a 
defendant has requested or accepted the services where they were clearly not 
intended to be gratuitous.231 Is recovery of a reasonable price in such 
circumstances a liability which arises outside contract, or can it be described as
of the liability rules in such cases, as to which purpose see Chapter 9.
228 In cases in which a contract is anticipated, a problem which commonly arises is 
that the parties perform work for which remuneration in some form other than separate 
payment is expected. In Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880, and William Lacey 
v. Davis [1957] 1 All E.R. 712, for example, the court imposed an obligation to pay for requested 
preliminary work to an anticipated but non-eventuating contract, even though there was no 
expectation on the part of either parties to the respective agreements that such work would be 
paid for separately. But clearly, the parties had not intended the work to be gratuitous. Instead, 
the plaintiffs in each case had expected to be remunerated by being awarded the lucrative 
contracts. Note, in contrast, Sinclair v. Rankin (No. 2) (1908) 10 W.A.L.R. 126, which expressly 
rejected the view that where "the way [of remuneration] contemplated by the parties failed, it 
follows as a matter of law that a means not contemplated by either party should be 
substituted." Sheppard J. in Sabemo disapproved of the decision in Sinclair v. Rankin.
229 By contrast, estoppel does not allow for the imposition of reasonable terms into 
incomplete bargains: Mason & Gageler, supra n. 1,15.
230 See Maddaugh & McCamus, 6, who state that quantum meruit has historically been 
utilised "without distinction in respect of both consensual and non-consensual transactions. 
This fact has been the source of a good deal of subsequent confusion." Cf. Goff & Jones, 4. The 
use of quantum meruit in respect of non-consensual transactions can be seen in cases of recovery 
for unsolicited services, considered in Chapter 8.
231 Cf. Bryant v. Flight (1839) 5 M. & W. 114, in arguendo: "When a party has 
performed valuable services for another at his request, the law will presume that he is to pay 
for them that which is reasonable." Recovery in quantum meruit may be more liberally available 
than in other doctrines. Recovery for requested work performed in circumstances in which it 
was not intended to be gratuitous suggests a broader scope than liability in estoppel, for 
example. Some support for this view may be found in the judgment of Rogers A-J.A., in 
Austotel Pty Ltd v. Franklins Selfserve Pty Ltd (1989) 16 N.S.W.L.R. 582, 621-2, where his Honour 
rejected the availability of an estoppel claim, but pointed to the possibility of a claim for 
"damages based on principles of restitution."
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contractual? The latter possibility is raised because the courts are prepared to 
imply terms to "fill gaps where it is clear that a contract was made" ,232 in order 
to facilitate performance of an obligation clearly undertaken.233 In other words, 
the courts use contract law techniques to otherwise complete incomplete 
agreements where parties have clearly intended to assume an obligation. It is 
generally said, however, that the courts will not make the bargain for the 
parties.234 Does such a position preclude an implied term as to price, where the 
price for services under an "agreement" is uncertain or has been left 
unspecified, for example?
Perhaps the orthodox view is that expressed by Fullagar J. in Hall v. 
Busst,235 that if "the parties [to a contract other than a sale of goods]236 are 
silent as to price, there can be no implication of a term that a reasonable price is 
to be paid." Any recovery for quantum meruit must consequently be seen as a 
non-contractual claim; price can be said to be an essential term of the 
agreement and the courts will not construct the parties' contract for them. Such 
a view, however, appears both to ignore the historical willingness of the courts 
to imply a reasonable term as to price, seemingly in contract,237 and is also out
232 Cheshire & Fifoot (Aust. ed.), 210.
233 Note, however, that the implied term must not be inconsistent with or contradict 
the express terms of the agreement.
234 E.g., Hall v. Busst (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206, 222, per Fullagar J. Thus, where the parties 
appear merely to have agreed to agree as to some essential term, it is said that such 
"agreement" will not generally be enforced: Cheshire & Fifoot (Aust. ed.), 102-3; but even this 
rule is open to exception. The authors note that "[s]ome decided cases are difficult to reconcile 
with" such a rule. See cases cited, particularly Foley v. Classique Coaches, Ltd [1934] 2 K.B. 1,11-2, 
per Greer L.J.
233 (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206, 222. See also A.N.Z. Banking Group v. Frost Holdings [1989] 
V.R. 695, though in that case, the parties had failed to agree on a number of essential matters, 
the very subject of the parties' negotiations. Importantly, the claim was for a loss of profits 
under the contract, which had not been executed.
236 In sale of goods, a term as to reasonable price is implied by various Sales of Goods 
Acts, (see Carter & Harland, 73-4), although such provisions appear to reflect the earlier 
common law position. See, e.g., Joyce v. Swann (1864) 11 C.B. N.S. 84,102; 144 E.R. 34, 41-2, per 
Willes J.; and see Stoljar, 187-96.
237 Some early examples include Bryant v. Flight (1839) 5 M. & W. 114, and Jewry v. 
Busk (1814) 5 Taunt. 302. In the former case, the plaintiff had agreed to enter the defendant's 
services as "weekly manager" with the plaintiff agreeing that "the amount of payment I leave 
entirely up to you." In the latter case, the plaintiff agreed to perform certain services for the 
defendant in relation to some real estate (to "take care of the house, and air it, and shew it to 
persons applying to take it") in return for which the defendant would make the plaintiff a 
"handsome present". In both cases the court appears to have been prepared to award the 
plaintiffs reasonable recompense on the basis of the contractual agreement. In Bryant, for 
example, Baron Alderson considered that the "jury were to ascertain how much the defendant,
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of step with the increasing preparedness of the courts to fill such a gap,238 
accepting, in effect, that the parties must have intended a reasonable price, 
since none was specified.239 The fact that the value of remuneration has not 
been fixed in an otherwise certain contract does not, on this latter approach, 
render such a contract void for uncertainty and a quantum meruit may be 
awarded in what is an action "to enforce an implied term of an express 
contract."240
At least in some circumstances, then, agreements incomplete as to price
acting bona fide, would or ought to have awarded." The difficulty in interpreting past decisions 
is that they were nearly all decided, where quantum meruit was awarded, in terms of implied 
contract. In some cases, however, recovery was clearly stated to be based on the express 
contract, a term being implied as to reasonable price. This was unequivocally accepted as a 
general proposition in Horton v. Jones (No. 2) (1939) 39 N.S.W.S.R. 305, 319, per Jordon C.J. In 
considering the availability of quantum meruit in the situation with which we are here 
concerned, his Honour stated:
If a person employs another to do work, or agrees to buy goods from him, nothing 
being said as to the wage or the price, the law implies a promise to pay a reasonable 
wage or a reasonable price, and an action may be maintained for a quantum meruit or a 
quantum valebat. In this case, the action is one to enforce an implied term of an express 
contract. (Emphasis added.)
Although his Honour compares provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, the statement clearly 
extends beyond merely sale of goods. See also, generally, Stoljar, 187-96 and Joyce v. Swann 
(1864) 11 C.B. N.S. 84,102; 144 E.R. 34, 41-2, per Willes J.
238 See Carter & Harland, 67-76. See also Coote, B., "Contract Formation and the 
Implication of Terms" (1993) 6 J.C.L. 51. Ball, supra n. 222, 584, has described this as the 
"realistic ability to construct a reasonable contract from the bare bones of agreement". Where a 
contract is executed, the courts may be more readily prepared to imply such terms. See Ball, 
585, and Denning J. in British Bank for Foreign Trade v. Novinex Ltd [1949] 1 K.B. 623, 630. Ball, 
583-4, is in favour of gap-filling by implying terms to render agreements complete. This 
appears consistent with the general policy of the courts "at least in modern times, [to] do their 
utmost" to uphold bargains: Cheshire 6* Fifoot (Aust. ed.), 98. Some examples include Foley v. 
Classique Coaches, Ltd [1934] 2 K.B. 1, particularly 11-2, per Greer L.J. and Wenning v. Robinson 
[1964-5] N.S.W.R. 614. See also Windeyer, dissenting, in Hall v. Busst (1960) 104 C.L.R. 206, 245. 
A reasonable term as to price may be implied even where remuneration has been agreed upon, 
but part of that remuneration remains unfixed. See, e.g., Graves v. Okanagan Trust Co. (1956) 6 
D.L.R. (2d) 54.
239 Fridman, G.H.L., "Construing, Without Constructing, A Contract" (1960) 76 L.Q.R. 
521, 536, has said that a preparedness of the courts to read a contract as involving, say, a 
reasonable price or commission, is not "tantamount to constructing a contract for the parties. It 
is really only giving effect to their intention by construing the contract as they must have 
intended it to be understood. For it is a fundamental postulate of contract law that the parties to 
a contract are deemed to be reasonable men."
240 Horton v. Jones (No. 2) (1939) 39 N.S.W.S.R. 305, 319, per Jordon C.J., quoted supra
n. 237.
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will be enforced after reliance by the implication of a term into the contract that 
a reasonable price is payable. Given the availability of such relief, determining 
whether a given quantum meruit award under an incomplete agreement is 
contractual or otherwise241 appears ultimately to be a distinction of no effect. In 
either case, the remedial outcome is the same: the incomplete agreement gives 
rise to a right to recover the reasonable value of services performed. Where 
only recovery for the work performed is sought, it seems a moot point whether 
there is any difference between implying (or imposing) a reasonable term as to 
price in order to complete the contract, or instead, holding that the contract is 
incomplete (and incapable of being completed) and then imposing an 
obligation to pay a reasonable price.242 This is especially so given that in both 
cases the underlying reason for imposing the reasonable price is the same: the 
parties have conducted themselves on the basis of having assumed an 
obligation. The parties either have a clear intention to assume some 
obligation243 (to pay for requested services rendered), though their exact 
intentions are not objectively completely discernible as to all terms (the price); 
or at least the defendant's conduct is such that the risk of the plaintiff's reliance 
rests with that defendant. Of course, a reasonable price may be more than one
241 Unjust enrichment theorists claim that quantum meruit awards under incomplete or 
defective contracts are based on unjust enrichment principles. See, e.g., Birks, 270-6; Burrows, 
supra n. 225, 595-8; Fridman, 284-92. Cf. Deane J. in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 67 A.L.R. 
577, 600. Where a quantum meruit is awarded in absence of a consensual relationship of the 
parties—where there has been no attempted assumption of obligations, for example—then 
quite different concerns may be raised and such a quantum meruit cannot, of course, be 
considered contractual. An example might be recovery for unsolicited services rendered in an 
emergency.
242 Of course, if damages for breach of contract are sought, then a determination of 
whether or not a contract exists is significant. Cf. British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland Bridge Co. [1984] 
1 All E.R. 504, 509, per Goff J. (as he then was). Holding that there is no contract may preclude 
an assessment of whether the work performed fulfils all other requirements of the parties' 
incomplete agreement. This further suggests in favour of giving effect as far as possible to the 
parties' intentions, finding a contract, and filling in the gaps. See Ball, supra n. 222, 577, who 
makes the point that if only a remedy in Restitution is available,
[t]he whole of risk of negotiations breaking down after performance has commenced is 
thrown on to the [defendant]. The [plaintiff] receives his reasonable expenses plus a 
reasonable profit via the free acceptance principle and thus gets approximately what he 
always expected. The [defendant] has to pay for everything that he actually receives 
but gets no protection in relation to any expectations he had of greater or better 
performance.
If, on the other hand, a contract is held to have arisen, then those parts of the agreement which 
are completed and do represent the actual expectations of the parties can be given effect.
243 Cf. Burrows, 293, in relation to anticipated contracts: "[PJarties carrying on pre- 
contractual negotiations can often be said to have reached some kind of bargain before a 
binding contract is struck."
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party expected to pay, or less than the other expected to receive, but there is no 
reason why one party's expectations are to be preferred over those of the 
other.244
There are some merits in treating all quantum meruit recovery on the 
basis of an incomplete agreement as nonetheless a remedy which is available 
within contract. One of the advantages of such an approach is that it avoids the 
perhaps impossible task of attempting to interpret past decisions as falling on 
either side of an artificial line, as being contractual or quasi-contractual. Since 
historically, nearly all quantum meruit cases245 used the language of implied 
contract as the basis for their decisions, the difficulty in making such a 
distinction is obvious.246 As Goff J. indicated in British Steel Corp. v. Cleveland 
Bridge Co.:
[The] quantum meruit claim ... straddles the boundaries of what we now 
call contract and restitution, so the mere framing of a claim as a quantum 
meruit claim, or a claim for a reasonable sum, does not assist in
244 See, e.g., Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (1909). See generally Palmer, §15.11.
245 See, e.g., Way v. Latilla [1937] 3 All E.R. 759; Watson v. Watson [1953] N.Z.L.R. 266, 
270, 272, but note Birks, 274, who considers that the decision in that case "affirmed the non­
contractual nature of the claim". Contrast Stoljar, 240. Two recent decisions, though not 
incomplete contract cases, have affirmed an implied contract basis for quantum meruit. See 
Guinness pic v. Saunders [1990] 1 All E.R. 652, and Building Design 2 Ltd v. Wascana Rehabilitation 
Centre (1992) 6 W.W.R. 343.
There are some exceptions. In William Lacey (Hounslow), Ltd v. Davis [1957] 2 All E.R. 712, in a 
judgment of rather confusing reasoning, the suggestion is made that the obligation is implied 
by law "irrespective of the actual views and intentions of the parties", 719, but at 717, Barry J. 
asks whether a promise to pay should be implied or not. Cf. Birks' interpretation of the case, 
272-3. In Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880, resort was not made to implied 
contract. Instead, Sheppard J. promulgated a very specific rule; importantly, he indicated that 
liability did not rest in unjust enrichment. See particularly at 902-3.
For a defective contract case which asserted a quasi-contractual as opposed to a contractual 
basis for the claim, see Craven Ellis v. Canons Ltd [1936] 2 K.B. 403,412, per Greer L.J.
246 One view is that in some of these cases, the implied contract is artificial, whilst in 
others, it is not. Cf. Brennan J. in Pavey & Mathews v. Paul (1987) 67 A.L.R. 577, 588:
quantum meruit is sometimes used to describe an action to recover a reasonable sum 
which is due under a contract and sometimes to describe an action to recover a 
reasonable sum when the obligation to pay it is imposed by law independently of 
actual contract.
See Stoljar, 187-96,240 et. seq. for a discussion of such views. There is considerable confusion as 
to the status of a quantum meruit claim, as evidenced by the judgments in the South Australian 
Supreme Court in Independent Grocers v. Noble Lowndes (1993) 60 S.A.S.R. 525.
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classifying the claim as contractual or quasi-contractual.247
Another advantage is that in recognising that a quantum meruit here is a 
contractual technique, equating with the filling of gaps in parties incomplete 
bargains by means of implied terms, it becomes clear that liability still 
ultimately attaches because the parties' clear intention that the services 
performed were to be paid for, and a plaintiff's reliance thereon.248 If quantum 
meruit in this context is instead seen as non-contractual, there are no alternative 
explanations as to why it is imposed. Historically, as already noted, the cases 
utilised the language of implied contracts; and the current favoured 
explanation, that of unjust enrichment, is seriously flawed. A defendant need 
not have been enriched as a result of a plaintiff's actions, and further, the 
unjustness of any enrichment can only be established by reference to those 
same factors which establish a contractual claim: the intention to assume an 
obligation to pay for requested services or at least conduct of the defendant 
which can objectively be determined as amounting to the assumption of such 
an obligation. In either case, the defendant can be taken to have assumed the 
risk of the plaintiff's reliance.
The relevance of a contractual analysis is well illustrated by the case of 
Way v. Latilla.249 The plaintiff, Way, agreed to supply the defendant with
247 [1984] 1 All E.R. 504,509.
248 The scope of the liability should thus reflect as much as possible the mutual 
intentions of the parties which are discernible, for example, as to the quality and timing of the 
performance of the services. See supra n. 242. As Farnsworth, supra n. 171, 220, has said in 
considering problems arising in the context of precontractual dealing:
Some observers have concluded that existing contract doctrines are not adequate to the 
task of protecting the parties—I argue that, on the contrary, those doctrines, 
imaginatively applied, are both all that are needed and are all that are desirable.
And in the United States, courts have generally favoured an "implied-in-fact" contract 
approach as a common mechanism for resolving precontractual disputes: Farnsworth, supra n. 
171,233, fn. 52.
249 [1937] 3 All E.R. 759. Another good illustration is provided by what is perhaps a 
paradigmatic precontractual dealing case, William Lacey v. Davis, [1957] 1 All E.R. 712, in which 
the defendant requested substantial and expensive services in circumstances where neither 
party expected such work to be performed completely gratuitously. Although neither party 
expected the work to be paid for separately, this was only because of the mutual expectation 
that the "main" contract would be finalised and that recompense would take the form of profits 
from that contract. Subsequent commentators (e.g., Birks, 272-4) have emphasised this lack of 
an expectation of separate recompense to reject contract as an appropriate mechanism for 
recovery. But as Stoljar has emphasised,
[e]ven if, as here, [the parties] did not at the time intend special payment for the 
preparatory work, this lack of intention was still predicated on the contemplated
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information relating to gold mine concessions in Africa and, inter alia, to secure 
appropriate mining concessions for the defendant. The defendant, in return, 
had agreed that the plaintiff would obtain "at least a fair share of the plums 
and rewards" of the concessions. Negotiations as to the nature and measure of 
the plaintiff's share in the "rewards" never reached fruition and the plaintiff's 
considerable work went unrewarded, despite the large profit ultimately 
derived by the defendant from the concessions. The plaintiff claimed damages 
for breach of a contract to share in the concessions obtained by the 
defendant.250 The House of Lords held that there "certainly was no concluded
contract indeed materialising in due course. Can it at all be said that the parties could 
have intended payment in no other event, such that P would be giving considerable 
services for free, even if D were to withdraw unexpectedly? Discerning such “counter- 
factual" intentions (what the parties would have said had the question actually been 
put) is precisely what contract does at many points ....
Stoljar, 242, footnotes omitted. Stoljar really is pointing out that contract law fills gaps in 
otherwise complete agreements by reference to what the parties would have agreed to had they 
turned their minds to the issue (as objectively determined). Stoljar goes on to say that this "is an 
exercise, moreover, for which quasi-contract offers no real help."
Stoljar gives a similar interpretation of Sabemo v. North Sydney M.C. [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 880. At 
244-5, he writes:
Notwithstanding his initial espousal of quasi-contractual liability, Sheppard )., in a 
somewhat curious reversal, declared 'the determining factor' entitling the plaintiff to 
succeed to be the circumstance that 'the defendant deliberately decided to drop the 
proposal'. The plaintiff, it was said, perhaps did take a risk in incurring the expenditure 
he did, 'that the transaction might go off because of a bona fide failure to reach 
agreement', but he did not take that risk for the event of one party changing his mind 
when final agreement was so near. ... It should be clear that this final principle, despite 
its choice of non-contractual language, is not only decidedly contractual in nature, 
admitting as it does the parties' agreement that certain preparatory or interim work is 
to be done for recompense. The new principle goes even further than ordinary contract 
law, in that it imposes a duty of good faith, that is, a duty not to withdraw for reasons 
other than a bona fide disagreement as to which neither party, is so to speak, at fault. 
But surely, there is no need to go so far as this in situations of this kind. ... In fact, all 
that is required for present purposes is simply to recognise that the parties are, or 
circumstantially must be, in agreement that work done by one while negotiating for a 
contract for the same or more work, is not work done gratuitously, but on a commercial 
basis, if only because neither the party doing the work nor the party accepting it can as 
yet be completely certain that the contemplated contract will indeed come about. Given 
such an agreement, obviously not express but one implied in fact, P has a contractual 
claim for his services,—the majority in Brewer Investments virtually decided as much 
(footnotes omitted.)
250 The potential size of a successful claim for a share in the concessions was much 
more than any claim merely for remuneration for the services rendered, even on the basis of the 
participation in the profits. This is illustrated by difference between the sum awarded by the 
trial judge (£30000), who accepted the plaintiff's claim at first instance, and the House of Lords 
award of £5000.
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contract between the parties as to the amount of the share or interest that Mr. 
Way was to receive" .251 Consequently, the House of Lords considered that the 
only remedy available to the plaintiff was by way of an implied contract to pay 
reasonable remuneration.
In determining the value of the quantum meruit for the services rendered, 
considerable differences between the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
arose. The Court of Appeal awarded the plaintiff a sum calculated as a 
reasonable fee for the services rendered,252 whereas the House of Lords 
awarded ten times this amount. The reason for this difference is significant. The 
House of Lords considered that the previous negotiations and the intentions 
and expectations of the parties should be taken into account, in order to fix an 
appropriate quantum meruit award. Lord Wright considered that the 
"communing of the parties" was evidence which was "admissible to show 
what the parties had in mind, however indeterminately, with regard to the 
basis of remuneration . " 253 Although the final form and measure of 
remuneration for the work was never finalised, it was clear that some 
"participation" in the gains of the defendant was anticipated by both parties. 
The recognition of an implied contract to pay for the services rendered thus 
reflected and sought to give effect to the intentions of the parties to assume a 
legal obligation, which intention was complete to all but one extent: the value of 
the remuneration. And here, the court simply implied a reasonable term, taking 
into account the parties negotiations and expectations.254
Birks has said that the decision of the House of Lords is "entirely 
satisfactory" ,255 but that the reasoning was "artificial" because of the courts
251 [19371 3 All E.R. 759, 763.
252 A sum of £500, which, in the view of Lord Atkins in the House of Lords, ignored 
the "real business position": ibid, 764.
253 Ibid, 766. Lords Macmillan, Thankerton and Maugham concurred with the 
judgments of both Lords Wright and Atkin, which were essentially similar. Lord Atkin, at 764, 
considered that
if no trade usage assists the court as to the amount of the commission, it appears to me
clear that the court may take into account the bargainings between the parties, not with
a view to completing the bargain for them, but as evidence of the value which each of
them puts upon the services.
254 The view is expressed in a number of other cases as well. See, e.g., Scarisbrick v. 
Parkinson (1869) 20 L.T. 175, and supra n. I l l ,  and text thereto.
255 Birks, 272.
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discovery of an implied contract. With respect, however, without such resort to 
contractual reasoning, the House of Lords could not have reached the result 
Birks perceives to be satisfactory. The basis upon which the House of Lords 
derived a “quantum meruit" award ten times greater than the reasonable value 
calculated by the Court of Appeal was by reference to the intentions of the 
parties. There was thus no artificiality in resort to such evidence.256 If, instead, 
the House of Lords had proceeded to resolve the issues before it by application 
of unjust enrichment principles, the court would have faced the difficult 
problem of determining the value of the "enrichment" (accepting that there was 
indeed an "enrichment" under one of the propounded tests)257 received by the 
defendant? Why was not the Court of Appeal's assessment of the reasonable 
value of the work performed the more appropriate?258 To reply that the 
measure of the disgorgeable enrichment should reflect the intentions of the 
parties would be merely to recognise the contractual nature of the claim.259
In decisions such as Way v. Latilla, then, reasonable price reflects the 
contractual intentions of the parties. Indeed, one commentator has noted that, 
at least in relation to sale of goods,260 the courts tend to reject an "automatic 
espousal of the market price" and base their assessment of reasonable value on
256 Contrast Birks, id.
257 It could probably only be said that there was enrichment under a subjective test, 
such as free acceptance or the "bargained-for" test. These tests emphasise the notion of an 
underlying bargain and confirm the essentially consensual nature of the transaction, albeit 
transactions which fail to fulfil the strict formalities of contract law. Burrows, who advocates a 
bargained-for test of enrichment, concedes in relation to anticipated contracts that the parties 
have reached "some kind of bargain"(293).
258 Presumably, the Court merely arrived at the figure by determining the cost of 
hiring someone such as the plaintiff, to perform the sorts of tasks he was asked to do.
259 Another difficulty with any unjust enrichment analysis of Way v. Latilla [1937] 3 All 
E.R. 759, would arise in determining the "unjustness" of any enrichment. If, for example, one 
wished to establish the unjustness by the defendant's "free acceptance", it would need to be 
shown that the work was accepted with the knowledge it was to be paid for. But in order to 
prove such knowledge, it would be necessary to refer back to the intention to assume an 
obligation and the nature of the parties' expectations. Reference to "unjust" would thus add 
another unnecessary stage to the analysis. This is well illustrated by the case of Canadian Co- 
Operative Implements Ltd v. Lou Petit Trucking Ltd (1983) 27 Man.R. (2d) 177, in which the court 
proceeded on the basis of an implied contract, but also considered an alternative unjust 
enrichment analysis of the problem. In so doing, it isolated four elements to be satisfied, of 
which three only could be proved by reference to contractual notions (the fourth was that of 
benefit).
260 Under various Sale of Goods Acts, a term as to reasonable price can be implied 
where price has not been specified.
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the intention of the parties; "reasonable price is something which takes account 
of individual quirks of the parties concerned."261
§ 6.2.3.3 A note re money
To this point, the cases considered have mostly concerned plaintiffs who 
have performed services, or more generally speaking changed their position, in 
reliance upon an incomplete contract which reliance proves detrimental. Such 
reliant action need not, of course, necessarily be beneficial to a defendant. The 
cases impose an obligation upon a defendant where a plaintiff has incurred 
some detriment, in circumstances where the defendant's conduct justifies his or 
her being made liable to the plaintiff.
In many cases, however, the plaintiff's detrimental conduct may take the 
form of a direct part-payment or deposit of money to the defendant. The receipt 
of such money is clearly beneficial to the defendant. It may then be possible for 
a plaintiff to recover such part-payment262 or, in more limited circumstances, a 
deposit,263 on similar terms and on similar principles governing recovery of a 
mistaken payment. As will be seen in Chapter 9, a plaintiff will be entitled to 
recover the economic advantage which such payment represents still retained 
by the defendant. Such liability is not conduct-based. This brings us to an 
important distinction which needs to be drawn. A plaintiff who has paid 
money to a defendant may be able to establish two distinct grounds of liability. 
The plaintiff may be able to point to conduct of the defendant such as would 
normally give rise to liability, say, to make good at least his or her losses
261 See Ball, supra n. 222, 588.
262 Part payments are recoverable generally only where there has been a total failure 
of consideration. See Goff & Jones, 417-24, 428-38, in relation to breach of contract, but these 
rules are relevant to defective or incomplete contracts as well. Cf. Palmer, Vol. II, 47-8. Where a 
breaching party seeks recovery of a part payment, the right to recovery is in theory governed 
by the terms of the contract, though these terms may be in the nature of a penalty and thus in 
effect, ignored. The requirement of a total failure of consideration can be criticised. If a plaintiff 
is the innocent party to a breach of contract, the matter may not be critical: an alternative 
remedy for damages is available. But if the party seeking recovery is the breaching party, or is 
relying on a defective or incomplete contract, a requirement of total failure would seem harsh 
where the defendant's performance has only partially reduced the economic advantage 
received as a result of such payment. For example, the defendant may have received $1000, but 
expended only $200 in his or her performance. Yet the economic advantage retained ($800) 
should still be recoverable on the same basis as a mistaken payment of such sum: see Chapter 9.
263 A deposit is generally only recoverable by a non-breaching party to a contract, a 
deposit being a guarantee of performance of the contract. This rule is subject to at least one 
proviso, namely that the forfeiture of a deposit must not be in the nature of a penalty so that it 
is unconscionable for the recipient to retain the money.
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incurred, or alternatively, the plaintiff may be able to establish the receipt and 
retention by the defendant of an economic advantage.
An obligation grounded on the retention of an economic advantage 
received is quite different to one which makes a defendant responsible for the 
plaintiff's loss; for merely requiring a defendant to return an economic 
advantage retained does not leave him or her worse off than before the 
payment. The latter type of claim is not conduct-related and might succeed 
against an entirely "innocent" defendant. Unlike in the service cases considered 
above, it is not necessary to show, for example, that the defendant has breached 
an assumed obligation. But it follows that an innocent defendant may also raise 
any defences, such as a change of position considered in Chapter 9, which 
establishes that the defendant no longer retains the economic advantage the 
money represents.
Where, however, it is possible to identify conduct of a defendant 
sufficient to justify liability to compensate for loss, then such a defendant 
should be liable to repay the money/economic advantage received, even if he 
or she no longer retains it. In other words, in such circumstances, change of 
position and similar defences ought not to be available.264 The liability arises, 
not because the defendant retains the plaintiff's money which can simply be 
returned, but because the defendant's conduct justifies liability to compensate 
the plaintiff's loss. In such circumstances, the symmetry between non-money 
and money cases needs to be maintained and the common basis for imposing 
liability—the defendant's conduct—needs to be emphasised.
§ 6.2.4 Conclusion: Defective and Incomplete Contracts
Contract law provides one mechanism whereby parties can assume 
obligations intended to have legal effect. In circumstances near contract, the 
rules of contract suggest no contractual obligation has successfully been 
assumed. Yet the parties' conduct may suggest either a clear intention to
264 Contrast the decision of Conmac Western Industries v. Robinson [1993] 6 W.W.R. 375. 
In Conmac, the plaintiff had paid over money (pre-payments of royalties) in anticipation of a 
lease, even though, as it turned out, a number of critical matters had not been agreed. 
Eventually, these outstanding matters led to negotiations breaking off. It is unclear if either 
party was at fault in this breakdown (see 440-1). The plaintiff, seeking recovery of the pre­
payments, conceded that a change of position defence, if made out, would reduce its right to 
recover such pre-payment. Such a concession may have been premature, however, for it may 
well have been possible for the plaintiff to establish all elements necessary for a claim for 
precontractual losses, at least in relation to the pre-payment. Arguably, the risk of the contract 
failing, in relation to the payment, lay with the defendants, who had requested, indeed insisted 
on, pre-payment under the contract (439).
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assume some obligation or risk, or that a defendant can be taken to have 
assumed an obligation or risk. If, in such circumstances, the plaintiff has relied 
to his or her detriment on an obligation having been assumed, equity and 
Restitution, in their gap-filling and ameliorative capacity, may nonetheless 
allow for the enforcement of the assumed obligations, at least to a limited 
extent. Thus, generally speaking, defective contracts are enforceable to the 
extent that such enforcement does not contravene the policy of the rule 
rendering the contract defective. Similarly, the courts may complete an 
incomplete agreement in reasonable terms, where there exists a clear intention 
some obligation or risk was to be assumed. Arguably, some of the techniques 
utilised to complete incomplete agreements—such as quantum meruit award 
where price is incomplete—may even be considered to be contractual, rather 
than merely contract-like.
Ultimately, it may not be of great moment whether one goes so far as to 
describe liability arising under defective and incomplete contracts as 
contractual, rather than merely contract-like. Certainly, a less formal, more 
inclusive view of contract—consider, for example, Stoljar's discussion of "loose 
agreements"265—based on a common core concern with the assumption of 
obligations, could incorporate most of the rules and doctrines operating near 
contract. One benefit of such an approach is that it avoids a difficulty noted by 
Atiyah:
Since the law does not contain an authoritative and conclusive definition 
of contract, there is no way of saying what is 'truly' a contractual 
liability. And the fact that different legal systems may treat liabilities as 
contractual which English lawyers would treat as non-contractual 
suggests that the search for a liability which is 'truly' contractual is 
pretty artificial.266
But one need not go so far as to consider all doctrines near contract as 
contractual, so long as it is recognised that such cases (and some more so than 
others) do raise many of the same essential concerns as contract itself and may 
thus even allow us to understand contract more fully.267 The term "quasi-
265 Stoljar, 192-6, 239-45, and see Stoljar, supra n. 11, particularly 22, cited infra n. 267.
266 Atiyah, 44.
267 Cf. Stoljar, supra n. 11, 21-2, discussing estoppel in circumstances near contract, 
but his comments may be seen as equally applicable to Restitution where operating in this 
context. In Stoljar's view, in circumstances near contract, estoppel,
notwithstanding its special language suggesting a separate doctrine, turns out to be 
little more than a contract-supplementing exercise as it reveals an additional agreement
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contract" may thus perhaps prove to be of continued utility, suggesting as it 
does the contract-like nature of recovery in these cases, whilst also implicitly 
suggesting that the accepted formalities of contract have not been satisfied.
§ 6.3 TORT-LIKE CONDUCT AND LIABILITY: Infringing 
Standards of Acceptable Conduct
Society has no interest in the mere shifting of loss between individuals for its 
own sake. ... [A] shifting of loss is justified only when there exists special reason 
for requiring the defendant to bear it rather than the plaintiff on whom it 
happens to fall,268
§ 6.3.1 Introduction
It is proposed now to consider liability rules arising in circumstances 
near tort, in which conduct of a defendant gives rise to tort-like liability. As 
with much of tort, the concern is with conduct which infringes certain 
minimum standards of acceptable conduct and results in harm to persons in 
relationships of some proximity to the defendant. As will be seen, such harm- 
producing conduct characteristically gives rise to an obligation to return the 
harmed party to his or her status quo ante.
Many of the topics claimed for Restitution which give rise to tort-like 
liability are rules and doctrines of equitable origin whose principal function is 
to provide mechanisms for the vitiation of transactions tainted by some 
wrongful conduct usually on the part of a party to the transaction .269
not included in the formal contract, or one which modifies the latter, or virtually 
replaces it, or is interpretative of some of its terms, or shows an 'agreement in principle' 
where a contract appears incomplete, not having gone through the usual offer-and- 
acceptance stages. In all these contexts ... estoppel is not really needed since we are, or 
should be, able to reconstruct our relevant contract principles so as to cure persistent 
deficiencies (footnote omitted).
268 Fleming, J.G., The Law of Torts (1992,8th ed.), 3, (hereinafter: "Fleming").
269 It may also be possible to vitiate a transaction entered by P with D where P's 
actions are the result of wrongful conduct on the part of a third party, X. Where D was an 
innocent bystander to X's wrongdoing, such claims clearly fall outside the category of wrongful 
conduct, for P, though alleging unfair conduct, does not do so against D. Consequently, claims 
against D, the innocent bystander, must involve differing concerns and will thus be considered 
in Chapter 9, alongside other cases in which a plaintiff's claim is not based on any wrongdoing 
on the part of the defendant. In this section, reference to such three-party transactions will only 
be made in passing.
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Transaction avoidance doctrines are not, of course, the exclusive province of 
equity, as duress illustrates.270 And such common law transaction avoidance 
doctrines will also be noted. But our concern is largely with equitable doctrines 
such as undue influence (actual and presumed), unconscionable dealings,271 
relief for non-fraudulent misrepresentations and relief for contracts entered 
under an operative unilateral mistake.
It may seem odd to consider such equitable doctrines within a thesis on 
Restitution, but such topics are covered within some texts on the subject. The 
inclusion of all or most of these doctrines, however, appears to be driven purely 
by the restitutionary remedial response—that is, transaction avoidance or 
"rescission"—which usually follows, leading to an incomplete or one-sided 
treatment of such topics. The focus is entirely on the doctrines when utilised 
with restitutionary consequences, as evidence of their supposed purpose of the 
reversal of unjust enrichment.272 The artificial division of doctrines which 
follows from an unjust enrichment analysis seems entirely inappropriate in the 
light of moves toward greater remedial flexibility, as will be seen. Outside of 
Restitution texts, an unjust enrichment analysis of these equitable topics has not 
gained any foothold.273 They are for the most part explained in terms of
270 Many equitable doctrines have merely expanded common law rights to have a 
transaction rescinded. Note, for example, the expanded scope in equity for the rescission of 
transactions induced by non-fraudulent misrepresentations, including gifts and voluntary 
settlements: Re Glubb [19001 1 Ch. 354. At common law, only fraudulent misrepresentations 
give rise to a right to rescind a transaction, unless there is a total failure of consideration, in 
which case money paid even on the basis of an innocent misrepresentation is recoverable. A 
negligent misrepresentation may, since Hedley Byrne v. Heller [1964] A.C. 465, give rise to a 
claim in tort, for damages incurred as a consequence of the misrepresentation.
271 They are sometimes known as "catching" bargains.
272 A striking example is provided by Goff & Jones, 15, who state:
The courts may well recognise new grounds to found a restitutionary claim;
unconscionability may be one such ground. The judicial recognition of the unifying
principle of unjust enrichment should encourage them to do so (footnotes omitted).
But with respect, this seems an inverted perspective of unconscionability. Undeniably, 
unconscionable conduct may result in a restitutionary remedy, but similarly, it may give rise to 
a number of other remedial consequences. Unconscionability is an idea which underlies many 
different doctrines and may even, of itself, found a cause of action (consider, e.g., Baumgartner 
v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, considered further Chapter 7). To suggest that its recognition 
as merely one more "unjust" factor within unjust enrichment is justified by a "unifying 
principle of unjust enrichment" appears to miss the non-remedy specific nature of the 
unconscionability idea.
273 See, e.g., Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, and Baker, P.V., & Langan, P. St.J., Snell's 
Equity (29th ed., 1990), neither of which make reference to unjust enrichment in their respective 
indexes. Interestingly, even in Restitution texts which cover these equitable topics, such as Goff
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quintessential equitable notions such as unconscionable conduct and within the 
context of the development of each rule in the courts of equity. This means that 
the substantive content of the doctrines is thus largely dealt with outside of 
unjust enrichment. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, there is some debate within 
the unjust enrichment camp itself as to how much of equity can rightfully be 
claimed.274
For these reasons, the specific and detailed operation of individual 
equitable doctrines will not be considered.275 Instead, two purposes are 
proposed. First, it is proposed to highlight briefly the type of conduct caught by 
equitable and, of less significance, common law doctrines claimed for unjust 
enrichment which is indeed tort-like in appearance. Secondly, it will be shown 
that such tort-like conduct gives rise to tort-like liability in the form of a 
remedial response aimed at returning a plaintiff to his or her status quo ante. 
Hence, the restitutionary remedies which characteristically follow the 
activation of the doctrines under consideration, it will be argued, are best seen 
as having a restorative purpose rather than being aimed at the disgorgement of 
benefits. As other remedies increasingly become available in response to 
doctrines commonly used to set aside transactions, the non-restitutionary 
purpose of such doctrines will become more evident.
Before we proceed to consider these two points, it should also be noted 
that not all cases of tort-like liability are concerned with transaction avoidance. 
For example, this writer has already described proprietary estoppel cases when 
activated by a defendant's acquiescence as examples of tort-like liability.276
& Jones, little effort has been made to apply unjust enrichment analysis in any rigorous way.
274 Beatson, 257, concedes that one of the challenges facing unjust enrichment is to 
"identify those equitable doctrines and remedies whose main underlying purpose is 
restitutionary." In this writer's view, such an exercise is fruitless, for in this context, it leads to 
doctrine excision. Even though a doctrine may characteristically give rise to a restitutionary 
remedial purpose, its purpose may be other than restitutionary, as evidenced by the availability 
of other remedial purposes to fulfil that doctrine's purpose. Hence, if unjust enrichment were 
adopted as an explanation, such doctrines would have to be dismembered according to 
whether in an individual case, the doctrine gave rise to a restitutionary or non-restitutionary 
response. See generally, § 4.4.3, and Finn, P.D., "Mr. Beatson's 'Unfinished Business'", 
Unpublished Paper, delivered to the Restitution Group, Society of Public Law Teachers 
Conference, Aberdeen, 1991.
275 Hence, the weighting of this chapter in favour of contract-like rather than tort-like
liability.
276 Though as was also noted, it is tort-like liability which may give rise to more than 
just compensatory (restorative) remedies. See § 6.1.2.
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Such other examples of tort-like liability will be noted when the variety of 
conduct which may be described as tort-like is considered below.
§ 6.3.2 Tort-Like Conduct
To describe conduct as tort-like obviously emphasises the affinity of 
such conduct with that which infringes duties in tort. Yet attempting to isolate 
the distinguishing features of tort law is no easy task. Fleming, amongst 
others ,277 has noted the difficulties in finding any satisfactory theory or 
theories of tort law and the "futility of seeking to impose a spurious unity upon 
a very complex congeries of problems/ ' 278 Put simply, tort law encompasses a 
variety of diverse duties infringed by a variety of conduct. Some torts are 
actionable per se, so that no actual damage need be shown for liability to arise. 
Nominal damages may be awarded for breach of such torts, which include 
trespass to land and defamation. But for our purposes, one of the principal 
aims of much of tort law is with the compensation of losses incurred as a result 
of a tortfeasor's conduct. Tort law, in its manifest and specific duties, indicates 
in which circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to claim compensation for losses 
by establishing some reason in law for shifting losses from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.279
Much of tort law proscribes deliberate conduct intended to harm 
another—conduct which can be described as wrongful and which thus generate 
a strong moral and legal basis for recovery.280 But conduct can also be 
described as wrongful where it is careless or irresponsible, involving 
unreasonable risk-taking or an unreasonable disregard for the consequences 
upon another of one's own action or inaction 281 Negligence is a prime example 
of such socially irresponsible conduct. One factor which may persuade us to 
view conduct as socially irresponsible is where a party is in a better position,
277 See generally, Keeton, W. Page, (ed.) Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed., 
1984), Chp. 1, (hereinafter: “Keeton"), and Heuston, R.F.V., & Buckley, R.A., Salmond and 
Heuston on the Law of Torts (19th ed., 1987), Chp. 2, (hereinafter: "Heuston & Buckley").
278 Fleming, 6. Others, who perceive that there may be some unifying principle 
running through the law of torts, nevertheless have difficulty in formulating such principles. 
See Keeton, 3, fnn. 8-9.
279 Supra n. 268.
280 See Keeton, 21-4, 608-9; Heuston & Buckley, 24-7.
28  ^ Such conduct need not reflect any malicious intentions on the part of the actor.
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vis-ä-vis the party ultimately harmed, to recognise and thus take steps to avert 
the risk of a particular harm.
Although a defendant's wrongdoing is not the only basis for the 
imposition of liability in tort—strict liability282 may attach to conduct which 
causes283 harm, even where the defendant has not acted wrongfully—for the 
most part, and perhaps increasingly so in Australia,284 tort liability attaches to 
conduct which can be characterised as wrongful. One particularly strong 
example of wrongdoing in tort is fraud. There are obvious parallels in equity. 
One of the remarkable features of much equitable doctrine is the pervasive use 
of the language of fraud (used in an expanded sense) to describe conduct of a 
defendant. But references to "fraud" ,285 "equitable fraud" , 286 or 
"unconscionable" or "unconscientious" conduct,287 are so widespread and 
used in such a variety of contexts that such references of themselves offer little 
guidance to characterising a defendant's conduct and the liability to which it 
gives rise as tort-like. Consequently, it is necessary to go beyond mere 
descriptions of conduct in the language of fraud in order to establish the types 
of conduct which can be described as tort-like.
§ 6.3.2.1 The essential characteristic of tort-like conduct
Perhaps one could encapsulate the essential characteristic of tort-like
282 The imposition of strict liability may be particularly appropriate where conduct 
has inherent risks, or alternatively where the gains of an activity flow to a defendant, so that 
such a defendant should appropriately also bear the costs of such conduct.
283 This is a legal conception and raises its own problems. Obviously, a question of 
causation involves certain policy and moral choices and thus provides flexibility even when 
considering the imposition of "'strict" liability. As Keeton points out, at 612, only "some among 
all the antecedents of a harm for which compensation is claimed will be separated out and 
treated as legally relevant causes."
284 The High Court appears to be limiting the possibility of strict liability, as 
evidenced by the view of the Court in Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 120 
A.L.R. 42, that the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, imposing strict liability, no 
longer operated in Australian law as a separate liability rule. The majority of the Court 
considered that the rule was absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence, subject to the 
possibility of liability in nuisance or trespass arising from a Rylands v. Fletcher situation.
285 As already noted, such language is particularly common in relation to equitable 
doctrine ameliorating the effects of unenforceability under the Statute of Frauds. But it is also 
commonly used in many other contexts. For example, in Symons v. Williams (1875) 1 V.L.R. 199, 
216, Barry J. considered that "[ujndue influence ... is in all cases bottomed in fraud."
286 See Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 125; 28 E.R. 82.
287 Stern v. McArthur (1988) 81 A.L.R. 463, 488, per Deane and Dawson JJ.
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conduct which activates equitable and common law liability rules within one 
general idea: that of abuse of power or position. The cases characteristically 
concern defendants in some superior position to that of the plaintiffs, 
possessing information not known to the other parties to a transaction (as in 
unilateral mistake cases), possessing some special knowledge generally, 
holding a position of trust or power, being aware of a particular vulnerability 
of the plaintiffs, or simply being in a better position vis-ä-vis the plaintiffs to 
avert harm. The concern of the doctrines under consideration is with 
defendants who fail to use (either actively or through inaction) in an acceptable 
way, that is, abuse, such power or position.
Typically, the cases under consideration concern defendants who fail to 
have due regard for the consequences of their actions on their "neighbours", 
that is, persons who are particularly vulnerable to harm should the defendant 
act or fail to act in an acceptable way. The "neighbourhood" idea, and related 
concepts such as "proximity" and "duty of care", are evident in the cases.288 
Other tort ideas are also emerging as important. As Finn has indicated, 
"liability limiting devices of risk allocation, volenti and the like are emerging 
(often under colourable guises) as available vehicles to blunt the otherwise too- 
unconstrained reach of equity."2883
In describing unconscionable conduct in its tort-like manifestations, Finn 
has summed up the burden of the cases as being that:
a party should not, for its own advantage, or to the other's detriment, 
use its superior relative power or position to exploit the vulnerability of 
the other, be this by positive acts of manipulation or through 
inaction.288*5
This may well prove a useful signpost to the circumstances in which 
tort-like liability generally may be imposed. As Finn notes, the abuse of power 
or position may take one of two forms: (1) positive acts of abuse, or (2) inaction, 
that is a failure to act in circumstances where there exists a duty to assist 
another. Equitable and common law liability rules and doctrines may be 
triggered by conduct of either type and it is proposed only to note some 
examples.
288 See Finn, P.D., "Unconscionable Conduct", Unpublished Paper delivered to QLD 
Law Society Symposium, 1994, at 7.
2883 Ibid, 9. 
288b Ibid, 11.
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§ 63.2.1.1 Conduct amounting to a positive abuse of power or position
(1) Conduct which amounts to an exercise of coercive pressure upon a 
plaintiff. Common law duress and actual undue influence—which in 
any case may nowadays "be one and the same phenomenon"289—are 
perhaps the most obvious exemplifying doctrines. Their concern is with 
the exercise of threats or pressure in respect of individual transactions 
where such threats or pressure both compels the will of the "victim" and 
is considered illegitimate by the law.290 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, 
even if duress is not of itself a tort, coercive conduct will usually infringe 
at least one of several economic torts, such as intimidation, if it has 
caused loss.291
(2) An abuse of power as exemplified by the second class of undue 
influence: presumed, or relational, undue influence, as it has been 
called.292 The concern of presumed undue influence is with particularly 
close relationships of dependence, such as those which come about 
through trust and confidence reposed by one party in the other, such 
that one party may have an ascendancy within that relationship and the 
other is to some extent peculiarly vulnerable to the former party's 
influence.293 Relations of influence can be seen as examples of fiduciary 
relationships,294 and a presumption of undue influence arises where a
289 Birks, 184. See also Hardingham, I.J., "Unconscionable Dealing" in Finn, P., (ed.) 
Essays in Equity (1985) 1, 23-4.
29  ^ See Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v. I.T.W.F. [1983] A.C. 360, 400 per Lord 
Scarman. See § 4.4.3.2.
291 § 4.4.3.2.
292 Birks, 184. See generally, 204-8.
293 Certain "well-known relations" (Johnson v. Buttress (1936) 56 C.L.R. 113, 134) are 
presumed to be ones of influence—doctor/patient, solicitor/client, and parent/child, to name a 
few—as a result of the trust and confidence that inheres in such relationships and the 
consequent "likelihood of the exercise of authority by the [ascendant] party over the other." 
See Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 386. Trust and confidence and the associated potential 
ascendancy of one party over another are also the gravamens of relationships which are 
proved, de facto, by the weaker party to be ones of influence by reference to the specific history 
and nature of the parties' relationship.
294 The close affinity of undue influence with fiduciary wrongs is obvious, and in 
Australian law, at least, relations of influence, whether presumed or proved de facto, have been 
equated with fiduciary relations. In Johnson v. Buttress (1936) 56 C.L.R. 113, 135, Dixon J. 
considered that in relations giving rise to a presumption of undue influence, the party holding 
a position of ascendancy
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transaction is entered by parties in such a relationship.295 In order to 
rebut a presumption of undue influence, a defendant must show that the 
transaction entered into "was the independent and well-understood act 
of a man in a position to exercise a free judgement based on information 
as full as that of the [defendant]".296 Hence, a defendant is required to 
act only in the interests of the reliant party in order to avoid a conclusion 
that the position of influence has not been abused. Unlike tort law 
generally, there is thus no need to prove wrongdoing; it is presumed. In 
this regard, undue influence goes well beyond core tort-law ideas, 
imposing what is almost a strict liability; but even here, there are tort 
law analogs, such as the notion of res ipsa loquitur in negligence.
(3) Misrepresentations, either fraudulent (at common law) or non- 
fraudulent (in equity)297 which induce another to enter a transaction.
falls under a duty in which fiduciary characteristics may be seen. It is his duty to use 
his position of influence in the interest of no one man but the man who is governed by 
his judgment, gives him his dependence and entrusts him with his welfare.
The doctrine of undue influence may then be seen as preventing but one possible type of abuse 
of a fiduciary relationship, though not all relations of influence can be classed as fiduciary 
relations and visa versa (for example, that of parent and child: Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 
391). In contrast with Australian trends, English law appears to be moving away from a 
"fiduciary" treatment of undue influence. See National Westminster Bank Pic v. Morgan [19851 1 
A.C. 686, which, with its emphasis upon the need for a "manifest disadvantage" before a 
presumption of undue influence arises tends to shift the emphasis away from the relational 
concerns of the operation of the doctrine. But see more recent decisions, cited infra n. 309. If a 
perception of undue influence as part of the general law of fiduciaries and fiduciary wrongs is 
valid, then unjust enrichment proponents may have to concede, as they have done in relation to 
fiduciary wrongs generally, that liability in such cases is not rooted in unjust enrichment but in 
the commission of the wrong, with benefit disgorgement being but one remedial option 
available to "right" that wrong. Stoljar makes the point forcefully in relation to fiduciary 
wrongs generally: "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603, 610.
295 Where the law perceives that a relationship of influence exists, then gifts conferred 
upon the ascendant party (or to a third party at the instance of that party), or contracts entered 
into with the party (or with a third party at the instance of the party), are presumed to have 
been conferred or entered into under the party's undue influence and can be impugned, unless 
that presumption is rebutted by showing that there was no undue influence.
296 Johnson v. Buttress (1936) 56 C.L.R. 113, 134-5. A number of considerations are 
relevant to discharging this onus. These have been fully canvassed elsewhere. See, e.g., 
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 393-6; see also Finn, P.D., Fiduciary Obligation (1977), 86, for a list 
of some of the factors considered relevant to determining whether the presumption has been 
rebutted.
297 At common law, only a fraudulent misrepresentation gives rise to a right to 
rescind the contract. Equity, however, has been prepared to order rescission of contracts 
induced by non-fraudulent (innocent or negligent) misrepresentations. See Goff & Jones, 184-5.
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Where representations are non-fraudulent, a party making such 
representations is effectively required to ensure the accuracy of 
statements made. Since the advantages of making the representations 
generally flow to the representer should they induce reliance, it seems 
reasonable to require such a party to bear the consequences of any false 
statements.298 The representer's positive act (in making the statement) 
misinforms the plaintiff and leads him or her to enter a transaction he or 
she otherwise would not have.
At times, positive abuses of power or position are motivated by 
dishonesty, such as a defendant's intention to deceive, defraud or mislead a 
plaintiff in order to seize an advantage. For example, a defendant may induce a 
plaintiff to enter into a contract with him or her by means of fraudulent 
misrepresentations. At other times, however, a defendant may merely have 
been careless or irresponsible in his or her actions, for example, where a 
misrepresentation is non-fraudulent.
§ 63.2.1.2 Conduct amounting to an abuse of power or position by inaction
(1) Conduct caught by equity's unconscionable dealing doctrine, 
activated where an individual transaction is entered as a result of a 
defendant unfairly take advantage of another's special or "serious 
disadvantage".299 The concern of the doctrine is to prevent a defendant 
exploiting the plaintiff's vulnerability in circumstances where a duty 
exists to ensure that the transaction entered by the plaintiff is "just, fair 
and reasonable".300
(2) Conduct giving rise to equitable relief for contracts entered into 
under a unilateral mistake, such as in Taylor v. Johnson.301 In that case, 
the purchaser of land set out "deliberately in the course of conduct 
which [was] designed to inhibit discovery" by the vendor of a serious
298 Cf. Redgrave v. Hurd (1880) 20 Ch. D. 1,12-3, per Jessel M.R., who justifies the right 
to rescind in cases of innocent misrepresentation in terms of wrongdoing, either for a 
defendant's failure to ensure its accuracy before making a statement intended to induce another 
into a transaction; alternatively, for a defendant's insistence on keeping a transaction once he or 
she knows that the representation which induced it was false.
299 See Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 C.L.R. 362, 405. See generally, Commercial Bank of 
Australia v. Amadio (1983) 46 A.L.R. 402, and Louth v. Diprose (1993) 110 A.L.R. 1.
300 Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio (1983) 46 A.L.R. 402.
301 (1983) 151 C.L.R. 422.
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mistake under which she was labouring as to the price payable.302 The 
mistake was not induced by the defendant but the defendant should 
have apprised the plaintiff as to her mistake.
(3) A defendant's acquiescence in another's detrimental reliance on a 
false assumption as to an existing or future interest in land, founding a 
claim in proprietary estoppel. To take one case, Denny u. Jensen,303 in 
which the plaintiff had improved the defendant's land in the belief that 
he had a contract to purchase the land. The court pointed out that 
neither party had "set out to take advantage of the other", but that the 
defendant "must have known" of the plaintiff's detrimental conduct and 
thus shared "the responsibility" for the plaintiff's detrimental reliance, 
because of his failure to alert the plaintiff as to the true position.304 In 
acquiescence cases, the parties are invariably in relationships of close 
proximity, where a defendant will have or ought to have known that the 
plaintiff was "likely" or "might well" undertake detrimental actions305 
which the defendant could readily avert. As a result, the defendant is 
under a duty to take reasonable steps to apprise the plaintiff of the true 
facts before any detrimental reliance occurs. In short, it appears in such 
cases that the "neighbourhood idea [is] most clearly at work."306 The 
significant difference in these acquiescence cases is that the courts are 
prepared to extend notions of duty of care to require positive actions on 
the part of a defendant, so that in effect, they are imposing a duty of 
rescue 307
302 Ibid, 433.
303 [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 635.
304 Ibid, 637-8. The court considered that the defendant had not made it sufficiently 
clear to the plaintiff that the arrangement between them was merely a tenancy and that no right 
to purchase the property existed.
305 See Gray, K., Elements of Land Law (2nd ed., 1993), 331, fnn. 13-4, citing cases such 
as Crabb v. Arun DC [1976] Ch. 179,198, per Scarman L.J.; J.T. Development Ltd v. Quin (1991) 62 
P. & CR. 33, 52 ff; and Salvation Army Trustee Co. Ltd v. West Yorkshire MCC (1981) 41 P. & Cr. 
179,194,196.
306 Cf. Finn, supra n. 288,16.
307 Cf. Finn, ibid, 7, writing generally in relation to unconscionable conduct in its tort­
like sphere of operation:
Where this moves beyond the domain of orthodox tort law is that (i) the duty of care,
commonly, is a duty to take steps to protect the other from himself or herself—a duty
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Again, as with a positive abuses of power, a defendant whose inaction 
triggers liability may have been acting dishonestly or fraudulently, or merely 
carelessly or irresponsibly. As proprietary estoppel cases show, at times, a 
defendant may be motivated by a dishonest "design" ,308 whereas at other 
times, a defendant may merely have been irresponsible or careless in allowing 
the plaintiff to incur foreseeable harm where the defendant could easily have 
averted such harm by apprising the plaintiff of the mistaken assumption under 
which he or she was labouring.
§ 6.3.3 The Tort-Like Nature of Remedial Responses: Returning 
Plaintiffs to Their Status Quo Ante
Most of the doctrines which encompass tort-like conduct of the type 
outlined above characteristically give rise to one remedial response: the 
rescission of transactions, be they gifts or contracts. If a transaction is set aside, 
restitutio in integrum follows, to return the parties to their previous position. 
This restitutionary remedy may explain the attempts to incorporate transaction 
avoidance doctrines generally within an unjust enrichment analytical 
framework, a position bolstered no doubt by the fact that in many of these 
cases the defendant will have been motivated by a desire to seize a material 
benefit from the plaintiff.309 But does this common restitutionary response
of rescue if you like; and (ii) the harm, the detriment, to be averted is characteristically 
purely economic.
308 Cf. Huning Ferrers (1711) Gilb. Rep. 85.
309 But this will not always be the case. For example, irresponsible or careless conduct 
giving rise to liability will generally not have been engaged in to obtain an advantage from the 
plaintiff.
In relation to some of these doctrines, there is debate as to whether the material outcome of a 
transaction entered into is a relevant, even decisive, consideration. For example, in relation to 
the presumption of undue influence, English courts have suggested that a material outcome is 
relevant in raising such a presumption. See National Westminster Bank pic v. Morgan [1985] A.C. 
686. Cf. Barclays Bank Pic v. O'Brien [1993] 3 W.L.R. 786, and C./.B.C. Mortgages Pic v. Pitt [1993] 
3 W.L.R. 802, particularly at 809, questioning the "limits of the decision in Morgan." Even on 
this approach, however, it is sufficient for the presumption to arise if there exists a material 
disadvantage to the weaker party; it appears that a material advantage to the dominant party is 
not a prerequisite: Morgan's Case, 703-7, per Lord Scarman. Although Lord Scarman indicates 
that "unfair advantage taking" of the party subjected to influence is the basis of the wrong, he 
makes it clear that any "sufficiently serious" disadvantage is the only prerequisite to the 
presumption of undue influence arising (704). The Australian courts have taken a different 
position on the relevance of material outcomes, instead emphasising matters of process in an 
inquiry as to whether any influence was unduly exercised. On this approach, an unfair material 
outcome, whether in the form of an advantage or disadvantage, merely operates as evidence to 
rebut or bolster the presumption and is not a prerequisite to its arising. See Johnson v. Buttress 
(1936) 56 C.L.R. 113,135-6, per Dixon J, and Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 392-3, citing other
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suggest that benefit disgorgement is the principal purpose of these doctrines? 
Given the analogies drawn with tort, one would not expect that benefit to a 
defendant is the precondition for liability,310 nor that benefit disgorgement is
Australian authorities contrary to the English position. Cf. Hardingham, supra n. 289, 4. See, 
however, James v. A.N.Z. Banking Group Ltd (1986) 64 A.L.R. 347,390.
310 Normatively, there appears to be little reason why, given that a defendant's 
conduct caused the plaintiff's loss, the receipt of a benefit should be a precondition for a 
defendant's liability. In tort, support for such a proposition can be found in moral theories of 
"corrective" justice. Numerous attempts have been made to explain all, or some, of tort liability 
on the basis of theories of corrective justice. For the most part, such theories
claim that the only necessary condition of liability is the causation of a wrongful loss....
Wrongful gain to the defendant is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition of
liability under this fault-based theory of corrective justice.
See Hurd, H.M., "Correcting Injustices to Corrective Justice" (1991) 67 Notre Dame L.R. 51, 64. 
Hurd considers theories by Holmes, Epstein, Fletcher, and Weinrib (see 56 for references). And 
such an approach seems intuitively correct—the defendant's wrongdoing has harmed the 
plaintiff (that is, upset the status of equality which is the concern of corrective justice) and thus 
a plaintiff is entitled to be restored to the status quo ante. One exception to this generally 
accepted view is provided by Coleman, who argues that an unjust gain is both sufficient and 
necessary for liability. As Hurd points out, however, Coleman appears to accept this as an a 
priori assumption, and never fully justifies it. See, e.g., Coleman, J., Markets, Morals and the Law, 
189 & 375-6, fn.16, where his response does not seem adequate. Although Aristotle's theory of 
corrective justice (Irwin, (ed.) Nicomachean Ethics, 125-6, paragraphs 1132a-1132b) seems to 
require both profit and loss, according to Aristotle, the mere infliction of a harm is a "profit", so 
that both a killer and someone who wounds another have profited by their actions. What is 
required in such cases, of course, is the repair of the damage, rather than "subtraction from [the 
offender's] profit" (126). Other expressions of Aristotle's views suggest that profit is not 
essential: "the law looks only at the ... equals, when one does injustice while the other suffers it, 
and one has done harm while the other has suffered it. Here the judge tries to restore this 
unjust situation to equality, since it is unequal" (125). This emphasises not the gain of the actor, 
but the injustice or harmful affects of his or her conduct.
Although theories of corrective justice are all concerned with "wrongdoing", it must be 
remembered that this term is not always pejorative. Even innocent tortfeasors are liable in torts 
for the damage they cause. So where a defendant has caused a plaintiff's loss (whether in a 
morally reprehensible way or not), there will be many circumstances in which one can say that 
the defendant should compensate the plaintiff, irrespective of any gains derived by the 
defendant. Clearly, causation is not on its own a sufficient ground to justify recovery. In 
theories of corrective justice, for example, there must have been a "wrongful" loss. The 
adjective "wrongful" separates out those cases in which recovery will be allowed from those in 
which it will not. Other factors need to be satisfied. But as the cases of tort-like relief show, such 
factors may be satisfied in ways other than the breach of tort duties.
For normative reasons, therefore, an enrichment should not be a precondition for legal liability 
in cases in which a plaintiff's loss is caused by "wrongful" conduct of a defendant. The 
remedial response to such conduct ought to aim at compensating losses rather than disgorging 
benefits. A recent case exemplifies the point. In Van den Berg v. Giles [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. I l l ,  the 
plaintiff (a tenant of the defendant) effected considerable structural alterations and 
refurbishments on the defendant's house (at a cost of $22500), in the belief that the defendant 
had agreed to sell the property to him. The defendant disputed the agreement and in any case, 
there was no written contract. Nevertheless, it was clear that the defendant had encouraged the 
plaintiff in his activity and that she was fully aware of the nature of the work and the plaintiff's
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the remedial aim of the liability rule. A closer consideration of the remedy of 
transaction rescission will support such a conclusion.
In most cases, the transactions which are sought to be set aside are 
contracts. It may be argued that the entry into any contract is of advantage or 
benefit to a defendant: that the plaintiffs contractual obligation to the 
defendant is of itself a benefit, irrespective, of whether that contract ultimately 
gives rise to a material advantage to that defendant, that is, irrespective of 
whether it is a "good" bargain.311 In fact, even if it is a "bad" bargain and 
results in a material disadvantage to the defendant, the contract itself may still be 
seen as a legal advantage. If we accept this view, then rescission of the contract 
may be said to amount to the "return" or specific restitution of the very thing 
the dominant party has received, the contractual rights held by that party.312 
Logically, such a view is persuasive. If, however, entry into the contract by a 
plaintiff is perceived to be of benefit to the defendant, then conversely, the 
submission by the plaintiff to the contractual obligation is of equal detriment to 
that plaintiff. Of course, this does not mean that the plaintiff need have suffered 
a substantive or material loss as a result of entry into the contract.313 So on the 
contract-as-benefit approach, gains and losses must always be equal—a zero 
sum—and the rescission of the agreement can equally validly be seen as a 
remedy which restores the plaintiff to his or her previous status quo. To describe 
the whole process of rescission as a case of reversing (unjustly gained)
motives for acting as he did. The court concluded "that the defendant deliberately misled and 
inveigled the plaintiff into spending very considerable sums of money on her property" (120). 
Yet despite this finding, the court awarded the plaintiff not his costs incurred, but the enhanced 
value of the defendant's property, that is, her enrichment. On the facts of the case, this was 
$20500, a minor difference in amount. Yet the principle is important, and if the enhanced value 
of the house had been, say, only $5000 (due to fairly idiosyncratic improvements, for example), 
an award of such a sum would appear unjust. A theory of corrective justice explains why. The 
defendant's unacceptable conduct has upset the previous status and caused the plaintiff harm. 
Such harm should be redressed irrespective of the defendant's gain or enrichment. See also 
Gamer, M., "The Role of Subjective Benefit in the Law of Unjust Enrichment" (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 
42, 51-2, and Birks, 275.
311 This view was first brought to my attention by R.A. Bigwood. See Bigwood, R.A., 
Fair Dealing in Contract Formation: An Analysis of Exploitation in the Procurement of Bargain 
Transactions (1993) Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Australian National University, 266-68. See 
Mason J. in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v. Amadio (1983) 151 C.L.R. 447, 464. Cf. Deane J. at 
489. See also Birks, 65-7,162-4,170-3.
312 Cf. Birks, id.
313 The doctrines under consideration may render a transaction voidable even if the 
plaintiff has entered a "good" bargain. The issue is one of procedural fairness—whether certain 
standards of acceptable conduct have been breached, which conduct induced the contract.
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enrichments is no more a valid conclusion than describing the whole process as 
restoring the plaintiff to his or her status quo ante, equating with the 
compensation of (unjustly incurred) detriment.
It is the latter description which ultimately appears to reflect the true 
concern of the courts. This is evidenced by a number of factors. First and 
foremost is the reasoning of the courts themselves. Where a contract is 
rescinded, the aim of the courts is to effect restitutio in integrum. As the High 
Court of Australia indicated in Alati v. Kruger:
the situation is such that, by the exercise of its powers, including the 
power to take account of profits and to direct inquiries as to allowances 
proper to be made for deterioration, [the court] can do what is 
practically just between the parties, and by so doing restore them 
substantially to the status quo314
Restitutio in integrum may be relatively easy to achieve where property 
has been transferred, for example, and still remains in the hands of the 
defendant. Similarly, money payments can usually be readily returned. But 
even where "precise restitution" 315 is impossible, where, for example, services 
have been performed, or complex multi-faceted transactions fully executed, the 
court will attempt to achieve practical justice between the parties, by utilising 
remedies such as the reasonable remuneration for work performed or the 
disgorgement of profits made under a contract.316
This desire to achieve practical justice between the parties might suggest 
that the focus of restitutio in integrum in this context is as much on the 
defendant as it is on the plaintiff. Such a conclusion would be misleading, 
however, as evidenced by an increasing trend toward compensatory damages 
being awarded against a defendant where restitutio in integrum is not possible 
or desirable. In the past, where restitutio in integrum was not possible, no other 
remedy was available.317 But there is a growing trend in the common law
314 (1955) 94 C.L.R. 216, 223-4, per Dixon C.J., Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ. As Goff & 
Jones, 199, note, however, "[t]he principle is easier to state than to apply in practice."
315 Goff & Jones, 198.
316 As in O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Ltd [1985] Q.B. 428, in which the 
fully executed contract entered into under undue influence was rescinded, an account of profits 
was rendered, but the defendant was granted an allowance of reasonable remuneration for the 
work performed.
317 See generally, Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co. (1878) 3 App.Cas. 1218,1278, 
per Lord Blackburn.
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world toward damages being an available remedy in response to a number of 
equitable doctrines previously limited in their remedial armoury to the 
rescission of transactions. These trends are consistent with the view of Davies J. 
in the Federal Court of Australia in Federal Airports Corporation v. Makucha 
Development,318 who spoke of a "general principle of equity that a court may 
relieve against the detriment caused by unconscionable conduct". This view is 
given weight by the High Court's use of "unconscionability" as a cause of 
action, as well as the increasing remedial flexibility in equity generally.319 
Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Verwayen,3^9a the majority of the High Court was 
prepared to award damages in estoppel. In Canada, the courts appear 
prepared to award "damages" for undue influence320 or unconscionable 
conduct, for example, in cases in which no rescission of the transaction is 
possible,321 or even where no transaction in the form of a gift or contract was 
ever entered 322 Although such an approach has been questioned in relation to 
undue influence,323 it does not seem odd and indeed has some force, if one 
perceives undue influence as but an exemplification of fiduciary
318 (1993) 115 A.L.R. 679,698.
319 See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, and Muschinski v. Dodds 
(1985) 62 A.L.R. 429. In New Zealand, a damages remedy would almost certainly be available 
in equity, given the views expressed in a number of recent decisions. See, e.g., Aquaculture 
Corporation v. New Zealand Green Mussell Co. Ltd [1990] 3 N.Z.L.R. 299, and Mouat v. Clark Boyce 
[1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 559, 569.
319a (1990) 95 A.L.R. 321.
320 This would take the form of a compensatory remedy to recover losses arising from 
the transaction entered into.
321 Treadwell v. Martin (1976) 67 D.L.R. (3d) 493, followed by the Court of Appeal of 
British Columbia in Dusik v. Newton (1985) 62 B.C.L.R. 1, 48. The links of undue influence with 
both fiduciary wrongdoing and underlying notions of unconscionability suggests that such a 
remedy will be available in Australia when required.
322 E.g., Norberg v. Wynrib (1992) 92 D.L.R. (4th) 449, in which equitable damages were 
awarded against the doctor of the plaintiff who had sexually exploited her; and K.M. v. H.M. 
(1992) 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289, in which damages were awarded against a parent who had sexually 
molested his child, in order to protect the non-economic interests of the child against abuse by a 
fiduciary.
323 Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 397, who state in relation to Treadwell v. Martin 
(1976) 67 D.L.R. (3d) 493, that "[elquity rescinds transactions vitiated by undue influence. 
Neither it nor the common law gives damages in respect of such complaint." Given the 
wrongful conduct, there is also normative justification for requiring a defendant to bear any 
losses. See, however, Cheese v. Thomas [1994] 1 F.L.R. 118, an undue influence case in which 
losses incurred upon the rescission of the contract were shared between the defendant and 
plaintiff. With respect, in the writer's view the decision is not justifiable.
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wrongdoing324 so that consequently the full range of remedies available for 
fiduciary wrongdoing ought generally be available.
Such trends toward remedial flexibility in equity appear to be gaining 
momentum. In Australia, at least, the mood has been captured by statute, in s. 
51AA of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Cth) which proscribes corporations in 
trade or commerce325 from engaging "in conduct that is unconscionable within 
the meaning of the unwritten law". Consequently, a wide range of remedial 
response under Part VI of that Act are available against corporations engaged 
in unconscionable conduct. Leaving these statutory developments aside, it 
appears increasingly likely that compensation will be available for breach of 
many equitable duties where rescission (that is, specific restitution) is not 
possible or desirable. But this suggests that even where restitution is awarded 
in response to, say, undue influence or unconscionable conduct, the principal 
remedial purpose of such an award is restorative, not benefit disgorgement.326 
If no benefit has been received, such as where a plaintiff, say, enters into a 
contract with a third party as a result of a defendant's tort-like conduct, a 
compensatory remedy may in any case still be available.327
324 Albeit this is a specialised kind of fiduciary wrongdoing in which a certain 
capacity or opportunity to influence exists.
325 These terms are broadly defined within the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
326 To counter the view that compensation to restore a plaintiff to his or her previous 
position is the principal concern of transaction avoidance doctrines, it may be argued that the 
very recentness of these developments toward remedial flexibility and their still quite uncertain 
status suggests that compensation was never previously the aim of these equitable doctrines. 
Where, in the past, restitutio in integrum was not possible, then no remedy was available and 
plaintiffs would have to bear any losses themselves. Two responses can be made to such an 
argument. First, although it is true that if damages were unavailable, a plaintiff would have had 
to bear any losses where restitutio in integrum was not possible, equally, a defendant would 
have been allowed to retain any gains, despite the obvious "unjustness" of their acquisition. 
Secondly, the unavailability of a damages remedy may be a consequence of the historical 
development of the doctrines themselves and of the remedial restrictions existing generally in 
equity. If this is so, then modem trends toward remedial flexibility may provide a clue as to the 
real concerns of these doctrines. Will the courts generally award compensatory damages, in lieu 
of rescission, or limit recovery to the disgorgement of benefits? Australian and Canadian 
developments suggest the former. The point is made by Finn, supra n. 274, 4-5, in relation to 
unconscionable dealing:
The unconscionable dealings doctrine, because of its presently limited remedial 
capability, may, despite its obvious purpose, have the appearance of a restitutionary 
doctrine. But if it is to have the capacity to realise its purpose in fact [preventing abuse 
of power], what is required is a tort-like power to award damages for loss.
327 See discussion of duress, § 4.43.2. In such a case, unjust enrichment would be 
shown to be utterly inapplicable. No material or other benefit, such as a right to enforce a 
contract, can be said to have passed to a defendant, unless the third party's relationship with
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§ 6.3.4 Conclusion: Tort-Like Liability
The concepts and ideas of tort are pervasive throughout much of equity 
and the common law where rules are activated by tort-like conduct of a 
defendant causing harm. Moreover, such concepts and ideas are entirely 
appropriate, given that the types of conduct which activate such liability rules 
share considerable affinity with the types of conduct caught within mainstream 
tort. Thus "fraud", "unconscionability", "foreseeable harm" and "duty of care" 
are obviously appropriate tools to determine the sorts of issues confronted by 
the courts. The fact that such inquiries often occur in the context of transactions 
which are sought to be rescinded ought not obscure this fundamental point. It 
is particularly where rescission of a transaction is not possible, or where a 
benefit has not been conferred upon a defendant (but where liability is still 
sought to be imposed), that the value of such tools becomes obvious.
By way of contrast, to utilise unjust enrichment in circumstances of tort­
like conduct simply does not enlighten us. Unjust enrichment asks the wrong 
questions, particularly by commencing with an inquiry as to whether a 
defendant has been enriched. To take one example, raised by the Canadian case 
of Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Canada,328 in relation to compulsion. In that 
case, the municipality sought to recover payments it had been compelled to 
make to a third party under an (as it turned out) ultra vires statutory provision of 
the Canadian government. The Supreme Court of Canada rightly concluded 
that the government had not benefited as a result of the municipality's 
payments, the government being under no obligation to make such payments 
itself, so that consequently, no duty owed by the government had been 
fulfilled. Recovery was thus not allowed. But to deal with an issue of 
compulsion in this way is to suggest that a compelling party can only ever be 
liable in law where that party has benefited. This, with respect, seems incorrect,
the defendant is such that some of the third party's benefits redound to the defendant. Only if a 
plaintiff's accession to the defendant's demands is deemed to be of benefit could unjust 
enrichment apply, but such a benefit seems very tenuous (and difficult to value) and would 
appear to be no more than a contrivance to sustain the unjust enrichment analysis. If rescission 
of the contract with the third party is possible, then such compensatory remedies may not be 
necessary. Such rescission will be available where the third party is an accessory to the 
defendant's wrongdoing or knows or had reason to know of it. If a plaintiff conferred a gift 
upon the third party who still has the plaintiff's property or retains money that is still traceable, 
there is a strong case to be made that such property or money should be returned, even where 
the third party was quite innocent of any wrongdoing by the dominant party to the 
relationship. The issue is considered further in Chapter 9.
328 (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140.
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as the discussion of duress in Chapter 4 has already suggested.329 Instead, Peel 
v. Canada raises fundamental issues of public policy, in particular, the extent to 
which a government in performing its functions, outside of its legal powers, 
can be held liable in tort for losses incurred as a result.330 Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court precluded an in-depth consideration of this rather topical 
issue331 by concluding at the outset that an action in tort was not available.332
329 §4.43.2.
330 The case really seems to raise two fundamental issues. First, the one already noted, 
namely, the extent to which tort liability attaches to illegal government actions causing harm. 
This is a topical question in public law. See, e.g., Northern Territory v. Mengel (1994) 95 N.T.R. 8, 
the judgments of both Priestley and Angel JJ. Determination of this issue is ultimately 
dependent upon general public policy concerns. The second fundamental issue is that of the 
extent to which the demand made by the government in Peel v. Canada equated with ultra vires 
provisions imposing taxes. Rather than tax the municipality and use the revenue to make the 
desired payments, the government had instead short-circuited such a process and directed the 
municipality to make the payments to the third parties. If the former approach had been 
adopted, the issue would have been whether and in which circumstances such invalid taxes 
should be recoverable (presuming the provisions imposing taxes also to be ultra vires). See 
generally Air Canada v. British Columbia (1986) 30 D.L.R. (4th) 24, and Woolwich Building Society 
v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [19921 2 All E.R. 737.
331 See discussion, ibid.
332 98 D.L.R. (4th), at 144.
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Chapter 7
COMMON INTERESTS: The 
Consequences of Unprovided For 
Contingencies
[Where money or other property is paid or applied on the basis of some 
consensual joint relationship or endeavour which fails without attributable 
blame, it will often be inappropriate simply to draw a line leaving assets and 
liabilities to be owned and borne according to where they may prima facie lie, as 
a matter of law, at the time of the failure.1
§7.1 INTRODUCTION
As was observed in Chapter 6, much of Restitution is concerned with 
liability imposed as a result of particular conduct of a defendant, which 
conduct often exhibits many of the characteristics of conduct giving rise to 
liability in contract or tort. In such cases, liability in Restitution may be seen as 
filling gaps arising from the failure of contract or tort doctrines to encompass 
such conduct. Yet other concerns are also addressed by liability rules in 
Restitution, and it is to one of these concerns that we now turn.
Where parties share a common interest in a matter (the nature of which 
interest will be considered below), in many cases events take their expected 
course, relationships achieve their goals, plans come to fruition. But where a 
contingency, perhaps not foreseen, but in all cases not provided for,2 affects the
1 Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429,454, per Deane J.
2 Parties may have foreseen events, but did not provide for them, either because they 
were considered too remote or because they did not apply their minds to the question of how to 
deal with such circumstances. Even where the particular event is a clearly foreseeable outcome 
(such as the eventual break-up of a "rocky" marriage or de facto marriage), the parties may 
have deliberately avoided turning their minds to a mutual consideration of the consequences of 
such an outcome.
Even where events follow their expected course, this need not result in all of the parties' 
expectations being fulfilled. Expectations may be based on unrealistic assumptions, for 
example, such as where a party enters into a particularly bad, imprudent or foolish bargain, or
matter in which the parties have a common interest—a de facto marriage 
breaks down, a ship is wrecked at sea, or a contract is frustrated—it may result 
in "gains and losses [which] are haphazard, uncontemplated, and the product 
of chance" * 3 to one or both parties. The question then arises as to whether any 
legal interference with the status quo after the contingency is warranted. Of 
course, if the parties have provided for the contingency which arises, having 
assumed, expressly or impliedly,4 the risk of its consequences, then the law will 
generally respect the assumption of risk. Similarly, where a party has engaged 
in wrongful conduct, or was at fault in some way, that party may be held fully 
responsible to bear all losses or give up all benefits arising from the conduct or 
fault. Such cases, however, are not within the province of this chapter.5
alternatively, events may not have taken a hoped-for course. As has been pointed out in the 
context of contract, by Kull, A., "Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract 
Remedies" (1991) 43 Hastings L.J. 1,1-4, mistake and frustration are "endemic" to the bargain
transaction. "Every agreement is to some extent 'frustrated' in that the precise cost and value of 
either side's performance can never be known in advance. We form contracts in the knowledge 
that our information is imperfect". Although this is accepted as an "inevitable incident of every 
contractual exchange", the "risk of such disparity is usually allocated by the express or implied 
terms of the contract." Thus, though the final outcome may not itself have been what the 
parties expected, in most cases it will nevertheless have been arrived at in a way which was 
within the contemplation of the parties.
3 Beatson, 80.
4 By means of some contract or agreement, for example, but such assumption of risk 
must cover the actual contingency which has arisen.
5 In such cases, a reason exists for shifting the losses or benefits. Cf. Fried, C, Contract 
As Promise, (1981), (hereinafter: "Fried"), 70:
In benefit and harm [principles] the predicate for shifting a burden or an advantage is 
the responsible act of one of the parties. Such responsibility may arise out of 
culpability—including negligence—a voluntary act, or a prior assumption of 
responsibility, as by a contract.... [I]n some situations [however] there may be no basis 
for holding the parties responsible or accountable to one another. Rather, persons in 
some relation, perhaps engaged in some common enterprise, suffer an unexpected loss 
or receive an unexpected gain.
Cf. Kull, supra n. 2, 4. Where a contingency arose because of the fault of one of the parties, such 
fault must usually be actionable to give rise to obligations justifying a shifting in total, losses 
and benefits. In the contractual sphere, such fault would normally amount to a breach of 
contract and consequently there will be no difficulty in determining how losses and benefits 
should be allocated. A particularly interesting contract case, however, is that of Albre Marble & 
Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co., 155 N.E. (2d) 437 (1959), in which the court proceeded upon the basis 
that the contract had been "frustrated", but nevertheless held the defendant to be liable for 
losses incurred as it was to some extent at "fault" in that its "involvement in creating the 
impossibility was greater than that of its subcontractors [the plaintiff]" (440). Yet this fault was 
not sufficient to be actionable as a breach of contract and did not preclude a finding that the 
contract was "frustrated".
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Where unprovided for contingencies have resulted in haphazard losses6 
and benefits7 to parties with a common interest, the law commonly resorts to a 
principle of sharing, encapsulated by the phrase that there be an "equality of 
burden and benefit",8 to adjust the parties' respective positions. But "equality" 
here does not necessarily connote equal sharing. Different parties may have 
disproportionately contributed to the matter in which they share a particular 
common interest. To divide losses and benefits equally in such cases may not 
be a particularly appropriate response, for "to treat as equal that which is 
unequal ... may be a very odious form of discrimination."9 And nor does the 
law respond in such a way. Instead, a presumption of "equality" generally 
results in a proportional distribution of losses and benefits, a proportionality 
determined by the parties' contributions to the matter in which they have a 
common interest. For example, if two co-sureties (co-sureties, it will be seen, 
share a common interest) have guaranteed a debt to $10,000 and $5000 
respectively, clearly their respective interests in the matter are 
disproportionate, and moreover, can be measured in clear numerical terms. 
Consequently, this writer uses the language of the principle of "just sharing", 
rather than the language of "equality". The former appropriately encompasses 
notions of parties' just deserts, or what they might reasonably be entitled to 
expect, given their contribution to a common interest.
Before we consider in detail the context and scope of its operation, it is 
useful to exemplify the idea of a principle of just sharing by reference to one 
area of law—the division of losses and benefits upon the premature dissolution 
of partnerships or joint ventures10—where such a principle operates
6 As Kennedy, D., "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. 
L.R. 1685,1717, points out, "[s]haring may also involve participation in another's losses".
7 Such losses and benefits are not measured as against parties' pure expectations, such 
as under a contract, for example, since the particular contingency will have prevented the 
parties pursuing their interests to a satisfactory conclusion. In contract, the parties' expectations 
are unfulfilled precisely because of a frustrating event, so that no further performance on the 
part of either party toward completion of the contractual obligations is possible or necessary.
8 See Houston v. Bain, 196 S.E. 657 (1938), citing Wayland v. Tucker, 50 Am. Dec. 76. See 
also Deering v. The Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 270, 274, and Ellesmere Brewery Co. v. 
Cooper [1896] 1 Q.B. 75, 80-1.
9 Neave, M., "Living Together—The Legal Effects of the Sexual Division of Labour" 
(1991) 17 Monash U.L.R. 15,17, quoting O. Kahn-Freund, (1971) 4 Human Rights J. 493, 510.
10 Some joint ventures are partnerships, but not all. A joint venture has been defined 
in Brian Pty Ltd v. United Dominions Corporation Ltd [1983] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 490, 506, per Samuals 
J.A., quoting from Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts (3rd ed., 1959), 555-6, as:
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unequivocally. It must be stressed that while the rules governing dissolution of 
partnerships and joint ventures are not claimed for unjust enrichment or 
Restitution, such rules do illustrate the ideas which operate in other areas of 
law claimed to be unjust enrichment-based, which areas will be considered 
further below.
Where a partnership or joint venture prematurely is dissolved without 
"attributable blame" of any party ,11 the prima facie position, as in cases of 
ordinary dissolution, is that losses and benefits of the partnership or joint 
venture at the time of the dissolution are distributed according to the parties'
an association of persons, natural or corporate, who agree by contract to engage in 
some common, usually ad hoc undertaking for joint profit by combining their 
respective resources, without, however, forming a partnership in the legal sense (of 
creating that status) or corporation; their agreement also provides for a community of 
interest among the joint venturers each of whom is both principal and agent as to the 
others within the scope of the venture over which each venturer exercises some degree 
of control.
On appeal in the High Court, (1985) 157 C.L.R. 1,10, see per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ.:
As a matter of ordinary language, [joint venture] connotes an association of persons for 
the purpose of a particular trading, commercial, mining or other financial undertaking 
or endeavour with a view to mutual profit, with each participant usually (but not 
necessarily) contributing money, property or skill. ... The borderline between what can 
properly be described as a "joint venture" and what should more properly be seen as 
no more than a simple contractual relationship may on occasions be blurred.
The indicia of partnership, by way of contrast, are generally stated in terms of parties carrying 
on business in common with a view of profit. See Fletcher, K.L., Higgins & Fletcher The Law of 
Partnership in Australia and New Zealand (6th ed., 1991) Chp. 2, (hereinafter: "Fletcher"); and 
TAnson Banks, R.C., Lindley and Banks on Partnership (16th ed., 1990) Chp. 2, (hereinafter: 
"Lindley & Banks"). It is often a failure to satisfy the second requirement of carrying on 
business in common which distinguishes a joint venture from a partnership. "It is the mutuality 
of rights and obligations that is so crucial to the existence of a partnership" and which will be 
lacking in joint ventures in which parties pursue their own several interests and goals, though 
within a common scheme in relation to a particular project. See Griggs, L., "Joint Ventures, 
Partnerships and Fiduciary Obligations" (1994) Q.L.S.J. 77, 78-9.
11 Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429,454, per Deane J.
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agreement.12 Where parties have not agreed as to the appropriate consequences 
of dissolution, however, to simplify the position somewhat, debts owed to 
outside creditors (that is, losses) are shared proportionally according to the 
proportion in which profits were to be distributed; any residue above initial 
capital contributions is shared in the same proportion; and finally, capital 
contributions are returned, again proportionally, according to each party's 
initial contribution.13 In short, the parties are required to share losses and 
benefits proportionally according to their input into the relationship and their 
expected benefits from the relationship.14 The effect of the application of these 
rules is clear: parties in partnerships or joint ventures cannot individually profit 
at the expense of, or be required individually to bear losses for the benefit of, 
the partnership or joint venture as a whole.
In both partnerships and joint ventures, the requirement that losses and 
benefits be shared by the parties is an aspect of the parties' joint interests 
deriving from their association for the purposes of a particular project. Indeed, 
in the case of partnerships, the parties share mutual interests, meaning that all 
parties must serve the interests of the group as a whole and are thus not free to 
pursue without restriction their several interests.15
12 Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429, 454-5, per Deane J. See also Corpus Juris 
Secondum, Vol. 48A, 452-3, 463. The dissolution of partnership is governed by the various 
Partnership Acts in Australian States and the United Kingdom. A similar rule of equity applies 
to joint ventures which are not partnerships. The position under the Partnership Acts merely 
encapsulates the pre-existing common law (or more accurately, equitable) position. The 
relevant section of the various State Acts in Australia is derived from the United Kingdom 
Partnership Act 1890, s. 44, which itself follows almost word for word the statement of the 
common law found in the 5th edition of Lindley on Partnership, 402, the seminal text on the 
topic. See Lindley & Banks, 641, fn. 15. For a case pre-dating the Partnership Act 1890, see Lyon v. 
Tweddell (1881) 17 Ch. D. 529, 531, per Jessel M.R.:
[I]t is the duty of the court when dissolving a partnership on equitable grounds to 
decide upon what fair terms the dissolution should be made. ... [I]t is the duty ... to do 
what is equitable between the parties.
13 See s. 44 of the NSW and United Kingdom Partnership Acts. This position is similar 
to that governing dissolution in the ordinary course of events. The courts may also apportion 
equitably any premium paid on entry into a partnership. Even before the Partnership Acts, the 
courts were prepared to apportion pre-payments or premiums upon frustration, so that strict 
common law rules applicable to the frustration of ordinary contracts were not applicable to 
partnership. Cf. Atwood v. Maude (1868) 3 Ch. App. 369.
14 Of course, in applying such a general principle, detailed rules have developed to 
take into account the myriad of possible fact variations which may arise. See, for example, the 
rule in Garner v. Murray [1904] 1 Ch. 57, and the divergence of opinion as to the method of 
application of the rule. See Fletcher, 256, fn. 307.
15 Cf. Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 130.
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However, the operation of a principle of just sharing is not limited to 
parties who share mutual or joint interests. The notion of a common interest, 
sufficient to give rise to a principle of just sharing, is a broad one. The essential 
feature distinguishing relationships in which parties can be said to have a 
common interest appears to be that such parties share a purpose or are 
pursuing the same hoped-for outcome, so that any contingency adversely or 
propitiously affects the prospects of achieving such a purpose or outcome. 
Parties with a common interest share in a "community of interest" ,16 as it so 
aptly has been described, and stand in a closer relationship than that which is 
shared "in the abstract relation of fellow citizens" ,17 at least in relation to the 
matter forming the subject of their common interest. Such a relationship is 
clearly evident in partnerships and joint ventures.
Other examples of parties with common interests include those who 
enter into relationships of marriage or de facto marriage to pursue co­
operatively common domestic, social and economic goals. Each party usually 
enters into such a relationship to fulfil his or her individual needs, but through 
the pursuit of common goals by pooling resources (financial or otherwise) with 
another, modifying behaviour, forgoing other opportunities, and so on. A very 
different type of relationship which nonetheless similarly exhibits a 
modification of behaviour by parties to pursue a common interest is a 
contractual relationship.18 Parties to a contract come together to pursue their 
several interests by means of the (hopefully) fruitful completion of a 
transaction.19 Relationships of these kinds, where parties have deliberately and 
actively come together to pursue certain goals, will be called common
16 Goff & Jones, 301.
17 Fried, 73. At 72, Fried has said in relation to parties standing in a contractual 
relationship:
By engaging in a contractual relation A and B become no longer strangers to each other. 
They stand closer than those who are merely members of the same political 
community. ...[T]hey are joined in a common enterprise, and therefore they have some 
obligation to share unexpected benefits and losses in the case of an accident in the 
course of the enterprise.
See also Kennedy, supra n. 15,1717-8.
18 Clearly then, the notion of a common interest is broader than the notion of a joint 
venture as, of course, most contractual relationships are not joint ventures. See infra n. 132.
19 See Fried, 72. In most cases, contracts are pursued by all parties in the belief that 
completion of the contract will benefit each of them. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the exchange 
would have occurred.
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endeavours. This is a term of convenience which describes cases in which 
parties share a close relationship, as opposed to other types of common 
interests. At its broadest, the notion of parties sharing a common interest 
encompasses even parties not pursuing a common endeavour, but who simply 
have assumed a common risk in relation to a matter. A common interest may 
be discernible even amongst strangers, such as where co-sureties unbeknownst 
to each other have a common interest in their principal debtor's satisfaction of 
his or her debt;20 or where individual cargo owners, strangers to each other, 
have a common interest in the safe voyage of a ship on which their cargo is 
carried. In such examples, it is merely circumstance which "unites" the parties.
Since the concern is with parties who are completely blameless in respect 
of the losses and benefits at issue, and since there are no assumptions or 
allocations of risk to protect or enforce, justification for adjusting parties' 
positions by the application of a principle of just sharing must lie elsewhere. 
Such justification lies with the parties' common interest and the community of 
interest to which it gives rise. It would seem inappropriate that an individual 
should suffer for the advantage of the "community" as a whole, or profit at the 
expense of the community as a whole. Precisely because contingencies or 
accidents might affect all parties, but in the circumstances have fortuitously 
resulted in losses and benefits being disproportionately distributed, we as 
members of a community might be entitled to expect to share such losses and 
benefits. This is an "unavoidably normative" determination21 based on what 
reasonable persons in the community are entitled to expect from their fellow 
members of the community. As Fried points out in relation to the frustration of 
contracts,
[sjince actual intent is (by hypothesis) missing, a court respects the 
autonomy of the parties so far as possible by construing an allocation of 
burdens and benefits that reasonable persons would have made in this 
arrangement. ... "Reasonable" parties do not merely seek to accomplish 
rational objectives; they do so constrained by norms of fairness and 
honesty 22
20 Of course, in most cases, co-sureties will be aware of each other's commonly 
undertaken obligation and may even be joined on the same instrument.
21 Fried, 73.
22 Id. Such an allocation must be made on the basis of principles external to the 
intentions of the parties, as they have not provided for the contingency which has arisen. 
However, we can still look to any agreement of the parties (where they are in a consensual 
relationship) to determine what is reasonable in the circumstances, so that one "treats the 
[agreement] as a kind of charter or constitution for the parties' relation." Cf. Fried, 73. For a
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As we have already seen, a policy choice in favour of a principle of just 
sharing has been made by the law in relation to partnerships and joint 
ventures. There are, however, other possible ways in which the law could 
respond to losses and benefits resulting from unprovided for contingencies. For 
example, losses and benefits could be left to lie where they fall,23 so that an 
individual may indeed be left to suffer for the common good, or be allowed to 
benefit at the expense of the community. This was the initial response of the 
law to the frustration of contracts. The undeniably harsh consequences of such 
an approach has led to its amelioration by the application of restitutionary 
remedies, so that benefits gained at another's expense are required to be 
disgorged, leaving losses alone to lie where they fall.24 This latter solution is 
one which follows from an unjust enrichment approach to this type of 
problem .25 Interestingly, where a party's benefit corresponds with a loss of 
another party, restitution in such circumstances does equalise the parties' losses 
and benefits.26 But where losses and benefits do not correspond (for example, 
only losses have been incurred), focusing purely on benefits is arbitrarily to 
draw a line which leaves part of the problem unaddressed. Such a solution 
seems inappropriate as contrary to what reasonable persons are entitled to
summary and discussion of Fried's views, see Trebilcock, M.J., The Limits of Freedom of Contract 
(1993), 141-6.
23 Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493. Note the response to this solution by Fried, 65- 
6: "The reasons why some losses are shifted and others not are as various as the law itself, but 
there must be reasons. Letting the loss lie where it falls is not an argument, a reason; at best it 
restates one possible conclusion of an argument." For well-articulated reasons for letting losses 
and benefits lie in the contractual context, see Kull, supra n. 2, whose views are discussed infra 
n. 135.
24 See, for example, the discussion in Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] 
A.C. 32, in the context of frustrated contracts, as to the common law's incapacity to provide 
remedies to effect the sharing of only losses. Such a view, however, seems to ignore the 
doctrines to be considered below, as well as a willingness by the courts to require losses to be 
shared under frustrated partnership agreements, even before the Partnership Acts were passed. 
See Higgins & Fletcher, (4th ed., 1981), 214-5.
25 See Stewart, A., & Carter, ]., "Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The 
Case for a Reappraisal" (1992) 51 C.L.J. 66, who advocate such a view.
26 Thus, where A pays B $1000, as a pre-payment under a contract which is 
subsequently frustrated before either party has incurred any further costs under the contract, 
restitution of the money would effectively distribute equally losses and benefits resulting from 
the frustration. Thus a money had and received award is one possible remedial mechanism for 
giving effect to a principle of sharing.
276
expect where they share a common interest, and generally,27 the courts do not 
apply such a one-sided solution in other areas of law and have accepted a 
principle of just sharing.28
Let us turn now to a consideration of the operation of the principle of 
just sharing within specific areas of law. Historically, a principle of sharing 
'"burdens and benefits" has been accepted in a number of areas of law and has 
been justified by appeal to broad equitable notions. More recently, the principle 
is being utilised to provide solutions to new problems. Topics to be considered 
are: (1) the maritime law of general average contributions; (2) rights of 
contribution arising amongst co-sureties, and parties in similar relationships; 
and (3) property disputes arising from the break-up of domestic 
relationships.29 A fourth area, the frustration of contracts, will also be 
considered. Although the principle has not been consistently applied in 
contract cases, the results of many of the cases are consistent with such a 
principle. Further, in some jurisdictions, legislative initiatives have adopted the 
approach suggested in this chapter. It will be argued that the frustration of 
contracts raises problems sufficiently similar to other cases in which 
unprovided for contingencies impinge upon parties with a common interest. 
Consequently, it will be argued that the same underlying rationale for legal 
intervention—the principle of just sharing—is equally as applicable as in those 
other areas of law,30 and that the law is moving toward the acceptance of such 
a policy choice.
§ 7.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE PRINCIPLE: General Average 
Contribution in Maritime Law
The doctrine of general average contribution in maritime law is of 
ancient lineage; its origins can be traced back to Rhodian law of as early as 1000
27 See, however, the discussion of frustration of contract, § 7.5.
28 A similar policy choice, between sharing losses amongst the community or allowing 
individuals to suffer for the community as a whole, has been faced in other areas of law as well. 
See, for example, developments in tort law in colonial Australia: see Finn, P., Law and 
Government in Colonial Australia (1987) 110.
29 The discussion will mostly be limited to de facto relationships, for reasons which 
will be outlined below.
30 See Fried, 69-73; and Kennedy, supra n. 6,1718.
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B.C.31 The doctrine applies where a ship carrying cargo faces a danger or 
emergency32 necessitating the sacrifice33 of some of that cargo or part of the 
ship,34 or the incursion of "extraordinary expenditure" ,35 for the purpose of 
safeguarding the "common maritime adventure". If as a result of such a 
"general average act", as the sacrificing conduct is called,36 at least part of the 
endangered property is thereby preserved, the law requires all parties to 
contribute to losses incurred by the "sacrificing owner" .37 Of course, the 
sacrificing owner will rarely have acted personally; the actions will usually 
have been carried out by the master of the ship, who, if acting reasonably and 
in the interests of the voyage as a whole, is authorised to take appropriate steps 
to safeguard the voyage, including by engaging in sacrificing conduct.38 The
3* See Pirie & Co. v. Middle Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.J. 426, 429; Simonds v. White (1824) 2 B. 
& C. 805; Aitchison v. Lohre (1879) 4 App.Cas. 755. See also Wilson, D.J., & Cooke, J.H.S., Lowndes 
& Rudolf: The Law of General Average and York Antwerp Rules (11th ed., 1990), 13, (hereinafter 
"Wilson & Cooke").
32 As to which, see Goff & Jones, 338-9, for the types of perils sufficient to trigger the 
jurisdiction. There must have been an "imminent and real danger" for there to have been a 
sufficient emergency.
33 The sacrifice must be genuine, in the sense that it must not involve merely the 
jettison of property already destroyed or irretrievable, for example, and the sacrifice must have 
been incurred voluntarily: Pirie & Co. v. Middle Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.J. 426.
34 Sacrifice includes damage sustained to the ship. See, e.g., The Seapool [1934J P. 53, 
and Birkley v. Presgrave (1801) 1 East 220.
35 "Extraordinary expenditure" includes contractual obligations reasonably incurred, 
so long as they are a "direct consequence" of the act giving rise to a right to general average 
contribution: Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v. Green [1971] 1 Q.B. 457, 481. See also 
Wilson & Cooke, generally at A68-A95, and Goff & Jones, 337-8. The cost of repairs, including 
temporary repairs, necessary for completing a voyage are subject to general average 
contribution: Marida Ltd v. Oswal Steel [1994] 1 W.L.R. 615.
36 For some definitions of "general average act", see Australian Coastal Shipping v. 
Green [1971] 1 Q.B. 456, 478-9. Lord Denning cites the York Antwerp rules (internationally 
agreed rules which seek to standardise the law of general average) as one definition:
There is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety
for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime
adventure. (1950, rule A).
37 In relation to an individual item of cargo, who bears the risk of the loss of that cargo 
will depend on any contractual relationship governing such cargo. The risk of the loss may lie 
with a buyer or a seller, or an insurer, for example.
38 The Seapool [1934] P. 53, 64. As to whether a general average act must have been 
authorised by the master, see Goff & Jones, 339.
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losses incurred as a result of the general average act39 must be contributed to 
proportionally by all those involved in the concern,40 including the "owners" of 
the losses. The contributions of the parties are determined in accordance with 
the respective assumed value of all cargo, the ship and sacrificed property and 
expenditure 41 The sacrificing owner is also entitled to a lien over any goods 
saved 42
The underlying rationale for the right to contribution is usually stated in 
the broadest of terms. In the words of Watkin Williams J.,
[i]t is a law founded upon justice, public policy and convenience, and 
rests ... upon reasons which are so obvious that it is not surprising to 
find that it is older than any other law or rule in force ... 43
These "obvious" reasons, however, are usually vaguely stated: the 
doctrine is said to rest on "foundation[s] in the plainest equity" and the 
"dictates of natural justice" 44 It is clear, though, that the rule is not dependent 
upon any contract, express or implied, between the parties,45 although most
39 Known as a “general average loss", a definition of which was provided by 
Lawrence J. in Birkley v. Presgrave (1801) 1 East 220, 228-9: "All loss which arises in consequence 
of extraordinary sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the preservation of the ship and cargo 
come within general average, and must be borne proportionally by all those who are 
interested." Such losses must not have been incurred as the result of any negligence or 
actionable fault on the part of claimants, who will have to bear such losses themselves. An 
example of this might be where a claimant is a shipowner whose ship was unseaworthy. See 
Schloss v Heriot (1863) 14 C.B. N.S. 59. Cf. Strang, Steele & Co. v. Scott & Co. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 
601.
40 This includes "all persons who chance to have an interest on board of a ship at sea 
exposed to some common danger threatening the safety of the whole": Pirie & Co. v. Middle 
Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.J. 426, 428-9.
4  ^ This is as at the time the journey is completed, or, where the journey is not 
completed, at the point at which the journey is broken, rather than at the commencement of the 
journey, "so that the owner of the thing lost or damaged may be put in the same position as he 
would have been in if the sacrifice had not been made": Goff & Jones, 341-2
4  ^ Through the agency, for that purpose, of the ship's master: Strang, Steele & Co. v. 
Scott & Co. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 601.
43 Pirie & Co. v. Middle Dock Co. (1881) 44 L.J 426, 429.
44 Strang, Steele & Co. v. Scott & Co. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 601,608.
45 See, e.g., Burton v. English (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 218, per Brett M.R.; Milburn v. Jamaican 
Fruit Importing Co. [1900] 2 Q.B. 540, 546, 550. Note the brief flirtation with an implied contract 
theory in Wright v. Marwood (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 62, 67, and Anderson v. Ocean Steamship Co. (1884) 10 
A.C. 107,115.
279
charter provisions include general average clauses, which reflect the almost 
universal acceptance of the rule.46
Although it has been said that the doctrine is based on notions of unjust 
enrichment,47 its very operation, in providing for the proportional sharing of 
losses, militates against such an explanation.48 Instead, the doctrine can be seen 
as the earliest manifestation of the principle of just sharing between parties 
linked by a common interest, where losses have arisen as a result of an 
unprovided for contingency. For we are dealing with parties who are all 
concerned in a common adventure, with common goals (the safe carriage of 
their cargo) and who are exposed to a common risk 49 Where the parties have 
not made provision for the sort of emergency which triggered the general 
average act,50 the law prescribes that the burden arising from the emergency be 
shared, proportionally, according to the parties' contribution to the venture. As 
William J. has said:
it would be unjust that the goods of one should be sacrificed for the
46 Castle Insurance v. Hong Kong Shipping Co. [1984] A.C. 226,233.
47 Goff & Jones, 334. Some support for this view may be derived from the language of 
the courts, which have at times made reference to the benefit conferred upon the defendant. 
See, e.g., Morrison Steamship Co. v. Greystoke Castle [1947] A.C. 265. The term "benefit", however, 
appears to be used in such cases merely to indicate that the plaintiff has incurred losses for the 
general good of the voyage and for the defendant in particular. In any case, even if it could be 
said that a defendant has benefited, such benefit does not determine the measure of any 
recovery. See infra n. 48.
48 The clear purpose of the rule is to partially indemnify plaintiffs for their losses. 
Although the liability attaches to the saved property of the defendant (so that the general 
average act must at least have been partially successful) the indemnity does not equate with 
any enrichment received, however that term is defined. For example, if cargo owner A has half 
of its $1 million cargo jettisoned, in order to successfully save a ship owned by B (worth $1 
million) and cargo owned by C (worth $1 million), both B and C may be required to pay one 
third of A's losses. Yet if the sacrifice prevented the loss of the entire ship and cargo, then 
surely B and C have been saved $1 million each. Alternatively, it is entirely speculative to 
attempt to calculate the value of any property of B or C that would have had to have been 
sacrificed if A's cargo had not been jettisoned. Such analysis seems entirely unnecessary if one 
rejects unjust enrichment as an explanation of recovery. And to argue that the parties have been 
enriched according to their proportional share of the losses is to presume an obligation to share 
according to such proportion. This does not illuminate the basis of that assumption. See § 4.3.3.
49 Cf. Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 A.L.R. 285, 319.
50 The parties are always free to expressly or impliedly allocate the risks of the 
consequences of an emergency. An implied allocation of risk may be assumed where "risk and 
benefit are not in fair proportion": Wright v. Marwood (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 62, 67. In that case, it was 
held that deck cargo (cattle) was not subject to the right to contribution, as it was "dangerous 
cargo, certain to be jettisoned owing to the facility of doing it when cargo under hatches would 
not be."
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benefit of all, and that one alone should be sacrificed for the benefit of 
all, and that one alone should suffer for the common safety.51
It is from this ancient doctrine that the principle of sharing of burdens 
and benefits originated, a principle of sufficiently strong appeal that it has been 
fostered by equity and spread to other areas of law.
§ 7.3 THE WIDER OPERATION OF THE PRINCIPLE: The 
Doctrine of Contribution
Contribution amongst co-sureties is founded in natural justice and the equitable
principles of equality of burden and benefit 52
Largely a "child" of equity,53 the doctrine of contribution has a long 
history54 and has manifested itself in a number of fields: the law of sureties and 
guarantees, insurance law and land law. The basic operation of the doctrine, as 
well as the inappropriateness of an unjust enrichment explanation of it, are 
matters considered previously in Chapter 4, and it is not proposed to dwell on 
these at the present juncture. The important point to be made for our current 
purpose is that the underlying rationale of the doctrine of contribution is the 
principle of just sharing of (in these cases) losses,55 upon the occurrence of an 
unforeseen contingency affecting parties with a common interest.
To take co-sureties as an example, the parties' common interest is readily 
identifiable where co-sureties have jointly undertaken their obligations on the 
same instrument. It could even be said that in such a case their relationship 
amounts to a common endeavour, the parties having together expressly
51 Hallett v. VJigram (1850) 9 C.B. 580; 137 E.R. 1018,1029. There are also strong public 
policy grounds for the law of general average. The rules allow the masters of ships the freedom 
to take whatever reasonable steps are necessary, without taking business considerations into 
account, to safeguard the ship and its cargo. See, e.g., Montgomery & Co. v. Indemnity Mutual 
Marine Insurance Company [1902] 1 K.B. 734, and Australian Coastal Shipping v. Green [1971] 1 
Q.B. 456,475 in arguendo.
5  ^ Houston v. Bain, 196 S.E. 657 (1938), citing Wayland v. Tucker, 50 Am.Dec. 76.
53 Though note the right of contribution amongst co-sureties at common law (see Goff 
& Jones, 307) and its origins in maritime law. See infra n. 54.
54 See Albion Insurance Co. v. GIO o/N.S.W. (1969) 121 C.L.R. 342, 350, per Kitto who 
considers that the doctrine's origins lie in general average contribution in maritime law.
55 The duty being one to "divide and equalise any loss" of a party who has paid a 
disproportionate amount of the principal debtor's debt: American Jurisprudence (2d) Vol. 74,144.
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undertaken the common risk of the principal debtor's capacity satisfactorily to 
meet his or her obligations. One could perhaps even imply a term into the 
parties' agreement to justify the imposition of an obligation to contribute, 
where there is no express term to this effect on the basis of fact.56 Of course, 
where the parties have provided for the contingency, such as where they have 
modified the right to contribution by express agreement or by implication, such 
allocations of risk are given effect by the courts.57
Where co-sureties were not aware of other co-sureties having 
undertaken a like obligation,58 an analysis of their relationship as a common 
endeavour is not appropriate. Nevertheless, the parties still clearly share a 
common interest, not because they have expressly undertaken the obligation 
together, but because circumstances have dictated that they each share in the 
"common risk" .59 In the words of Eyre L.C.B., "they are joined by the common 
end and purpose of their several obligations, as much as if they were joined in 
one instrument."60 Although it may not be until after a creditor has called upon 
a surety to pay a debt that such "sacrificing" party realises that the burden has 
been borne exclusively and for the benefit of the other parties, the doctrine of 
contribution still operates.
The unprovided for contingency in such cases is not the failure of a 
principal debtor to meet his or her obligation, for this is the very exigency all 
the co-sureties have jointly or individually contracted to meet. Instead, the 
unprovided for contingency arises from the unforeseen context in which a
56 If the parties were asked at the time they entered into the contract whether they 
should be entitled to contribution from the other sureties if one of them were required to repay 
the whole debt, all parties would almost certainly answer "yes, that goes without saying, we all 
expect to pay equally." A term to this effect might be implied. Compare this with the implied 
contract approach adopted in some cases. See Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 
270; 126 E.R. 1276, and Cornfoot v. Holderson [1932] V.L.R. 4, 8. See also Council of Windsor v. 
Enoggera [1902] St.R.Q. 23, 80. But cf. Morgan Equipment Co. v. Rodgers (1993) 32 N.S.W.L.R. 467: 
the rights of co-sureties are now "substantially equitable rather than contractual."
57 The parties are free to modify the rights to contribution by mutual agreement. 
Sureties can, for example, waive their right to contribution, or defer it. It is not possible, 
however, for sureties to unilaterally limit rights of contribution against themselves. See Hong 
Kong Bank of Australia v. Larobi (1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 593, and Fisher, S., "Suspension of Co- 
Surety's Right of Contribution" (1992) 7 B.J.I.B. & F.L. 231.
58 It need not be exactly the same obligation, for example, as where co-sureties have 
guaranteed a debt to different amounts. The suretyship must, however, relate to the same debt.
59 Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 A.L.R. 285.
60 Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 270.
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debtor's failure to meet the obligation occurs: that there are other co-sureties 
who have undertaken the same risk and that the creditor has failed to share the 
burden of the debt proportionally amongst all of them.61 A co-surety meeting a 
disproportionate share of the burden is entitled to seek from other co-sureties 
contributions to the payments made. Where co-sureties have guaranteed a debt 
to different amounts, then the right to contribution will arise proportionally, 
according to the sums guaranteed.62 Consequently, the obligation springs not 
from a notion of "equality in its simplest form, but what has been sometimes 
called proportionable equality/ ' 63
The rationale for the doctrine of contribution has always been stated in 
the broadest terms, to be "founded in equality" ,64 or in the words of the High 
Court, on "principles of natural justice."65 Not surprisingly, given such flexible 
statements of principle and their intuitive appeal to fairness, the doctrine of 
contribution extends beyond the law of guarantees, to insurance law (requiring 
contributions from co-insurers),66 and even to land law (contribution from
61 At times, it has been sought to justify the doctrine of contribution on the basis of the 
creditors' inequitable exercise of their legal rights, by enforcing disproportionate contributions 
from co-sureties. See Mahoney v. McManus (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 673, 680 per Brennan J. Support for 
this view may be found in Stirling v. Forrester (1821) 3 Bli. 575; 4 E.R. 714, 717. Such an argument 
does not indicate, however, why rights to contribution should then exist against co-sureties, 
with no corresponding rights against the creditors, and why such rights arise even where a 
surety simply pays a greater proportion of the debt in order to discharge it, without legal action 
or threat. Brennan J. appears to accept these difficulties in Mahoney's case. The fact is, the 
creditor "is not bound to take any steps to distribute the burden among the sureties": McLean v. 
Discount Finance (1939) 64 C.L.R. 312, 328, per Latham C.J. Consistently with his or her rights 
under the contract with the co-surety, a creditor is entitled to seek payment from only one 
party.
62 See, e.g., Albion Insurance Co. v. GIO (1969) 121 C.L.R. 342, 350; Ellesmere Brewing Co. 
v. Cooper [18961 1 QB. 75, 80, and Godin v. London Assurance Comp. (1758) 1 Burr. 489, 97 E.R. 
419, per Lord Mansfield.
63 Steel v. Dixon (1881) 17 Ch.D. 825, per Fry J. For example, where three sureties have 
guaranteed a debt to limits of $1500, $1000 and $500, then any final payment by one of them 
will have to be borne by the sureties in a ratio of 3: 2:1.
64 Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 270; 126 E.R. 1276, 1285. See also 
Albion Insurance Co. v. GIO (1969) 121 C.L.R. 342, 350; Ruabon Steamship v. London Assurance 
[1900] A.C. 6, per Lord Redesdale; Exchange Elevator Co. v. Marshall, 22 N.W. 2d 403 (1946), 410.
65 Mahoney v. McManus (1981) 55 A.L.J.R. 673, 676. The Roman maxim cjui sentit 
commodum, sentire debet et onus (he or she who enjoys the benefit ought also to bear the burden) 
has also been cited as a justification for the doctrine and this might be seen as a reference to 
unjust enrichment notions. See, e.g., Shelley's Case (1579-81) 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 99; 76 E.R. 206; 
Deering v. Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 2 Bos. & Pul. 270, 274; and Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 
A.L.R. 285, 319.
66 In insurance cases, in order "for a contribution claim to succeed, there must be a 
common peril and the policies must cover the same interest in the same property": Goff &
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parties having a common interest in realty).67 All these topics exemplify the 
principle of just sharing.
§ 7.4 NEW APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE: Property 
Disputes Upon the Breakdown of Domestic Relationships
[A general principle of equity] operates in a case where the substratum of a joint 
relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the 
benefit of money or property contributed by one party on the basis and for the 
purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the 
other in circumstances in which it was not specifically intended or specially 
provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is 
that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain 
the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable 
for him so to do.68
Where a joint relationship of two persons in a domestic arrangement, 
such as a married couple, ends, the legal system is often called upon to resolve 
disputes as to the ownership and respective rights of the parties to property 
and assets of one or both parties. Where a couple have never legally married,69
Jones, 320. In Godin v. London Assurance Comp. (1758) 1 Burr. 489, 97 E.R. 419, the plaintiff, who 
was doubly insured, was nevertheless entitled to recover the full amount from one insurance 
company, though he was not entitled to recover more than the losses actually suffered by 
suing both insurers. Notwithstanding the fact that contractually, each insurer was bound to pay 
the whole loss suffered, which ever one was sued was entitled to contribution from the other. 
And the result seems sensible. For although both had insured against a particular event and 
that event had occurred, only one insurer had found itself bearing the anticipated loss, whilst 
the other was left free of any liability, but for the obligation to contribute. Their common risk 
assumption provided the link justifying that the losses should be borne equally.
67 See Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 A.L.R. 285, 319. In an old case, Webber v. Smith 
(1689) 2 Vern. 103, 23 E.R. 676, several sub-lessees paid the full rent owed by all the sub-lessees 
in order to avoid forfeiture and were entitled to contribution from those other sub-lessees. 
There may also exist a right to contribution where the purchase price of land is provided by 
only one of several purchasers of the land, but such a right to contribution will not arise where 
it is clearly "contrary to the intentions of the parties at the time when the joint obligation was 
undertaken": Coulls v. Bagot's Executor & Trustee Co. Ltd (1966-7) 119 C.L.R. 460, 488, per Taylor 
and Owen JJ. See also Gadsden v. Commissioner of Probate Duties [1978] V.R. 653.
6^ Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429,455, per Deane J., who considered that this 
principle also finds expression in the common law, in the count for money had and received, 
and in the frustration of contracts. See 454-5.
69 This prevents the courts from according the parties the status of marriage, even 
where the relationship has all the hallmarks of marriage. See Peart, N.S., "A Comparative View 
of Property Rights in De Facto Relationships" (1989) 7 Otago L.R. 100, 101, and cases cited fn. 
13. See also at 132, where Peart states that the courts have "repeatedly declined" to equate de 
facto relationships with legal marriages. Nevertheless, the practical results of the legal
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by choice, or because of some practical or legal impediment, the courts often 
cannot turn to wide discretionary powers such as those granted in matrimonial 
legislation in Australia70 and elsewhere to resolve property disputes. Arguably, 
given the broad social policy issues raised, legislation may well be the most 
appropriate means of resolving disputes arising from breakdowns in de facto 
marriages.71 But where no such legislative provisions govern, the courts must 
instead utilise and develop common law and equitable rules and principles.72 
Consequently, in order to highlight these common law and equitable 
developments, the focus, in Australian law at least, will largely be on cases of 
de facto "marriages", by which term it is intended to include "all relationships 
which resemble marriage" .73 In O' er  jurisdictions, however, common law
resolution of de facto property disputes appear not dissimilar to cases in which a couple were 
legally married. In particular, the courts appear to be moving towards a distribution of the 
benefits and burdens arising from a relationship proportionally, according to the parties 
contributions towards that relationship. Cf. Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 24-5, 
(Supreme Court of Canada). See further below.
70 See the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s. 75. The High Court has recently confirmed the 
"unfettered nature" of this discretion in Mallet v. Mallet (1984) 52 A.L.R. 193.
71 And in New South Wales, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the 
Northern Territory, de facto property legislation has been enacted which gives the courts wide 
discretionary powers to resolve property disputes arising from the breakdown of such 
relationships. See, e.g., the De Facto Relationship Act 1984 (N.S.W.), and an example of its 
application in Brown v. Byrne (1986) D.F.C. 95-061. See generally Chisholm, R., Jessep, R., & 
O'Regan, S., "De Facto Property Decisions in NSW: Emerging Patterns and Policies" (1991) 5 
Aus. Jo. of Fam. Law 241. These Acts do not extend to homosexual couples sharing a domestic 
status akin to marriage.
72 This is not to suggest that legislative developments and the policies engendered 
therein may not have a marked effect on the development of common law principles. Statutory 
developments may provide a guide to changing community values, for example, although the 
very fact that a particular legislative scheme has not been extended to de facto relationships 
may be of significance.
73 Adopting the definition of Parkinson, P., "Doing Equity Between De Facto Spouses: 
From Calverley v Green to Baumgartner" (1988) 11 Adel. L.R. 370. Such relationships may, of 
course, like marriages, vary greatly in their nature and the extent of the integration of the 
parties lives and commitment to each other. For some relevant considerations in determining 
whether a relationship is in the nature of marriage, see Narev, I., "Unjust Enrichment and De 
Facto Relationships" [1991] 6 Auck. U.L.R. 503, 525-7, and Rotherham, C.I., "The Contribution 
Interest in Quasi-Matrimonial Property Disputes" (1991) Cant.L.Rev. 407, 424. The definition is 
intended to include homosexual relationships which exhibit the hallmarks of a marriage. See 
Narev, 505, fn. 6. Cf. Peart, supra n. 69, fn. 1. Under the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (N.S.W.), 
"de facto relationship" is defined as "the relationship between de facto partners, being the 
relationship of living or having lived together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic 
basis although not married to each other": s. 3. For judicial definitions of the term "de facto 
relationship", see, e.g., Re Lambe (1981) 38 A.L.R. 405.
The fact that sexual partners are also co-habitees need not necessarily suggest the relationship
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rules may still govern disputes between previously married couples, or may 
have done so until quite recently.74 Such cases will also be considered. It will be 
argued that the burden of the case law, as evidenced by developments in a 
number of jurisdictions,75 suggests a growing acceptance of the principle of just 
sharing as the best non-legislative mechanism for distributing (usually) the 
benefits of a relationship upon its failure.
It is appropriate first to outline the nature of a "typical" domestic 
property dispute. Such disputes arise where a couple separate after several 
years co-habitation, with the legal title to most of the property used or acquired 
in the course of the relationship76 vested in one party only (often the male), 
though both parties will have made substantial contributions to the 
relationship as a whole. These contributions may take the form of money, home 
improvements, domestic services, labour in general, child minding services, 
emotional support and other sacrifices or forgone opportunities. As a result,
[t]he essential question which confronts the court in such cases is 
whether a remedy, either personal or proprietary,77 should be provided 
to a person who has made contributions to family resources.78
Legal recognition of the need for intervention where a joint domestic 
relationship has failed requires the development of a principled basis for relief, 
the results of which are seen to be just and capable of reasonably certain 
application.79 This is not an easy task, however, given the widely varying
is akin to marriage. Perhaps one of the most significant features is the pooling of financial and 
other resources and assets in an integrated way. Where this does not occur and the parties have 
kept their financial lives clearly separate, the relationship may not be akin to marriage, nor 
amount to a common endeavour, at least in relation to the pursuit of financial goals. See further 
below, n. 88.
74 See, for example, the Canadian case, Rathwell v. Rathwell (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289. 
Even where statutory schemes have been introduced, the common law rules may still be of 
considerable importance. See, e.g., Rawlukv. Rawluk (1990) 65 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
75 The approach adopted here is in the nature of a synopsis of developments in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, to a much lesser extent, England.
76 As to which see below.
77 It is not proposed to discuss the appropriate form of recovery in this chapter; the 
concern is with the basis of liability and the appropriate measure of any recovery.
78 Neave, M., “Three Approaches to Property Disputes" in Youdan T.G., Equity, 
Fiduciaries and Trusts (1989), 251.
79 Cf. Scane, R.E., “Relationships Tantamount to Spousal', Unjust Enrichment and
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nature of the relationships and disputes in question. Domestic disputes do not 
readily lend themselves to formulistic solutions, unless the courts are prepared 
to ignore the myriad of possible factual variations which provide the contexts 
for such disputes. Consequently, applications of any legal principles tend to be 
uncertain and highly contextual.80 These difficulties are evidenced by the wide 
variety of legal responses to the problem in different jurisdictions, at least in 
terms of the stated reasoning of the decisions.81 It will be argued, however, that
Constructive Trusts" (1991) 70 Can. B. Rev. 260, 261-2.
80 Cf. Toohey J., in Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 88. Cf. Peter v. 
Bebloio (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 13, per McLachlin J. (La Forest, Sopinka and Iacobucci JJ. 
concurring): "[TJhe courts should exercise flexibility and common sense when applying 
equitable principles to family law issues with due sensitivity to the special circumstances that 
can arise in such cases."
81 In Australia, the High Court has utilised equitable notions of unconsionability to 
impose a trust where it would be unconscionable for a defendant to deny a plaintiff's interest in 
particular property. This is an extremely broad notion. Significantly, however, the court has 
openly recognised that the underlying rationale for such a finding of unconscionability is the 
failure of the parties' joint endeavour, giving rise to unforeseen gains and losses. The High 
Court's approach will be explored further below, but its essence can be distilled from 
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, and the judgment of Deane J. in Muschinski v. 
Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429.
In Canada, the courts are prepared to impose a constructive trust over property owned by a 
defendant in favour of a plaintiff, or alternatively, award monetary compensation to a plaintiff, 
on the basis of unjust enrichment. See Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, and Sorochan 
v. Sorochan [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38. For a general consideration of the Canadian approach, see Scane, 
supra n. 79. An "enrichment" may be established by the plaintiff's direct or indirect 
contributions to particular property (Peart, supra n. 69, 120), or to the relationship generally, 
where the contributions are not "property related" (see Everson v. Rich (1988) 53 D.L.R. (4th) 
410, particularly 473-5, and Herman v. Smith (1984) 34 Alta. L.R. (2d) 90). The "unjustness" of 
that enrichment is established by showing that the contributions were not intended as a gift, 
that the plaintiff had some "reasonable expectation" of a share in the assets of the relationship 
and that the defendant "freely accepted" such contributions: Pettkus v. Becker, at 274. See also 
Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1. Significantly, however, the Canadian courts have 
largely ignored the conceptual strictures and frameworks they themselves have placed upon 
the concept of unjust enrichment. In fact, a conceptually consistent unjust enrichment approach 
would probably not provide any guidance or assistance in many cases of de facto property 
disputes. This is discussed further below, nn. 109-17 and text thereto.
In England, the House of Lords, in Pettit v. Pettit [1970] A.C. 777, indicated that for a plaintiff to 
claim any share in the defendant's legally owned property, an implied or express agreement or 
"common intention" to that effect had to be discernible. But such an "intention" may be 
inferred from the parties' conduct. One method in which a common intention as to a share in 
the property may be shown is where one party has made a "'substantial' financial contribution" 
towards family expenses. See Burns v. Burns [1984] 1 All E.R. 244, 252, 265. In Burns v. Burns, 
the de facto wife made contributions to the relationship for 12 years, but was denied any 
interest in the family home because her contributions were largely of a non-financial variety. As 
the result in Burns v. Burns itself demonstrates, the English approach has reflected a far more 
conservative leaning by the judiciary, so that arguably the principle of sharing has not yet been 
recognised in that jurisdiction. Contrast, however, the far more liberal approach of Lord
287
the practical consequences of applying these different legal responses to the 
facts of the cases tend to be very similar, such that the courts in different 
jurisdictions may in fact all be "driving in the same direction", as Cooke P. put 
it in Pasi v. Kamanaß2 This direction, it is suggested, in Australia, New Zealand
Denning, in Eves v. Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338, and Cooke v. Heade [1972] 1 W.L.R. 518, and the 
views of Lord Diplock and Lord Reid in Pettit v. Pettit, who considered that the parties would 
in most cases simply not have turned their minds to such issues and that instead, "[t]he Court 
would have to decide what the common intention of reasonable spouses would have been if 
they had addressed their minds to their respective proprietary rights" (823, 795, and see Peart, 
supra n. 69, 106). The views of Lord Diplock and Lord Reid, that a "common intention" could 
be imputed, did not have the support of the majority of the House, however, and Lord Diplock 
has since modified his views in Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886, accepting that a "common 
intention" could at most be inferred from the parties' conduct. See Peart, at 106. With respect, 
the English emphasis upon parties' common intention asks the wrong question. The problems 
in domestic property disputes arise because the contingency (the failure of a relationship) has 
not been provided for: the parties have not expressed any clear intentions on the matter. By 
asking how the parties have provided for the contingency can only lead to a preservation of the 
status quo.
In New Zealand, the basis of recovery is said to rest on the "reasonable expectations" of the 
parties. The appropriate test is said to be "whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the 
claimant would have understood that his or her efforts would naturally result in an interest in 
the property": Pasi v. Kamana (1986) 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 417,419. Significantly, however, "relief may be 
given even if neither of the parties actually had given any thought to the question of respective 
individual legal entitlements during the relationship": Rotherham, C , "The Redistributive 
Constructive Trust: Confounding Ownership with Obligation" [1992] Cant.L.Rev. 84, 92. It has 
been said by the Court of Appeal that such a principle of "reasonable expectations" underlies 
all the different doctrinal approaches evident in different common law jurisdictions. See infra n. 
82, and see also Gillies v. Keogh [1898] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327, 331, per Cooke P.: "Whatever legal label 
or rubric cases in this field are placed under, reasonable expectations in the light of the conduct 
of the parties are at the heart of the matter." It is clear from cases such as Gillies v. Keogh that 
"reasonable expectations" are intended to refer to what the parties are reasonably entitled to 
expect rather than any actual expectations which are reasonable.
82 (1986) 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 417. In the view of Cooke P.:
I respectfully doubt whether there is any significant difference between the deemed, 
implied or inferred common intention spoken of by Lord Reid and Lord Diplock [in 
Pettit v. Pettit] ... and the unjust enrichment concept used by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Unconscionability, constructive or equitable fraud, Lord Denning's "justice 
and good conscience" and "in all fairness": at bottom in this context these are probably 
different formulae for the same idea ... I think we are all driving in the same direction.
Some support for the views of Cooke P. may be derived from the views of Toohey J. in 
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 87, who considered that there was little 
difference at a practical level between two doctrinal approaches: "The notion of unjust 
enrichment ... is as much at ease with the authorities and is as capable of ready and certain 
application as is the notion of unconscionable conduct." Cf. Peart, supra n. 69,121,126-7. Such 
a view may be accurate if one accepts that both doctrines give effect to an underlying rationale 
of the sharing principle arising from, in these cases, the failure or breakdown of a common 
endeavour, such that although the labels adopted are quite different, "unjust enrichment" and 
"unconscionability" in fact disguise similar results. It will be argued below, however, that if 
unjust enrichment is applied with conceptual rigour, it fails to provide any ready solutions to 
the types of problems raised by de facto property disputes.
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and Canada, though perhaps not in England,83 is towards an acceptance of a 
principle of sharing burdens84 or, more usually, benefits proportionally 
according to each party's contributions to a relationship.85 The results of many 
of the decisions in cases of domestic disputes are largely consistent with the 
application of such a principle.
In Australia, such results are being achieved by resort to notions of 
unconscionability, whereby
[e]quitable intervention is based on the principle that the failure of the 
enterprise makes it unconscionable for one partner to retain the benefit 
of contribution made for its purpose.86
83 In England, the courts have been far less ready to liberalise the basis for recovery, 
and consequently, relief tends to be circumscribed within the narrow confines of the need to 
show a "common intention". See, e.g., Burns v. Burns [1984] 1 All E.R. 244, noted supra n. 81. 
This suggests that the English courts have not yet consistently given effect to a principle of 
sharing in determining the property rights of domestic partners. Some decisions, however, are 
consistent with the principle. See Eves v. Eves (1975) 1 W.L.R. 1338, for example. Cf. Peart, supra 
n. 69, 140, who concludes that Cooke P.'s views are an accurate summation of the different 
developments in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and England, but adds that England is "in 
the slow lane".
84 Burdens include debts in the name of only one party, but incurred for the benefit of 
the relationship. The recognition that losses may be incurred in the course of the relationship 
which are losses of the relationship as a whole and not just one party (even if in only one 
party's name), suggests that one party cannot simply claim an asset of the relationship without 
contributing to such losses. This ensures that creditors are given priority ahead of both parties 
to the relationship where a debt was integrally linked to the relationship. This may also shed 
some light on the question of the appropriate form of recovery, suggesting that a constructive 
trust ought not necessarily follow a finding that a plaintiff has a claim against the defendant.
85 See Rotherham, supra n. 73, in which the author calls for the open recognition of the 
"contribution" interest. This is an excellent summary of the practical effects of the relief granted 
in different common law jurisdictions and this writer has drawn liberally on the ideas outlined 
therein. Rotherham also points to the problems which stem from the various doctrinal vehicles 
utilised to achieve the results they do without openly acknowledging the underlying principle 
of recovery. Giving recognition to parties' contributions to a relationship also has the support of 
Neave, supra n. 78, though she considers that unjust enrichment may be the best way of 
achieving this. Cf. Parkinson, supra n. 73, 372, who considers that the "common thread" of 
three High Court decisions (Calverley v. Green (1984) 56 A.L.R. 483; Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 
A.L.R. 429; and Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75) "is that the remedies will 
coincide more or less with the financial contributions of the parties" (emphasis added). The 
High Court in Baumgartner, however, suggested that non-financial contributions may also be 
taken into account in determining a party's share in the assets of the relationship. See below. 
And see Neave, M., "From Difference to Sameness—Law and Women's Work", Unpublished 
Paper.
86 Neave, supra n. 78, 267. See Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429, and 
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, which extended the joint venture analogy used 
in Muschinski to the breakdown of de facto relationships which do not share the element of a 
common business venture which existed in Muschinski.
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The High Court is recognising that this particular species of unconscionability 
is founded on the refusal by one party to allow the other to share benefits 
arising from the failure of the parties' common domestic endeavour.87 Such 
endeavours take the form of particularly close relationships in which resources 
are pooled and behaviour is modified to pursue varied personal and social 
goals.88 In these sorts of relationships, the parties' "lives and economic well­
being [are] fully integrated" 89 and the parties share "in a relationship in the 
nature of a joint venture so that it would be artificial to treat them as 
independent actors." 90 When such relationships fail or breakdown,91 so that 
the parties' plans are frustrated, the parties will not usually have planned
87 Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 84. See also Muschinski v. Dodds 
(1985) 62 A.L.R. 429.
88 For a perhaps romanticised description of such domestic relations, see Peter v. 
Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 24-5, per Cory J.
Not all persons coming together in a domestic arrangement need be considered as having a 
common interest or as pursuing a common endeavour. Consider, for example, students sharing 
a group house. But even sexual partners who are co-habitees need not be considered to share a 
common interest for all purposes. Where the parties keep their financial affairs and resources 
strictly separate, it may be said that there is no common endeavour in relation to their financial 
and economic goals, as they have not integrated the material aspects of their lives. In such a 
case, although their relationship may still be a common endeavour for the pursuit of social, 
emotional and sexual goals and these may be frustrated by the breakdown in the relationship, 
the parties' financial and economic goals need not be frustrated in such circumstances. In other 
words, there is no unprovided for contingency arising in respect of any common financial or 
economic interest, as there is no common interest in relation to their purely financial affairs, 
each party having sought separately to protect their own interests.
89 Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 476.
90 Rotherham, supra n. 73, 423. In the past, the courts tended to approach domestic 
disputes as if they were ones between strangers acting in their individual interests. Feminists 
have pointed out the masculine nature of this latter perspective and that it is far removed from 
the reality of the situation. See Rotherham, 422, fn. 101, and 410.
91 It was stated earlier that as a general rule one party must not have been at fault or 
responsible for the particular unprovided for contingency preventing parties from successfully 
pursuing their common interests. Such an element was suggested as relevant to the breakdown 
of domestic relationships by Deane ]. in Muschinski v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429,456, where he 
considered that the frustration of the joint endeavour must not have been the result of any 
"attributable blame" of either party. With respect, however, this writer concurs with the views 
of Parkinson, supra n. 73, 392, that this "requirement does not transfer easily to the context of 
de facto relationships where the reasons for the breakdown of relationships are varied and 
complex." This view is reflected in legislation which abandons requirements of fault in relation 
to disputes arising out of failed marriages, one of the hallmarks of the Family Law Act 1975. 
Perhaps in cases of domestic common endeavours the courts will simply presume "no fault" on 
either party's part. In the view of Parkinson, 393, "[i]t is likely that the notion of blame will 
disappear quietly as a meaningful requirement."
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accordingly as to the consequences of such a breakdown.92 Of course, where 
there exist clear express or implied common intentions of the parties as to their 
respective rights vis-ä-vis any property or assets acquired "for the purposes of 
[their] joint relationship" ,93 then these intentions will be respected by the 
courts 94
The reasoning of the High Court is consistent with notions of a principle 
of sharing arising where an unprovided for contingency affects parties sharing 
a common interest. At a practical level, how does the a principle of sharing 
manifest itself in the decisions?95 To simplify the burden of much of the case
92 "It is commonplace to observe that people who live together rarely make clear 
arrangements about their property interests. They are certainly unlikely to spell out complex 
understandings to the effect that the spouse who does the housekeeping will thereby derive an 
interest in the property." Neave, supra n. 78, 263. Cf. Peter v. Beblovo (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 31, 
quoted infra n. 100.
Where a relationship does not end as a result of a breakdown in the relationship, but continues 
until the death of one of the parties, disputes as to the ownership of property may still arise. 
See, e.g., Bryson v. Bryant (1992) 29 N.S.W.L.R. 188. Where the surviving party has title to the 
main property utilised in the relationship, the deceased party's estate would be unlikely to be 
able to successfully claim a share in the property (see Bryson). Conceptually, this seems an 
appropriate response, for the deceased party will have had the use of the property until death 
and the surviving party will have absolute use of the property thereafter. This is consistent with 
the position in many married couples, where real estate, money and other property is often 
held as joint tenants and would thus automatically pass to the surviving party. In other words, 
such an outcome will often reflect the way in which the parties would have provided for the 
contingency of each party's death in any case, had they turned their minds to the matter. 
Where, by way of contrast, the surviving party has no title to substantial assets used in the 
relationship and such property has not been left by will to the surviving party, then much 
stronger grounds exist for asserting some claim to the property. This could be done either on 
the basis of the common intentions of the parties, where they exist, that the surviving party was 
to have a share in the property, or alternatively, on the basis of the contingency of the death not 
having been provided for, in such a case, to secure a common purpose of the relationship that 
financial security extends beyond the death of the other party. An interesting decision is that of 
Boccalatte v. Bushelle [1980] Qd.R. 180, which supports the view that a claim in these latter 
circumstances will succeed. The court relied on the parties' common intention that the property 
belong to the surviving party and imposed a constructive trust. See also Fleming v. Beevers 
[1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385.
93 Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 84.
94 See Peart, supra n. 69,103-4, and note the approval by the High Court in Muschinski 
v. Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429, of the NSW Court of Appeal decision in Allen v. Snyder [1977] 2 
N.S.W.L.R. 685. Allen v Snyder had reaffirmed the view that a common intention had to 
"actually exist" and could not be imputed, but where such intention was discernible, it would 
be given effect. See also Gillies v. Keogh [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 327, in which the defendant had at all 
times asserted that the house the subject of the action was "hers and hers alone" (340). The 
plaintiff's contributions in that case were made in circumstances in which he could not have 
understood that he was acquiring an interest in the property. Consequently, the court denied 
the plaintiff a share in the assets owned by the defendant.
95 One needs to bear in mind, however, the proviso above about the difficulties in 
drawing any general conclusions about the effect of decisions in these types of factual
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law in Australia, as well as New Zealand and Canada, where similar results are 
being achieved, it is evident that the courts are beginning to balance parties' 
differing contributions, both "financial and in kind" ,96 to relationships. Once 
the various individual contributions have been weighed up in order to 
determine their relative worth, though this is not usually done explicitly, the 
courts in m any cases are making awards by dividing the assets of the 
relationship (which term appears to include any real or personal property 
utilised in the course of the relationship97) according to the proportionate 
contributions of the parties to that rela tionsh ip .98 The language of
problems.
96 See Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 84-5.
97 Rotherham, supra, n. 73,426, considers that all property used during the course of a 
relationship should be taken into account when assessing the property which can be the subject 
of an award, but that consequently, property such as money and real estate owned by one party 
at the commencement of the relationship should be treated as a contribution to the relationship. 
This would mean that parties with considerable assets at the outset of the relationship may be 
considered to have contributed a greater proportion to it. There is some merit in such an 
approach, which is highlighted by an example given by Rotherham:
A and B go into a relationship and for ten years live in a house inherited by B. A is the 
primary care giver and works as well while B does little at all. A is able to maintain the 
parties (sic) standard of living but no property is acquired. If the only property 
available for distribution was that acquired in the course of the relationship, A would 
not be entitled to an interest in the house. (426, fn. 127).
And the courts appear to have accepted that any property utilised in the course of the 
relationship may potentially be distributed. Principally, domestic property disputes concern the 
parties' family home and the fact that it was owned by one party at the outset of the 
relationship or purchased from the assets of one party will not preclude the other party 
claiming an interest. Nevertheless, there are also difficulties in such an approach, for it means 
that in any case in which one party brings considerable property to the relationship, there can 
be no presumption of equal contributions (as to which, see below) and the courts may then 
need to balance property contributions made at the outset, with contributions of a non-financial 
kind made during the course of the relationship. One way of avoiding this difficulty would be 
for the courts to merely consider initial assets as part of a determination of each party's benefits 
and losses resulting from the relationship. Consequently, a party who brings a house worth 
$50,000 into a relationship can be considered to have benefited by $50,000 if that house is worth 
$100,000 at the end of the relationship. A presumption of equality of contributions could still 
then be applied to allow the other party a 50% share of the net increase. This would also avoid 
the difficulty of balancing initial assets as against contributions to relationships of an ongoing 
nature.
98 In Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, for example, the family house 
was divided in a proportion of 55: 45 between the parties.
These types of approaches are evident throughout the common law world. In Canada, see, e.g., 
Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257. The appellant and respondent had lived as man and 
wife for nearly 20 years. For several years both were employed, the respondent's income being 
utilised to pay rent and living expenses, whilst the appellant saved his entire income. These
292
"contributions" to relationships is being openly used and the courts are giving 
recognition to a variety of contributions: the relative pooled incomes of the 
parties; any property owned by one party at the commencement of the 
relationship, but utilised in the course of the relationship ;99 and perhaps 
increasingly, non-financial contributions such as child-minding, housework 
and the maintenance of property .100 Where one party 's contributions are
savings provided the purchase price for a farm and apiary, in the appellant's name. Over a 
period of more than 10 years both worked diligently to build up the business (see 267-8, for a 
summary of the type of work undertaken by the respondent), and profits were used to 
purchase two more farms. The respondent, after the relationship had ended, claimed a share in 
the property. Her claim succeeded and the court held she was entitled to a half share which 
constituted her proportion of contribution to the relationship. In the words of Dickson J. (at 
2 7 7 ). "The extent of the interest must be proportionate to the contributions, direct or indirect, of 
the claimant. Where the contributions are unequal, the shares will be unequal."
For a detailed consideration as to quantum of relief in the Canadian cases, see Parkinson, P., 
"Beyond Pettkus v. Becker: Quantifying Relief for Unjust Enrichment" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 217. The 
results of the cases considered there are broadly consistent with the principle outlined here. 
This is supported by Parkinson's own summary of the cases:
There will be an enrichment, and a deprivation without juristic reason, wherever one
party denies to the other an equitable share of the wealth that represents the fruit of their
domestic and economic partnership. (Emphasis added.)
Support for Parkinson's view can be found in the judgments of McLachlin and Cory JJ. in Peter 
v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1. For example, at 25, Cory J. considered that "[b]oth the 
reasonable expectations of the parties and equity will require that upon the termination of the 
relationship, the parties will receive an appropriate compensation based on the contribution 
each has made to the relationship." See also at 31.
In New Zealand, see, e.g., Cossey v. Bach [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 612, and Gibb v. MacDonnell [1992] 3 
N.Z.L.R. 475.
99 See Cossey v. Bach [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 612; Gibb v. MacDonnell [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 475.
100 In the past, non-financial domestic contributions were largely ignored by the 
courts, one of the consequences of which was that women were often denied an interest in 
property, given that contributions of this type are often made by women. See Neave, supra n. 
85, 17: historically "the value of women's domestic labour has been disregarded in the family 
law context." See also Neave, supra n. 9, 63: "the existing law reinforces patriarchal gender 
expectations by failing to recognise the value of unpaid work in the home." As McLachlin J. put 
it in Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 10: "The notion [that domestic services are not 
worthy of recognition by the courts], moreover, is a pernicious one that systematically devalues 
the contributions which women tend to make to the family economy. It has contributed to the 
phenomenon of the feminization of poverty". Today, however, there appears to be a growing 
recognition of the value of non-financial contributions, specifically domestic services, a process 
which can only be enhanced, it is submitted, by the acceptance of the rationale of the principle 
of sharing. In Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, references were made to 
contributions "financial or otherwise" and "in kind", and to the pooled "resources" and 
"efforts" of the parties. This suggests the court was intimating the possibility of non-financial 
contributions giving rise to a claim for a share of the assets utilised in the relationship, although 
it is unclear whether the Australian courts will be prepared to extend the principle of 
Baumgartner to purely domestic contributions. See, e.g., Hohol v. Hohol (1980) F.L.C. 75,212. Cf.
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Willets v. Marks (C.A., Q.L.D., unreported, noted (1994) 68 A.L.J. 462). Outside Australia, a 
number of cases have expressly given recognition to non-financial contributions, giving rise to 
a share in the assets of the relationship, see, e.g., Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, 
Herman v. Smith (1984) 34 Alta. L.R. (2d) 90, Everson v. Rich (1988) 53 D.L.R. (4th) 470, and Peter 
v. Beblow. Significantly, in the latter three cases, the contributions in question were largely of a 
non-financial kind. Cf. also Eves v. Eves [19751 1 W.L.R. 1338.
Some of the Canadian cases which have given recognition to non-financial contributions have 
done so by the use of a quantum meruit award for housekeeping services rendered. Herman v. 
Smith is an example. In this writer's view, such an approach demeans contributions to the 
household, in that it equates a party responsible for such work with a paid housekeeper and 
ignores significant contributions of a less tangible kind: emotional support for children and 
spouse, planning decisions and so on. As Scane, supra n. 79, 280, has pointed out:
in a spouse-like arrangement, this marketplace approach seems far removed from 
reality. ... People normally do not enter into spousal arrangements expecting or relying 
upon receipt or payment of a market-valued quid pro quo for itemized services 
performed, akin to making a contract with a maid service or a plumber.
Scane points out some of the difficulties that result from such an approach, but goes on to state, 
at 281,that
[t]his is not an argument against a finding of enrichment. It is, I submit, an argument 
against using a quantum meruit approach based upon what must be, at best, the crudest 
of guesses about the net difference in the market value of the exchanged services, to 
establish the amount of unjust enrichment to be remedied.
Some support for this view may be gained from the judgment of Cory J. in Peter v. Beblow, 31-2:
[I]t is unlikely that couples will ever turn their minds to the issue of their expectations 
about their legal entitlements at the outset of their marriage or common law 
relationship. If they were specifically asked about their expectations, I would think that 
... rather than expecting to receive a fee for their services based on their market value, 
they would expect to receive, on dissolution of their relationship, a fair share of the 
property or wealth which their contribution had helped the parties to acquire, improve, 
or to maintain.
In this writer's view, the quantum meruit approach highlights some of the difficulties with 
unjust enrichment. The Canadian courts have largely avoided applying the concepts of unjust 
enrichment with any rigour, reflecting the unsuitability of such tools in resolving problems of 
this type. Importing concepts such as quantum meruit appears artificial and tends to obfuscate 
the issues. A quantum meruit valuation of services in the context of domestic relationships could 
also lead to unjust outcomes. Take two extreme examples. In one, both parties are paupers and 
despite an equal contribution by each to the relationship, at the end of ten years, they still own 
nothing. On the strict logic of Herman v. Smith, since the domestic services were not intended to 
be "free", the housekeeping spouse could sue for the value of the ten years work (which might 
be practically worthwhile, for example where the other party has had a windfall win in lotto 
after the relationship has ended). Given that both parties have not gained from the relationship 
at the time it ends and their respective equal contributions, this would appear unjustifiable. In a 
second possibility, property of a relationship owned by one party only may increase 
dramatically in value, through a combination of market forces and maintenance and 
improvement work carried out by both parties. Why should the "housekeeping party" in such 
a case only be entitled to a quantum meruit award? If, alternatively, the plaintiff is entitled to a 
greater share, is such a share also based on unjust enrichment? How are the potentially 
different values of enrichment reconcilable and is a plaintiff entitled to pursue whichever is the 
greater? Such questions would need to be answered.
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considerably greater than those of the other, any property of the relationship will 
be divided accordingly to reflect their respective contributions to the 
relationships.101
A considerably greater contribution on the part of one party will 
probably not be a common occurrence, and the courts have expressed the view 
that in most long-term relationships,102 a presumption of equal contribution 
should be the starting point for any judicial assessment. Where such a 
presumption is applicable, its application will result in the parties sharing the 
property of the relationship equally. In the view of Mason CJ., Wilson and 
Deane JJ., in Baumgartner's case:
Equity favours equality and, in circumstances where the parties have 
lived together for years and pooled their resources and their efforts to 
create a joint home, there is much to be said for the view that they 
should share the beneficial ownership equally as tenants-in-common, 
subject to adjustment to avoid any injustice which would result if 
account were not taken of the disparity between the worth of their 
individual contributions either financial or in kind.103
It will be suggested below that a better and more realistic basis for recovery than a quantum 
meruit valuation of services is to commence with a presumption of equal sharing in most 
normal relationships.
101 This will involve a re-adjustment of the rights of the parties according to their 
contributions, rather than their respective existing legal title to the property. See Muschinski v. 
Dodds (1985) 62 A.L.R. 429, and Cossey v. Bach [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 612. In Muschinski v. Dodds, the 
parties expressly agreed that the property should be held as tenants-in-common in equal 
shares, despite the purchase price being almost wholly provided by Muschinski. The common 
intention was premised, however, on the expectation that Dodds would make "substantial 
contributions" to the projected development in the future. This expectation was frustrated by a 
number of events outside the parties' control, including a failure to obtain necessary council 
permission for the development and the subsequent break-up of the relationship. 
Consequently, Muschinski was entitled to a greater share in the property than merely her legal 
entitlement of one half. The court ordered that Muschinski and Dodds should "hold their 
respective legal interests as tenants-in-common upon trust (after payment of any joint debts 
incurred in improvement of the property) to repay to each her or his respective contribution 
and as to the residue for them both in equal shares." See at 458. Cf. Kais v. Turvey (1994) Fam. 
L.R. 498 (Supreme Court of Western Australia). In Cossey v. Bach, property was held in equal 
shares, but had been purchased entirely from the defendant's assets. His contribution to the 
property in question was consequently far greater than that of the plaintiff and he was held 
entitled to a considerably greater share.
102 This, of course, avoids the issue of when a relationship may be considered long 
term, but this will undoubtedly be illustrated in future cases. Where a relationship is short 
term, the courts will pay much more attention to the initial assets brought into the relationship 
by each party. See cases, ibid.
103 (1987) 76 A.L.R. 84-5. In Cossey v. Bach [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 612, 632, Fisher J. stated
that:
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Such a presumption of "equality of beneficial ownership at least as a 
starting point" 104 has considerable merit. It recognises that the parties' lives 
were fully integrated for a number of years.105 It recognises that despite the 
quite different roles which each party might perform in a relationship 
(particularly one in which each party has adopted a "traditional" role),106 the 
parties nevertheless are accorded an equal status107 and can be presumed to
In a stable and enduring de facto relationship, and in the absence of any expressed 
intention to the contrary, it will readily be accepted as reasonable for the claimant to 
expect that following those contributions and sacrifices normally associated with de 
facto marriage, family assets would be shared. For this purpose contributions may be 
of an intangible nature, need not be traceable to the property in dispute, and may have 
little measurable value.
Similarly, Parkinson, supra n. 98,256, states:
Where the contributions are approximately equal, the shares should be equal. Such 
would be the case where one party's contribution was mainly in the form of income 
while the other's took the form of domestic responsibilities.
Contrast Casad, R., "Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and 
Back Again" (1978) 77 Mich.L.Rev. 47, 60, who considers that although "marriage implies equal 
sharing of burden and benefits, and the courts and legislatures recognize that", it is 
"questionable" whether the same implication ought to apply to unmarried couples. In the view 
of this writer, where relationships are akin to marriage and thus display most of the hallmarks 
of that institution, so that parties can be said to share a common interest, the same legal 
consequences should apply where contingencies arise which the parties have not provided for. 
Even if parties refuse to marry in order to consciously and deliberately avoid the legal 
consequences of that institution, including consequences upon the failure of the relationship, 
they may in any case, then, have maintained separate financial lives. Contrast Parkinson, supra 
n. 73, 373.
Interestingly, a presumption of equality has been rejected by the High Court as a starting point 
for property settlements under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). See Mallett v. Mallett (19&4) 52 
A.L.R. 193, which held that decisions must be made on a case by case basis, but this decision 
has to be considered in the light of the wide, unfettered discretion granted to the courts under 
the statute.
104 (1987) 76 A.L.R. 84.
105 Supra nn. 89-90.
106 Housekeeping and child minding on the part of the female spouse and income 
production on the part of the male spouse.
107 where both parties are engaged in full-time work and thus contribute substantial 
income, there is no reason why the presumption of equal contribution should not apply, even 
where there are differences in the income earned by each. The courts should not simply 
compare the respective incomes of each party in order to assess contributions, for this would 
ignore the non-financial contributions which each party still makes. The result in Baumgartner v. 
Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, is thus open to criticism, as the court appears to have ignored 
the non-financial contributions of the plaintiff in reaching its figure of a 55: 45 division. Cf. 
Neave, supra n. 85,16.
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have contributed equally to the relationship. Such a starting presumption also 
avoids the difficulties inherent in attem pting to balance non-financial 
contributions ("housekeeping" and so on) against income and property. A 
presumption of equal contribution will not apply, or will be readily rebutted, 
where one party has assets worth considerably more than those of the other 
party at the commencement of the relationship. In such a case, the initial 
contribution will entitle the party making it to a greater share in the assets of 
the relationship.108
The Canadian courts have been at the forefront of liberalising common 
law rights to share in family property upon the break-up of a domestic 
relationship, and have also been far more willing to give recognition to non- 
financial contributions than courts in other jurisdictions. The results of the 
Canadian cases are generally consistent with the principle of just sharing .109 
Although the decisions, in their reasoning, rely upon the language of unjust 
enrichment, such language often appears merely as w indow dressing for 
reasoning which is very similar to that of the High Court of Australia in 
draw ing an analogy w ith frustrated joint ventures .110 For example, in 
determining that there is "no juristic reason" for an enrichment, the Canadian 
courts have referred to a party 's "reasonable expectations" of receiving an 
interest in the property .* 111 But given the courts' readiness to find such 
expectations,
[tjhere has developed in Canada a tacit legal presum ption that an
expectation of entitlement is to be inferred from the fact that substantial
108 See cases supra n. 99. For an example under the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 
(N.S.W.), see Browne v. Byrne (1988) DFC 75,734.
109 See supra n. 98.
110 Indeed, note the reference to "joint family venture" in Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1,16.
111 A number of cases have justified relief on the basis of the existence of a 
"reasonable expectation" of the plaintiff "of receiving an interest in property", where the other 
party "knows, or ought to know of that reasonable expectation": Pettkus v Becker (1980) 117 
D.L.R. (3d) 274, followed in Sorochan v. Sorochan [1986] 2 S.C.R. 38. Alternatively, the courts 
have also utilised language emphasising detrimental reliance and the defendant's 
"inducement" to act detrimentally. See generally, Peart, supra n. 69, who concludes that some 
form of inducement is necessary. But such a requirement suggests wrongful conduct on the 
part of the defendant in gaining a benefit or creating the "corresponding" loss to the plaintiff 
(and in most cases, such a corresponding loss can only be assumed). The principle of sharing 
operates irrespective of whether there has been anything akin to one party's wrong in causing a 
loss or appropriating a benefit. Benefits and losses need to be shared irrespective of such 
wrongdoing. See also Neave, supra n. 78, 263.
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contributions were made in a relationship akin to marriage.112
In recognition of the very essence of the problem at hand—that the 
parties have not turned their mind to the consequences of a break-up of their 
relationship113—the Canadian courts appear to be determining what parties are 
reasonably entitled to expect in the circumstances given their contributions to a 
relationship.
Significantly, the results of many Canadian cases are not consistent with 
an unjust enrichment analysis. Although a defendant's "enrichment" may 
readily be identifiable in most cases on an impressionistic basis, it is 
nonetheless often difficult to isolate and value any tangible114 benefit,115 which 
benefit should in theory also determine the measure of recovery. Instead of 
merely disgorging benefits, the Canadian courts have in many cases granted 
remedies reflecting the parties' actual expectations or what they could 
reasonably be entitled to expect.116 The latter two measures need not, of course, 
equate with any tangible benefit received by a defendant at the expense of a 
plaintiff.117 The language of unjust enrichment, then, obscures the practical
112 Rotherham, supra n. 73, 410. He goes on to state that "[i]n reality the approach of 
the Canadian courts is not based on the expectations of the parties involved", by which he 
clearly means the parties' actual expectations. Cf. Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 31-2, 
quoted supra n. 100.
113 Neave, supra n. 78, 262-3.
114 This is required according to Canadian unjust enrichment theory, at least: Peel 
(Regional Municipality) v. Canada (1992) 98 D.L.R. (4th) 140,155.
115 Casad, supra n. 103, 59, has concluded that "[a]nalogies drawn from common 
restitution cases, therefore, probably cannot identify an unjust enrichment except where [the] 
disparity [between the parties' respective contributions] is extreme."
116 See Neave, supra n. 78, 260. See also Birks, P., "Book Review" (1991) Can. B. Rev. 
814, 817-9.
117 This has lead Rotherham, supra n. 73, 413, to conclude that:
The provision of justice in this area through the development of unjust enrichment law 
has only been achieved by the courts doing considerable violence to the integrity of the 
doctrine involved. While paying lip service to doctrine, the Canadian courts fudge 
important questions of law and draw unwarranted inferences of fact.
See also at fnn. 38 and 40. Similarly, in the view of Scane, supra n. 79, 270:
[Restitution theory, applied to typical "family property" cases, raises some problems 
whose solution is not obvious. Conclusions that the defendant has been enriched, that 
the enrichment is sufficiently connected to a corresponding deprivation suffered by the 
plaintiff, and that there is no juristic reason for the enrichment, standing alone, tell us 
that, in the particular case, the court has overcome these problems to its own
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consequences of many of the decisions.
In this writer's view, a number of advantages would follow if the courts 
openly recognised that the underlying basis of recovery is the principle of just 
sharing applicable once parties' common domestic ventures have been 
frustrated. This would be consistent with the results achieved in many of the 
decisions. Parties would be entitled to share benefits of the relationship 
proportionally according to their contribution to the relationship (their 
"contribution interest", as it has been called).118 One advantage of formulating 
recovery on such a basis is that the courts would need to state openly which 
contributions are being taken into account and their relative worth. By 
identifying contributions, the process of adjusting the parties' rights allows for 
the incorporation of changing social values as to which types of contributions 
should be given recognition by the law as being valuable. Any disparate 
treatment of different types of contributions by parties to a relationship 
performing quite distinct roles119 would need to be stated and justified. For 
example, in identifying the relative worth of contributions, the courts would 
either have to accept an equal valuation of non-financial, domestic 
contributions, or else have to justify their continued depreciation.120
Recognition of a party's contribution interest also raises considerable 
potential for creative, but principled, judicial developments. The courts might 
consider taking into account "negative" or depreciative contributions, such as 
where an alcoholic de facto husband beats his wife and children and is 
generally destructive around the household. It might be said that in such a case 
the husband has contributed less than fifty percent to the relationship, even
satisfaction. They do not, without more elaboration, tell us how it has done so.
Earlier, at 262, Scane writes that there is an "arbitrary appearance to many of the decisions."
See, however, Neave, supra n. 78, 259-62, who considers unjust enrichment an appropriate 
doctrinal vehicle for solving property disputes arising from the failure of a domestic 
relationship. See also Neave, supra n. 9, 27-8.
118 See Rotherham, supra n. 73.
119 Such roles are often determined on the lines of gender.
120 Decisions such as Anast v. Anastopolous (1982) F.L.C. 91-201, may become a thing of 
the past. In that case, decided under the Family Law Act 1975, a wife worked full-time without 
wages for 6 years in her husband's business and, in the following 6 years, raised three children, 
continued to a lesser extent to work in the business and took some paid employment. Despite 
these efforts, she received only about a quarter of the property. See Neave, supra n. 85, 29.
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where he has contributed a very substantial income to the household.121 Such 
an idea is only speculative, but worth consideration. The important factor is 
that the principle of sharing is sophisticated enough to incorporate such a 
possibility within a rational and intelligible legal framework; a framework 
which, it is suggested, may increase the likelihood of decisions appearing just, 
without compromising the need for clearly understood legal principles being 
applied with some certainty of outcome.
§ 7.5 THE UNCERTAIN STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLE IN 
CONTRACT: Frustration of Contracts
The ideal solution, we suggest, is that the parties in such a case [of frustrated 
contract] should simply share the loss. Where the risk of loss has not been 
allocated to either party, they may be considered to be common victims, as it 
were, of a contractual accident in circumstances where there appears to be no 
reason for preferring the interests of one party over the other.122
The performance of contractual obligations may be frustrated by events 
beyond the control or foresight of either party. The question of what amounts 
to "frustration" in contract is largely settled in its definition and generates little 
debate, so that it has been said that "overall the doctrine itself engenders a
121 The alcoholism and violent conduct of the defendant in Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, may well have been a factor influencing the decision of the Supreme Court to 
apportion the assets of the relationship as it did in that case. See, e.g., at 9,19. See also Behrens,
"Domestic Violence and Property Adjustment: A Critique of "No Fault" Discourse" (1993) 7 
Aust. Jo. of Fam. Law 9, concerning property orders under the Family Law Act 1975.
Another possibility is that forgone opportunities might be considered a form of contribution to 
a relationship, so that, for example, a party's decision to give up a high paying job with 
potential career prospects, might be said to be a contribution to the relationship. Cf. Gillies v. 
Keogh [19891 2 N.Z.L.R. 327, 334, per Cooke P.: "One has to remember that sacrifice cannot 
always be measured in dollars and cents. The longer a union, the more likely that one or other 
partner will have forgone opportunities in life. This can be highly relevant, I think, in assessing 
reasonable expectations, unjust enrichment or unconscionability." Cf. Peter v. Beblow (1993) 77 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, 26-7. There are serious problems, however, in treating forgone opportunities as 
contributions. All decisions in life involve making choices, by forgoing some opportunities in 
order to take up others. A choice of a domestic arrangement such as marriage or a de facto 
marriage is one which entails (potentially) lost opportunities for both parties, but nevertheless, 
parties may make such choices because of the perceived benefits of the relationship. It would be 
almost an impossible task to unravel the relative worth of different opportunities grasped and 
forgone as a result of such choices, and this task may thus be one best left alone by the 
judiciary.
122 Maddaugh & McCamus, 408.
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certain feeling of contentm ent." 123 Under one widely accepted definition, 
approved in the High Court of Australia,124
frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of 
either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being 
performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for 
w ould render it a thing radically different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract.125
It is not proposed to discuss the adequacy of this definition, for it clearly 
conforms with the notion of an unprovided for contingency outlined at the 
outset of this chapter, and thus satisfies one of the pre-requisites for the 
operation of the principle of just sharing. Instead, we will consider the debate 
which, am ongst com m entators and the judiciary, has centred on the 
consequences of frustration.
It should be noted that the entry into a contract by parties acting under 
some fundamental common or mutual mistake,126 raises essentially the same 
problem as where a contract is subsequently frustrated. As one commentator 
has noted, "logically and functionally" m istake and frustration  are 
indistinguishable, because in either case, there exists a risk of "potential 
disparity between the terms of exchange as envisioned at the time of contract 
formation and the terms of the same exchange as subsequently perceived in 
light of greater information". In both cases, the "risks of the disparity in
123 Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, 66. For a detailed history of frustration sufficient to 
discharge a contract, see Wladis, J. D., "Common Law and Uncommon Events" (1987) 75 
Geo.L.J. 1575.
124 Codelfa Constructions v. State Rail Authority of N.S.W. (1982) 56 A.L.J.R. 459. Cf. 
Brisbane C.C. v. Group Projects (1979) 54 A.L.J.R. 25.
125 Davis Contractors v. Fareham U.D.C. [1956] A.C. 696, 729, per Lord Radcliffe. The 
definition is sometimes stated in the form of the maxim non haec in foedera veni (it was not this 
that I promised to do.) Cf. Kull, supra n. 2, fn. 1.
126 As to the meaning of these terms, see Carter & Harland, 381-2.
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question was not allocated to either party, expressly or by implication." 127 
Mistake and frustration, then, can be treated as raising the same essential 
problems and should involve essentially the same principles in their resolution, 
though what follows will be limited to a discussion of the law of frustration.
A frustrating event immediately and automatically discharges a contract 
as to any future obligations,128 but parties to contracts may often have incurred 
expenses, paid money, transferred or received property or other benefits before 
the contract was frustrated. Is it satisfactory in such circumstances simply to 
leave the parties in the position they are in at the time of the frustrating event? 
If the principle of just sharing is applicable to the frustration of contracts, then 
the answer must of course be "No". It is submitted that parties in a contractual 
relationship do share a common interest (the matter will be further considered 
below), so that a principle of sharing should apply where a contingency is truly 
unprovided for.
In many contractual relationships, however, it will be likely that a 
determination as to an allocation of the risk of the consequences of a 
contingency to a more appropriate risk bearer can be made.128a The courts' 
unwillingness to interfere in parties' transactions where an allocation of risk 
has expressly or by implication been made is particularly evident in cases of 
one-off, short term transactions, such as a sale of goods or real estate. Because 
of the nature of sale transactions, risk, by implication, usually passes with 
property and even if a contingency arises affecting the value of that property, 
the losses or benefits will usually be held to lie with the owner of the property 
at the time the contingency occurs.129 In other words, the courts will let
127 Kull, supra n. 2, 2-4. Strictly speaking, in mistake cases the parties' contract is not 
frustrated by a subsequent change of circumstances but was never possible of performance (or 
radically different to what was expected) in the first place. Since, however, the parties will have 
proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the contract was capable of being performed, the 
effect of their subsequent discovery of the mistake is no different to a frustrating event. Note, 
however, the view expressed by Cartwright, J., "Solle v. Butcher and the Doctrine of Mistake in 
Contract" (1987) 103 L.Q.R. 594, 604, fn. 48, that as a mistake is capable of discovery, it is at least 
arguable that the test for mistake should be stricter than that for frustration. This issue can be 
addressed by the courts in considering whether any party has assumed the risk of a particular 
mistake.
128 M cD onald v. D enny Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 C.L.R. 457,476-7, per Dixon J.
128a This may be possible even where the contingency was not actually foreseen by 
the parties, but nonetheless was expressly or by implication provided for. Such a determination 
will leave no scope for the application of the principle of just sharing.
129 In one-off, short-term transactions, frustration will be an unlikely event. Given that 
there is usually only a short space of time between entry into the contract and its execution (or
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windfalls lie and confirm the status quo. Less usually, such an allocation of risk 
may also be made by implication where contracts are of an ongoing or 
relational nature.130 It is not proposed to dwell on such cases, however, for 
importantly, they do not weigh against the general applicability to contract of 
the principle of just sharing, but preclude its operation because a precondition 
for such operation—that the risk of a contingency has not been provided for— 
has failed.
Leaving aside allocations of risk, the principle of sharing clearly ought to 
be applicable to contracts generally, given that the parties to a contract share a
the two may even occur simultaneously), it is unlikely that a supervening event will arise to 
render the contract incapable of performance. The longer a contractual relationship subsists, the 
more likely it is that a frustrating event will occur. The more likely source of complaint in one- 
off, short-term transactions will arise not from a frustrating event, but as a result of a mistake 
affecting both parties. For example, the buyer and seller of a cow which turns out to be fertile, 
may have believed it to be barren: cf. Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). As Kull, supra n. 2, 
41, fn. 146, points out, the fact that a mistake is pleaded at all in such cases is a matter of "purest 
chance". He notes, in relation to two sale of goods cases, including Sherwood v. Walker, that
[h]ad the new information in either case been available earlier, the disputed bargains 
would not have been made; were it discovered significantly later, no attempt would be 
made to avoid either transaction. When an item of property suddenly increases in 
value, our normal expectation is that the benefit accrues to its owner; when value 
decreases, the identical (converse) rule is that res perit domino. Thus a sudden change in 
value—windfall or casualty—gives rise to a dispute only when it occurs in awkward 
proximity to a transfer of ownership.
As Kull demonstrates, the common response in such circumstances is that losses and benefits 
are left to lie where they fall and no further performance is required. He has called this the 
"windfall principle" and he persuasively argues in favour of such a judicial response. But in 
this writer's view, the unwillingness of the courts to interfere in the status quo in such cases is 
not as a result of the application of a windfall principle, but follows from an inference which 
can safely be made in many such cases: that the risk of a mistake (or frustrating event) passes 
with property. The onus is thus on the parties to safeguard their respective interests before and 
after that event. The one-off transaction cases do not necessarily indicate that a windfall 
principle (which is clearly contradictory to the sharing principle) is appropriate for dealing 
with frustration or mistake in contract generally, as Kull suggests. In this writer's view, such an 
approach has little appeal where the parties share a common interest in having a contract 
performed and carried through to fruition and there exists no reasonable basis for allocating the 
risk of a frustrating event or mistake to one or the other party.
130 See McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 C.L.R. 377, in which the 
court held that the risk of a particular outcome lay with one of the parties to the contract, 
although the outcome was not foreseen by either party. Similarly, if the parties have stipulated 
how the consequences of frustration are to be dealt with (by incorporating a suitable arbitration 
clause, for example) the contract will not be discharged in relation to such terms: Codelfa 
Constructions v. State Rail Authority of N.S.W. (1982) 56 A.L.J.R. 459; B.P. Exploration v. Hunt 
[1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 829. This is presuming that the contractually assumed risks can be said to 
have been intended to apply to post-frustration situations. This will not always be the case, 
however: Beatson, 84.
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common interest in its continued performance to completion. Although the 
parties to a contract are usually pursuing their own individual commercial 
goals, they come together to achieve those goals through co-operative, 
mutually beneficial contractual relations, often lasting considerable periods of 
time, with the common aim that the parties' contractual obligations be fulfilled 
to the completion of the contract. Indeed, all parties to a contract have a right in 
law to expect the other parties to perform as obligated under the contract. 
Where a frustrating event precludes the continued performance of a contract, 
the parties' expectations as to future outcomes are shattered through no fault of 
any party.131 Although the ordinary contractual relationship is not as close as 
that which subsists between joint venturers, for example,132 nonetheless, the 
parties' common interest in the contract's successful133 completion is clear. 
Consequently, the principle of just sharing is an appropriate legal response to 
losses and benefits resulting from the frustration of contracts. Yet despite this 
conclusion, the legal consequences of frustration are not, unequivocally, 
consistent with the application of such a principle.
In the past, it was considered acceptable that losses and benefits 
resulting from frustration should lie where they fell.134 The "primitive"
131 "Self-induced frustration" is an oxymoron and does not amount to frustration in 
its legal consequences. See McKendrick, E., "Frustration, Restitution and Loss Apportionment" 
in Burrows, Essays, 147,169, fn. 98. See Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, 66, fn. 2.
132 The courts have rejected treating all contracts as joint ventures (see Stewart & 
Carter, supra n. 25,109), and the view advanced here is not intended to contradict this position. 
It is argued here that the parties' common interest gives rise to only a very limited obligation in 
circumstances in which losses and benefits are incurred upon the frustration of a contract. No 
other rights and duties which attach to "true" joint venturers are relevant to a contractual 
relationship which is not also a joint venture. Thus, it is not suggested that there is an 
obligation on normal contractors to take "positive steps to conserve the welfare of their 
'partners'" Contrast Stewart & Carter, at 109. The difference between obligations which may 
attach to all contractual relationships on the basis of the parties' common interest and 
obligations attaching to joint ventures, is borne out by Cummings v. Lewis (1993) 113 A.L.R. 285. 
In that case, the court rejected the existence of a joint venture, but nevertheless went on to 
consider whether a claim to contribution could arise. Since that case did not involve any 
frustration of the contract (i.e., no unprovided for contingency arose), the court rightly rejected 
such a claim. If, however, there had been a finding of a joint venture, then a claim that the 
parties should share losses would probably have succeeded, even though there was no 
frustration of the venture. Such an obligation may arise simply at the termination of a joint 
venture.
133 "Successful" here refers to completion in an expected manner, rather than to 
completion in a way which fulfils all the expectations of the parties. See supra n. 2.
134 See the discussion of Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493 below, and see also 
Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
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fatalism135 of such an approach has had little appeal this century and instead, 
the courts have characteristically turned to restitutionary remedies to 
ameliorate the consequences of such an approach by requiring the 
disgorgement of benefits. On the whole, such limited remedial relief has never 
seemed entirely satisfactory, a view reflected in the widespread criticisms of 
legal responses to frustration.136 It is submitted that much of this criticism is 
founded upon the common law's failure, essentially for technical reasons,137 to 
adopt the equitable principle of the sharing of burdens and benefits arising 
from the frustration of contracts. It is this principle which forms the underlying 
idea of much of the legal discontentment with the law's ordering of positions 
after frustration.
It is necessary then, to consider the rather unsatisfactory state of the law
135 Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] A.C. 32, 72. See, however, a recent 
reformulation of the argument that the courts ought to let losses and benefits lie where they 
fall, which Kull, supra n. 2, calls the windfall principle. The general thrust of the argument is 
that the courts ought not to interfere (and generally have not, in the view of Kull), as this gives 
the parties the opportunities to allocate the risks of frustration themselves. On this view, even a 
non-allocation of risk amounts to a form of allocation by the parties. The argument is 
summarised thus:
But if the parties have not allocated the risk of a particular windfall or casualty loss to 
one of them, neither have they allocated it to the other. There is thus no basis in their 
bargain on which to justify a court's intervention to shift windfall benefits and burdens 
in either direction. ...(6)
[The source of the principle] is found in the individualistic conception of contractual 
obligation as something exclusively defined by the voluntary undertakings of the 
parties. It reflects, as well, the traditional skepticism of the common law toward the 
likelihood of increasing justice by requiring that casualty losses be shared (7).
Such a view, with respect, places too much emphasis upon the parties' autonomy to allocate 
risks. In these cases, the parties have not done so. Although as Kull points out, this is of itself an 
allocation, it is not one which reflects a conscious intention of the parties to allocate risks on the 
basis that losses and benefits will be left to lie where they fall. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
impose reasonable terms as to the parties' entitlements, to gap-fill the incomplete agreement. 
See also infra n. 145 for a rebuttal of Kull's views on Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K.B. 493.
136 Such criticisms have come from both the judiciary and legal commentators. See, for 
example, references listed in Maddaugh & McCamus, 408, fn. 33.
137 It has been said that the common law, unlike equity, has never developed 
mechanisms for loss sharing. See, e.g., Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] A.C. 32, 
49, and McKendrick, supra n. 131,167: "the common law has generally set its face against loss 
apportionment. There is no general principle known to the common law which requires that 
losses be shared between the parties." Cf. Kull, supra n. 2,41. For an example of loss sharing on 
equitable principles upon the setting aside of a transaction, see Cheese v. Thomas [1994] F.L.R. 
118, (C.A.). In this writer's view, however, since that case concerned a transaction entered into 
by the plaintiff as a result of the exercise of undue influence by the defendant, the loss in 
question ought to have been borne by him rather than shared.
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as to the consequences of frustration, both at common law, which still governs 
most jurisdictions in Australia,138 and under any statutory reforms made to 
such common law rules.
§ 7.5.1 Frustration at Common Law
Before the significant House of Lords decision in Fibrosa Spolka v. 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe,139 the common law response to frustration was harsh 
and arbitrary—parties were to bear the consequences of frustration as and 
where they fell. In Chandler v. Webster,140 for example, one of a number of cases 
arising out of the cancelled coronation procession of King Edward VII,141 the 
court stated that "the law leaves the parties [to a contract] where they were 
when the further performance of the contract became impossible."142 Any 
rights or obligations arising after the frustrating event were discharged, but any 
rights which had accrued before the event could be enforced. Thus the plaintiff 
in that case failed to recover £100 paid in advance for the rental of a room 
intended to be used to view the procession. Further, the plaintiff was also 
required to pay £41 15s due under the contract before the cancellation of the 
procession.143 The court conceded, however, that simply letting the loss lie 
where it falls is rather an "arbitrary" rule,144 and the result has been much 
criticised and since overruled.145 The court in that case did not give any
138 Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, as well as the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory do not have statutory provisions dealing with the effects 
of the frustration of contracts. Even in states which have legislatively intervened, such 
legislation generally does not cover all contracts. See Carter & Harland, 690, et seq.
139 [1943] A.C.32.
140 [1904] 1 K.B.493.
141 Another famous decision is that of Krell v. H en ry  [1903] 2 K.B. 740. See Wladis, 
supra n. 123,1609, fn. 162, for an extensive list of reported decisions.
142 [1904] 1 K.B. 493, 500.
143 The court dealt with the argument that there had been a total failure of 
consideration for the payment on the basis that the contract was not void ab initio  but only from 
the date of the frustrating events. See also Anglo Egyptian N avigation Co. v. Rennie (1875) L.R. 10 
C.P. 271. At times, the principle in Chandler v. W ebster can lead to results consistent with the 
principle of sharing, where, for example, money is due under an employment contract which 
has been frustrated. In such a case, the employer will have received the benefit of the 
employee's work and the employee will have performed his or her required services. See, e.g., 
Stubbs v. H ollyw ell R y Co. (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 311.
144 [1904] 1 K.B. 493,499.
145 Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] A.C. 32. The criticism of Chandler v.
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persuasive principled reasons to justify its refusal to intervene: "letting the loss 
lie where it falls" on its own could justify a refusal to intervene in all 
circumstances, including for breach of contract, for example.146 Consequently, 
it has been said that such a rule offers no solution at all, but is the "consequence 
of despairing of arriving at a conclusion."147
The effects of the rule in Chandler v. Webster were subsequently 
moderated by the application of a doctrine of total failure of consideration in 
performance, in Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe.us  Where one party to 
a contract has not received any part of what he or she bargained for,149 such
Webster has at times been harsh. See, for example, the Scottish case of Cantiare San Rocco S.A v. 
Clyde Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd. [1924] A.C. 226, 259, per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline:
The maxim [that "the loss lies where it falls"] works well enough among tricksters, 
gamblers and thieves; let it be applied to circumstances of supervenient mishap arising 
from causes outside the volition of parties: under this application, innocent loss may 
and must be endured by the one party, and unearned aggrandisement may and must 
be secured at his expenses to the other party. That is part of the law of England. I am 
not able to affirm that this is any part, or ever was any part, of the law of Scotland.
For a defence of the decision, however, see Kull, supra n. 2, who points out that one can 
consider that persons owning property on the coronation route suddenly obtained a valuable 
asset (the vantage for viewing the parade), which they could either enjoy personally or dispose 
of for profit as with any other property. Where the asset was "sold", Kull argues that the 
cancellation of the parade resulted in losses to whomever owned that asset at the time. See 26, 
and generally, 22-38. Kull considers that this is merely an example of the principle that "the loss 
from the destruction of property is for the account of the owner." This view would be both 
logically and morally appealing if one perceives the coronation cases as involving the 
straightforward transfer of property in which there is a clear-cut point at which property 
passes. In such a case, risk clearly follows the passing of property. Since this was not the case, 
however, as with most complex contractual arrangements the subject of frustration, such an 
analysis seems unsatisfactory. The parties' affairs were too interwoven to be viewed in such a 
way. The "windfall principle", supra n. 135, though maybe an accurate summary of the effect of 
legal responses to frustration or mistake affecting contracts for the sale of goods or real estate, 
seems inappropriate where parties share a common interest in the continued completed 
performance of ongoing contractual relationships. Such relationships are likely to be frustrated 
in a way which results in haphazard losses and benefits for which no allocation of risk has 
expressly or impliedly been made and to which the principle of sharing is thus applicable.
146 Fried, 66; Beatson 79-80.
147 Beatson, 79. In Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] A.C. 32, 59, Lord 
MacMillan considered that such an approach was "in truth a confession of impotence in the 
face of a problem deemed to be inextricable". See also McKendrick, supra n. 131, fn. 29.
148 [1943] A.C. 32, 72.
149 At common law, even where there has been some performance, no matter how 
trivial, recovery may be precluded. An extreme example is Re Thompson (1848) 1 Ex. 864, in 
which a £210 premium was paid for a 5 year articled clerkship, in which the clerk died only one 
month later. None of the money was recoverable. Cf. Whincup v. Hughes (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 78,
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party will be entitled to the return of any money payments made.150 Even this 
approach has obvious limitations, however, as was recognised by the House of 
Lords151 and as are illustrated by the facts of the case.
Fibrosa had prepaid considerable sums of money under a contract with 
Fairbairn, under which Fairbairn was to construct and deliver certain 
machinery. Delivery became impossible as a result of the outbreak of war. 
Fibrosa was held to be entitled to the return of the prepayment as the 
consideration for the payment had totally failed. No machinery had ever been 
delivered and Fibrosa thus had not received any of the bargained-for 
performance, despite the fact that Fairbairn had incurred considerable expenses 
in the construction of the machinery. In the circumstances, the result was not 
inconsistent with an apportionment of losses and benefits, as the machinery 
was readily saleable "and realisable without loss."152 Consequently, the resale 
of the machinery could cover Fairbairn's expenses and the return of the 
prepayment thus ensured that both parties were in much the same position as 
if the contract had never been entered into. Where losses and benefits are equal, 
restitution in such a case in effect achieves loss and benefit sharing in an 
"underhand" way.153 The issue would have been much more problematic, 
however, if the frustrating event had destroyed the machinery.154 For to order 
the return of prepayments in such circumstances would have left Fairbairn 
bearing a substantial loss. Such a result would be inconsistent with the 
operation of a principle of sharing, yet the common law, at present, does not
particularly at 86. The rule has been criticised by most commentators on Restitution and there 
does not appear to be any strong judicial commitment to the rule, so that it may in future be 
abandoned. Abandoning the rule may provide further opportunities for achieving results 
consistent with the principle of sharing at common law.
150 The courts have not utilised the language of total failure of consideration in 
relation to services (cf. Burrows, 253; contrast Birks, 242-9). Since services cannot be returned, 
the party who has performed the services may be entitled to a quantum meruit, unless perhaps 
the contract is one which requires complete performance. See Goff & Jones, 409-12. It should be 
noted, though, that the law in this field is particularly uncertain.
151 In the course of the decision where there were a number of calls for legislative 
intervention: [1943] A.C. at 49, 57, 72, 78.
152 By the respondent's own admission ([1943] A.C., 76). But cf. Mackinnon L.J. in the 
Court of Appeal, [1941] 2 All E.R. 300, at 304, 307.
153 vVeiss, P.D., "Apportioning Loss of Discharge of a Burdensome Contract" (1960) 69 
Yale L.J. 1054,1066. Cf. Beatson, 85-6.
154 As in Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 651.
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offer any further prospect for relief.
If restitution of enrichment appears to be the only available remedy at 
common law, and some commentators perceive it to be an adequate remedial 
response,155 it is worthwhile briefly to consider such a solution to an example 
in which no benefit survives in the hands of any party to a contract, yet losses 
have been incurred upon the frustration of the contract. Such an example 
brings out most sharply the arbitrariness of a restitutionary solution. For where 
one is dealing with losses alone—unlike in cases in which a plaintiffs total loss 
equate with a defendant's total benefit and thus restitution achieves an 
equitable result—any response other than loss sharing will leave one party 
bearing the entire loss.
Let us consider a claim by a plaintiff who has built machinery under a 
frustrated contract, for which no payment has been received. Has the defendant 
been enriched by the plaintiff's performance, where the frustrating event has 
resulted in the destruction of the machinery? Surprisingly, there are two 
possible answers to this question, giving rise to diametrically opposing results 
in similar circumstances. This is evidenced by the results reached in the United 
States, where unjust enrichment is the ostensible ground for recovery in such
155 Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25. Stewart and Carter consider that loss sharing is not 
justifiable as parties engaged in commercial activity "do not generally engage in relations out of 
a spirit of mutual welfare, but rather to serve their own interests" and thus ought not be 
required to "insure" the other party for losses incurred (87-8, 109). They assert that unjust 
enrichment is the only legitimate basis for legal intervention (67). This, they argue, is more 
readily justifiable because the existence of a "benefit" in the hands of a defendant, which can be 
returned (though note their definition of benefit, at 68: "performance must be treated as a 
benefit because it has been requested"). Some fundamental criticisms of the views expressed by 
Stewart and Carter can be made. The requirement of loss sharing is not one of loss insuring and 
consequently is not dependent upon any rationale that the parties are responsible for the other 
party's mutual welfare in the contractual arena. The reason for remedial relief is the random 
nature of the losses and benefits which result from the unforeseen frustration of the common 
contractual purpose. Stewart and Carter suggest that "[w]hile the demise of the contract is not 
necessarily a reason for compelling parties to insure each other, there seems far less reason to 
allow benefits to be retained without payment." But the mere fact that one party has benefited 
as a result of certain events on its own is not sufficient to justify recovery. What is the reason for 
granting restitution in such a case (or, to utilise the language of unjust enrichment, why is the 
enrichment unjust)? It must surely be the frustration of the contract, as it is clearly not the result 
of any conduct on the defendant's part or any mistake on the plaintiff's part. But if frustration 
justifies the disgorgement of benefits where there is a corresponding loss, so that as a practical 
consequence, benefits and losses are reallocated between the parties, why does frustration not 
justify a re-allocation of losses where there is no corresponding benefit. If one advocates a 
windfall principle there appears to be no basis for making such a distinction. The status quo 
would need to be preserved in either case.
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cases.156 On an objective view of enrichment, the answer would be that there is 
no enrichment where the property has been destroyed, as the defendant has not 
received any of the plaintiffs performance. Accordingly, some states in 
America have taken such an approach and denied recovery.157 But on an 
alternative view adopted in other United States jurisdictions, there would be an 
enrichment here—the requested contractual performance is considered of itself 
to be of value—and consequently recovery should be allowed.158 The fact that 
such inconsistent reasoning has been adopted, and in both cases has been 
subjected to criticism,159 suggests that neither approach is satisfactory. As an
156 Many of the cases involve repairs to buildings which are destroyed before the 
repairs are completed.
157 See Palmer, §7.8; Weiss, supra n. 153,1062-3.
158 See references, ibid. Cf. Siegel v. Eaton 46 N.E. 449 (1896). Even on this essentially 
subjective approach, it is difficult to see how the requesting party could have valued the partial 
performance of services from which nothing tangible was received. Birks would argue that 
there was no enrichment in such circumstances due to the lack of free acceptance. See 114-6. It 
thus appears illusory to find an enrichment in such situations. See Beatson, 84-5, and Dawson, 
J.P., "Restitution Without Enrichment" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 563, 585-92. See also McKendrick, 
supra n. 131,150, who concludes that there would be no enrichment in this type of case. Some 
courts in the U.S. have acknowledged the artificiality of "unjust enrichment" in reaching a 
conclusion which allows recovery in such a situation. See Albre Marble & Tile v. John Bowen Co., 
155 N.E. (2d) 437 (1959). The court accepted that it was in effect allowing for the recovery of 
reliance losses. Note, however, the references to some element of "fault" on the part of the 
defendant. See supra n. 5.
Treating requested performance as a benefit is not artificial if one is dealing with employment 
contracts, in which the requesting party is paying for the time expended, irrespective of 
whether there is a valuable end-product.
159 For example, Palmer, §7.8 criticises the former approach. See references, id, for 
criticisms of a finding of enrichment in cases taking the latter approach. See also the views of 
Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, as to the solution to this type of problem. The authors reject the 
recovery of pure reliance losses, but conversely, adopt a very wide definition of benefit to 
include any performance under a contract. See at 68. In relation to the problem where the value 
of services has been destroyed by the frustrating event, Stewart and Carter suggest that the 
answer to the question of whether the non-performing party has been enriched by such services 
depends upon the terms of the contract. In the machinery example considered above, Stewart 
and Carter perceive that there should be a different outcome depending upon whether such a 
contract was for the building of machinery (hence performance, and consequently an 
enrichment to be disgorged) or instead, one for the installation of machinery (no performance, 
and hence no enrichment). Where there can be said to be an enrichment, Stewart and Carter 
consider this to be an example of restitution of benefit, but with respect, this is based on 
technical finding of benefit. The quantum meruit remedy advocated by the authors in effect 
shifts the entire loss from one party to another. The difficulty with the authors' approach is that 
it leads to an all or nothing outcome: the loss remaining entirely with one party, or being 
transferred in its entirety. It is not surprising that Stewart and Carter thus face considerable 
difficulty in drawing the line as to when one or the other solution is appropriate. See 74-7.
Significantly, many United States courts, despite the differing approaches, have managed to 
achieve a measure of loss and benefit sharing, via two mechanisms. (1) By determining that a 
contract is severable and adjusting rights accordingly. This approach by its nature ensures that
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alternative to allocating the losses either entirely to a plaintiff or entirely to a 
defendant, requiring that the losses be shared in such cases seems intuitively 
just.160 The principle of sharing, arising as a result of the unprovided for 
contingency causing loss to one party sharing a common interest with another, 
provides a rational and principled explanation for this intuitive response.
Many advocates of unjust enrichment concede that restitution may not 
always prove the fairest solution in cases of frustration and that loss sharing 
may be a more appropriate solution where losses alone remain after any 
restitutionary remedy.161 There are also a number of judicial utterances in 
support of such a view.162 It is submitted that given the long history of the 
recognition of such the principle of the sharing of burdens and benefits163 in
any adjustments do not involve the entire potential losses or benefits from the frustration of the 
contract. (2) In relation to building contracts (where the building is destroyed), United States 
courts have developed a doctrine of incorporation, whereby materials which have been 
incorporated into a building may be recoverable, but other labour and expenses will not be. See 
Palmer, §7.8.
160 Dobbs, 268-9. To take an example which illustrates the principle at work: X has 
paid $2000 in advance as the full purchase price for the construction and delivery of machinery. 
Y has constructed half the machinery at a cost of $1200, when a frustrating event occurs, 
discharging the contract and rendering the work worthless. By requiring Y to repay the $2000, 
X's loss and Y's corresponding benefit will have been shared equally, but this still leaves Y with 
a $1200 loss, which X should share by paying $600. The net result is that Y should have to 
return only $1400, which leaves both parties worse off by $600. It is important to note, however, 
that the principle ought not to be utilised to require the sharing of losses or benefits which are 
the result of a good or bad bargain, rather than the result of frustration. See below.
161 Maddaugh & McCamus, 408, quoted supra n. 122, and see articles cited there, fnn. 
33 & 36. See also Weiss, supra n. 153, 1058-9; Greig & Davis, 1338, & 1341, and the third 
supplement, 238.
162 E.g., Fibrose Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe [1943] A.C. 32, 58; and National 
Carriers Ltd v. Panalpina [1981] A.C. 675, 707: "justice may require the burden to be shared".
163 In the United States, it has been suggested that the courts appear to be moving 
toward a recognition of a principle of sharing. See Fried, 71, who cites the Restatement of 
Contracts, Second, §272 (2), in support of the view that the recognition of the principle of sharing 
"is the direction in which courts are now moving." See also articles cited in Farnsworth, 736, fn. 
32, but compare Farnsworth's own views, 735-7.
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equity and elsewhere,164 in those jurisdictions without statutory enactments 
there should be no impediment to the development of an equitable doctrine 
akin to contribution which gives effect to such a principle. The principle of just 
sharing is an ancient one, but flexible enough to deal with modern problems 
arising from the frustration of contracts.
To argue that the principle of just sharing is an appropriate basis for 
dealing with the consequences of the frustration of contracts is only a starting 
point for resolving complex issues. For example, how are losses and benefits 
which result from good or bad contractual bargains to be dealt with? 
Presumably, such losses and benefits ought to remain with each party. 
Potentially, one may be faced with complex factual problems,165 but these 
should still be capable of resolution by reference to first principles. Only those 
losses and benefits which are the result of a frustrating event need to be 
distributed. Consider, for example, where P has incurred expenses of, say, 
$4000, in nearly completing the construction of machinery for which only $2000 
was payable under the contract. If a frustrating event destroys the machinery, 
leaving it worthless, P cannot claim to have suffered a $4000 loss as a result of 
the frustrating event. Instead, P's loss as a result of frustration is only 
approximately half that sum. The remaining loss arose purely as a result of P's 
bad bargain or inefficiency, or both, so that it would be inappropriate for D to 
assume any responsibility for it.166
164 The principle can also be seen in maritime law as well as at common law (the 
doctrine of contribution as it operates at common law, for example: see Goff & Jones, 307). As 
was noted above, supra n. 13, equitable principles were utilised to deal with the consequences 
of frustration of partnership contracts, even before the Partnership Acts, so that losses and 
benefits could be apportioned equitably amongst partners. The view that development of loss 
apportionment remedies may be appropriate is also supported by the thrust of legislative 
reform. See Haycroft, A.M. & Waksman, D.M., "Frustration and Restitution" [1984] Jo. of Bus. 
Law 207, 223; they cite Devlin L.J. in Ingram v. Little [1961] 1 Q.B. 31, 74:
It is only in comparatively recent times that the idea of giving to a court power to 
apportion loss has found a place in our law. I have in mind particularly the Law 
Reform Acts of 1935, 1943 and 1945, that dealt with joint tortfeasors, frustrated 
contracts and contributory negligence. These statutes ... show a modern inclination 
towards a decision based on just apportionment rather than one given in black or in 
white according to the logic of the law.
165 As evidenced, for example, by the Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (N.S.W.) which 
attempts to take such variables into account.
166 The issue becomes more complex if the machinery had been only half completed, 
for example, in circumstances where it is clear that P's full completion would cost considerably 
more than the contract price. Determining the loss from the frustration in such a case is 
possible, however, by notionally determining the costs of P's full performance, given his or her 
expenses up to the point of frustration. P's loss as a result of frustration could then be
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§ 7.5.2 Statutory Reform to The Common Law Position
In New South Wales, South Australia and British Columbia, legislative 
reforms have expressly adopted the equal sharing of burdens and benefits as 
their underlying objective.167 The legislative provisions achieve this by quite 
different mechanisms,168 but in essence, they firstly require the return of any 
benefits conferred (which given the corresponding losses, achieves an equal 
sharing of gains and losses), and then require the division of any further losses 
which have resulted from the frustrating event.169 Thus, all three Acts "invoke 
the same principle of distributive justice",170 that is, the principle of just 
sharing.
These Acts can be contrasted with the British The Law Reform (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act 1943, which has provided the model for many other 
jurisdictions.171 The underlying objective of this Act is unclear. It has been said 
that the aim of the Act is "the prevention of ... unjust enrichment",172 but 
contrary views have been expressed,173 and some have claimed that the Act 
provides devices "for the adjustment of loss."174 Such interpretations are
calculated accordingly: expenses incurred multiplied by contract price/notional total cost.
167 Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 (N.S.W.); Frustrated Contracts Act 1988 (S.A.); 
Frustrated Contracts Act 1974 (B.C.). See Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, 82-4, 87.
168 South Australia and British Columbia appear to have chosen relatively simple 
provisions (see s. 7, and ss. 5 and 7, respectively), whereas N.S.W. has adopted a complex and 
detailed scheme which seeks to cover all possibilities but which may consequently be 
unworkable. This fact is seemingly conceded by the drafter, who provide an "escape" clause 
allowing for such adjustments to be made as the court considers proper. See s. 15(1), and 
Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, 82-3,109. See also McKendrick, supra n. 131,167.
169 The South Australian Act appears to do this in "one hit" by aggregating the net 
gains and losses and then making a final adjustment. See s. 7.
170 Stewart & Carter, supra n. 25, 87.
171 In Victoria, The Frustrated Contracts Act 1959, as well as in six Canadian provinces. 
In New Zealand, see the Frustrated Contracts Act 1949.
172 B.P. Exploration v. Hunt [1979] 1 W.L.R. 783, 799A, per Goff J.
173 In the Court of Appeal in B.P. Exploration it was said that "no help from the use of 
words which are not in the statute" could be gained: [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232, 243.
174 Haycroft & Waksman, supra n. 164, 216.
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largely speculative, however, given the limited judicial guidance available.175
175 Apart from B.P. Exploration v. Hunt [19791 1 W.L.R. 783, to this writer's knowledge, 
the only other reported decision relating to statutes of the British model is the Canadian case, 
Parsons Bros. v. Shea (1965) 53 D.L.R. (2d) 86.
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Chapter 8
ALLOCATING THE COSTS OF 
JUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT
Necessity knows no lawd
§8.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous two chapters the concern was with liability rules in 
Restitution which are activated by either a defendant's conduct toward, or 
common interest with, the plaintiff. More exceptionally, however, liability may 
be imposed upon a defendant despite the absence of any such conduct or 
common interest. One example is provided by liability rules which can be 
activated where a plaintiff unsolicitedly intervenes in some way in the affairs of 
another. For example, a plaintiff who rescues an endangered defendant may 
have a claim for recompense for such services. The successful pursuit of such a 
claim is not dependent upon showing that the dangerous situation was in any 
way caused or contributed to by any fault or breach of duty on the part of the 
defendant.1 2 Claims arising as a result of such unsolicited interventions are the 
concern of this chapter.
Liability rules which allow plaintiffs to seek recompense for unsolicited 
services, amounting to some form of intervention in the affairs of others and 
not being rendered under any mistake, will be seen to occupy a small but
1 Necessitas non habet legem: Publilius Syrus (attributed).
2 If a defendant negligently causes an accident, for example, thereby putting himself or 
herself in a position of danger, then liability in tort may extend to persons who might 
foreseeably rescue the defendant. In Baker v. TE Hopkins & Sons Ltd [1958] 3 All E.R. 147, 153, 
Barry J., in an obiter opinion, considered that "[ajlthough no one owes a duty to anyone else to 
preserve his own safety, yet if, by his own carelessness, a man puts himself into a position of 
peril of a kind that invites rescue, he would in law be liable for any injury caused to someone 
whom he ought to have foreseen would attempt to come to his aid." See also Chapman v. Hearse 
(1961) 106 C.L.R. 112 and Tiley, J., "The Rescue Principle" (1967) 30 M.L.R. 25. In Canada, see, 
e.g., Horsley v. MacLaren (1972) 22 D.L.R. (3d) 545, but contrast Dupuis v. New Regina Trading Co 
Ltd [1943] 4 D.L.R. 275. In the United States, see, e.g., Carney v. Buyea, 65 N.Y.S. 902 (1946).
important niche in our law of obligations. Other examples where such claims 
may arise include: (i) a physician (Plaintiff) renders medical aid to an 
unconscious accident victim who subsequently dies and whose estate 
(Defendant) is called upon to pay for the service;3 (ii) a neighbour (P) repairs an 
absent person's (D) storm damaged roof to prevent further loss;4 (iii) a 
physician (P) provides necessary medical assistance to a child, even though her 
parents (D) have declined to have her treated;5 (iv) a development company 
(P), realising that the resale value of its housing estate will be depreciated by 
the failure of the owner of the neighbouring estate (D) to install guttering (as 
required under council regulations), performs the work;6 (v) P pays a debt 
owed by D to a third party, in order to redeem goods owned by P and lawfully 
seized by the third party.7 In all of these cases, the plaintiffs seek recompense 
for the services rendered. With the exception perhaps of examples (ii)8 and 
(iv),9 in all these cases there would be a reasonable likelihood that such a claim 
would succeed.
The phrase "recompense for services rendered" will be used inclusively
3 Cf. Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 1 W.W.R. 758, 2 D.L.R. 787, in which the rescuee had 
attempted suicide.
4 Cf. Berry v. Barbour, 279 P. 2d. 335 (1954).
5 Cf. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d 390 (1953). See also Lamb v. Bunce (1815) 4 M. & B. 275.
6 George L. Schnader v. Cole Building Co., 202 A. 2d 326 (1964), in which the plaintiff paid 
the council to perform the work and sought reimbursement by claiming to be subrogated to the 
right of the council. The claim succeeded. Cf. Guardians of the Poor of the Holborn Union v. Parish 
of St. Leonard (1876) 2 Q.B.D. 145, to be discussed infra n. 149.
7 Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308. For similar examples, see Goff & Jones, 346-7. Such 
cases are said to be examples of the "compulsory discharge of another's liability". The word 
"compulsion" must be treated with caution, however, for the compulsion does not stem from 
any actions of the defendant, but instead stems from the plaintiff's existing legal obligations or 
from the actions of a third party.
8 In Berry v. Barbour, 279 P. 2d. 335 (1954) the intervener (a building contractor 
previously employed by the defendant to repair the building) succeeded in a claim for 
recompense for the work done. Palmer, Vol. II, 373, however, considers that if the services had 
been provided by a neighbour "there is little or nothing in the case to indicate he would be 
entitled to recover the value of the labour and materials used." In the writer's view, the issue 
would turn on a number factors, including the reasonableness of the repairs, the urgency with 
which they needed to be made and whether or not the services were intended to be gratuitous. 
These matters will be considered further below.
9 See discussion in § 8.3, as to the difficulties facing the self-serving intervener in 
pursuing a successful claim in Anglo-Australian law. In the United States, it seems likely that 
such a claim would succeed. See supra n. 6.
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to refer to two types of claims: (1) the reimbursement for goods expended and 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred; and (2) remuneration10 for a plaintiffs time 
and effort. Although a distinction between reimbursement and remuneration 
may seem artificial,* 11 it will be seen below that in some circumstances it may be 
more difficult to pursue a claim for remuneration than merely for 
reimbursement. Consequently, such a distinction will at times need to be 
drawn.12
Significantly, irrespective of whether the claim is for remuneration or 
reimbursement, since the concern is with cases of unsolicited services,13 a 
defendant usually will not have received anything capable of being returned as
10 Another term commonly used in this context is that of "reward". Some writers use 
the terms remuneration and reward interchangeably to refer to recompense for time and effort, 
as distinct from reimbursement for expenses incurred. See, e.g., Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 
Chapter 17, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (hereinafter: "Stoljar, Negotiorum 
Gestio"), and Honore, A.M., "Law, Morals and Rescue", in Ratcliffe, J.M., (ed.) The Good 
Samaritan and the Law (1966), 225, 234 (hereinafter: "Ratcliffe"). Others, however, appear to use 
reward to refer to something further, such as a bonus awarded, or an ex gratia windfall 
payment. See Rose, F.D., "Restitution for the Rescuer" (1989) 9 O.J.L.S. 167, 201. To avoid 
confusion, the term remuneration will be used to refer to claims for recompense for time and 
effort; reward will only be used in the sense of a bonus or windfall payment.
11 Arguably, in the latter case, a plaintiff is simply seeking reimbursement for the 
expenditure of his or her labour. Cf. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 16-7. To draw such distinctions 
may also lead to anomalous results. As Rose points out, supra n. 10, 202: "The possibility of 
recovering expenses provides further support for the recoverability of remuneration in that to 
distinguish between the two types of recovery would be to create an anomaly. If a person can 
recover the expense of employing a warehouseman to store a cargo owner's grain, why should 
he not be remunerated for storing the grain himself?" (footnote omitted). There is some support 
for this view in the cases. In Jenkins v. Tucker (1788) 1 H. BL. 90, 94, for example, Wilson J. 
suggests that there is no difference between a claim (in that case for funeral services) by 
someone who has carried out a service personally, and one who has hired another to perform 
the service and "defrayed the expences". Similarly, see Ambrose v. Kerrison (1851) 10 C.B. 777, 
per Jervis C.J.
12 While in theory there should be no differential treatment of claims for 
reimbursement and remuneration, nevertheless as a practical matter, where a claim is for 
remuneration only it may be more difficult to show that the services were not intended to be 
gratuitous, especially where carried out by a non-professional. It should be noted, however, 
that there are few claims solely for remuneration for time and effort, successful or unsuccessful. 
In many cases (such as in examples (ii) and (iv) above), the performance of services will require 
both the service provider's time and effort, as well as the outlay of expenses.
10 Unsolicited, non-mistaken payments of money directly to the defendant are likely 
to take the form of either gifts or loans and will thus not raise any legal difficulties. As Birks has 
pointed out in "Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law" [1971] C.L.P. 110, 115, in relation to 
circumstances of necessity: "If my help in your emergency takes the form of money actually 
given into your hands it will either be a present or a loan. If I intend to recover at all, it will 
therefore be in contract." Consequently, the cases do not concern payment of money to a 
defendant directly.
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such, that is, for which specific restitution can be ordered.14 So unless the 
plaintiff has fulfilled a pre-existing duty owed by the defendant to another 
(often in the form of a debt), an order for recompense for services, rather than 
return the parties to their status quo before the plaintiffs intervention, "creates a 
new financial burden for the defendant."15 A defendant will be forced to bear 
the costs of such services despite not having solicited them and despite the fact 
that such a defendant's wealth will not necessarily have been enhanced. The 
plaintiff in such a case effectively seeks to allocate the costs of his or her 
conduct to the defendant. Hence the reference in the chapter heading to the 
allocation of costs, rather than to the restitution of benefits, as some 
commentators would have.16
"Costs" refer to very specific types of losses of a plaintiff: deliberately 
assumed burdens—what some have labelled "sacrifices"17—such as expenses 
incurred, in goods and money, and time and skill expended. Excluded from the 
scope of the term "costs" are injuries or losses to the plaintiff's person or 
property fortuitously incurred in the course of his or her actions.18
14 An exception might be where the plaintiff has supplied goods to the defendant, 
which have not been consumed and of which he or she seeks the return, or where the services 
have produced an end-product which can be returned.
15 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 10. Where the plaintiff has paid a pre-existing debt, 
requiring a defendant to reimburse the plaintiff does not impose a new burden, though it does 
change the nature of the obligation, namely the identity of the obligee. This is clearly a lesser 
burden than being required to meet a new obligation to pay for unsolicited services and the 
significance of this will become apparent later.
16 Some commentators perceive the problem as one of the restitution of benefits. The 
difficulty with this view has been dealt with in Chapter 4, but the essential flaw rests in the 
artificiality of treating remedies shaped by the costs incurred by a plaintiff as being concerned 
with the disgorgement of benefits. The "restitutionalists" treat such services as a benefit even 
though in all these cases, the services will not have been requested or accepted and in many 
cases will not have resulted in a valuable end-product, or even, in some cases, have saved the 
defendant any "necessary" expenditure.
17 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio; Stoljar, "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice" (1987) 
50 M.L.R. 603; Muir, G.A., "Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener" in Finn, 297.
18 Normally, fortuitous losses will only be recoverable by a plaintiff if such losses can 
be traced to someone's (the defendant's) breach of duty (for example, a duty of care). The cases 
considered here do not encompass such claims, limited as they are to costs which can be traced 
to the plaintiff's deliberate acts, but recovery for which is, as already indicated, not premised on 
any breach of duty on the defendant's part. The compensation of injury suffered by plaintiffs 
raises different issues to those addressed here and the theoretical constructs developed herein 
would not appear to be an appropriate mechanism for determining liability. For example, 
compensation claims for injury potentially may involve large sums and, given that defendants 
here may be completely innocent of any wrongdoing, it would be harsh to impose such liability 
on the same grounds as those on which other costs may be allocated. Stoljar rejects the use of
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Let us return to the examples outlined above. As they illustrate, the 
interveners have deliberately rendered services without the request of the 
defendants and while not acting under any mistaken assumptions.19 Although 
the plaintiffs' actions amount to deliberate intervention in the defendants' 
affairs, few w ould argue that intervention in such circum stances is 
unreasonable. This is despite each plaintiff's very different motivations. The 
physicians and concerned neighbour of examples (i) (aid to accident victim), 
( i i )  (medical treatm ent of child) and ( ii i)  (repair to dam aged roof) are  
motivated by altruistic concerns for the welfare of others, albeit, as will be seen, 
only by a limited form of altruism .20 In examples ( iv )  (debt paid to redeem 
goods) and (v) (improvements to neighbouring estate), the interveners act 
largely or even entirely out of self-interest, to protect their own property and 
interests. We are considering then, two very different kinds of intervener: on 
the one hand, there are those intervening prim arily to further their own 
interests, and on the other, there are those intervening prim arily21 in the 
interests of others;22 in short, the self-server23 and the altruist respectively. 
Nevertheless, in both types of case, the courts may be prepared to allocate the 
costs of an intervener's ju s t i f ia b le  conduct to the defendant as the m o r e  
appropriate  party to bear those costs.
To say, however, that a plaintiff may recover in those circumstances
negotiorum gestio-type doctrines as appropriate for recovering for injuries sustained. See 
Negotiorum Gestio, 149-52. See also Dawson, J.P., "Rewards For the Rescue of Human Life" in 
Ratcliffe, 63, 85-9, for a persuasive argument against recovery on a no-fault basis from a rescuee 
for injuries incurred in the course of a rescue. Cf. Levmore, S., "Waiting for Rescue" (1986) 72 
Va L.R. 879, 898-9. Contrast Honore, supra n. 10, who supports recovery from the no-fault 
rescuee for injuries sustained, but "only so far as his means reasonably permit" (236).
19 The mistaken improver of another's land or the mistaken payer of money are not of 
present concern and will be discussed in the following chapter.
20 This is because a "pure" altruist (to use the terminology of Stoljar), is likely to 
render the services with a gratuitous or donative intent and this, as will be seen, is generally 
fatal to recovery.
21 It will be seen that altruists may recover even where motivated by some self- 
interest, provided they intended to act primarily in the interests of the defendant or some third 
party.
22 Cf. Palmer, Vol. II, 362.
23 This term is not intended to be pejorative, for the protection of one's own interests is 
a legitimate motivation for acting. This is reflected by the law's response to the self-serving 
intervener, who, it will be seen, often succeeds in recovering costs incurred.
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where a defendant is the "more appropriate" party to bear the costs of a 
plaintiffs "justifiable" conduct as an intervener, can never be intended to 
operate as a legal principle. It is simply too open-textured, too general, to be of 
any use in determining when a plaintiffs claim may in fact succeed. Such a 
general statement can at best merely describe the effect of a number of liability 
rules. But even as a descriptive device, the statement needs clarification as to 
the two fundamental concepts identified: (1) what sort of conduct can be said to 
be justifiable (as an intervention for which recompense may ensue)?24 and (2) 
in which circumstances is the defendant the more appropriate party to bear 
particular costs? In order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to 
identify the different and competing concerns underlying the determination of 
a claim by an intervener. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to isolate 
some of these concerns, which will vary according to whether the intervention 
was motivated by altruism or by self-interest. Thus, it is proposed to deal with 
these two types of cases separately. Importantly though, in both types of 
intervention, the distinctive feature of the cases under consideration is that the 
determination of legal liability is arrived at largely by focusing on the plaintiffs 
conduct, and on the effects of that conduct, rather than by focusing on the 
defendant's circumstances (his or her conduct, status, relationship with the 
plaintiff, enrichment, and so on).25 Of course, a defendant's conduct may have 
created the condition precipitating a plaintiffs intervention in the first place, as
24 A finding that a plaintiff's conduct is justifiable is part of the process of inquiry to 
determine whether recovery should be allowed: a conclusion that conduct is not justifiable is 
not intended to suggest that it is somehow morally reprehensible or wrongful.
25 A number of grounds for recovery have been suggested which seek to justify 
recovery in these cases by reference to the defendant's circumstances. These do not, however, 
stand up to close scrutiny. It has been argued that one moral basis for imposing liability upon a 
defendant rests upon that defendant's moral obligation to compensate his or her benefactors. 
Cf. Goodin, R., Protecting the Vulnerable (1985), 99-104. But such a moral obligation would 
appear to depend upon the benefit having been accepted, which will not be so in cases under 
consideration here. Related to this type of argument is the view that a liability may be said to 
arise from a duty on the part of the defendant to show gratitude. Even if such a duty exists, 
however, it need not translate into and in fact suggests against a duty to make financial 
recompense for the services. There are many other ways of showing gratitude. See Berger, F.R., 
"Gratitude" [1985] Ethics 298. This view is given judicial support by the observations of Eyre 
C.J. in Nicholson v. Chapman (1793) 2 H. & BL. 254, 259, that "acts of benevolence from one man 
to another" arguably did not give rise to a legal duty for recompense (note, however, the 
contrary view expressed earlier in the judgment) and "should depend altogether for their 
reward upon the moral duty of gratitude." Thus, Eyre C.J. appears to be saying that a duty to 
show gratitude does not equate with a duty to make recompense.
Similarly, basing liability upon the defendant's failure to disgorge an enrichment does not 
stand up to scrutiny, given that the defendant will not usually have received any tangible 
benefit to disgorge. An order for recompense imposes a new financial obligation upon the 
defendant, in circumstances where he or she need not have been benefited. See supra n. 16.
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examples (iii) (refusal by parents to treat child) and (iv) (failure to install 
required guttering) above demonstrate.
It is important to emphasise this feature of the cases. Whether a plaintiff 
will be entitled to recompense for his or her intervening actions is dependent 
upon balancing competing legal concerns and policies which revolve around 
judgments and conclusions about the plaintiff's actions. These include, in 
matters to be expanded upon below, judgments as to the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff's conduct and whether the plaintiff was a "proper" person to intervene 
or merely an "intermeddler". Similarly, in protecting a defendant's autonomy 
to order his or her own affairs, the courts consider whether a plaintiff's actions 
have unjustifiably deprived a defendant of an opportunity to choose to act 
otherwise. Even the issue of the "appropriateness" of the defendant to bear the 
costs turns on the plaintiff's conduct—whether he or she has acted altruistically 
or in self-interest, or whether the plaintiff's conduct has fulfilled some duty of 
the defendant.
Given these very special features of the claim by an unsolicited 
intervener, it is not surprising that the courts have been fairly cautious in 
allowing such claims. Although in the writer's view, some commentators have 
over-emphasised this caution ,26 it is nevertheless fair to say that the 
circumstances in which recovery will be allowed are fairly limited.27 This is 
evidenced by the fact that it is the impediments to recovery rather than the 
principles upon which recovery can be claimed which the courts have tended 
to emphasise and which feature prominently in the language and reasoning of 
the cases. The reasons for this caution will be brought out more sharply below.
It is not easy to isolate the competing concerns underlying the 
determination of a claim by the altruistic intervener and the self-server, 
respectively. There appear to be two broad reasons for this. First, where the 
courts have denied recovery, they have often done so by using conclusory or 
even pejorative labels, such as "volunteer" or "officious intermeddler", to 
describe a plaintiff, without articulating the underlying concerns or limiting
26 See, e.g., Hope, E.W., "Officiousness" Pt I & II, (1929) 15 Corn. L.Q. 25, 205, at 25, 
citing Radin, Handbook of Roman Law (1927), 301-2: "There are few persons for whom the 
common law has so little kindness as for the voluntary intermeddler in other persons' affairs."
27 Such a caution exists also in jurisdictions which have a doctrine of negotiorum gestio. 
Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, Part 1, particularly at 11, has pointed out that the limits upon 
recovery evident in the common law are largely reflected in civil law systems.
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policies these labels are meant to signify.28 Such labels appear to do little more 
than "state conclusions rather than guide analysis."29 Secondly, when allowing 
recovery the courts have often resorted to vague language—appeals to "natural 
justice" are not uncommon—to justify their finding; and further, unlike the civil 
law, such recovery has been effected by resort to quite disparate doctrinal 
vehicles and never as part of any broader, coherent doctrine or principle.80 
Most decisions thus appear as single or isolated instances, or seemingly 
anomalous extensions of existing well-understood legal doctrines. Such 
doctrinal vehicles include amongst others:81 resort to quasi-contract,82 or more
28 Klippert, 100, notes that in some cases, to call a “transfer voluntary is merely to use 
a legal term as a conclusion; it acts as a substitute for legal analysis. This causes a problem 
because we are not informed on what basis the court has decided to treat the claimant as a 
volunteer . For the inadequacies of the term "volunteer7', see Hope, supra n. 26. It is often 
said that a "volunteer" will not recover (see, e.g., Radin, cited supra n. 26). Yet, to take but one 
example, in the ex Argos (1872-3) L.R. 5 P.C. 134, the court stressed the voluntary nature of the 
plaintiff's actions before allowing recovery. Not surprisingly, Palmer, Vol. II, 359, has said that 
"volunteer" is a "word of many meanings". See generally, Klippert, Chp. 4, who at 99 states 
that a "volunteer is an elusive person in restitution cases ... . Most generalizations about him 
break down in light of the decided cases." Hope, 28-9, prefers the term officious, but there are 
difficulties with this as well. Wade, ]., "Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request" 
(1966) 19 Vanderb. L.Rev. 1183, 1212, has concluded that expressions like "officious" and 
"volunteer" are no more than "question-begging epithets".
29 Landes, W.M., & Posner, R.A., "Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other 
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism" (1977) 9 J. of Legal Studies 83,84, note that 
"[t]he efforts of conventional legal scholarship to give these terms concrete meaning have not 
been very successful, and there is a growing tendency to acknowledge that, as currently 
employed, such terms state conclusions rather than guide analysis" (footnotes omitted). At 90, 
fn. 16, the authors provide an economic definition of "officious".
80 Cf. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 4: "At common law negotiorum gestio does not 
officially exist as an independent institution operating in its own right." Similarly, Jackson, 24, 
has said that the "principle of negotiorum gestio does not exist in our law." Nevertheless, in the 
view of Stoljar, the "common law, too, contains results, strewn over several places, all of them 
eminently comparable to those achieved in the civil law." Cf. Birks, supra n. 13, 110, who 
"questions] [the] reality" of the common law's "supposed hostility" to claims for unsolicited 
services; and McCamus, J.D., "Necessitous Intervention: The Altruistic Intermeddler and the 
Law of Restitution" (1979) 11 Ox. L.Rev. 297. See also Powell, R., Law of Agency (2nd ed., 1961), 
416: "A thorough investigation of English case law would reveal a large number of cases in 
which the basic principle of negotiorum gestio has in fact been followed." Contrast the 
conclusions of Aitken, L.J.W., "Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law: A Jurisdictional 
Approach" (1988) 11 Syd. L.R. 566. It has been argued that the refusal of the English common 
law to adopt a doctrine of negotiorum gestio is due to a difference in national temperament: 
Hope, supra n. 26, 29. Stoljar concludes, however, in Negotiorum Gestio, 34, that "[t]here is ... 
little or no justification for the idea that common and civil law are so starkly different as to 
reveal a deep cultural rift, a radical divergence of national temperament."
81 See, e.g., Sorrell v. Paget [1950] 1 K.B. 252.
82 An example is a claim for quantum meruit for services rendered and money paid 
actions, as in the funeral cases, to be discussed below.
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recently, particularly in Canada33 and the United States, Restitution or unjust 
enrichment;34 indirect relief in the form of the reduction of damages payable in 
tort by the tortious preservers of property;35 enforcing contracts apparently in 
contradiction of the rule that past consideration is not valuable consideration;36 
a gradual expansion of the "agency of necessity" doctrine, to be considered 
below;37 subrogation in equity;38 and the enforcement of "implied" contracts.39 
Arguably, the absence of a coherent, single doctrine has proved to be an 
impediment to an ordered development of the law governing recovery for the 
unsolicited intervener.40
33 See, e.g., Re Jacques (1968) 66 D.L.R. (2d) 447, and Samilo v. Phillips (1968) 69 D.L.R. 
(2d) 411. In the latter case, Seaton J. considered "agency of necessity" as a "further branch of 
restitution".
34 See the Restatement of Restitution, §§112-117. An example may be Cotnam v. Wisdom, 
104 S.W. 164 (1907), although the basis of recovery is not entirely clear, with references also 
being made to implied contract.
35 E.g., Munro v. Willmot [1949] 1 K.B. 295. The defendant allowed the plaintiff to store 
her car at his premises. After several years, and having tried unsuccessfully to communicate 
with the plaintiff, the defendant spent £85 to repair the car, in order to make it saleable, and 
subsequently sold it. The plaintiff sued for damages in detinue or conversion and succeeded, 
but the court allowed the defendant to credit the amount he had spent to render the car saleable 
against the damages awarded for the value of the car at the time of the sale.
36 See, e.g., Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 199 (1935), and the cases cited therein. In Webb v. 
McGowin, a promise to "care for and maintain" the promisee for the rest of his life, made 
subsequent to the promisee's rescue of the promisor from serious injury or even death and in 
consideration of the past act of rescue, was held enforceable. This case went far beyond 
remuneration for the services rendered, but other cases cited in Webb have involved promises to 
that effect. See also Gibbons v. Proctor (1891) 64 L.T. 594, and Williams v. Cawardine (1833) 4 B. & 
Ad. 621.
37 See Sims & Co. v. Midland Ry Co. [1913] 1 K.B. 103; cf. Springer v. Great Western Ry Co. 
[1921] 1 K.B. 257. For the widest statement of the principle, see Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp & 
Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 K.B. 566. See also In re F. (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 75, per 
Lord Goff. Contrast the restrictive approach of Scrutton L.J. in Jebara v. Ottoman Bank [1927] 2 
K.B. 255, 270. The doctrine has been said to be limited to existing agents, acting outside their 
usual authority, but has also been applied to parties who were not agents at the time of 
necessity. See infra n. 109.
38 George L. Schnader v. Cole Building Co., 202 A. 2d 326 (1964).
39 E.g., Lamb v. Bunce (1815) 4 M. & B. 275. See also Great Northern Ry v. Swaffield 
(1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 132, 137, per Pigott, B.; but contrast at 136, per Kelly C.B., and at 138, per 
Pollock, B. Note that this was considered to be a case of agency of necessity by McCardie J. in 
Prager v. Blatspiel [1924] 1 K.B. 566.
40 The common law may, however, be moving towards an acceptance of a more 
general principle governing recovery, at least in relation to the altruistic intervener. See In re F. 
(Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 A.C. 1, per Lord Goff, particularly at 73-6, where his 
Lordship accepts the existence of a general principle of necessity. Lord Goff's statements are
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Given this diversity of forms of action and the lack of a ready-made 
formula laid down in authoritative judgments, any attempt to find common 
ideas running through these cases is difficult. Consequently, any legal 
framework for such ideas must to a large extent be constructed from the results 
and reasoning of all the cases. Constructing such a legal framework is 
nonetheless possible. As will be seen, both the justifiability of a plaintiffs 
conduct and the appropriateness of the defendant to bear the plaintiffs costs 
are determined by the mostly uniform application of identifiable concerns, 
though admittedly these are often not expressly or clearly articulated.
An added difficulty in coming to some understanding of the basis of 
recovery for unsolicited services is that the number of decisions, particularly 
those concerning altruistic interveners, is small. Outside of maritime salvage, 
for example, the writer knows of no Australian authorities concerning claims 
for recompense by rescuers of property. And the dearth of authorities in some 
classes of case is not restricted to Australia. Consequently, it is proposed to 
consider common law decisions as a whole. This is not to presume that there 
may not be a distinctive English, Australian, Canadian or United States law, 
but rather to acknowledge that there is insufficient authority in many types of 
case (particularly outside the United States), to make any meaningful 
comparisons. Thus, the exercise here will essentially be a speculative one of 
attempting to state what the common law might be.41 And although arguably
expansive and accept a general principle of necessity at common law, applicable whenever 
actions are taken in the best interests of a person and where the necessity of the circumstances 
means that it is not practicable to communicate with the assisted person (75). These views, 
however, are expressed in the context of establishing the lawfulness of a person's physical 
interference with another's body without that other's consent. Lord Goff stresses that claims for 
recompense for services raise separate questions. It is unlikely that Lord Goff's general 
statement of principle can be applied without qualification to the latter type of case, where a 
plaintiff goes beyond seeking to establish the lawfulness of his or her actions and instead seeks 
to allocate the costs of such conduct to the defendant.
4  ^ This is a necessity made more real by the age of some of the authorities. It would be 
entirely speculative to predict how some of these problems would be decided today, though 
this does not prevent us reaching a view as to how they ought to be decided.
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the United States courts have been a little more liberal in granting relief42 than 
their English counterparts, so that United States decisions may have to be 
treated with some caution, such "liberality" may simply be a reflection of the 
greater volume of cases heard by United States courts, rather than of any 
significant divergence in legal principle.
Despite all of these difficulties (or perhaps because of them), claims by 
unsolicited interveners are perhaps of greater interest than any other in 
Restitution, for they bear no resemblance to other mainstream and well- 
recognised sources of liability in our common law. As such, they have often 
been marginalised and largely neglected.43 However, such a fate need not be 
inevitable. In Continental legal systems, for example, many of these types of 
cases are united by the doctrine of negotiorum gestio, or "unsolicited 
intervention in another's affairs" .44 Such European doctrines are essentially 
limited to cases of altruistically motivated rescue or intervention45 and are thus 
not as inclusive as the subject-matter of this chapter. Negotiorum gestio does, 
however, cover much of the material to be considered under the heading of 
altruistic intervener, to which we now turn.
§ 8.2 THE ALTRUISTIC INTERVENER
That selfless acts done for the welfare of another or of the community 
generally are morally good has been widely recognised amongst moral
42 See, for example, Stoljar's consideration of the rights of finders of goods, where he 
suggests that under United States law, the right to recover is more liberal. See Negotiorum 
Gestio, 122-3. But this may not be the case generally. Palmer, for example, and despite the 
recognition of liability for certain types of unsolicited interventions in the Restatement of 
Restitution, strikes an essentially pessimistic chord. He considers that the United States courts 
have been particularly restrictive so far as the altruistic intervener is concerned. See Palmer, 
§10.1. This compares, for example, with the views of Birks, writing in an English context. See 
Birks, supra n. 13.
43 One notable exception is the writing of Professor Stoljar in what is perhaps the 
definitive comparative work, Negotiorum Gestio. This work is a significant achievement and this 
writer has drawn liberally upon it. Renewed interest in Restitution has also partially rectified 
the neglect of cases of unsolicited intervention (see, e.g., Goff & Jones, Chp. 15), but such 
interest has also had (in the writer's view) the deleterious consequences which follow from 
seeking to incorporate such cases within an unjust enrichment framework, within which they 
do not fit comfortably.
44 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 3. See, however, In re F. [1990] 2 A.C. 1, discussed supra n. 
40.
45 This altruism, however, must be of the limited kind to be considered below.
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philosophers46 and the judiciary. Thus, by way of example, it has been said that 
"[t]he impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of the most 
beneficial instincts of humanity."47 Ever since the parable of the Good 
Samaritan48 (and probably before), there has been little dissent from such 
views. But the law's concern is not with the virtue of the well-meaning actor, 
but with the issue of whether the "Good Samaritan" who intervenes in the 
affairs of another can obtain recompense for his or her services. When 
addressing this issue, the law has proved cautious in allowing recovery. This 
caution reflects the need to balance competing policies. In particular, when 
firstly determining whether conduct is a justifiable intervention for the 
purposes of establishing a right to recompense, very generally speaking, the 
courts repeatedly emphasise two countervailing concerns:
(1) On the one hand, it is desirable that the law encourage, or at least not 
discourage "socially useful" interventions 49 These terms incorporates a 
number of ideas to be considered below, but reflects an overall 
conclusion that the conduct in question is likely to enhance social well­
being or utility; and
(2) On the other hand, there is a need to protect individuals in society 
against undue interference in their liberty, by discouraging conduct 
which amounts to an unjustifiable disregard for the autonomy of others.
Balancing these conflicting policies leads to a determination as to whether a 
plaintiff's conduct was justifiable in the circumstances.50
Once the question of justifiability is resolved, it is still necessary to go
46 See generally, Honore, supra n. 10.
47 Scaramanga v. Stamp (1880) 5 C.P.D. 295,304, per Cockbum C.J.
48 Luke, 10.30-37.
49 Cf. Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 49, who employs the term "useful", derived from 
notions of utility, found in the civil law of negotiorum gestio.
50 This clash of policies is reflected in philosophical debate as to when paternalistic 
actions are morally justified. Considerations of paternalistic behaviour attracts two applicable 
moral principles. In the words of Lee, S., "On the Justification of Paternalism" (1981) 7 Social 
Theory and Practice 193:
One is the principle that prescribes the avoidance of harm to a person. The other is the 
principle that proscribes interference with another person's choices. The harm principle 
morally favors paternalistic interference, and the liberty principle morally opposes it; 
thus the clash.
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one step further and show why it is that the defendant should bear the costs. For 
the defendant may still legitimately ask, "but why should I pay?".51 This raises 
a number of other issues which will be considered under the head of 
"appropriateness". But first, the justifiability of a plaintiff's conduct will be 
considered in detail by reference to the two general competing policies outlined 
above.
§ 8.2.1 Justifiable Conduct
§ 8.2.1.1 Not discouraging socially useful conduct: social utility
It should be noted from the outset that the term "socially useful" is not 
generally employed by the courts. It is merely a convenient short-hand 
conclusion arrived at after considering a number of more specific requirements 
which must be satisfied. To generalise, the burden of these requirements is the 
social utility of the conduct, a point which has been emphasised in the case 
law.52
One requirement for conduct to be considered socially useful would 
appear to be that the purpose, or end-desired outcome, of the conduct is one 
which society perceives as worthwhile. Perhaps the simplest way of illustrating 
such worthwhile purposes is by reference to cases which have allowed 
recompense for particular types of conduct. Not surprisingly, given the 
undoubted worth of such actions, recovery has been allowed where a plaintiff 
has sought to save a life or preserve property.53 Other services for which 
recovery has been allowed include: the supply of "necessaries" such as food,
51 The fact that society has an interest in not discouraging certain conduct might 
warrant public funds being used to recompense plaintiffs. This is indeed the situation in 
Austria, which has provided for a state fund from which saviours of another's life may be 
awarded grants. See Dawson, supra n. 18, 88. There are, of course, many publicly funded 
bodies (police, fire brigade, "state emergency services", and so on) whose function is to carry 
out socially useful acts of the type under consideration.
52 See, for example, references such as those to the "inconvenience to the public" that 
would arise if the plaintiff had not acted: Rogers v. Price (1829) 3 Y. & J. 28; 148 E.R. 1080,1082, a 
case involving the burial of a corpse. Cases involving the supply of necessaries to those in need 
have also stressed the social utility of the conduct in question. See, e.g., Wentworth v. Tubb 
(1841) 1 Y & C.C.C. 171; 62 E.R. 840, 842, in a passage cited infra, text to n. 148.
53 Although outside of maritime law, recovery in the latter case may still be rare. See 
generally, Mclnnes, M., "Restitution and the Rescue of Life" (1994) 32 Alb. L.Rev. 37.
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medicine, or other basic necessities of life54 to the poor,55 physically56 or legally 
incapacitated;57 actions taken in the interests of public health58 and safety59 
(such as the prompt burial of the dead);60 and the preservation of another's 
"credit" 61 or financial position 62
Another important aspect of the social utility of a plaintiff's conduct 
would appear to be the reasonableness of any costs incurred, in the sense that 
the intervention is a resource-efficient one, at least in the circumstances as they 
appear to the intervener. Clearly, where an intervener can, at little cost, save a 
person from serious injury or death, or save valuable property, society has 
benefited. Conversely, expending large sums in an attempt to save property 
which is obviously worth little, is particularly wasteful.65 This element of 
utility—reasonable cost—has been stressed in a number of the cases64 and is 
emphasised by economic analyses of rescue law. Such analyses have suggested 
that the rules appear to ensure that there be some proportionality between the
54 See the discussion of "necessaries" in Nash v. Inman [1908] 2 K.B. 1. It has been held 
that acts to preserve the estate of a mentally disordered person are "necessaries". See Williams 
v. Wentworth (1842) 5 Beav. 325; 49 E.R. 603.
55 Lamb v. Bunce (1815) 4 M. & S. 275; 105 E.R. 836
56 Re Jacques (1968) 66 D.L.R. (2d) 447.
57 Such as infants (In re Clabbon [1904] 2 Ch. 465) or the mentally disordered (Williams 
v. Wentworth (1842) 5 Beav. 325). Claims for such services have been allowed either directly 
against the recipient of the necessaries, or against a defendant who owed a duty to supply the 
necessaries to the recipient.
58 Guardians of the Poor of the Holborn Union v. Parish of St. Leonard (1876) 2 Q.B.D. 145 
(cleaning rubbish from premises).
59 Note the comments of Kelly C.B. in Great Northern Ry v. Swaffield (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 
132, 135.
60 See the series of decisions known as the funeral cases, to be considered further
below.
61 See § 8.2.2.2 in relation to acceptor's of bills of exchange.
62 Samilo v. Phillips (1968) 69 D.L.R. (2d) 411.
65 What is a reasonable cost becomes a much more difficult problem, as yet 
unaddressed by the law, where the rescue of life is the issue.
64 Particularly in the funeral cases. For example, in Tugwell v. Heyman (1812) 3 Camp. 
299, Lord Ellenborough noted that the charges incurred were "fair and reasonable" and that the 
services were "suitable to the [deceased's] degree and circumstances". See also The Winson 
[1982] A.C. 939,958, per Lord Diplock.
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value of the outcome which is sought to be achieved and the costs of achieving 
such an outcome. This idea is illustrated by the law of maritime salvage—the 
salvage of cargo and ships wrecked at sea. Landes and Posner, for example, 
argue that the rules governing maritime salvage65 conform with notions of 
economic efficiency, that "the purpose of salvage awards is to provide 
incentives for efficient resource allocation."66
Finally, the need to establish social utility may require that conduct be 
reasonable in two other respects: first, that the plaintiff has acted reasonably in 
all the circumstances,67 acting, for example, with due care and skill; and 
secondly, that it was reasonable for the particular plaintiff to have acted in the 
circumstances, a requirement perhaps manifested in the emphasis placed by 
some courts on the plaintiff being a "proper" or "appropriate" person to act. 
The meaning of such terminology, however, is not generally made clear.68 
Although few cases appear expressly to turn on these two requirements, they 
may explains69 why claims for remuneration (for time and effort) generally 
only succeed where the claimants are professionals (such as physicians) or 
stand in some relationship with the defendant or the defendant's property. 
Thus, in many of the cases involving the preservation of property (outside
65 Which, unlike the rules governing most of the topics under consideration here, are 
well-settled. See generally Steel, D., & Rose F., Kennedy's Law of Salvage (5th ed., 1985)
66 Landes & Posner, supra n. 29,102, and see also at 100. According to such economic 
analysis, court interference is justified in imposing an obligation upon defendants in such 
circumstances because of the "high transactions costs" of achieving a bargain. These costs 
include the possibility and costs of communication, the time available, and the expenses of 
bargaining. The professional nature of salvage operations is, however, a distinguishing feature 
which may mean that the conclusions of Landes and Posner may not readily translate to other 
types of rescue. See also Levmore, supra n. 18, who considers whether particular types of rules 
will maximise the incidence of life rescue.
67 The action "must be such as a reasonable and prudent man would take in his own 
interest." Rose, supra n. 10,193. See also Phelps, James & Co. v. Hill [1891] 1 Q.B. 605, 611. Cf. In 
re F. [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 75, though note the context in which the comments were made: supra n. 40.
68 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Tucker (1788) 1 H. BL. 90. In the funeral cases, this requirement 
appears to have been satisfied either by the plaintiff being an undertaker or some relative of the 
deceased. The requirement that a plaintiff be a "proper" person is not particularly widespread, 
however, and cases which have used such language have not tended to articulate when a 
plaintiff will be considered as proper. See Hope, supra n. 26, 42. In any case, a number of 
funeral cases have accepted that a stranger can perform such services. See infra n. 136. The 
requirement that a plaintiff be a "proper" person may also be a manifestation of the principle to 
be discussed below, that the plaintiff has not unjustifiably interfered in the autonomy of the 
defendant, that is, that he or she is not an intermeddler or "busybody". See Birks, supra n. 13, 
122-3.
69 Other reasons will be considered below.
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maritime law), the claims were by bailees of the property70 or agents of the 
defendant.71
To summarise, in order to prove socially useful, a plaintiff's services will 
generally have had a purpose which the law considers worthwhile, and will 
generally have been carried out at a reasonable cost and been reasonable in all 
the circumstances. It is important to note, however, that it does not appear to be 
a prerequisite for a successful claim that the services have been of benefit to the 
defendant72 or the third party (such as a dependent of the defendant) for whom 
the services were rendered. In other words, the services need not have proved 
successful. Thus a plaintiff may still obtain recompense for a failed rescue 
attempt, as in Matheson v. Smiley,73 where a doctor failed to resuscitate an 
injured person. The law's concern appears to be with the general social utility 
of the conduct of the type in question, rather than with any actual benefit 
conferred on an individual defendant in a given case. We will return to this 
point below.
The notion of social utility, then, incorporates these requirements. In 
circumstances in which they have been satisfied, it might be argued that 
allowing recovery is "a means of encouraging interventions which are 
perceived to be socially useful."74 However, this may be stating the matter too 
broadly. Perhaps more cautiously, it could be said that allowing recovery aims 
not so much at actively encouraging socially useful conduct, but at not 
discouraging it.75 The reason for this caution is that encouragement suggests an
70 See Palmer, Vol. II, 371. See also 369, fn. 3, for American cases which have denied 
recovery for services aimed at preserving property.
71 See, e.g., The Winson [1982] A.C. 939, and G.N.R. v. Swaffield (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 132. 
Alternatively, this may merely reflect that such persons are more likely to have been in the 
vicinity of the property and felt obliged to assist or perhaps were even under a duty to act.
72 The notable exception to this are claims for maritime salvage.
73 [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787.
74 McCamus, supra n. 30, 297-8. Similarly, John Austin has said that the basis of the 
obligation to indemnify one who has "to his own inconvenience" acted for the advantage of 
another, such as in cases of salvage, is "to incite certain useful actions. If the principle were not 
admitted at all, such actions would not be performed so often as they are." See Jurisprudence 
(4th ed., 1879) Vol. 2, 944 (emphasis in original). Note, however, that McCamus considers that 
the operating principle which justifies recovery by necessitous interveners is unjust enrichment: 
that benefit disgorgement is the underlying rationale. Cf. Goff & Jones, 26.
73 The extent to which rules of law ever influence human behaviour, however, 
particularly in this sphere, is open to debate. Note the contrasting positions of some writers. 
See, e.g., McCamus, supra n. 30, 298, who considers it unlikely that the rules relating to rescue
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active promotion of certain conduct.76 Yet the common law does not appear to 
have gone this far. For example, unlike most civilian jurisdictions, the common 
law does not impose a general77 duty to rescue.78 Some commentators would 
cavil with the need for such an obligation and the positive encouragement of 
certain conduct that such a duty would entail.79 It is unlikely, however, that 
anyone would argue that such conduct should actively be discouraged.80 Yet a 
failure to recompense (and especially to reimburse) a plaintiff who has incurred 
expenses in performing such an act could almost be considered punitive. It has
will have an impact on shaping human affairs. Contrast Rudzinski, A.W., "The Duty To Rescue: 
A Comparative Analysis" in Ratcliffe, 91, 122: the "law quite successfully modifies human 
attitudes, reinforces moral impulses, and awakens the indifferent and the passive."
76 It may even suggest an active promotion of a particular moral ideal, that we behave 
as Good Samaritans.
77 Some persons in certain special relationships with others may owe them a duty of 
care, extending to a duty to rescue. These categories appear to be expanding. See Levmore, 
supra n. 18, 899-900. See also Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman (1985) 60 A.L.R. 1, 28-31, per 
Mason J., as to circumstances in which a duty in tort may arise to take positive steps to protect 
persons, to whom the duty is owed, against foreseeable harm.
78 As was stated in a United States case of Union Pacißc Railway Co. v. Cap-pier, 72 P. 
281, 282 (1903):
Those duties which are dictated merely by good morals or by human considerations 
are not within the domain of the law. Feelings of kindliness and sympathy may move 
the Good Samaritan to minister to the needs of the sick and the wounded at the 
roadside, but the law imposes no such obligation; and the suffering humanity has no 
legal complaint against those who pass by the other side.
Some persuasive arguments have been put in support of a duty to rescue. See, e.g., Adler, J.M., 
"Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of 
Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others" [1991] Wis. L.R. 867. See 
particularly at 878-86, for a persuasive attack upon the distinction drawn in tort law between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance, and at 901, for a brief summary of the author's alternative 
approach. See also Rudzinski, supra n. 75, particularly 119-25.
79 See, e.g., Epstein, R.A., "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1970) 2 J. Legal Studies 151, 
200-1. Landes & Posner, supra n. 29,119 et seq., appear to reject the need for such a duty. See 
also Dawson, supra n. 18, 85-9, and generally Menlowe, M.A., & McCall Smith, A.M., (eds) The 
Duty to Rescue: The Jurisprudence of Aid (1993).
80 E.g., Landes & Posner, supra n. 29, 119 et seq., point out that there is no reason 
based on economic efficiency to impose a duty to rescue, but support a right of "restitution". 
Note, however, that it could be argued that there is no essential difference between 
"encouragement" and absence of "discouragement". See Honore, supra n. 10, 232-3.
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been said that there is no neutral position: if the law "does not compensate, it 
will indirectly penalise."81 For if the
rescuer who suffers injury or incurs expense or simply expends his skill 
goes without compensation, the law, so far as it influences conduct at all, 
is discouraging rescue.82
Even if one does not go so far, it seems clear that recompense for socially 
useful services ought not to be disallowed where a failure to recompense may 
discourage in future such socially useful conduct or can be considered to 
penalise a plaintiff who has engaged in such actions. Such a conservative 
statement of the underlying aim of recovery—not to discourage or penalise 
socially useful conduct—is supported by the requirements of utility already 
considered. The combined weight of meeting these requirements could in fact 
prove burdensome for interveners seeking recovery. In any case, these 
requirements are of themselves insufficient to justify recovery. There is little 
evidence of generosity in granting relief, which is also reflected in the next 
issue: the constraining concern of the need to protect the autonomy of others.
§ 8.2.1.2 Protecting the autonomy of the defendant
A respect for liberty requires that individuals have the freedom to make 
choices, in order to pursue their own goals and desires. Although of course 
such freedoms cannot be absolute (being subject to legal and social constraints), 
a society which values individual autonomy also needs to guard against those 
who unjustifiably intermeddle in the affairs of others. Such values are reflected 
in our legal system, and in relation to claims for unsolicited83 services take the 
form of a preclusion against recovery where a plaintiffs intervention amounts 
to an unnecessary or unjustifiable disregard for the autonomy of the defendant. 
Even if an intermeddler was acting in the "best interests" of another,84 and the 
intervention in that other's affairs was socially useful, such an intervention will 
nonetheless be unjustified where, to a reasonable person's knowledge,85 that
81 Honore, ibid, 232.
82 Honore, id.
83 A request for services will be sufficient to establish that the plaintiff's "intervention" 
was not in disregard of the defendant's autonomy. See Re Jacques (1968) 66 D.L.R. (2d) 447.
84 We are leaving aside the possibility that the plaintiff may even have been motivated 
by malice. See, e.g., Norton v Haggett, 85 A. (2d) 571 (1952).
85 It is probably a sufficient justification for a plaintiff's intervention if such plaintiff 
reasonably believed that the defendant was incapable of ordering his or her affairs. For
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other was perfectly capable of ordering his or her own affairs. Thus a mechanic 
who makes substantial repairs to a client's car additional to those requested, 
without the client's knowledge,86 doubtless has no claim for recovery, even 
where the repairs needed to be made.87 The mechanic could simply have 
contacted the client to have the repairs authorised.
In legal parlance, preclusion against recovery by those who disregard 
the autonomy of others often take the form of admonitions against "officious" 
intermeddlers and "volunteers". The Restatement of Restitution, for example, has 
adopted the concept of "officiousness" as a general limiting principle upon a 
right to Restitution.88 These terms will be avoided here, however, for they are 
of uncertain meaning and scope.89 Instead, the restriction on recovery will be 
stated in terms of an unjustifiable disregard for the autonomy of others.90 Such 
a statement, of course, requires substantiation as to what amounts to an 
"unjustifiable disregard". This will be done by setting out some of the specific 
factors that the courts appear to consider in deciding whether or not to grant
example, it has been held that it is possible to recover for necessaries supplied to a "lunatic", 
where the lunatic was one not so found. See Morrow v. Morrow (1920) 52 D.L.R. 628
86 If that other was aware of the repairer's actions, then a doctrine of acquiescence, for 
example, may give rise to a legal liability, founded on the "unconscionable" conduct of the 
owner in not disabusing the repairer of the owner's intention not to pay. This is doubtful, 
however, where the repairer has not acted under any mistake. In such a case, it could be argued 
that the repairer has taken the risk of not being paid. A similar debate, in unjust enrichment 
circles, has centred on whether a defendant who stands by while a risk-taker performs services 
can be said to have "freely accepted" those services and thus be liable to make "restitution" for 
the "benefit" conferred. See generally, Burrows, A.S., "Free Acceptance and the Law of 
Restitution" (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 576, and Birks, P., "In Defence of Free Acceptance" in Burrows, 
Essays, 105.
87 The result will be the same even where the owner accepts that the repairs needed to 
be made; he or she is still entitled to choose how and when those repairs should be made. For 
an example of even more extreme conduct of this type, see Finelli v. Dee (1968) 67 D.L.R. (2d) 
393, in which a contractor performed work after a contract with the defendant had been 
cancelled, waiting till the defendant had left for a holiday before performing the work.
88 Section 2 states that "[a] person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is 
not entitled to restitution therefor" but then rather unhelpfully adds (comment a), that 
"officiousness means interference in the affairs of others not justified by the circumstances 
under which the interference took place."
89 See supra n. 28.
90 Advocates of unjust enrichment encapsulate this idea within the policy that benefits 
cannot be forced upon people against their will. See Wade, supra n. 28,1212.
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recovery, at the back of which, it is suggested, lies the desire to safeguard the 
autonomy of individuals.
There have been repeated judicial warnings against forcing liabilities 
upon people behind their back91 or "in spite of their teeth" .92 Since ordering 
recompense for services involves limitations upon the defendant's use of his or 
her limited resources—it imposes a new obligation, in fact—the law is reluctant 
to interfere, even where the services can be seen to be beneficial.93 For where 
the particular defendant was in a position to choose, the issue is one of 
allowing such choice.94 As Baron Pollock laconically stated in Taylor v. Laird, 
"one cleans another man's shoes. What can one do but put them on."95 The 
strength of this exclamation is not weakened by a plaintiff producing evidence 
of the social utility of clean shoes and his or her selfless motivation in seeking 
to rid the world of dirty shoes. For the fact is that in such a case, there is 
ordinarily no impediment to a plaintiff asking whether the defendant wants the 
shoes cleaned.96 Unjustified intermeddling should not be encouraged by 
creating an expectation of recompense in such circumstances.97 The notions, 
that freedom of choice is to be protected and intermeddling not to be 
encouraged, are alternative expressions of the same underlying idea: the need 
to protect against an unjustifiable disregard for individual autonomy.98
91 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, 248, per Bowen L.J.
92 Stokes v. Lewis (1785) 1 T.R. 20, 22, per Lord Mansfield. For similar expressions of 
opinion, see also Wade, supra n. 27,1183, fnn. 2 & 3.
93 This will be so under whichever definition or approach to benefit one may care to
take.
94 For a strong articulation of the underlying concerns of liberty behind denying relief 
for unsolicited services, see generally Mathews, P., "Freedom, Unrequested Improvements and 
Lord Denning" [19811 C.L.J. 340. For an economic perspective to the "free choice" argument, 
see Levmore, S., "Explaining Restitution" (1985) 71 Va L.Rev. 65, 74-9.
95 (1856) 25 L.J. Ex. 329, 332.
96 Economists would argue that there are no high transaction costs and therefore no 
impediments to bargain. It is argued then that on grounds of economic efficiency alone, the 
court should refuse to impose such a bargain. See Levmore, supra n. 94, 79 et seq. Allowing 
recompense in such cases would result in "thin", that is, uncompetitive and inefficient, 
markets.
97 Allowing recovery in such circumstances would amount to an endorsement of the 
plaintiff's conduct. As to when paternalistic behaviour is justifiable, see, Lee, supra n. 50.
98 Contrast McCamus, supra n. 30, 300-1, who considers these to be quite separate 
concerns. This appears to ignore the fact that intermeddling conduct is conduct which gains its
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How does this concern manifest itself in the legal rules under 
consideration? A distinction needs to be drawn for the purpose of answering 
this question between cases in which the plaintiff has acted in the defendant's 
interest (saving his or her property, for example), and cases in which the 
plaintiff has acted in the interests of a third party (supplying necessaries to a 
dependent of the defendant, for example), including the public, thereby 
fulfilling a duty of the defendant. These two cases will be taken in turn.
§ 8.2.1.2.1 Acting in the interests of a defendant
Where a plaintiff has sought to act in the interests of the defendant, the 
law could take one of two approaches in order to protect the defendant's 
autonomy. First, the law could seek to protect the defendant7s actual choices, by 
considering his or her subjective preference as to what he or she would have 
done in the circumstances: whether, in fact, the defendant would have chosen 
as the plaintiff did and incurred the liability or sought the services. It is clear 
that such an approach would be unsound and has not been adopted. It would 
make the success of a plaintiff's claim dependent upon facts he or she would 
have had no awareness of at the time of acting. Particular idiosyncrasies of the 
defendant, even quite perverse ones, could defeat the plaintiff's claims.
Instead, the courts protect a defendant's interests by restricting 
interference in the defendant's opportunity to choose, as a rational, capable 
adult. Where a plaintiff has deprived the defendant of an opportunity to act 
which he or she would otherwise have had, then recovery will generally be 
barred. Where, to a plaintiff's reasonable assumption, no opportunity has been 
interfered with, then the courts ignore any idiosyncratic choices the defendant 
may have made, but of which the plaintiff was unaware (such as an attempted 
suicide's desire to die),99 and simply determine (on utility grounds) whether 
the defendant should pay in the circumstances.100 No opportunity of a
character from the interference in another's affairs, interference which in some way limits that 
person's freedom of choice or autonomy.
99 Cf. Goff & Jones, 377.
100 Some unjust enrichment writers (see Goff & Jones, 375, Birks, 194) use the 
language of whether a defendant would  have incurred the liability in the circumstances, but it is 
clear that they have in mind an objective determination by the courts or an objective bystander 
as to what such a choice of the defendant should be, rather than a determination based on his or 
her actual choice. To state that a defendant would have incurred the liability in question 
consequently amounts to no more than a conclusion that the defendant should pay. But by 
formulating this conclusion as part of a benefit-based approach, the whole process obscures the 
underlying reasons for why the defendant should pay, namely that the plaintiff justifiably
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defendant to act will have been interfered with where there was an emergency, 
or the defendant was legally or physically incapacitated or absent,101 or where 
the plaintiff reasonably believed such circumstances to govern the situation.102
To take an example, if P should mend ID's storm-damaged roof to avoid 
a threatened danger of further storm damage, while D is absent on an extended 
overseas trip having left no means of contact, it cannot be said that P has 
interfered in D's opportunity to choose. There simply was no opportunity for D 
to make a choice: the need for swift action would preclude the argument that 
the matter could have been dealt with upon D's return. D's actual choices, as to 
whether to have the roof fixed at all, and the manner of fixing it, are not 
relevant to this determination.103 Where, however, to P's knowledge D was 
only away at work for the day (and readily contactable), then D has every 
opportunity to act before the danger to his or her property eventuates, so that 
interference by P in such circumstances would amount to an unjustifiable 
disregard of D's opportunity to choose.104
acted, non-gratuitously, in the interests of the defendant. It is not necessary that the defendant 
was benefited as a result of such actions. This is discussed under the heading of 
"appropriateness".
101 For a consideration of the necessity for consent to medical treatment, and the 
circumstances in which such consent will not be necessary, see In re T. (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782, (C.A.). See also In re F. [1990] 2 A.C. 1.
102 There is little authority for this proposition, but where a plaintiff reasonably 
believes that there is no opportunity for a defendant to make a choice and acts accordingly and 
reasonably, then such conduct would seem justifiable. See supra n. 85.
103 The example is not intended to suggest that a claim by P for recompense would 
necessarily succeed. P would still have to show that the work was socially useful (§ 8.2.1.1) and 
not intended to be gratuitous (§ 8.2.2). Cf. Berry v. Barbour, 279 P. 2d 335 (1954).
104 An example used by Feinberg, J., "Legal Paternalism" in Sartorius, R., (ed.) 
Paternalism (1983) 8-9, further illustrates the point. He commences by quoting J.S. Mill:
If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge 
which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of 
his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement 
of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire 
to fall into the river.
Of course, for all the public officer may know, the man on the bridge does desire to fall 
into the river, or take the risk of falling for other purposes. If the person is then fully 
warned of the danger and wishes to proceed anyway, then, Mill argues, that is his 
business alone; but because most people do not wish to run such risks, there was a solid 
presumption, in advance of checking, that this person did not wish to run the risk 
either. Hence the officer was justified, Mill would argue, in his original interference.
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Where services take the form of the rescue of property or life, the 
defendant's opportunity to choose is generally protected by the need to show 
the existence of some necessity which justifies the intervention. This can be 
illustrated by the requirements of maritime law and the "agency of necessity" 
doctrine.
In maritime law, it is necessary that there was some danger at sea before 
a claim for salvage is potentially available.105 It is sufficient for these purposes 
that "there was a possible contingency that serious consequences might have 
ensued."106 Although it has been reconfirmed that the law of salvage does not 
extend beyond the seas,107 where an emergency arises on land, the doctrine of 
"agency of necessity" has at times been used in an analogous way to allow 
recovery for services performed, usually by existing agents or persons acting on 
their behalf,108 but also by "strangers" ,109 in order to preserve property110 or
105 Under English law, maritime salvage law has been extended by statute to aircraft. 
There is no equivalent legislation in Australia. See White, M.W.D., (ed.) Australian Maritime Law 
(1991), 210.
106 The Ella Constance (1864) 33 L.J. Adm. 189, 193 per Dr. Lushington. Consequently, 
there need not have been an "immediate risk" or "immediate danger". One suggested test (in 
Steel, D.W., & Rose, F.D., Kennedy 's Law of Civil Salvage (5th ed., 1985), 14), is that the danger 
must have been
so much a just cause of present apprehension, that, in order to escape out of it or to 
avoid it (as the case may be) no reasonably prudent and skilful seaman in charge of the 
venture would refuse the salvor's help if it were offered to him upon the condition of 
his paying for it the salvor's reward.
107 The Goring [1988] 1 A.C. 831; see also in the Court of Appeal, [1987] Q.B. 687.
108 Most cases involve either claims by existing agents who seek recompense for the 
services rendered or expenses incurred, or claims by parties who have been contracted by the 
agents, and who seek to recover in contract against the defendants, so that the issue turns on 
whether such contracts were "authorised". An example of the latter type of claim is Langan v. 
Great Western Railway (1874) 30 L.T. 173. The issue of whether a contract is authorised will 
depend upon whether the agent's powers were expanded by the necessity of the circumstances. 
In the House of Lords, it has been suggested that "agency of necessity" ought, strictly speaking, 
be used to refer only to the latter type of claim: The Winson [1982] A.C. 939, 958, per Lord 
Diplock, 965, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale. But the label has in the past been applied to both 
types of claim.
It has been argued, and the view has merit, that cases which concern existing agents are of less 
interest than those in which there is no pre-existing agency, given that notions of implied 
powers can adequately explain the former type of cases. Consequently, the former type of cases 
may be seen as nothing more than specialised cases of true agency, with all the usual 
consequences incidental to the exercise of an agent's power. See McCamus, supra n. 30, 303-10, 
particularly at 305. As he points out, the pre-existing relationship may give rise to a duty to act 
on the part of the agent. See ex Argos (1873) L.R. 5 P.C. 134, and Langan v. G.W.R.
109 It has been suggested that there are in fact very few examples of "agency of 
necessity" cases extending relief beyond pre-existing agents. See Aitken, supra n. 30, 591-7, who
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assist injured persons.* 111 For the doctrine to apply, however, there must be, 
amongst other things112 some necessity or emergency, so that there is a real 
danger to property or life,113 and a shortage of time, so that it can be said that 
there is a pressing urgency for action.114 This requirement encapsulates the 
idea that the owners of property (or parties responsible to injured persons) be 
given all reasonable opportunity to choose how best to deal with a particular 
situation. Consequently, it is sufficient if communication is merely impractical 
rather than impossible,115 given the emergency and the time available.116
concludes (at 5%) that "[algency of necessity stands revealed as little more than an excrescence 
on a basally unsympathetic common law." Cf. Birks, supra n. 13, 130. Undeniably, however, 
there is obiter in support of a wide doctrine of agency of necessity. For the strongest judicial 
support, see Prager v. Blatspiel [1924] 1 K.B. 567. See also Irrre F. [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 75. Contrast 
Jebara v. Ottoman Bank [1927] 2 K.B. 254. It is interesting that the earliest development of the 
doctrine involved cases of shipmasters, who, it has been argued, cannot realistically be seen as 
true agents of the cargo owners. See McCamus, 306; and Aitken, 594, who concedes the point. 
There are other cases as well which are difficult to rationalise on the basis of an existing agency, 
or even an existing relationship. See, e.g., The "Cynthia" (1852) 20 L.T.R. 52, and McCamus's 
discussion of Hastings v. Village of Semans ([1946] 4 D.L.R. 695), at 307. Contrast the conclusions 
of Aitken, 598.
1111 E.g., Tetley & Co. v. British Trading Corp. [1922] LI. L.R. 678, and Sims v. Midland 
Railway Co. [1913] 1 K.B. 103.
It must be conceded, however, that there is considerable English dicta denying a stranger a right 
to recompense for acts to preserve property. See, for example, the statement of Lord Reid in The 
To jo Maru [1972] A.C. 242, 268: "On land a person who interferes to save property is not in law 
entitled to any reward." One case commonly cited in support of such a proposition is Nicholson 
v. Chapman (1973) 2 H. BL. 254; but that case concerned a claim for a lien, rather than a personal 
claim. There are conflicting statements in the case, some of which would appear to rather 
favour personal recompense for preserving another's property. See Birks, supra n. 13, 111-2. 
The conflicting statements are quoted infra, § 8.2.2.1. See also Muir, supra n. 17,322, who points 
out that whilst the authority in support of a proposition against recovery for property saved on 
land is weighty, it consists entirely of obiter. In other jurisdictions, claims by strangers for the 
preservation of another's property have succeeded. See, e.g., Re Pike (1888) 23 L.R.I. 9 (Ireland), 
and Frost v. Ponca, 541 P. 2d. 1321 (1975).
111 A number of cases involve railway accidents in which existing agents arranged for 
the treatment of the injured. See, e.g., Walker v. Great Western Railway (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 228, and 
Langan v. Great Western Railway (1874) 30 L.T. 173.
112 For the elements of a successful claim of an "agency of necessity", see Prager v. 
Blatspiel [1924] 1 K.B. 567, as well as Goff & Jones, 366-9, and Hastings v. Village of Semans [1946] 
4 D.L.R. 695.
113 Rose, supra n. 10,185.
114 Landes & Posner, supra n. 29,100.
115 See also the Restatement of Restitution, §117 (1) (b).
116 Sims v. Midland Ry. [1913] 1 K.B. 103, 107, per Scrutton J.; Cf. Birks, 201. See also
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Where a "principal" is absent or unreachable, it cannot be said that the rescuer 
has disregarded that principal's autonomy or opportunity to deal with the 
situation as he or she desires.
Where a plaintiff is in an existing relationship with the defendant (being 
a bailee of the defendant's property, for example), then there may arise a duty 
by virtue of that relationship to act in an emergency to protect such property. 
An "agency of necessity" in such circumstances may not only authorise the 
agent to act as he or she did, but may require it. The existence of such a duty, 
however, clearly entitles the plaintiff to recompense for costs incurred in 
discharging that duty,117 including perhaps remuneration for time expended.
In both rescue at land and at sea, then, the requirement that a danger to 
property or life amounts to some emergency is itself, if not defined by, at least 
given substance by, the very inability of the defendants to preserve their own 
interests. Thus a defendant might be unconscious or injured,118 absent,119 or 
incapable of being communicated with in the short time frame available given 
the pressing need for the services.120 The plaintiff's actions do not unjustifiably 
disregard the defendant's opportunity to choose in such circumstances. 
Perhaps a more difficult issue, however, arises where conditions of emergency 
exist, but the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that the defendant did not 
desire such services.121 Should recovery for the services ensue? Some cases 
suggest not. Thus, in Mulloy v. Hop Sang, a patient whose arm was injured in an 
accident, expressed a clear desire that his hand be saved until he could see 
another surgeon. The operating physician was unsuccessful in his claim for 
services rendered when he amputated the hand, despite the reasonableness of
Springer v Grt Western Ry Co. [1921] 1 K.B. 257.
117 The Winson [1982] A.C. 939. See generally Muir, supra n. 17, 316-9, and particularly
320-1.
118 See Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787; Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); 
Estate of Crisan, 107 N.W. 907 (1961).
119 Berry v. Barber, 279 P. 2d 335 (1954).
120 Economists might say that transaction costs are too high for a bargain to be 
negotiated. See Landes & Posner, supra n. 29, 100.
121 See the Restatement of Restitution, §116 (c). Presumably, this would include a desire 
to be left to die. See In re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782, but see also 
Matheson v. Smiley [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787, and cf. Goff & Jones, 377.
339
his actions.122 Such circumstances would be very rare, however, for even if, to 
take one example, a physician treats an attempted suicide, the physician may 
not know the suicide's true intentions (was it a "serious" attempt, or merely an 
attention-seeking exercise?),123 or his or her mental competency.124 Where, 
however, an adult with full mental capacity makes a clear choice to refuse 
treatment, which refusal clearly encompasses the circumstances which have 
arisen, then such a choice should be respected.125
It has been argued by some (Birks, for example) that the existence of an 
emergency suggests some "involuntariness" on the part of the intervener: that 
the plaintiff's conferral of services has resulted from some form of moral 
compulsion.126 To attempt to determine the issue in terms of voluntariness 
however, does not aid analysis. For it is often the case that the plaintiff had 
alternative choices. Birks concedes that in maritime salvage cases "it cannot be 
said that the law confines awards to those who have felt compelled to give 
assistance . " 127 The same can be said of cases of the application of other
122 [1935] 1 W.W.R. Cf. Malette v. Shulman (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 325. See also Soldiers 
Memorial Hospital v. Sanford [1934] 2 D.L.R. 334, in which the defendant, after being arrested, 
was taken to a hospital by the arresting officers in order to be treated for a serious wound. 
There was some evidence that the patient did not desire the services (335). Given the 
seriousness of his injuries and doubts about his level of consciousness at the time (see 338-9), 
this should not of itself have precluded recovery. Nevertheless, the decision disallowing 
recovery appears justified, given that the patient was under arrest and that there consequently 
resided a duty in the municipality (through the arresting officers) to ensure that he was 
adequately attended. The hospital therefore ought to have sued the municipality as the more 
appropriate defendant. See 337.
123 Cf. Honore, supra n. 10, 234—those who attempt suicide often "lack a settled 
determination in the matter." This could be one explanation for the decision in Matheson v. 
Smiley [1932] 2 D.L.R. 787, although there is a suggestion in the case that a wish to die might 
simply be ignored. In circumstances of an emergency and the surrounding uncertainty, this 
may be a fair conclusion. Otherwise, it is arguable that such a wish to die ought to be respected.
124 For a consideration as to when a person refusing to allow lifesaving medical 
treatment has sufficient capacity to decide, see In re T. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782.
125 Where there is any doubt as to whether the choice was intended to cover the 
contingency or changed situation which arises, then an intervener will be justified in ignoring 
such choices. See In re T. [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782, at 797-8, 803. This will be the case where a refusal 
to receive medical aid was not "made with reference to the particular circumstances in which it 
turns out to be relevant": per Staughton L.J., 804-5. See also Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W. 2d 426 
(1991), and Malette v. Shulman (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 325.
126 See Birks, 193-202. Birks does not provide a satisfactory definition as to what 
amounts to sufficient compulsion. At 173, he states: "The party who was compelled says that 
his brain could not operate freely for fear of some evil consequence."
127 Birks, 305; see also 304.
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doctrines, such as agency of necessity. Thus, in ex Argos,128 for example, the 
plaintiff (the master of a ship), was unable to discharge cargo at the port to 
which he had been requested to transport it. After several unsuccessful 
attempts to off-load the cargo at nearby ports, the plaintiff returned with it to 
the port of departure. The plaintiff was held entitled to recover back-freight 
and expenses, as he had sought to land the cargo where he considered most 
convenient. An explanation of this decision on the basis of compulsion would 
have been difficult to sustain, given the number of options available to the 
plaintiff and the adequate time for reflection. The court concluded that "a 
master should do that which a wise and prudent man would think most 
conducive to the benefit of all concerned. But it appears to be wholly voluntary; 
I do not know that he is bound to do it/ ' 129 Rose sums up the issue succinctly:
there is a right to restitution because the existence of necessity authorises
rather than compels the plaintiff to act.130
In some circumstances, where there is no imminent danger to life or 
property, but still some reasonably urgent need to act, recovery may be 
justified where it was not practical to inform the defendant. Perhaps the best 
examples are provided by a series of decisions—the funeral cases—in which the 
plaintiffs, in the interests of public health and safety, have proceeded promptly 
to bury the dead. In these cases, plaintiffs have recovered for the costs of 
interment where the parties principally responsible for the burial have been 
away131 or unable to be contacted.132 Some of these cases have indicated that 
the party intervening must be a "proper" or "appropriate" person to act, but it
128 (1872-3) L.R. 5 P.C. 134.
129 Ibid, 164.
130 Rose, supra n. 10, 174, (emphasis in original); cf. at 79. See also Burrows, 242-3, 
who rejects moral compulsion as a general explanation of the necessity cases. For a 
consideration of some of the conflicting motivations which may be at work in the mind of both 
rescuers and persons who refuse to render aid in an emergency, see Gusfield, J., "Social Sources 
of Levites and Samaritans" in Ratcliffe, 183.
131 Jenkins v. Tucker (1788) 1 H. BL. 90, (husband abroad when wife died; buried by her
father).
132 Rogers v. Price (1829) 3 Y & J. 28; 148 E.R. 1080, (no opportunity to consult with the 
executor). See, however, Bradshaw v. Beard (1862) 12 C.B. N.S. 344; 142 E.R. 1175, in which the 
defendant was never contacted, even though he did not live far away. Nevertheless, the 
plaintiff recovered.
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is unclear what the underlying concerns of such references are.133 One 
possibility134 is that a conclusion that a person was a proper intervener may 
suggest that the plaintiff (being a relative of the deceased, for example) had an 
interest in acting as he or she did and was not therefore merely intermeddling. 
But in any case, it is not likely that such a requirement will limit recovery to 
persons in a pre-existing relationship with the deceased or defendant, 
especially where the need for action is more urgent.135 Thus, even strangers 
have recovered for funeral services.136
There is, however, a further aspect to the funeral cases: the existence of a 
public duty on the part of a defendant to bury the dead means that often, the 
element of choice is given little prominence. Even if a defendant could be 
contacted, recovery has been allowed where such defendant was unwilling to 
perform his or her duty .137 The courts have repeatedly stressed the public 
benefit of such actions being performed—out of a "proper regard to decency 
and to the comfort of others" .138 The funeral cases may thus best be seen 
alongside other cases in which a defendant's duty has been fulfilled, and it is to 
this issue that we now turn.
§ 8.2.12.2 Fulfilling a defendant's duty
A plaintiff may have acted not in the interests of the defendant, but in 
the interests of some third party or of the public generally and, further, may 
have fulfilled a duty owed by that defendant. What exactly is encompassed
133 Those cases that have made such references usually have concluded, without 
explanation, that the plaintiff was a “proper" person.
134 A conclusion that the plaintiff was an appropriate person to act may also suggest 
that the plaintiff has exercised reasonable skill and care (or was likely to have done so), or has 
acted in the interests of defendant. Cf. Birks' consideration as to the significance of a pre­
existing relationship in proving a plaintiff's claim. See Birks, 202.
135 As in Shallcross v. Wright (1850) 12 Beav. 558: deceased died of "malignant fever", 
and there was a consequent urgency to dispose of the body as quickly as possible.
136 E.g., Tugwell v. Heyman (1812) 3 Camp. 299, Ambrose v. Kerrison (1851) 10 C.B. 776, 
138 E.R. 307.
137 Tugwell v. Heyman (1812) 3 Camp. 299, per Lord Ellenborough, in which the 
executor had not "ordered anyone else to furnish the funeral, and the dead body could not 
remain on the surface of the earth. It became necessary that someone should see it consigned to 
the grave."
138 Ambrose v. Kerrison (1851) 10 C.B. 776,138 E.R. 307. See also Croskery v. Gee [1957] 
N.Z.L.R. 586,589.
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within the notion of "duty", including the issue of whether a duty can be said 
to have been fulfilled where a plaintiff has fulfilled other than a legal duty 
owed by a defendant to another, will be considered further below when we 
consider the appropriateness of a defendant to bear particular costs. For now, it 
suffices to say that the term duty is intended to include assumed obligations, 
such as in contract,139 as well as obligations imposed by statute or common 
law.
A plaintiff who has fulfilled a defendant's duty must still establish that 
there has been no interference with the autonomy of the defendant to choose to 
act as he or she wishes. There is, however, one exception to this general 
requirement, which exception distinguishes "duty" cases from those in which 
no duty has been fulfilled. This exception entitles a plaintiff to ignore the 
defendant's communicated, preferred choices in circumstances where the law 
(post facto) and the plaintiff (at the time) determine that choice to be 
unacceptable.140 An example, a variation of the facts of Greenspan v. S/flte,141 
will illustrate this. A child has incurred a serious sports injury. An 
acquaintance, seeing the injury, realises that unless action is taken, the child 
will suffer further serious damage. He informs the child's parents, who refuse 
to act. The acquaintance may justifiably have the child attended to and is likely 
to recover the medical fees expended.142 The parents' choice is limited by their
139 Such private obligations, however, may have to have a public interest aspect. See 
infra n. 140.
140 This also appears to be the position in the civil law. Under the German Code, for 
example, a gestor can disregard his or her principal's wishes where there is a duty imposed in 
the public interest, or for the maintenance of a relation: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), s. 679. See 
Schuster, E.J., The Principles of German Civil Law (1907), 356.
Where the duty is one owed to a third party, it would appear that there would need to be some 
public interest aspect to that duty. For example, the public has an interest in the prompt supply 
of necessaries to indigents and a plaintiff can thus fulfil this duty where the defendant refuses 
to act. Where entirely private rights are concerned (for example, a contractual debt), a plaintiff 
cannot simply pay the debt (fulfil the duty) in the interests of the third party. As Landes & 
Posner, supra n. 29, 114, have pointed out, the debt can be enforced by more effective or less 
expensive means: the third party can sue in debt or pursue bankruptcy proceedings, for 
example.
141 97 A. 2d 390 (1953). The facts of which are as set out below, except that the 
intervener did not inform the parents before acting. It was considered by the court that this was 
not necessary because of the great urgency in taking immediate action. Palmer, Vol. II, 381, 
however, doubts whether one can say that there was a sufficient emergency requiring 
"immediate treatment" in that case. Consequently, he considers that the parents ought to have 
been informed of the actions beforehand, as they may not have been aware of the seriousness of 
the injury.
142 Query this conclusion, however, if the parents refuse particular treatment (such as
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obligation to their child, which if breached would result in harm to her. This 
will be the legal position in any case in which a plaintiff supplies a minor, 
pauper, or mentally disordered person with "necessaries": food, medical aid or 
some other basic service or items with which every individual needs to be 
provided.143 Although it may be possible to claim directly from the recipient of 
the necessaries,144 where such necessaries are supplied in fulfilment of a duty 
owed by a defendant to the recipient, such services must be paid for even 
where the defendant did not wish them supplied. In Carr v. Anderson, a case in 
which a plaintiff supplied necessary legal services to the wife of the defendant, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota indicated that
[i]t is unimportant that the husband, who does not furnish the necessary, 
does not want it furnished, or forbids its furnishing, or declares in 
advance that he will not pay. The law imposes an obligation, and 
enforces it by a contract remedy.145
The plaintiff in such circumstances cannot, however, entirely ignore a 
defendant's opportunity to choose. Although defendants may not neglect their 
duty, they nevertheless have the right to choose by whom and in which manner 
necessaries should be supplied. A plaintiff is not entitled simply to impose his 
or her own views as to what is best.146 Thus, in the example above, the parents 
must still be given the reasonable chance to fulfil their duty, however they see 
fit, choosing their own doctor or hospital and so on.147
a blood transfusion) on genuine moral or religious grounds; that is, on the basis of a concern for 
the child's spiritual, rather than physical, welfare. Ought the law to recognise such choices? Cf. 
Goff & Jones, 377. The answer may depend on the nature of the duty owed by the parents to the 
child, which at common law appears to be in an uncertain state. See McCamus, supra n. 30, 325- 
6. See also discussion in Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d 399 (1953).
143 See supra n. 54.
144 E.g., In re Clabbon [1904] 2 Ch. 465; or alternatively, from their estate (In re Rhodes 
(1890) 44 Ch.D. 94).
145 191 N.W. 407 (1923).
146 In the words of Muir, supra n. 17, 327:
What the plaintiff must not do is avoid communicating with the defendant if possible 
thus denying the latter the chance to act himself or appoint someone else to do so. But if 
the defendant refuses to act, or even if he prohibits the plaintiff from acting but 
appoints no one else to do so, it is clear that the intervention should be rewarded.
147 See supra n. 141.
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It is accepted that the supply of such services is not only in the interests 
of the individual in question, but also in those of society as a whole. In 
Wentworth v. Tubb, it was said that
[t]he inconvenience which would ensue, if necessaries could not be 
supplied to a person in this situation ... would be great ... . [S]uch a 
person might be left to casual charity—thrown upon the parish, or 
exposed to starvation.148
Similar public interest considerations will also apply where a plaintiff has 
fulfilled a statutory duty of the defendant.149
§ 8.2.2 The Appropriateness of the Defendant to Pay
Unsolicited services which are socially useful and which in law do not 
amount to an unjustifiable disregard of the autonomy of the defendant can thus 
be said to be justified. It is in the interests of society that such actions be carried 
out. The issue here, however, is not simply one of whether society values such 
conduct.150 The issue is whether that cost should appropriately be allocated to 
a particular defendant. Although those cases which allow relief tend not to
148 (1841) 1 Y & C.C.C. 171; 62 E.R. 840, 842, a case in which necessaries were supplied 
directly to the defendant.
149 A good example is provided by Guardians of the Poor ofHolborn Union v. St. Leonard 
(1876) 2 Q.B.D. 145, in which the defendants owed a statutory duty to the public to remove 
“dirt, ashes, rubbish and filth" from within their parish. The plaintiffs requested the removal of 
such material from their warehouse. The defendant refused and the plaintiff subsequently 
incurred expenses in doing the work themselves, reimbursement for which they successfully 
claimed. Since the legislature had imposed a duty, the plaintiffs were entitled to disregard the 
defendants' refusal to act. It would have defeated public policy to disallow the claim. The Court 
considered that it "would be unreasonable to hold that the duty cast upon the [the defendants] 
can be enforced only by indictment or mandamus." (149, per Mellor J.). See also Muir, supra n. 
17, 326-7. A decision which appears in direct contrast, however, is that of Macclesfield Corp. v. 
Great Central Ry [1911] 2 K.B. 528. In that case, the plaintiffs acted after the defendants' refusal 
to fulfil their public duty (under statute) to keep a bridge in repair. The plaintiffs, the local 
authority, believed there may have been a "concurrent" liability to repair (see Cripps K.C., in 
arguendo). Given the dangerous state of the bridge, public safety may have required fairly 
prompt action (though there was no evidence on this: Stoljar, 211), and there was nothing to 
suggest the plaintiffs had in any way performed the work unreasonably (by incurring excessive 
costs, for example). Nevertheless, the claim failed, with the "court sheltering under the blanket 
observation that the plaintiffs [had] acted as volunteers": Stoljar, 211; see, e.g., per Farwell L.J., 
at 539, and per Kennedy LJ. at 541. The case has been criticised widely, and in the view of the 
writer, was wrongly decided. See also Gebhardt v. Saunders [1892] 2 Q.B. 452.
150 It may even be argued that society ought to meet the costs of such conduct. See 
supra n. 51.
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answer this question directly,151 it is possible to glean from the decisions two 
broad categories within which successful claims fall:
(1) the services performed were intended to be in the interests of the 
defendant, and were not intended to be gratuitous; and
(2) the services fulfilled a duty owed by the defendant to a third party or 
the public, and were not intended to be gratuitous.
These two categories will be considered separately, for although it is often 
stated as a general requirement that a plaintiff intended to act in the 
defendant's interests, it is clear that in the latter type of case (the duty cases), 
this will almost invariably not have been the case, with the plaintiff intending 
to act in the interests of the third party or in the public interest.
§ 8.2.2.1 Services performed in the interests of the defendant
In the context of the rescue-type case, although an intervener may have 
been motivated by some self-interest152 (a particularly notable feature of 
maritime salvage, to be discussed below), cases allowing recovery generally 
require that the plaintiff intended to act bona fide and primarily in the overall 
interests of the defendant.153 In some cases, the plaintiff may not have been 
aware of the identity of the defendant, such as where a plaintiff saves 
apparently abandoned goods,154 yet even here it can be assumed that the 
plaintiff is intending to act in the interests of the as-yet-unidentified owner.155
151 Where the courts refuse relief it is often by reference to the fact that the defendant 
ought not to bear the burden in question.
152 The self-interested intervener in another's affairs may be entitled to recover in 
certain circumstances, to be considered in the next section.
153 Where a plaintiff acts from mixed motives, it has been suggested that he or she 
may recover where they have intended to act primarily in the interests of the defendant. See 
The Winson [1982] A.C. 939, 965-6, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale; cf. 962-3, per Lord Diplock. Cf. 
also Rose, supra n. 10, 194-8, who considers that although in maritime law it is clear that 
partially self-interested interveners may still recover, provided they did not act solely in self- 
interest, the position in relation to other claims is not certain (195). He considers that mixed 
motives may defeat a claim (196). For an example of a case in which the plaintiff was partially 
motivated by self-interest and in which the claim failed, see Kelley v. East Jordon Chemical Co., 
127N.W.671 (1910).
154 Cf. Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871), a case refusing recompense for the act 
of rescuing a boat which was adrift, but allowing recovery for the storage and repairs necessary 
to preserve the boat.
155 It may be that the intervener is intending to appropriate the property to himself or 
herself, or at least that this is at the back of his or her mind. But since the concern here is with
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A requirement that a plaintiff intended to act in the interests of the defendant is 
also one of the fundamental elements of the civil law doctrine of negotiorum 
gestio.156
Significantly, both the common law and civil law appear to share 
another important similarity. It seems that, excepting claims for maritime 
salvage, the plaintiff need not show that the acts done in the interests of the 
defendant were ultimately successful. No objectively identifiable benefit need 
have accrued to the defendant in order to recover.157 It is sufficient if the 
plaintiff's actions were socially useful in the sense identified above. Thus the 
endangered property may not have been saved158 or the rescuee may 
ultimately have died.159
This seems reasonably straightforward. There is, however, a 
fundamental tension which has only been hinted at so far. For although a 
plaintiff must have intended to act in the interests of the defendant, he or she 
must also not have intended to act gratuitously.160 Thus on the one hand, the
claims for recompense, this presumes the defendant has received back the property and thus 
such possibilities need not trouble us further.
156 It is a requirement that the gestor "manifests an intention to act in the interests of 
or (more broadly) as an agent for [the principal]": Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 46
157 Contrast those commentators who perceive the claim of the necessitous intervener 
to be one in unjust enrichment. See, e.g., McCamus, supra n. 30; and Birks, supra n. 13. This 
usually involves a conclusory approach to the issue of enrichment.
158 See the civil law cases cited in Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 17, 52-3. See also de Vos, 
"Liability Arising from Unjustified Enrichment in the Law of the Union of South Africa" [1960] 
Juridical Review 125, 132. The writer knows of no cases in relation to property at common law, 
but such a view has the support of a number of commentators such as Goff & Jones, 375, and 
Dawson, supra n. 18, 85, the latter of whom considers that "[i]f the land-based rescuer 
voluntarily ... submits his own body or goods to the risk of loss or injury, there is no good 
reason why he should also assume the risk of failure." Contrast Rose, supra n. 10, 198-9, who 
considers that
there appears to be no specific judicial consideration at common law in England of 
whether a claim for restitution in an emergency should fail for lack of success. The 
problem has received consideration elsewhere, the general effect of the cases being that, 
without success, there is not the enrichment of the defendant necessary to require 
restitution by him.
But Rose does not cite any authorities in support of his proposition and does not indicate to 
which jurisdictions he is referring.
159 See cases supra n. 118.
160 See, e.g., Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch.D. 94. See also Wentworth v. Tubb (1841) 1 Y. &
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law is demanding altruistic conduct, that the plaintiff be motivated by selfless 
concern for others; on the other hand, the plaintiff must not have been too 
selfless, to the point where he or she was acting charitably. Stoljar has 
recognised this point and labelled the requisite intentions of the plaintiff as a 
form of "calculated" altruism. For a "pure" or absolute altruist, one who 
performs services gratuitously, intending them as a gift, would fail in any claim 
should he or she subsequently seek recompense161 for those services.162 In the 
words of Stoljar:
One can surely say that precisely the altruist cannot demand 
recompense; he may deserve gratitude, he may earn a medal, but he 
does not deserve money if the help he gave came from the pure kindness 
of his heart. To put this criticism in another way: A theory of altruism or 
human aid can tell that we ought to help one another, particularly where 
there is a clear and present need; such a theory, however, does not 
explain how we can charge for our services if and when we unsolicitedly 
choose to help.
In this light, the altruism we now consider turns out to be an altruism of 
a special kind. It is a materialistic or calculated altruism, since the gestor 
does not act without intending to charge and, if necessary, even to 
enforce his claim in court.163
Whether, indeed, a plaintiff can establish the requisite degree of 
calculated altruism may depend on the nature of the recovery sought. It may 
prove difficult for a non-professional service provider to show that the mere 
outlay of time and effort was not intended to be gratuitous, and to thus recover 
rem uneration . 164 Where merely reimbursement for expenses is sought,
C.C.C. 171,174.
161 This includes recompense in the form of reimbursement for expenses incurred.
162 Stoljar has pointed out that this point weakens any theoretical justification of 
recompense for the negotiorum gestio on the foundations of encouraging or rewarding altruism. 
See Negotiorum Gestio, 13-6.
163 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 14. Stoljar illustrates the point thus:
Lending money without interest may well be called a kind act, but it is not charity. 
Similarly, lending another a book is assuredly a kind or helpful act but not a wholly 
altruistic one; the owner may lend the book for the other's advantage, even expect it to 
come back the worse for wear, yet he still remains only a lender, not a pure altruist 
making a gift. Indeed, the more altruistic the person the more gift-like or donative his 
acts; and the more he acts graciously, or as a favour, the weaker his right of recovery 
for what he gives or does.
164 Take an example in which a motorist comes upon an road accident and spends one
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however, in most cases there should not be any difficulty proving that the 
services were not intended freely.165 But even this may not be the case given 
the sentiment sometimes expressed, "that virtue should be its own reward." 166 
In effect, the courts appear to be raising a presumption of gratuitous intent; to 
be saying to a plaintiff—"Is not this the sort of charitable, friendly act we in 
society are all obliged to do, should the need arise?" Thus, in Glenn v Savage an 
Oregon court considered that
[t]he great and leading rule of law is, to deem an act done for the benefit 
of another without his request as a voluntary act of courtesy, for which 
no action can be sustained .... The law will never permit a friendly act, 
or such as was intended to be an act of kindness or benevolence, to be 
afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand . . . .167
Such sentiments may be founded on the view that there exists a moral168 
obligation to the community to act in such circumstances.169 Fingarette, for 
example, has said there is
a general acknowledgment of some fundamental and at least minimal 
obligation to make sacrifices for the sake of public order and the safety 
of those who belong in the community.170
hour comforting and rendering first aid to an injured driver whilst waiting for medical help. It 
is difficult to perceive of such services as anything other than gratuitously intended. Even if 
they were not so intended and socially beneficial, how would they be valued? Contrast the 
situation where an ambulance driver comes upon the accident and provides one hour of para­
medical assistance little different from that of the lay-person, above. It is far more likely that the 
ambulance driver's services are not intended to be gratuitous. It is also much easier for the law 
to value such services. See also Dawson, supra n. 18, 83, and Landes & Posner, supra n. 29,110.
165 Consider the friendly roof-repairer of example (ii) in the introduction to this 
chapter. It seems unlikely that such a plaintiff would intend to incur expenses gratuitously. 
Conversely, where only time and effort are outlaid and the roof repairer is not a professional, it 
would be difficult to show that the services were not intended to be gratuitous.
166 Honore, supra n. 10, 234, rejects the validity of this sentiment and in any case 
doubts whether it can apply to claims for "compensation as opposed to reward."
167 13 P. 442 (1887), 448.
168 Where there is a legal duty to act, this will strengthen a claim for recompense. See 
ex Argos (1873) L.R. 5 P.C. 134.
169 In Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442 (1887), 448, the court went on: "let these meritorious 
and generous acts remain lasting monuments of the good offices intended in the days of good 
neighbourhood and friendship."
170 See Fingarette, H., "Some Moral Aspects of Good Samaritanship" in Ratcliffe, 220.
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Whereas Fingarette appears to consider this to be a justification for recompense 
for such acts,171 views such as those expressed in Glenn v. Savage would equally 
suggest that this obligation is one to act gratuitously.172
It is perhaps the common law's difficulty in striking a balance between 
these competing ideas—that is, in coming to grips with a notion of limited 
altruism—which may explain some of the conflicting sentiments expressed and 
the, at times, inconsistent results of the cases. This conflict is perhaps no better 
exemplified than by the dicta of Eyre C.J. in Nicholson v. Chapman.173 In 
considering whether a personal claim for recompense for services in preserving 
property might succeed, the Chief Justice made two contradictory statements. 
On the one hand, his Honour indicated that such services were
meritorious, at least in the moral sense of the word, and certainly intitles 
the party to some reasonable recompense from the bounty, if not from 
the justice of the owner; and of which, if it were refused, a court of 
justice would go as far as it could go towards enforcing the payment.174
On the other hand, later in the judgment, his Honour considered that
perhaps it is better for the public that these voluntary acts of 
benevolence from one man to another, which are charities and moral 
duties, but not legal duties, should depend altogether for their reward 
upon the moral duty of gratitude.
These tensions need to be resolved. In this writer's view, the courts 
should reject the view that certain services ought to be performed gratuitously 
out of a sense of moral obligation, for the upshot of such a view is that persons 
who incur costs in so doing are in effect penalised for their actions.175 The
1' 1 Fingarette, id, goes on to state: "This general obligation underlies and justifies the 
specific obligations spelled out in law and custom." See also at 223: "The law should encourage 
coming to another's aid by providing legitimate physical, financial, and legal protection".
172 The view being that the moral obligation to act is sufficient to stimulate acts of 
rescue; that there is thus no need for legal encouragement. Cf. The Goring [1987] Q.B. 710, per 
Ralph Gibson L.J.
175 (1793) 1 H. BL. 254, 258-9. The case concerned a claim for a lien for expenses 
incurred in saving property. The court did not have to consider the issue of a personal claim.
174 A footnote to the judgment adds:
It seems probable that in such a case, if any action could be maintained, it would be an
action of assumpsit for work and labour, in which the Court would imply a special
instance and request, as well as a promise.
175 Cf. Honore, supra n. 10. Perhaps the common law courts could take guidance from 
civil law of negotiorum gestio, which requires that a gestor must have intended to take charge of
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consequences of this must be apt to discourage such conduct in the future.176 
As it is, the limitations upon recovery are difficult to overcome. A plaintiff 
would need to show that the services were socially useful, were not performed 
in disregard of the defendant's autonomy, and were intended primarily to be in 
the interests of the defendant. Once these matters have been established, 
recovery should ensue where the plaintiff can show that he or she did not 
intend to act gratuitously;177 to require an intent to charge178 is too onerous, 
given that most necessitous interveners will not have turned their mind to the 
issue at the time.179 When deciding whether the plaintiff was acting 
gratuitously, the courts could have regard to presumptions. For example, a 
rebuttable presumption that a near-relative of the recipient of the services 
intended to act gratuitously180 may be warranted on public policy grounds 
alone.181
One further point needs to be made as to the appropriateness of a 
defendant to bear the costs of the plaintiff's conduct. If a plaintiff has assumed 
the risk of the defendant not paying, then he or she will not, and ought not, be
another's affairs. This gets to the crux of the matter, because it points to the critical requisite 
intention of acting in the interest of a defendant whilst not intending to do so gratuitously.
176 See above discussion, § 8.2.1.1.
177 Goff & Jones, 384, even suggest a reversal of the onus of proof—that the defendant 
must show that the services were intended to be gratuitous—but although this view has merit, 
it is not supported by the authorities.
178 Some writers tend to oscillate between these two requisite intentions, despite the 
clearly different states of mind required in each case. See, e.g., Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 44-9, 
141. The Restatement of Restitution has a requirement that the plaintiff acted with an "intent to 
charge". See §§113-7.
179 As Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 141, points out, spontaneous rescue is "typically 
unreflective".
180 See Igbach v. Hoffman, 198 P. 2d 266 (1948), in which the court expressed the view 
that in intra-family transactions, services such as board and lodging are presumed to have been 
supplied gratuitously. Cf. Re Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch.D. 94, which suggests that the onus is upon 
the plaintiff to prove that he or she intended to charge. Cf. Wade, supra n. 28, 1191-2. Where 
services such as the payment of expenses were performed gratuitously, there may nevertheless 
be a basis for recovery where they were rendered under a fundamental mistake, such as the 
plaintiff's mistaken belief as to the recipient's capacity to pay for the services out of their own 
pocket. See Deskovick v. Ponzio, 187 A. 2d 610 (1963), 613: "Such circumstances would take the 
payer out of the category of voluntary intermeddlers."
181 Such a presumption would avoid claims being brought after family squabbles, for 
example.
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successful in a claim for recompense. This may be a further reason why a 
plaintiff who ignores the defendant's opportunity to choose will fail. Such 
interveners can be said to have assumed the risk of the defendant refusing to 
pay, having had the opportunity to bargain with the defendant first.
§82.2.1.1 Exertional features of maritime salvage
It has already been noted that the law of maritime salvage displays a 
number of exceptional features, two of which stand out, for the purposes of our 
discussion. First, given the long historical recognition of claims for maritime 
salvage and the consequently well-established rules governing salvage at sea, a 
large-scale professional salvage industry exists. Given the professional nature 
of the salvage industry, most acts of salvage are now done in at least a partial 
self-interest—the pursuit of profit182—for salvage awards not only include 
reimbursement for expenses and remuneration for time and effort, but 
additional rewards calculated according to the success of the operation.183 The 
professional nature of salvage may also partially explain the second feature 
which appears unique to salvage at sea: that the act of salvage must have been 
successful, and thus beneficial, before a claim for recompense will be 
allowed.184 Stoljar explains this difference by noting that where shipwrecks are 
concerned, it would be difficult to prove or disprove allegations of expensive 
services having been carried out unless one can point to some property or lives 
having been saved.185 Since it cannot be said that salvors have intended to act
182 See Rose, supra n. 10, 194-8, who points out that "[t]he court has ... not only 
permitted but actually encouraged maritime salvors to act out of financial self-interest" (194). 
Rose considers that it is sufficient to justify recovery so long as the salvors were not acting 
"solely" out of self-interest (195). See also Birks, 304-5. For an example in which the salvor was 
clearly acting in self-interest, see The Medina (1876) 1 P.D. 272, affd. (1876) 2 P.D. 5. Birks, 305, 
considers that the salvors in that case behaved "shabbily", by seeking to bargain for a "grossly 
exorbitant" sum with the victims of the disaster: see the report at 2 P.D. 5, 7.
183 Where the parties' rights are not governed by an enforceable agreement, the matter 
is one for the discretion of the court. See Goff & Jones, 395:
In exercising this discretion, the court is not concerned to calculate reasonable 
remuneration for work done, as is done in quantum meruit claims. The court's task is to 
assess the amount of a reward which will, in the interests of public policy, encourage 
others to act as salvors, but which at the same time will not bear too harshly on the 
owners of the salved property.
See, e.g., The Telemachus [19571 P. 47, 49.
184 See Rose, supra n. 10,171: "[T]he cases indicate that, no matter how much public 
policy considerations permeate the whole of salvage law, the essential basis of the claim is in 
fact the provision of a benefit to the defendant."
185 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 121. Consequently, a claim in rem attaching to the cargo
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as clearly in the interests of the defendant as in other cases of rescue, but are 
instead merely professional rescuers seeking to profit from their profession, 
this added requirement of benefit appears a perfectly reasonable basis for 
justifying the link between a plaintiff's conduct and the defendant's obligation 
to bear the "cost" 186 of such conduct.
§ 8.2.2.2 Plaintiff has fulfilled a duty of the defendant
Where a plaintiff's conduct can be shown to have been a justifiable 
intervention to protect the property, life, health or well-being of a third party, 
or to have been in the interests of the public generally, then such a plaintiff may 
recover whenever he or she has in the course of his or her actions fulfilled a 
legal or, perhaps, moral187 duty which the defendant owed to that third party 
or the public. In the words of Rowell C.J. in Mathie v. Hancock:
[Wjhen an obligation is imposed by law upon one to do an act because 
of an interest in the public to have it done, and that one fails to do it, he 
who does do it, expecting compensation, may recover therefor of him on 
whom the obligation is imposed.188
It is not necessary in such cases for plaintiffs to show that their actions were 
intended to be in the interests of the defendants. It is sufficient if the actions 
were intended to be in the interests of a third party (including the public) to 
whom the defendant owed a duty. Again, plaintiffs also needs to satisfy the 
requirement that the services were not intended to be gratuitous. In duty cases, 
however, this requirement does not appear to have raised the same difficulties 
for plaintiffs as in the cases considered above.189
or ship salvage is allowed, given that the existence of the cargo ship provides clear proof that 
beneficial services have been rendered.
It would also appear to be economically sound to limit the salvor's claim to the value of the 
property saved. See Landes & Posner, supra n. 28, 101-5, and note the different rules which 
apply where the concern is with saved lives.
186 "Costs" here extending beyond mere recompense.
187 Whether or not fulfilment of a moral duty will satisfy the requirement that a duty 
of the defendant has been fulfilled will be considered further below.
188 63 A. 143 (1906), 144. Note the above discussion, supra n. 140, on the need for some 
public interest aspect to the duty in question.
189 This may be because a plaintiff will not have acted in the defendant's interest and 
may thus be less likely to need to answer a claim that he or she is an altruist.
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For our purposes, it remains to consider what types of duty need to be 
fulfilled to give rise to a right to recompense. Certainly, the cases suggest that 
plaintiffs may recover where they have fulfilled defendants' legal duties, 
including duties to supply necessaries to dependants; duties to the public to 
inter the dead,190 or preserve public health and safety generally; and duties to 
pay debts owed to third parties.191
A specialised and long-established category of recovery for debts paid 
concerns acceptors for honour of bills of exchange.192 Such an acceptor is 
entitled to be subrogated to the rights and duties of the holder as against the 
party on whose behalf the acceptor paid (the defendant). Such an acceptor may 
have been a complete stranger, having no antecedent relationship with that 
party .193 Although there need not have been anything in the way of an 
emergency, so that these cases cannot really be classed as one of "necessitous" 
intervention , 194 they nonetheless fit within the scheme adopted here. A 
plaintiff's (acceptor's) conduct can be considered socially desirable, in that it is 
in the interests of commerce that negotiable bills be honoured wherever 
possible. Secondly, the plaintiff will not have unjustifiably disregarded the 
defendant's opportunity to choose, as the acceptor will only be entitled to claim 
where a defendant has failed to meet the bill when presented and thereby has 
failed to fulfil his or her duty. Consequently, there is no need to show that the 
acceptor acted in the interests of the defendant, though perhaps one can 
presume this from the fact of the payment itself.
Although it is said that the owner of property does not generally owe a
190 Primarily, such a duty will usually rest with the estate of the deceased. Where it 
appears that no arrangements for burial are being made, then such a duty may rest upon local 
municipalities, who will usually be given a statutory right to recover from the estate of the 
deceased.
191 An interesting example of the payment of a debt under necessity is provided by 
Samilo v. Phillips (1968) 69 D.L.R. (2d) 411, in which a son paid fines owed by his father for a 
criminal breach of tax provisions. The son never informed his father as to the existence of the 
debts as he feared that his father, suffering from failing ill health, would suffer serious harm as 
a consequence. The plaintiffs (the executors of the son's estate) successfully recovered the sums 
paid on the father's behalf from the estate of the father.
192 Although these rights have been given statutory recognition, these rules are 
merely codifications of common law rights that have a long history. See Aitken, supra n. 30, 
577- 80.
193 Aitken, supra n. 30, 579-80.
194 Contrast Goff & Jones, 378, and see Hawtayne v. Bourne (1841) 7 M. & N. 595, 599.
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duty to preserve it,195 in some circumstances such a duty may exist. In 
particular, where the welfare of animals are concerned, owners may be under a 
duty to ensure that animals are not mistreated. Today, such duties may be 
imposed by legislation, but even where this is not the case, it may be argued 
that we have a strong moral duty to not maltreat animals in our possession. 
Arguably, such a moral duty may be sufficient to justify a plaintiff disregarding 
the wishes of the defendant who has not fulfilled such a moral duty, and thus 
successfully claim recompense for the value of the services rendered.196 This 
raises a more general and interesting question as to whether a plaintiff can 
recover in circumstances where he or she has fulfilled other than a legal duty of 
a defendant. In Croskery v. Gee,197 McGregor J., when considering the agency of 
necessity doctrine, observed that it arose "where a person carries out the legal 
or moral duties of another, in the absence of the other." In this writer's view, 
there appear to be no justifiable reasons why a notion of duty should 
necessarily be restricted to legal duties. If a plaintiff has acted either in the 
interests of a third party or in those of the public (and thus not in the interests 
of a defendant), the only basis on which such a plaintiff can establish that the
19  ^ See Morse v. Kenney, 89 A. 865 (1914), 867: "There is no such obligation upon one to 
retain and preserve his property whether it be live animals or anything else. He may abandon it 
or destroy it, if he pleases."
The owner of property, such as a landlord, for example, may have a contractual duty to 
maintain it. In such a case, a tenant may in circumstances of necessity fulfil the landlord duty 
and claim recompense for the services. See, e.g., Waters v. Weigall (1795) 2 Anst. 575.
196 Contrast Morse v. Kenney, 89 A. 865 (1914), 867, quoted ibid. Despite the sentiments 
expressed in that case, many of the cases which have allowed claims for the preservation of 
property have involved animals. See, e.g., Great Northern Ry v. Swaffield (1874) L.R. 9 Ex. 132 
(horse, fed and stabled by the plaintiff; the court pointed out that if the plaintiff had not done 
so, this would have endangered the horse and the public: Kelly C.B. 136); Todd v. Martin, 37 P. 
872 (1894) (stock taken care of after death of owner—estate liable); Wilder Grain Co. v. Felker, 5 
N.E. (2d) 207 (1936) (estate liable for feed necessary to preserve deceased's stock). Contrast the 
result in the latter two cases with that in Mathie v. Hancock, 63 A. 143 (1906), in which the court 
did not consider that the plaintiff's actions were necessary in the circumstances. Admittedly, 
although in none of these cases was it suggested that the defendants did not wish the animals 
"preserved", in this writer's view, they ought not have been entitled to raise such a defence in 
any case. This view, however, runs contrary to a number of decisions in which the defendants 
had indicated they no longer wanted the chattel and in which plaintiff's (presumably as a 
consequence) failed to recover for the cost of keeping the chattel. See cases cited in Wade, supra 
n. 28, 1195, fn. 60 (the most recent of which was in 1901). Two of these cases involved horses, 
the third, a slave. Wade considers that "[a]s applied to living creatures, especially a human 
being, the application of this rule seems very questionable." In the writer's view, such views 
would almost certainly not prevail today. Cf. Rose, supra n. 10,177. See also Robinson v. Walker, 
(1617) 3 Bulst. 269.
197 [1957] N.Z.L.R. 586, 588.
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defendant is the more appropriate party to bear the costs of the intervention198 
is by showing that some duty has been fulfilled. There may well be cases in 
which recovery is justified even though no legal duty of the defendant has been 
fulfilled.199 To this writer's knowledge, however, there are no cases which have 
expressly decided that a plaintiff who has not acted in the interests of the 
defendant can nevertheless recover where he or she has fulfilled other than a 
legal duty of that defendant.200
§ 8.2.3 Summary
A plaintiff who selflessly intervenes in the affairs of another generally 
needs to show that the intervention was justifiable in that it was socially useful 
and did not disregard the autonomy of the defendant. Although it may well be 
in the interests of society that such justifiable interventions take place, it is still 
necessary to determine whether the defendant appropriately ought to bear the 
costs of the plaintiff's actions. The cases suggest that this will be so wherever 
the plaintiff has intended to act primarily in the interests of the defendant, or 
has otherwise fulfilled some duty owed by that defendant. The latter series of 
cases present few difficulties, but the former have generated considerable 
uncertainty, as tensions arise from the law's attempts to balance competing 
ideas and policies, to give meaning to the notion of limited altruism as the 
necessary motivation of the intervener. Such difficulties, as will be seen in the 
next section, are not faced by interveners who have acted primarily in self- 
interest, but nevertheless seek to allocate the costs of their actions to another 
party.
198 Where a plaintiff has intended to act in the interests of the defendant, recovery 
may be allowed on that basis; it will not be necessary to show that any duty of the defendant, 
moral or otherwise, has been fulfilled.
199 An interesting hypothetical example would support such a conclusion. A grazier 
refuses to mend a small segment of fencing on his property, adjacent to a busy road, despite 
repeated requests by the local council that he carry out such work. Numerous accidents and 
near-misses occur as a result of straying animals, but the grazier is exempted from any duty of 
care to the motorists to repair the fence, under the rule in Searle v. Wallbank [1947] A.C. 341 
(House of Lords), (followed in the High Court of Australia in S.G.I.C. v. Trigwell (1979) 26 
A.L.R. 67). The council has no authority to order the repairs but eventually does the work at a 
reasonable cost, motivated by a concern for public safety. Arguably, the council should be able 
to recover their costs, for the grazier has failed to fulfil his moral duty to do the repairs. Of 
course, the council would still need to show that the work done was socially desirable, cost 
effective and warranted in the circumstances. Admittedly, where such a conclusion could be 
drawn, this would suggest that the rule in Searle v. Walbank is itself unjustifiable and that a legal 
duty ought to exist in such a case.
200 Although perhaps Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d 390 (1953) is an example.
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§ 8.3 THE SELF-SERVING INTERVENER
The self-serving intervener, by definition, is motivated by very different 
concerns to those of the (limited) altruist considered above. Yet the rights of 
such an intervener can be described in the same terms: recovery in the form of 
recompense for services rendered will be allowed where the costs of the 
intervener's justifiable conduct should more appropriately be borne by the 
defendant. However, both these determinations—justifiability and 
appropriateness—reflect particular policy concerns which often are not 
articulated explicitly by the courts.
§ 8.3.1 Justifiable Conduct
Goff and Jones have said that "[a] person who confers a benefit on 
another while acting in his own self-interest cannot obtain restitution from that 
other." 201 In English law, at least, general propositions to this effect have 
gained some support.202 Yet it is clear from the results of the cases that in some 
circumstances self-serving interveners will be entitled, not so much to 
restitution, but to recompense for their costs incurred where they have fulfilled 
a duty owed by the defendant to a third party. This will usually be in the form 
of reimbursement for a debt "discharged" .203 Such liability will arise provided 
a plaintiff's "interest" is one which in law is recognised as sufficient to justify 
self-protective measures.
In both English and Australian law, many of these cases coalesce under 
the well-recognised rubric of "compulsory discharge" of another's liability. 
Although it is said in such cases that the plaintiff acted under some legal or
201 Goff & Jones, 56.
202 Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, is often cited in support 
of this proposition. See, e.g., Birks, 195. Interestingly, the famous dicta of Bowen L.J. usually 
cited refers to acts done to preserve another's property and has nothing to say about preserving 
one's own. The case will be discussed further below. Similarly, Ruabon Steamship Co. v. London 
Assurance [1900] A.C. 6, is cited as authority. As will be seen below, however, the self-server 
will only be entitled to recovery where he or she has fulfilled a duty of the defendant, and 
Ruabon Steamship Co. v. London Assurance, both in its reasoning and result, is entirely consistent 
with this view.
203 The issue of when a debt owed by D to TP is said to be discharged by a payment 
by P, is complex. See generally, Beatson, Chp. 7. For our purposes, however, the crux of the 
matter is whether P is entitled to restitution from TP on the basis of mistake, compulsion, total 
failure of consideration, and so on. Where P is not entitled to restitution from TP, then the only 
recourse will be against the principal debtor, D, and these are the circumstances with which we 
are here concerned. See further § 9.2.3.3.
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practical compulsion, this "compulsion" will usually take the form of (1) 
legitimate demands made by a third party that the plaintiff meet his or her 
legal (usually contractual) obligation to that third party (for which the 
defendant is primarily responsible),204 or (2) some threat to the plaintiff's 
property interests.205 Thus, to say that a plaintiff was "compelled" to act must 
not be allowed to obscure the ultimately self-interested nature of the plaintiff's 
actions. For the plaintiff has chosen the option which is in his or her best 
interests at the time,206 in order to meet a legal obligation or to protect property 
interests.207 Clearly, meeting one's legal obligation is a perfectly justifiable 
action, which, where it results in the defendant's primary duty being fulfilled, 
will usually give rise to a right to reimbursement.208 Protecting one's property 
interests is equally justifiable.209 Unhelpfully, however, although the courts
204 Where the plaintiff is under a secondary legal obligation to discharge a debt, for 
example. See Moule v. Garrett (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 101.
205 Where, for example, property was lawfully distrained for rent. See example (v) in § 
8.1, and Exalt v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308; 101 E.R. 1405. See also Edmunds v. Wallingford (1885) 
14 Q.B.D. 811, 814, per Lindley L.J.
2°6 The self-interested nature of the conduct is reinforced by the fact that in general, 
the plaintiffs will have been aware that primary responsibility lay with someone else; 
presumably, the possibility of reimbursement would always have been at the back of their 
minds at the time they paid.
207 Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308; 101 E.R. 1405. Another common type of case 
involves lessees who seek to protect their interest by meeting the obligations of an assignee, 
such as to pay rent to the head-lessor. See Goff & Jones, 347-9.
208 One exception arises where plaintiffs have deliberately exposed themselves to the 
obligation against the wishes of the defendant and in circumstances where there was no reason 
in self-interest for so doing. A recent example is the decision of Owen v. Tate [1976] 1 Q.B. 402. 
The defendants had obtained a loan from a bank (the third party) secured by a mortgage upon 
property owned by a fourth party. The plaintiff, without the defendants' request, and in fact 
contrary to their wishes, deposited money with the bank (and signed a guarantee to pay should 
the defendant default) in return for the release of the fourth party's title deeds. When the 
defendants subsequently defaulted, they requested the bank to have recourse to the deposited 
sums. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sued for the reimbursement of the money. It was considered 
that the plaintiff's conduct was "palpably useless and officious", being contrary to the 
defendants' express wishes and therefore an unjustified interference in their choice as to how to 
run their affairs. The plaintiff had not been motivated by any self-interested desire to protect 
his own welfare. See Fridman, 253-4.
209 If a plaintiff has not acted out of justifiable self-interest or altruism, a claim for 
recompense for costs incurred in non-mistakenly intervening in the affairs of another will 
generally fail. See, e.g., Owen v. Tate [1976] 1 Q.B. 402; In re National Motor Mail-Coach [1908] 2 
Ch. 515. This will be so even where the defendant has benefited as a result of the plaintiff's 
actions and even where the plaintiff fulfilled an obligation of the defendant, such as by 
payment of a debt owed. There is simply no reason why the costs of the plaintiff's actions 
should be borne by the defendant; in fact, the plaintiff may have been acting maliciously (e.g., 
Norton v. Haggett, 85 A. 2d. 571 (1952)), paternalistically, in order to gain the defendant's 
business (perhaps McKissick v. Hall [1929] 1 D.L.R. 48) or for no apparent reason at all (e.g.,
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recognise this and recovery may ensue, such recovery is often allowed on the 
basis of a fiction that the plaintiff had no real choice but to act.210 The fiction 
lies in the fact that other options may have been available to a plaintiff, who 
instead has chosen a course which he or she perceived was in his or her own 
best interests 211
Recovery by the self-server, even in English and Australian law, extends 
beyond the "compulsory discharge" cases. Sutton, for example, has pointed to a 
neglected212 but unrepudiated body of equitable authorities whereby part- 
owners of property are entitled to pay debts owed by other part-owners and 
charged upon the property, and yet keep that debt alive against the other part- 
owners 213 Significantly, Sutton concludes that such debts
may be paid off by a part-owner, and a restitutionary claim pursued, 
without there having been any mistake, or any particularly compelling 
urgency to meet the claim. The matter is left to the judgment of the part- 
owner, considering what is most convenient in the management of the 
estate.
In the United States, the circumstances in which a self-interested 
intervener may recover are widely recognised. Dawson sums up the situation 
thus:
Tap-pin v. Broster (1823) 1 Car. & P. 112; 171 E.R. 1124). In such cases, the plaintiffs conduct is 
clearly not justifiable and the costs of that conduct should not be borne by anyone other than 
the plaintiff.
210 Further, to the extent that “compulsion" suggests an overborne will, it is 
misleading. For in these cases, although the plaintiff will have been acting under some form of 
pressure (and moreover, legitimate pressure) the plaintiffs response will be to act in a 
calculated, self-interested way to do whatever is best for the plaintiff given the limited choices 
available. The use of compulsion as the underlying source of recovery can thus lead to 
confusion. See, e.g., Condev Project Planning Ltd v. Kramer Auto Sales Ltd [1982] 2 W.W.R. 445, 
453-4, in which the court accepted compulsion as a head of recovery, but also re-affirmed the 
preclusion in Goff & Jones, 56, quoted above, against recovery by the "self-interested" actor. 
Consequently, the court took the view that the plaintiff must not have been "compelled" by 
self-interest. Yet in all compulsory discharge cases, payment of the debt is clearly not motivated 
by altruism.
211 As with cases of duress, a plaintiffs will need not have been overborne by the 
pressure, the plaintiff often deliberately opting for the course of conduct which at the time is in 
his or her best interests.
212 Sutton, R., "Payment of Debts Charged Upon Property" in Burrows, Essays, 71, 
considers these to be authorities which have "atrophied through lack of use."
213 This will be in the form of a charge on the property.
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Denial of restitu tion is usually expressed in the m urky epithet 
"volunteer" that is applied to intervenors who fail to show a good 
enough reason for intervening .214 But clearly one reason that is very 
often good enough is protection of the self-interest of the intervenor. If 
"volunteer" implies that a gift was intended, the motive of self­
protection helps to negative generosity. But this ground for restitution 
does more than dispel some fog that is generated by a highly ambiguous 
epithet. In most modern decisions, promotion of self-interest that takes 
this form—the discharge of another's inescapable debt—is fully 
approved, is made to seem rational, almost laudable, and is freed from 
restrictive rules.215
One American com m entator has gone so far as to say that it is 
"paradoxical" that the self-interested intervener may have less difficulty in 
pursuing a claim than the altruist.216 Certainly, recovery by a self-interested 
intervener cannot be based upon notions of recompense for altruism and the 
social utility in not discouraging such conduct. Hence, some other explanation 
m ust be found. Such an explanation lies in the fact that a plaintiff's self- 
interested (and self-protective) actions are only necessary as a result of the 
failure of the defendant to meet his or her own obligations: to pay a debt or to 
meet some other obligation owed to a third party .217 Where the plaintiff's
214 This is reflected in one definition of volunteer which has consequently found 
favour in the United States. See Irvine v. Angus, 93 F. 629 (1899), per Judge De Haven:
A volunteer is one who has paid the debts of another without request, when he was not 
legally or morally bound to do so, and where he had no interest to protect in making 
the payment.
215 Dawson, J.P., "The Self-Serving Intermeddler" (1974) 87 Harv. L.R. 1409,1437.
216 Palmer, Vol. II, 362, states:
Our law finds itself in the paradoxical position of aiding one who acted in his own 
interest while denying aid to one who acted from the generally more laudable motive 
of protecting the interest of another. This is not a satisfactory state of affairs, at least as 
to money payments, but the fact that it is a generally accurate statement of the law 
highlights the traditional attitude toward the intermeddler.
It is fair to say that the altruist does face considerable impediments. But this is not as 
paradoxical as it at first appears. The courts tread cautiously in such cases, primarily, it is 
submitted, in order to ensure that a defendant's autonomy has not been disregarded. Altruistic 
plaintiffs must show that they fall within the category of the limited altruist—someone acting 
in the interests of the defendant, but not too much so—to avoid being considered a gratuitous 
intervener. The self-server faces none of these difficulties. The need to protect one's own 
interests operates in a different context. Self-interest provides the reason for a non-gratuitous 
intervention and precludes any possibility of intermeddling of the sort considered in § 8.2.1.2.
217 This was the case in example (iv), § 8.1, in which the defendant was under a 
statutory obligation to make certain improvements to the property. See George L. Schnader v. 
Cole Building Co., 202 A. 2d 326 (1964). In Anglo-Australian law, such a claim would be unlikely 
to succeed, unless it could be brought under the head of compulsion. Although in the George L.
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actions result in that duty being fulfilled, the law accepts that the plaintiff 
should not bear the costs of the intervention. Protecting one's own interests is 
justifiable; and the underlying policy behind allowing recovery appears to be 
that where a legal obligation just if iably has been met by a plaintiff, it should 
ultimately be borne by those who are primarily responsible.218 The primary 
responsibility of the defendant provides the clear link between the plaintiff's 
actions and the defendant being the appropriate party to bear the costs. This 
will be discussed below in § 8.3.2.
What sort of self-interested conduct in discharge of someone else's duty 
is sufficient to be considered justifiable by the law? We have already seen that 
meeting one's legal obligations will suffice. It would also seem that any acts to 
protect one's property rights,219 the value of one's property, or one's financial 
well-being, will justify relief. It may even be that actions to protect one's 
honour or reputation are justifiable.220 In relation to property interests, it has 
been said that recovery will extend to "cases in which non-payment would or 
might eventually have presented a threat to the interest, but the threat was not 
immediate nor would it necessarily have an adverse effect on the payer's 
interest."221 This appears to be the position in the United States, where 
payments of premiums owed by a defendant under an insurance policy, in 
which the payer has some concern, are recoverable. It may even be possible in 
the United States for a plaintiff to recover for the payment of debts charged on 
property in which the plaintiff has merely an expectancy of an interest, such as 
where he or she is an expectant heir to that property.222 Often, United States 
courts have resorted to remedies of subrogation to allow recovery to plaintiffs 
who have made payments to protect these types of interests.223
Schnader case, the court did talk of the plaintiff being "economically compelled" to act, this case 
does not fall within the recognised heads of "compulsory discharge".
218 See Birks, 186.
219 Such as the right to continued possession of premises (e.g., Allison v. Jenkins [1904] 
1 I.R. 331), or maintaining a security interest in property (e.g., Butler v. Rice [1910] 2 Ch. 277).
220 See Alexander v. Vane (1836) 1 M. & W. 511; contrast, however, Child v. Morley 
(1800) 8 T.R. 610; 101 E.R. 1574.
221 Palmer, Vol. II, 343-4.
222 See Palmer, §10.5 (c).
223 See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 83, Subrogation, §3.5, as to the extremely liberal
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In Anglo-Australian law, however, in order to recover on the same 
liberal grounds as in the United States, a plaintiff faces the difficulty of 
overcoming the decision of Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.224 In Falcke's 
case, the intervener had paid premiums on an insurance policy in which he had 
a residual interest, in the form of an equity of redemption. He failed in his 
claim for a lien over the proceeds of sale of the policy.225 This, of itself, is 
justified, given that the intervener was seeking a security interest ahead of 
other parties with an interest in the property. But the Court of Appeal also 
rejected any possibility of a personal claim for reimbursement of the sums 
expended. Arguably, the decision is inconsistent with the views expressed 
herein; alternatively, it may simply be said that the interests of the intervener 
were insufficient to justify the intervention;226 that there was not a sufficient 
reason of self-interest to make the conduct justifiable. Perhaps too much should 
not be made of this one decision. Given that authorities in Anglo-Australian 
law have granted recompense to self-interested interveners, Falcke's case should 
not be an impediment to acceptance of a general proposition allowing recovery 
to a self-interested intervener who is protecting a legitimate interest.227
§ 8.3.2 The Appropriateness of the Defendant
The issue of appropriateness can be dealt with briefly. Unlike the altruist 
considered earlier, the self-serving intervener will not have intended to act 
primarily in the interests of the defendant. Consequently, the defendant will 
only be held liable in these types of case (provided the plaintiff can firstly show
application of the remedy in the United States.
224 (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234.
225 And some have sought to interpret the case restrictively on this basis. Mathews, 
supra n. 94,350-1, however, persuasively rejects such a view.
226 Sutton, supra n. 212, 86-96, and see cases discussed therein. Sutton persuasively 
argues that Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, is not inconsistent with 
the cases in which part-owners of insurance policies have been able to recover for debts 
charged on the property which have been paid.
227 A residual interest in valuable property, such as the equity of redemption held by 
the intervener in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, should suffice as a 
legitimate interest. Contrast such an interest with the interest of a beneficiary of a third party 
contract. Such a beneficiary has an interest merely derivative of the contracting parties' choice 
to continue in their performance for their own and the beneficiaries benefit. Consequently, such 
a beneficiary should not be entitled to "repair" a breach of contract and seek recompense from 
the contract-breaker.
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that conduct is justifiable) if the plaintiff's actions have fulfilled some duty 
owed by the defendant. In most cases, this will involve the payment of a 
defendant's debt. But some cases suggest that recovery will also be granted 
where an unliquidated legal obligation of the defendant is met.228
Where a plaintiff has not fulfilled a duty of the defendant recovery will 
generally229 be precluded even if the plaintiff's conduct was justifiable for 
reasons of self-interest. The position is enunciated in Ruabon Steamship Co. v. 
London Assurance, in which the Earl of Halsbury L.C. wondered
how it can be asserted that it is part of the common law that where one 
gets some advantage from the act of another, a right to contribution 
towards the expense from that act arises on behalf of the person who has 
done it.230
228 See George L. Schnader v. Cole Building Co., 202 A. 2d 326 (1964) (supra n. 6, and 
example (iv), § 8.1). Cf. Green Trees Estate v. Furstenberg, 124 N.W. 2d. 90 (1963), in which the 
facts were almost the same as those in Schnader's case, except that the defendant did not have a 
duty to perform the work. Consequently, the plaintiff failed in its attempt to recover for the 
self-interested improvements it had made to the defendant's property. See also cases discussed 
in Palmer, §10.6.
It is speculative whether the fulfilment of a moral duty or obligation will be sufficient to justify 
recovery against the defendant. Given the self-interested nature of the conduct in these cases, it 
is perhaps less likely that this should suffice than in cases of altruistically motivated conduct. 
But consider an example where, say, a defendant neglects cattle owned by him or her, thereby 
breaching a moral duty not to maltreat animals. Consequently, the beasts are disease and tic 
ridden. A neighbouring grazier, fearing that the diseases and tics could spread to his or her 
own herd, expends money to treat the animals. Should the neighbour recover the costs of such 
actions, despite the entirely self-interested motivation for the action?
229 There are a few exceptional circumstances where recovery may nonetheless be 
allowed. One exception appears to be co-tenants who repair or improve their land for their 
own purposes. Although such tenants are not entitled to contribution for the costs of such 
repairs or improvements, they will be entitled to an allowance for the actual enhancement of 
the property, upon partition. See Leigh v. Dickeson (1884) 15 Q.B.D. 60, and Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 744-47. Life tenants may, in a few exceptional circumstances, be entitled to 
recompense from their remainderman for a portion of money expended on improvements. See 
Maddaugh & McCamus, 748, fn. 28. Contrast the position in America: Dawson, supra n. 215, 
1422-7.
Another exception is the United States doctrine by which lawyers may in some circumstances 
be awarded recovery for services rendered from non-clients who have benefited from such 
services. For the general conditions governing recovery, see Palmer §10.8. For a more detailed 
consideration, see Dawson, J.P., "Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds" 
87 Harv. L.R. 1597 (1974), and Dawson, "Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest 
Litigation" 88 Harv. L.R. 849 (1975).
23  ^ [1900] A.C. 6, 10. See also per Lord Macnaghten, at 15. Cf. the Restatement of 
Restitution, §106:
A person who incidentally to the performance of his own duty or to the protection or
improvement of his own things, has conferred a benefit upon another, is not thereby
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Even though the plaintiff may have acted in justifiable self-interest, there is no 
reason why the defendant should bear the cost,231 and recovery will not 
generally ensue.
The reasons for this appear twofold. First, the plaintiff, although perhaps 
seeking to improve his or her own property or financial position, will not be 
acting from a motivation of self -protection from the defendant's actions (or 
inaction) that is, the need for the plaintiff's conduct does not arise from the 
defendant's failure to fulfil a duty owed. No connection can be drawn with that 
defendant if he or she has not actually failed to meet such duty. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, if recompense were granted in such circumstances 
the defendant would be forced to bear a new burden where none previously 
existed. This contrasts with the situation where the plaintiff has paid a debt 
owed by the defendant and seeks reimbursement. The effect of allowing 
reimbursement is merely to alter the party to whom the debt is owed, rather 
than impose an entirely new obligation. To impose a new obligation would be 
to require the defendant to allocate his or her resources in a way he or she may 
not have wished, merely because the plaintiff considered it to be in his or her 
own self-interest that the defendant do so. This is unacceptable in law as being 
an unwarranted interference with another's autonomy, and the defendant's 
position is not weakened by the fact that he or she may even have benefited as 
result of the plaintiff's actions. This is, after all, the very burden of the often 
quoted dicta of Bowen L.J. in Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., rejecting
entitled to contribution.
231 Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Villegia, 28 P. 97 (1891), 98, per Garoutte J.:
It clearly appears that plaintiff expended this money for his own benefit and his own 
advantage, and not for the benefit and use of the defendant. A party cannot of his own 
volition create an obligation in his own favor by doing some act for his own interests, 
and the necessity for which was caused by himself. This is in no sense an action 
brought for the recovery of money advanced for and to the use of defendant. No legal 
duty rested upon the defendant to perform the work for which money was expended...
The point is brought out most sharply by cases concerning co-tenants of land. Co-tenants who 
make improvements to land face "bleak prospects" should they seek contribution from fellow 
co-tenants (though note exceptions, supra n. 229). Co-tenants, however, who meet charges on 
the property can "confidently expect contribution if they expend more than their pro rata share 
in discharging liens on the common estate." See Dawson, supra n. 215,1439. The reason for this 
seems clear. In the former case, no duties of the defendants will have been fulfilled; whereas in 
the latter case, duties of the defendants will have been discharged.
364
recovery for benefits conferred upon others against their will.232 Where a 
plaintiff has fulfilled an obligation of the defendant, however, such dicta has 
little force. In effect, no new obligation is being imposed. Even if a defendant's 
obligation was not in the form of a money debt, so that ordering recompense 
w ould have the effect of crystallising the unliquidated obligation into a 
liquidated one, such recompense still seems appropriate and some United 
States cases have been prepared to accept that recovery should ensue. It is 
unclear whether courts in other jurisdictions are prepared to take this step, but 
there appear to be no reasons in principle why they should not do so.
232 (1886) 34 Ch.D. 234, 248. See also Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (1888); Restatement of 
Restitution, §106; Goff & Jones, 56.
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Chapter 9
THE INNOCENT RECIPIENT OF 
MONEY AND SERVICES
§9.1 INTRODUCTION
Circumstances may arise in which money, services or goods (the 
emphasis will be on the first two) of a plaintiff are conferred on an entirely 
"innocent" defendant, where there is no requisite intention on the part of the 
plaintiff to "transfer" to the defendant such money, services or goods. Hence, a 
plaintiff may seek to undo the consequences of the "transfer" and seek to 
impose liability of some kind on the defendant, even despite the innocence of 
that defendant.
Rules governing the imposition of liability on innocent defendants are 
the concern of this chapter. In some ways, such liability rules, for example, 
those governing recovery from a recipient of a mistaken payment of money, are 
a residual category of case. The distinctive feature of this category is the 
absence of any conduct on the defendant's part, or shared common interest or 
any reason of social policy, to justify liability in the form considered in the 
previous three chapters. In many cases, though by no means all, the liability 
imposed (if any) takes the form of, and is limited to, the restitution of a benefit 
received and surviving in a defendant's hands. Thus unlike in the categories 
considered previously, a concept of unjust enrichment may have some work to 
do here. Nonetheless, as will be seen, unjust enrichment is not overly useful 
even in this category of liability rules. Instead, this writer will seek to unify the 
case law on the basis of a notion of achieving fair outcomes. The crux of this 
notion is the need to ensure that an innocent defendant is not disadvantaged by 
any relief aimed at undoing the consequences of a particular transaction.
Before we turn to an expansion of the notion of achieving fair outcomes, 
it is necessary to outline fully the types of circumstances which raise the 
essential problem at hand, that is, which potentially give rise to claims against 
innocent defendants.
Perhaps the most significant class of claims are those arising as a result 
of mistake. A mistake of existing1 fact or law2 may cause a plaintiff to pay 
money or transfer goods to, or perform services for, another, so that "but for" 3
1 Mistakes of existing fact must be distinguished from predictions as to a future 
outcome which prove incorrect (mispredictions). See Birks, 147-8. Persons who act on the basis 
of a prediction as to a future outcome cannot bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the 
courts to relieve against mistakes merely because the predicted outcome does not eventuate. 
An example of a misprediction is where a plaintiff makes improvements to property in the 
hope of obtaining a future inheritance, as in Kelly v. Kelly, 148 A.L.R. 331 (1943).
2 For most practical purposes, the distinction between a mistake of fact and a mistake 
of law has been abolished. In Australia, see David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, noted in Burrows, A., "Restitution for Mistake in Australia" 
(1993) 13 O.J.L.S. 584. In Canada, see Air Canada v. British Columbia (1989) 59 D.L.R. (4th) 161, 
and cf. Maddaugh & McCamus, 256. These decisions overturn considerable authority 
precluding recovery of money paid as a result of a mistake of law. See, e.g., Sawyer & Vincent v. 
Window Brace Ltd [1943] 1 K.B. 32, 34. The preclusion still survives in England, despite the 
difficulties which may arise in drawing a distinction between mistakes of "fact" and "law" in 
given circumstances. See, e.g., Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 115-6. It has been suggested in 
the House of Lords, however, in Woolwich Building Society v. IRC (No. 2) [1991] 3 All E.R. 737, 
783, per Lord Slynn, that the rule is "open to review". Despite the abolition of the distinction 
between mistakes of fact and law in Australia, such a distinction may still have practical 
significance in the context of available defences to a claim for recovery of mistaken payments. It 
has been said that "voluntary" payments made in satisfaction of honest claims—where a payer 
is "prepared to make the payment irrespective of the validity or invalidity of the obligation, 
rather than contest the claim for payment"—will not be recoverable. See David Securities, at 71. 
Such "voluntary" submissions, which the court will uphold on the basis of a policy of enforcing 
"compromises freely entered into" (72), will more usually arise in the context of mistakes of 
law, rather than fact. As Goff & Jones, 144, point out:
The essential difference between a restitutionary claim arising from a mistake of law 
rather than of fact is that the limiting principle, that benefits conferred in submission to 
an honest claim are irrevocable, assumes considerable importance if the payer's 
mistake is one of law. But it is only in rare cases that a plaintiff's claim is defeated 
because he has voluntarily assumed the risk of his own mistake of fact.
Cf. Birks, 165-6. For examples of submissions to honest claims under a mistake of fact, see Goff 
& Jones, 127-30.
Contrast the views of the majority in David Securities, to those of Brennan ]., at 87-92. As his 
Honour's judgment makes clear, there are difficulties in formulating a defence in terms of 
"voluntariness". See also Watts, P., "Mistaken Payments and the Law of Restitution" [1993] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 145.
3 It has been accepted in Australia that a mistake is operative in the context of 
mistaken payments of money and may thus give rise to a right to restitution wherever it causes 
the payment. See David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57. 
This is sometimes stated in terms of a simple "but for" test of causation. See Burrows, 101, 24-7. 
Under such a test, it would not appear that the mistake must be the predominant cause of the 
plaintiff's action. It is sufficient if it is a cause of the actions. See David Securities, 73-5, and 
contrast Watts, ibid, at 147-8, who doubts whether the courts will be able to apply only a 
causation test. In Watts' view, resort may still have to be had to some concept of 
"fundamentality" (despite the High Court's rejection of such a requirement), particularly in 
determining whether gifts should be recoverable or not. For the position in England, see 
Barclays Bank Ltd v. WJ Simms Ltd [1980] Q.B. 677, and Burrows, 95-109.
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that mistake, the plaintiff would not have conferred the money, goods or 
services.4 Where a plaintiffs mistake was induced by the defendant,5 or 
allowed to continue by the defendant in circumstances suggesting a duty to 
apprise or disabuse the plaintiff of his or her mistake,6 liability may be imposed 
on the defendant on the basis of his or her conduct. The defendant's connection 
with the plaintiff's mistaken actions in such cases may trigger conduct-related 
liability rules considered in Chapter 6. Such mistakes are not of concern here.
Instead, the concern in this chapter is with mistakes of a kind such that 
the mistaken actor does not seek "to make anything of the way in which the 
mistake came about."7 To utilise the language of Birks, such mistakes can 
conveniently be labelled "spontaneous",8 which term encompasses the idea 
that the defendant is completely innocent in relation to the plaintiff's mistake 
and has not assumed the risk of such mistake. Indeed, if any blame for the 
plaintiff's mistaken actions were to be allocated in the cases under
4 The mistaken transfer of land presents problems peculiar to land law and will not be 
considered here. Usually such transfers will occur in the context of contractual mistakes, which, 
for reasons discussed below, are not considered in this chapter. Where the mistaken transfer 
was not contractual, the right to undo the transaction will in many jurisdictions depend upon 
statutory provisions relating to the rectification of registries of title.
5 A mistake may have been induced by a defendant where it was the result of 
representations made by a defendant, as in Old Men's Home v Lee's Estate, 4 So. 2d 235 (1941), or 
where it was the result of a defendant's negligent or mistaken conduct, as in Phelps v. Kuntz, 76 
A 237 (1910). In Phelps v. Kuntz, the defendant landowner had mistakenly located the position 
of the plaintiff's lot in an estate so that the plaintiff proceeded to build on the defendant's land 
as a consequence.
6 An example of a mistake allowed to continue by a defendant would be where the 
defendant acquiesces in the plaintiff's mistaken conduct affecting the defendant's land, 
potentially giving rise to an estoppel against the defendant.
7 Birks, 146.
8 As Birks concedes, this is a somewhat inaccurate term, given that such mistakes may 
often have external causes. See Birks, 146-7. However, there appear to be no better labels. For 
example, the mistake need not be a "pure" unilateral mistake, for the defendant may have 
shared the mistaken belief.
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consideration, such blame would rest with the plaintiff.9 The risks of the 
mistake and the perhaps even considerable losses of money,10 goods, or wasted 
time and effort such mistake may occasion to the plaintiff, are risks which the 
p la in tiff can reasonably expect to bear. Given the plaintiffs responsibility for his 
or her own actions, one could say that as a starting premise, no reasons exist for 
overturning the prim a-facie rule that loss lies where it falls.* 11
Nonetheless, although we can say that plaintiffs bear the risks of their 
spontaneous mistakes, simply to allow the consequences of such mistakes to go 
unremedied may often result in considerable hardship. Where a plaintiff may 
not have acted in a particular way but for the mistake, the mistake can be said 
to vitiate his or her intention to act. This lack of requisite intention to act in the 
legal and factual circumstances actually prevailing provides a strong argument 
for "undoing" the consequences of a plaintiffs mistake,12 in order to restore 
that plaintiff to his or her pre-mistaken position.
A plaintiffs intention to act in a particular way may be vitiated by more 
than just a mistake in the form of a false belief of existing fact or law. A person 
who merely is unaware of certain matters, rather than consciously believing the 
contrary, is also in a sense mistaken.13 Unawareness may extend to ignorance
9 The mistake may even have been the result of the plaintiff's own negligence. Such 
negligence, however, will not preclude recovery of a mistaken payment of money: Kelly v. Solari 
(1841) 9 M. & W. 54, 152 E.R. 243; Maddaugh & McCamus, 211. As will be seen, liability is 
justifiable despite the plaintiff's negligence, as such liability does not shift the risk of the 
plaintiff's mistaken actions to the defendant, who will not be disadvantaged where merely 
required to return the economic advantage received as a result of the mistaken payment. Query 
whether negligence will preclude recovery for services mistakenly rendered where such 
recovery would otherwise be allowed? The issue is not usually addressed, but some cases have 
emphasised the plaintiff's negligence as one basis for precluding relief: e.g., Ings v. Industrial 
Acceptance Corp (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 611, 618-9, and Taylor v. Shaw, 55 So. 2d 502, 507 (1951).
10 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1979] 3 All E.R. 
1025, in which some $2 million were paid to the defendant by mistake.
11 There may exist some policy reason for shifting losses to a defendant, but this 
would be an exceptional case. For example, it seems unlikely that a plaintiff's mistaken actions 
would ever trigger the liability rules considered in Chapter 8.
12 Such an argument has far less weight, however, if a plaintiff has acted in a way 
which suggests that the risk of the consequences of his or her mistaken actions has been 
assumed, even outside of a contractual relationship. An example is provided by McGrath v. 
Hazlett (1973) 13 N.S.R. (2d) 567, in which a plaintiff in possession of land to which he believed 
he was entitled was aware of the defendant's competing claim to that land, but nevertheless 
proceeded with improvements. The court considered that the defendant, in failing to heed the 
defendant's notice of competing claim, “was the author of his own misfortune", (568), and 
refused any relief.
13 Such as where a plaintiff has forgotten that money has previously been paid. Cf.
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of the very occurrence of a particular event, such as where money is lost from a 
tom pocket14 or transferred as a result of a computer error. Conceptually, there 
is no difference between the transfer of money in "ignorance" 15 and under a 
consciously-held false belief (mistake). In neither case does a plaintiff intend the 
defendant to have the money,16 at least in the circumstances which actually 
apply. Provided the defendant was equally blameless in both situations,17 the 
problem to be addressed is the same: when will the law undo the consequences 
of the plaintiff's error-or-ignorance-induced "actions", given that no grounds 
exist for making the defendant bear, or share in, the plaintiff's losses? Hence, 
the term mistake will include cases of a transfer in "ignorance" direct from a 
plaintiff to the defendant.
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Israel-British Bank [1979] 3 All E.R. 1025. As was stated by Eves J, in 
Lady Hood of Avalon v. Mackinnon [1909] 1 Ch. 476, 482, a case concerning the setting aside in 
equity of a deed of gift:
It seems to me that when a person has forgotten the existence of a pre-existing fact, and 
assumes that such a fact did not pre-exist, he is labouring under a mistake, and he acts 
on the footing that the fact really did not pre-exist;... I should have thought that a man 
makes a mistake in forgetting an existing fact quite as much as he does in assuming a 
state of things to exist which does not in fact exist.
14 Cf. Holiday v. Sigil (1826) 2 C. & P. 176.
15 See Birks, 140: an "ignorant" transfer of wealth is one which has occurred "wholly 
without the knowledge of the plaintiff".
16 Cf. Burrows, 139. Birks has persuasively argued that one cannot treat ignorance and 
mistake separately; that in principle, you cannot treat the mistaken payer of $100 differently 
from one who loses $100, subsequently found by the defendant. See Birks, 140-2. At 141, Birks 
states:
Restitution for mistake does not involve the proof of any wrong; and total ignorance is 
a fortiori from the most fundamental mistake. Hence a system which believes in 
restitution for mistake cannot but believe in restitution for ignorance, quite 
independently of any wrong incidentally committed.
See also Birks, P., "Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient" [1989] L.M.C.L.Q. 296, 
305-8. Birks goes on to treat three-party transactions, where a plaintiff's property is misdirected 
by a third party to the defendant, as examples of ignorance. In one sense, this may well be 
correct; but it does not deal with the very different manner by which the defendant in three- 
party transactions comes by the property in question. In mistaken transactions, it is as a result 
of the plaintiff's own actions. In three-party transactions, it is as a result of an independent 
transaction with a third party. These are very different causes of the problem. The important 
similarity is where both types of claim are against innocent defendants.
17 The recipient of funds transferred by computer error may be completely unaware of 
the mistake. By contrast, a person who picks up notes on a street will, of course, be aware of his 
or her lack of title to the money.
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Excluded from consideration in this chapter are mistakes which occur in 
the context of contractual and precontractual relationships. Although mistake 
here is undoubtedly important, contract law has developed different 
approaches and rules as to the consequences of mistake in contract. The courts 
appear far more reluctant to undo contractual relationships entered by one or 
more parties acting under a mistake than, say, mistaken payments.18 This may 
well be as a result of the parties' allocation or assumption of risks, expressly or 
implicitly forming part of their contractual relationship. Such assumed risks 
may include the consequences of a mistake. Further, in order to protect the 
security of bargain transactions, the parties to a contract may be deemed to 
have assumed the risks of certain mistakes.19 Alternatively, even if a mistake is 
not one which either party can be taken to or is deemed to have assumed, 
perhaps a common or mutual mistake, then the parties' contractual relationship 
may justify the application of a principle of sharing (see Chapter 7).20
18 Although the law of mistake in contract is far from straightforward, it is fair to 
conclude that the courts have tended to apply a far narrower test of what constitutes an 
operative mistake sufficient to allow a party to escape from a contract than merely a "but for" 
test. See Midland Bank pic. v. Brown Shipley & Co Ltd [19911 2 All E.R. 690, 700-1. See Stoljar, 20-1. 
Goff & Jones, 110, state:
A claim to recover money paid under a mistake is essentially different from a claim to 
avoid or set aside a contract for mistake. To avoid a contract, the mistake "must be 
basic enough to overcome the pressures favouring finality of contract", hence the 
condition in cases of mutual or shared mistake that the mistake must be fundamental. 
A fundamental mistake in the sense used in contract law will, of course, enable money 
paid under such a mistake of fact to be recovered, whether the money was paid under a 
supposed liability or as a gift. But the test of mistake in restitution should be broader. 
The only transaction that needs to be set aside is the payment. A restitutionary claim 
"does not destroy expectations created by a previous bargain", it merely seeks to 
prevent the defendant's unjust enrichment, (footnotes omitted).
Burrows, 107, makes a similar point:
A contract generally constitutes a bargain between at least two parties; and one of the 
purposes of contract law is to allow the binding allocation of risks. It follows that the 
courts should not be as willing to allow an escape from a contract, thereby 
disappointing bargained-for expectations, as they are to allow the restitution of money 
paid. ... It is hard to believe that the courts would move to a position whereby a party 
could escape from a contract, in the sense of a legally binding bargain, simply by 
establishing that he had made a mistake but for which he would not have entered the 
contract.
19 Where one party enters a contract under a mistake and the other party does not 
know of that mistake (pure unilateral mistake), the courts will not generally interfere in the 
contractual relationship. Of course, where the other party is aware of the fact that the first party 
is mistaken, then the mistaken party may be entitled to rescind the contract. Such cases were 
considered under the heading of tort-like liability in Chapter 6.
211 Such a principle will be particularly significant where the mistake occurs in the
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A mistaken or ignorant conferral of money, goods or services by a 
plaintiff is thus one example which raises the problem of the potential liability 
of an innocent defendant. Another type of case in which essentially the same 
problem may arise is where a plaintiff transfers property21 to the defendant 
upon a condition which is not met, through no attributable blame of the 
defendant.22 For example, the plaintiff may have transferred money in pre­
payment under a contract discharged for the plaintiff's breach. Recovery of the 
pre-payment in such circumstances, for total failure of consideration,23 ought in 
theory (though in practice it may not)24 follow on the same principles as govern 
recovery by a mistaken payer against an innocent defendant. Consequently, 
such cases will not be considered separately.25
context of a long-term contractual relationship only partially performed. As has been argued 
previously, the problem raised in such cases can be dealt with akin to parties sharing common 
interests generally. Where, however, a shared mistake occurs in the context of discrete one-off 
transaction, the courts have generally let losses (and gains) lie where they fall at the time the 
mistake is discovered. Executed contracts are upheld and unexecuted contracts are not 
enforced. See § 7.5.
21 The issue does not really arise in relation to services. If services have been conferred, 
such conferral will either have been gratuitous or non-gratuitous, which factor will determine 
whether a defendant will have imposed upon him or her a contractual or contract-like (e.g., for 
services conferred in anticipation of a contract) liability to pay for the services.
22 However, one type of case which could be so described is not of concern here. 
Frustration cases (and included here are cases of common mistakes occurring in the context of 
contract) are ones in which a condition fails without blame of a defendant, but as was argued in 
Chapter 7, in such circumstances, the parties common interest justifies liability of a very 
different kind to that being considered here: namely, liability which gives rise to a duty to share 
gains and losses.
23 This is provided that the consideration is entire. If consideration is severable, then 
consideration need only have failed as to the severable residue: Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] A.C. 32, 64-5, per Lord Wright. As to the meaning of 
failure of consideration, see Burrows, 251-3.
24 As will be seen, the primary concern of liability rules governing innocent 
defendants is that such defendants are not disadvantaged. In one sense, a claim for money paid 
for total failure of consideration against an innocent defendant shares this concern. Any 
reliance by the defendant on the payments gives rise to an absolute bar to recovery. Such 
protection, however, may be more extensive than is desirable. If there has been only a partial 
failure of consideration, the defendant may still retain part of an economic advantage received 
and capable of being returned. The return of surviving economic advantage will be seen to be 
the essence of money claims. To ensure results consistent with those in mistake cases, the writer 
favours the view, gaining widespread acceptance, that a partial failure of consideration ought 
to suffice for a claim to be potentially available.
25 Many claims for recovery of money under the rubric of total failure of consideration 
are not against innocent defendants and occur in the context of categories considered earlier. In 
such cases, an alternative claim on the same basis as against an innocent defendant may exist,
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A third type of case—three-party transactions, as they will be called— 
also raises the issue of the potential liability of an innocent defendant. These 
cases involve transfers of money (using the term loosely, to include both cash 
and "bank money" such as cheques, credits in bank accounts and credit 
cards)26 in three (or more)-party transactions, where a plaintiffs money27 is
even where a defendant's conduct towards or common interest with the plaintiff justifies a 
more expansive liability. For example, if a plaintiff has paid money in performance of a contract 
and there occurs a breach by the defendant sufficient to justify termination of the contract, then 
such money payment will be recoverable, provided there was a total failure of consideration. In 
such a case, the plaintiff will have paid money on the basis of a condition (the defendant's 
performance) which subsequently has not been fulfilled. Restitution in such a case is an 
alternative remedy aimed at restoring the plaintiff to his or her position before the contract was 
entered into. Normally, this alternative remedy will be subsumed by the more extensive rights 
arising as a result of the breach of contract: to seek damages or specific performance. In some 
circumstances, however, such a restitutionary right may be a significant one, where, for 
example, the payment made exceeds any contractual damages actually suffered. Although the 
plaintiff in such a case has made a bad contractual bargain, restitution of the full payment is 
nonetheless justifiable, given that the defendant retains the money received and that the 
condition upon which it was paid has failed.
As already noted, it is a requirement in English and Australian law that there be a total failure 
of consideration (that is, consideration in the sense of contractual performance) before a 
payment under a contract is recoverable. This requirement appears to reflect an unwillingness 
on the part of the common law to restore a plaintiff to his or her position where that plaintiff 
has received something in return for the payment, which something cannot be returned. For 
example, the plaintiff may have had services conferred, or perhaps had the use of goods 
transferred (note, however, Rowland v. Divall [1923] 2 K.B. 500). Such an absolute prohibition 
against restitution seems unjustifiable, given that the courts could take into account a plaintiff's 
partially received performance in formulating the measure of restitution which achieves an 
approximate restoration. This should especially be so where a defendant's breach of duty is the 
basis of the remedy, for in such cases, protecting a defendant from disadvantage should not be 
an overriding concern, as it will be seen to be in relation to innocent defendants. In the United 
States, restitution of money payments made under a contract is available where there has been 
a breach of vital importance, even if some consideration or performance has been received by 
the plaintiff. This is subject to the proviso that the plaintiff must return "in some way what he 
received as a part performance by the defendant": Corbin, A.L., Corbin on Contracts, (1964), Vol. 
5, 608, and see generally §1114. Where, however, performance is substantial, restitution is not 
an available remedy, as the condition upon which the payment was made has been satisfied 
and the defendant is entitled, contractually, to keep the payment. A plaintiff will be limited to a 
claim for damages resulting from the inconsequential breach. See, generally, Corbin, Vol. 5, 
§ 1102-§1121.
It may also be that claims for restitution of money paid in reliance upon a defendant's wrongful 
conduct may mask a claim for recovery of reliance losses. This will often be the case where the 
money payment was made under an incomplete or defective contract. See § 6.2.3.3. Where this 
is the case, even only a partial failure of consideration should give rise to recovery of the 
difference between the payment made and the benefit received. Consistently with this view, 
where a defendant in receipt of money has changed his or her position in some way other than 
contractual performance, a change of position defence should not be available to such a 
defendant.
26 In strict legal definition^ "money" does not include such bank money. It has been 
suggested that the "quality of money is to be attributed to all chattels which, issued by the 
authority of the law and denominated with reference to a unit of account, are meant to serve as
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m isdirected28 by another, which money ultimately finds its way to the 
defendant. It is thus as a result of a third party's actions rather than a plaintiff's 
own actions that the problem arises. Three-party transactions are particularly 
complex and, as will be seen, raise issues not relevant to the mistaken conferral 
of money, goods or services directly upon a defendant by the plaintiff (two- 
party transactions). Consequently, this chapter is divided into two broad 
groups of cases—mistaken transactions and three-party transactions.29 Cases in 
which a plaintiff seeks the recovery of mistakenly paid debts owed by the 
defendant to a third party are considered as mistaken transactions, involving 
the conferral of a service (the payment of the debt) directly upon the defendant.
It is convenient to consider mistake and three-party situations 
separately. The appropriate legal response to three-party problems is the 
subject of much debate, and the current legal position is in a state of some 
confusion. By firstly considering the limits of recovery in mistaken transactions, 
it is proposed to outline a rationale for recovery which, it will be argued, ought 
equally be applicable to three-party transactions. Such rationale will be argued 
to be one of restoring a plaintiff, as near as possible, to his or her previous 
position (before the mistake or misdirection), without disadvantaging the 
defendant. Where restoration on such terms is possible, a fair outcome can be 
said to result. It must be stressed that although the notion of restoration
universal means of exchange in the state of issue.": Mann, F.A. Legal Aspects of Money (5th ed., 
1992), 8, (hereinafter: "Mann"). In this writer's view, the essential characteristic of money of 
relevance here is its "inherent" quality as "wealth power" or purchasing power. Cf. Mann, 28-9. 
Consequently, for the purposes of this thesis, the term money is used to include bank money, 
which shares this quality. The different forms which money (speaking loosely again) can take, 
may be important if one is seeking to establish a tracing claim to property, but is not relevant 
where merely establishing a personal claim against the immediate recipient of the money.
22 Three-party transactions do not typically involve goods or services.
28 The term "misdirected" incorporates honest conduct by the transferor of money 
which nonetheless is in breach of some duty. See Birks, supra n. 16, 297:
"Misdirected" is intended to be neutral as to the moral quality of the misapplication. 
The most graphic case is the thief who steals the plaintiff's money and gives it to the 
defendant. But an honest mistake may equally underlie the misdirection, as where 
trustees misunderstand their duty and pay to the defendant money which ought to go 
to the plaintiff.
29 For the purposes of simplification, the problem will be addressed by reference to a 
standard three-party situation in which X misdirects money to D, which P seeks to recover 
from D. Of course, in complex modern commercial dealings, any number of parties may be 
interposed between X and D.
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achieving a fair outcome provides a rationale of the results of much of the case 
law on mistaken transactions and offers the most satisfactory basis for 
determining liability, it is not an explanation found in the cases themselves. 
Instead, the reasoning of the cases in recent times has often been in terms of 
unjust enrichment. Although, as will be seen, unjust enrichment provides a 
plausible explanation of money cases, it is not an appropriate tool for 
determining the limits of liability where services have been mistakenly 
conferred.
§ 9.2 MISTAKEN TRANSACTIONS
§ 9.2.1 Achieving Fair Outcomes: A Distinct Concept to that of Unjust 
Enrichment
If P mistakenly30 pays $1000 to D, then D has been enriched by that 
amount.31 Given P's mistake, if D is not required to repay such sum, it could 
further be said that he or she has been "unjustly" enriched.32 Mistaken 
payments, it is said, are "easy to analyse according to the unjust enrichment 
principle", and recovery of such payments is considered to be one of the 
clearest examples of the principle at work.33 Certainly, the courts fairly readily 
grant restitution of money mistakenly conferred—a readiness which is perhaps 
even increasing34—and in recent times have often done so, unequivocally,
30 It will be presumed for the purposes of the discussion that the mistake has caused 
the payments or other actions and is one which the courts are prepared to consider, prima facie, 
sufficient to justify having the transaction undone. The nature of the mistake will thus not be 
relevant to the discussion of the issues at hand. It will be assumed that a mistake sufficient to 
ground restitution of money paid will also be sufficient, prima facie, to ground other remedial 
relief where the mistaken conduct took the form of the performance of services. However, the 
question of the nature of a mistake is not usually dealt with in service cases, since recovery is 
often refused for reasons other than the lack of a legally operative mistake.
31 The receipt of money is said to be unquestionably enriching at the plaintiff's 
expense. See, e.g., Goff & Jones, 17-8, and Birks, 109.
32 The payer's mistake "negatives the voluntariness with which the plaintiff paid the 
money": Burrows, 95; or "vitiates" the judgment of the plaintiff in relation to the transfer of the 
goods: Birks, 140-1,146-7. Birks considers that once the mistake is discovered, the plaintiff may 
legitimately cry, "I did not mean you to have the money in those circumstances": cf. Birks, 140.
33 Burrows, 95. Keener, 26, has said that recovery of mistaken payments affords "one 
of the most striking illustrations of the equitable nature of the quasi-contractual obligation, 
where the liability rests upon the doctrine of unjust enrichment".
34 Contrast Burrows, 95, who considers that "English law has traditionally taken a 
narrow view of recovery". But the two restrictions upon recovery Burrows cites in support of
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under the rubric of unjust enrichment.35 We could, then, say that the recipient 
of a mistaken payment of money has been "unjustly enriched", provided we 
can be sure of when indeed the enrichment is unjust. The issue at hand, 
however, is whether we should want to so describe the situation. Is it a 
particularly useful description at all, one which serves some explanatory role 
and provides us with clear concepts for approaching problems of mistake 
generally?36 The danger exists that unjust enrichment may merely be a 
description of a conclusion that has been reached, rather than the means of 
arriving at that conclusion.
This note of caution is not intended as a prelude to a detailed 
reconsideration of ground already covered. It is sufficient to remind ourselves 
of the lack of clarity in the meaning of the term "unjust" .37 In the context of 
mistake, this is no better evidenced than by the fact that the receipt of money by 
a defendant from a plaintiff acting under a mistake may not of itself be 
sufficient to ground recovery. For example, in the past, and there is still support 
for the view today,38 the courts insisted on some notion of fundamentality 
before a mistake was considered operative. "Unjustness" does not even begin 
to hint at the possible policy reasons behind such a rule.39
his view have been abolished in Australia (in David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57), and the English courts are likely to follow suit (cf. Burrows, 95). 
The abolition of these restrictions suggests a broadening of the right to restitution. The 
restrictions are: (1) the preclusion against recovery of payments conferred under a mistake of 
law (see supra n. 2); and (2) a requirement that a mistake be fundamental, or perhaps even 
more strictly, be one going to liability, (namely one whereby the mistaken payer was acting 
under the belief he or she was under a legal obligation to make the payment). It could also be 
said, however, that the courts are at the same time narrowing the right to restitution by 
recognising a general change of position defence. It is not certain what the scope of such a 
defence will be, or whether its operation will extend much beyond defences previously 
recognised and applied at common law. See § 9.2.22.
35 See, e.g., ANZ v. Westpac (1988) 78 A.L.R. 157, and David Securities Pty Ltd v. 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, though see the discussion in Chapter 2 as 
to the role of unjust enrichment in Australia, as perceived by the High Court.
36 The question becomes all the more important if one accepts the view of the Court of 
Appeal of New Zealand in Martin v. Pont [1993] 3 N.Z.L.R. 25, 30, that although "unjust 
enrichment can be regarded as the rationale of (albeit not necessarily the test for) a number of 
restitutionary claims, it is not a prerequisite of the action for money had and received."
37 Generally, see Chapter 3.
38 See supra n. 3.
39 Similarly, available defences may preclude recovery, some of which defences, it has 
been suggested, may operate whenever it would not be unjust in the circumstances for the
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Let us instead turn to another matter which raises considerable 
challenges to any unjust enrichment analysis of mistake. There exists a distinct 
dichotomy in the law which unjust enrichment may not be able to explain. To 
generalise very broadly, and thus perhaps somewhat inaccurately: on the one 
hand, mistaken money payments are fairly readily recoverable by the payer; on 
the other hand, where a mistake has resulted in the conferral of services, such 
as the improvement of a defendant's land or goods, the right to recovery tends 
to be more limited.40 Can unjust enrichment theory explain this tendency (it is 
suggested to be no more than that) of the law to treat mistakenly conferred 
money and services differently?
Most attempts to explain in unjust enrichment terms the different 
tendencies of legal responses to money and services turn on the issue of 
enrichment. Since both the mistaken payer of money and mistaken service 
provider are mistaken, and since, on most views, a mistake on its own satisfies 
the requirement of unjustness, prima facie liability must then turn on whether a 
defendant has been enriched.41 The recipient of money is always enriched, but
defendant to retain the money. Birks considers that a change of position defence, to be 
considered below, may refer to both the issue of enrichment and unjustness, that is, that there 
are "enrichment-related changes of position" and "unjust-related changes of position". See 
Birks, Restitution—The Future, Chp. 6. In the former case, the defence is said to be concerned 
specifically with the continued existence of an enrichment in a defendant's hands. Of interest 
here are changes of position which no longer render it unjust for a defendant to retain a benefit. 
One may ask whether merely describing defences as "unjust-related" can ever tell us anything 
about the policies underlying the availability and scope of such defences. Birks accepts that 
"[tlhere are, potentially, as many such versions [of 'unjust-related changes of position'] as there 
are sub-conceptions of justice capable of being invoked against the plaintiff's claim." 
(Restitution: The Future, 143). One may legitimately ask, what is a "sub-conception of justice"? 
For an example of unhelpful reasoning addressing the issue of whether it is "unjust" for a 
defendant to make restitution of money, specifically in the context of defences, see McDiarmid 
Lumber Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1992) 94 D.L.R. (4th) 227.
40 Of course, the mistaken service provider is not absolutely barred from relief; 
nevertheless, it could be said that such a provider will only exceptionally recover for those 
services, even in circumstances in which the defendant has clearly benefited (at least on a 
receipt of wealth approach) as a result of those services. To take one example, if P mistakenly 
builds a house on D's land, where there has been no acquiescence by D in P's conduct, the most 
recent Australian authorities suggest that P will be remediless. See Brand v. Chris Building Co. 
[1957] V.R. 625. Cf. Beaton v. McDivett (1987) 13 N.S.W.L.R. 162. This ignores the possibility of a 
claim under statutory provisions, but such provisions may in any case be narrowly interpreted. 
See Amatek v. Googoorewan (1993) 67 A.L.J.R. 339. It will be suggested below that Brand's case 
ought to have been decided differently.
41 If one accepts the burden of most unjust enrichment theory, then a plaintiff's 
ignorance or mistake on its own meets the requirement of unjustness, as the voluntariness of 
the transfer has been negatived. See, e.g., Birks, 140-2.
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the "recipient" of services, it is said, may not be.42 In order to determine 
whether in fact a service recipient has been enriched, a number of tests have 
been proposed, none of which have proved entirely satisfactory. The 
complexities in relation to enrichment were discussed in Chapter 4, and there is 
no need to return to that debate. Suffice it to recall that this is a path leading to 
considerable conceptual difficulty. What is clearly indisputable is that there 
exists no widely accepted standard, let alone consensus, amongst 
commentators as to the meaning and scope of enrichment.43 This is perhaps 
best illustrated by the example of a mistaken improver of another's land. 
According to Birks, the lack of any request or acceptance by the defendant of 
the improvement controverts enrichment, and therefore recovery will be, and 
ought to be, precluded 44 Yet in some United States jurisdictions, courts faced 
with the same problem have concluded that the market increase in a 
defendant's land equates with his or her enrichment, and that such a sum is 
recoverable by the plaintiff.45 Such completely irreconcilable results are said to 
flow from the same process of analysis: by asking whether a defendant was 
enriched.46
Service cases, then, present some difficulties for unjust enrichment 
analysis. This has led some commentators to highlight the very differences 
between the law's response to money and service cases and to seek other
42 This is a consequence of the argument from "subjective devaluation" (Birks, 109-10, 
and see also Burrows, 7-16) considered previously in Chapter 4.
43 More controversially, perhaps there can never be such a consensus: the diversity of 
the results of the cases suggests against any widely accepted standard of enrichment ever 
adequately doing the job. This conclusion follows from the problems in relation to enrichment 
highlighted in Chapter 4.
44 Birks would not generally consider such an improvement to be an "incontrovertible 
benefit". See Birks, 411-2, 371-2, and Sutton, R.J., "What Should Be Done for Mistaken 
Improvers" in Finn, 241, at 255, who discusses Birks' approach to this specific question.
45 See Palmer, §10.9 (c).
46 This has simplified the debate; but the fact that greater complexity is possible 
supports the very point being made. Thus, it is arguable whether the owner of improved land 
has been "incontrovertibly" benefited or not, for example, but quite different results can be 
arrived at by applying the tests of different theorists. The conclusion reached would depend on 
one's interpretation of what amounts to "necessary" expenditure, or whether one considers that 
the test covers merely improvements "realised in money" (e.g., Birks), or extends to 
improvements "realisable" in money (e.g., Goff & Jones, and Maddaugh & McCamus). 
Consequently, one can pick the version of the test which gives the desired answer to a 
particular problem.
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principled explanations exclusively of service cases.47 Such an approach, 
however, has the unacceptable consequence of dividing like cases, which, it 
will be seen, can be explained on a unified basis. Birks is one writer who has 
repeatedly stressed the need to analyse money and service cases as one and the 
same, according to the common causative events which trigger liability.48 
Although in Birks' case, this argument is linked to his unjust enrichment 
analysis—that a benefit, once identified, is disgorgeable on the same grounds, 
irrespective of the form in which that benefit was received49—it has merit 
beyond unjust enrichment. As was evident in this writer's analysis in previous 
chapters, liability rules the applications of which are triggered by similar 
causative events should be considered together. In all the cases to be considered 
in this section, the underlying cause of the legal problem is the same: the 
plaintiff's mistaken actions. Whether a mistaken action takes the form of the 
performance of services or the payment of money should not, theoretically at 
least, be of concern.50 It is the consequences of their mistakes which plaintiffs 
wish to undo. In cases of spontaneous mistakes, a claim for any remedial relief 
cannot rest on a defendant's conduct towards or relationship with the plaintiff. 
The mistake, of itself, must be the raison d'etre for any relief sought.
Is it possible to explain both services and money cases uniformly, whilst 
also accounting for the different emphasis of the law in its preparedness to 
grant recovery in money cases and its reluctance to do so in service cases? In 
the writer's view, an explanatory principle which satisfactorily links all cases of 
spontaneous mistake can be found.
47 Stoljar and Muir, for example, have advocated theories of unjust sacrifice to explain 
service cases in distinct terms to any explanations of money cases. One advantage of such 
approaches is that they recognises the difficulties in seeking to incorporate recovery for services 
within a benefit-based analysis. Beatson, by excluding "pure" services from unjust enrichment 
analysis, goes partly along this route. Beatson perceives many of the cases claimed for unjust 
enrichment as examples of recovery of reliance losses. See Beatson, Chp. 2.
48 See, e.g., Birks, P., "In Defence of Free Acceptance" in Burrows, Essays, 105,111-2, 
127; and Birks, Restitution: The Future, 86, 91.
49 Birks, P., "Review" (1991) 70 Can. B. Rev. 814, 820:
Yet if the concept of an enrichment is properly understood—that is, if the first question 
[was the defendant enriched?] is answered fully—the law as to causes of action must be 
the same in whatever form the enrichment is received.
50 The mistake which leads P to pay D $100 because P believes that he or she owes D 
the money, when in fact P does not, is no different to the mistake which leads P to pay C $100 
in the belief that he or she owes C the money, when in fact the money is owed by D. Yet the 
former is a "money" case, the latter, a "service" case.
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In seeking such principled explanation, it is important to remind 
ourselves of the innocence of a defendant in cases of spontaneous mistake. The 
plaintiff is responsible for his or her own actions and the risks of the 
consequences which follow. There are competing legal motivations at work 
here: on the one hand, to "undo" the mistake and thus relieve the plaintiff of 
the unintended and perhaps seriously detrimental consequences of his or her 
actions; on the other hand, not to impose a burden upon the defendant. It is the 
latter motive, suggesting the limitation on any recovery, which must be of 
primary concern, given the defendant's innocence. Any relief to the plaintiff 
ought not leave the defendant at a disadvantage when compared with such 
defendant's position before the plaintiffs mistaken actions.
In some cases, however, it may be possible to go some way towards 
restoring a plaintiff to his or her pre-mistaken position, without infringing the 
primary concern of protecting the defendant. To take an example, P has 
mistakenly transferred goods (let us say, a car) to D, who still has those goods 
in his or her possession. If, according to the rules of property law, property in 
the car has not passed,51 P will be entitled to reclaim the car. If D does not re­
deliver it, P may seek either specific restitution of the goods or damages in 
lieu.52
Specific restitution of the very thing received by a defendant as a result 
of the plaintiff's mistake is one example of remedial relief which does not 
disadvantage a defendant, yet the plaintiff is restored to his or her pre-mistaken 
position. A fair outcome is consequently achieved. To describe the outcome as 
fair is not a reference to fairness at large. The outcome is fair precisely because 
it promotes the policy of restoration without infringing the paramount concern 
of not disadvantaging an innocent party—the defendant.53
51 An example of property not having passed might be where the mistake is as to the 
identity of the transferee. See Goff & Jones, 179.
52 Specific restitution of the goods may be possible in limited circumstances, either in 
an action in detinue or under equitable jurisdiction to grant specific restitution. In either case, 
the courts will generally only grant such a remedy where damages at common law would be an 
inadequate remedy, for example, because the goods have special value to a plaintiff or are not 
readily replaceable (see North v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1860) 2 Giff. 64, 69), or because the 
defendant is insolvent. An interesting example is Orr v. Lane (1951) 52 N.S.W.S.R. 37, in which 
an order was made for the specific restitution of money, since damages were an inadequate 
remedy against the insolvent defendant. See also McKeown v. Cavalier Yachts (1988) 13 
N.S.W.L.R. 303, and Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Chp. 22.
53 To utilise the language of economics, such a result might be said to resemble a form 
of Pareto optimality or to be a form of Pareto improvement. A Pareto improvement, in the 
context of economic efficiency, is one which moves closer towards a social optimum by
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Of course, it can be argued that the specific restitution of goods has 
nothing to do with Restitution, falling instead within property or tort law. In 
the mistake cases under consideration, specific restitution of the very things 
received will only be possible in exceptional cases. But the idea of specific 
restitution as a quintessential fair outcome is an important one. For in many of 
the cases under consideration, whether involving money or services, remedial 
relief will effect what in essence amounts to specific restitution. A defendant is 
asked to return something he or she still retains which can rightfully be said to 
belong to the plaintiff. In money cases, it will be argued, recovery is justifiable 
whenever a defendant retains the economic advantage which the mistaken 
payment represents. If a plaintiff mistakenly pays $100 to the defendant, to 
require the defendant to return the $100 does not impose any particular 
hardship upon the defendant where he or she still has the economic advantage 
which that $100 conferred. A change of position defence will be critical in 
determining the survival of such economic advantage. In service cases, by way 
of contrast, remedies which achieve a fair outcome will be more exceptional, 
but nonetheless possible at times. If a plaintiff has expended $100 in mistakenly 
painting the roof of the defendant's house, to order recompense of $100 would 
be to impose a new (that is, different) obligation upon the defendant. In most 
cases, any relief should thus be refused, for otherwise the defendant would be 
required to reach into his or her own pockets, effectively to be made insurer of 
the plaintiff's loss.
Given the variety of forms services can take and the multifarious factual 
contexts within which they may be conferred, it is difficult to state a general 
rule of when a fair outcome is possible in service cases. The idea of protecting 
defendants could be stated in terms of not requiring them to "reach into their 
own pockets",54 but this, at best, provides only a rule of thumb. What is clear is 
that any determination of liability which seeks to restore a plaintiff without 
disadvantaging a defendant should be context specific. Liability should not be 
determined formulistically, so that to some extent, the courts should exercise 
discretion in achieving a fair outcome. Discretion here does not suggest a
maximising utility in a way so that at least one person is made better off, but no one is made 
worse off. See Cooter, R., & Ulen, T., Law and Economics, (1988), 49-51. In the context of a 
plaintiff seeking relief for mistake, a remedy will be a Pareto optimal one where it puts the 
plaintiff someway back to his or her original position, but does not leave the defendant at a 
disadvantage. Any outstanding losses after a Pareto-optimal remedy must be borne by the 
plaintiff.
54 Dawson, J.P., “Erasable Enrichment in German Law" (1981) 61 B.U.L.R. 271, 272.
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judicial carte blanche. As will be seen when service cases are considered in 
detail, it is possible to articulate a number of factors which are relevant to the 
exercise of such discretion and which assist in a determination as to whether or 
not a defendant would be disadvantaged as a consequence of imposing a 
particular remedy. It must be noted, however, that the courts have not as yet 
accepted a discretionary basis for relief. Instead, the paramount concern of 
protecting defendants has led the courts to be more cautious in granting relief 
than is perhaps necessary.
It might be argued that wherever a defendant retains an enrichment 
received as a result of a plaintiffs mistake, restitution of that enrichment does 
not disadvantage such defendant; in fact, it achieves a fair outcome. As will be 
seen, however, an equation of disgorging unjust enrichment with achieving fair 
outcomes is not valid, at least in relation to service cases. Circumstances will 
arise where a defendant retains an enrichment, but disgorgement of that 
enrichment would leave the defendant at a disadvantage. Conversely, in some 
cases, a defendant will not have been enriched (on the "receipt of wealth" or 
subjective tests) but a remedy which does not disadvantage the defendant is 
nonetheless possible.
There are significant conceptual difference between applying unjust 
enrichment theory as opposed to seeking fair outcomes; and the difference 
between the two notions can lead to an albeit subtle divergence in results. The 
very focus of unjust enrichment is misplaced in the context of mistake cases. 
Unjust enrichment focuses on the status of a defendant as an unjustly enriched 
party as the triggering event justifying the imposition of liability;55 and further, 
dictates that the remedial aim of relief is the reversal of that status, that is, the 
disgorgement of the enrichment. By way of contrast, it is suggested that the 
focus in mistake ought to be on the paramount concern of protecting the 
innocent defendant.56 Further, the aim of any remedial relief ought to be on the 
restoration of the plaintiff, as near as is possible, to his or her pre-mistaken
55 The language of unjust enrichment also has pejorative connotations, somehow 
always hinting that a defendant who is unjustly enriched is a wrongdoer. To be sure, unjust 
enrichment theory accepts that recovery is not premised on any wrongdoing of a defendant. 
But the language of unjust enrichment seems to suggest otherwise.
56 In unjust enrichment theory, this protective concern would have to be given effect 
largely through the operative defences. This is because on most theories, prim a facie liability is 
established by the mistake itself, satisfying the requirement of unjustness. Any protection of the 
defendant must then be via any operative defences. In the writer's view, this inverts the liability 
rule from that which it should be: a restorative principle confined in its operation to achieving 
fair outcomes, that is, ones which do not disadvantage a defendant.
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position, without infringing this paramount concern. Balancing these two 
competing concerns is the essence of achieving fair outcomes.57' 58
Let us turn now to a detailed consideration of the idea of achieving a fair 
outcome by reference to the case law on mistake, commencing with the 
mistaken payment of money.
§ 9.2.2 Mistaken Payments of Money
§ 9.2.2.1 A property analogy
Particular characteristics of money59 distinguish it from other forms of 
personal property. Money is a universal means of exchange, so that once it has 
been negotiated to a bona fide purchaser—"passes into currency"—any claim, 
even to a specifically identifiable sum of money, is lost.60 Thus, provided 
money is received in good faith and for valuable consideration without notice 
of the owner's interest, a transferee of money gets property to it even where the 
transferor had none.61 Even if the recipient of money was a volunteer or acted 
mala fides, money tends to lose its specific identity in the hands of its recipient 
or may have been negotiated on. Consequently, leaving aside the exceptional 
case in which notes or coins have been kept, say, in a box,62 any claim for the
57
58 The distinction between unjust enrichment and fair outcomes can be illustrated by 
reference to ideas at work outside the context of mistake, specifically, in equity's considerable 
powers to effect restitutio in integrum upon the unwinding of a transaction. Although 
characteristically restitution of benefits is the mechanism by which restitutio is effected, the 
principle which underlies such remedial relief has a more subtle purpose than merely the 
disgorgement of benefit. As the High Court emphasised in Alati v. Kruger (1955) 94 C.L.R. 216, 
224, per Dixon C.J., Webb, Kitto & Taylor JJ., the purpose of restitutio in integrum is to "do what 
is practically just between the parties, and by so doing restore them substantially to the status 
quo." By making sensitive adjustments, equity can balance the parties' position to achieve a 
substantial and fair restoration of the parties to their status quo ante. And equity has a variety of 
tools at its disposal to achieve a substantially fair restoration. For example, equity may require 
an account of profits, or make allowances for deterioration in any property transferred. 
Restitutio in integrum aims at the restoration of both parties to a transaction, whereas in mistake, 
the aim is restoration of a plaintiff in a way which does not disadvantage the defendant. 
Admittedly, however, it may well be argued that equity's rules provide us with merely a more 
sophisticated notion as to when an enrichment is indeed unjust, so that achieving restitutio in 
integrum could still be said to be consistent with achieving the restitution of an unjust 
enrichment.
59 The term money is being used inclusively, as discussed supra n. 26.
60 Goff & Jones, 77; cf. Stoljar, 114, and Mann, 8-11. See Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 
398,418, per Lord Haldane.
61 Cf. Banque Beige v. Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321, 329, per Scrutton L.J.
62 Taylor v. Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562, 575, per Lord Ellenborough. See also Orr v.
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return of money generally has to be an action in personam, for the return of an 
equivalent sum .63 This will be so irrespective of whether the money was loaned 
to the defendant, or paid by mistake, or even stolen by the defendant.64 This 
contrasts with the situation in respect of most chattels, which, potentially at 
least, are specifically recoverable in an action in rem ß5 Regardless, however, of 
whether a claim is for the return of money or some other chattel transferred, a 
plaintiff in all such cases is essentially seeking the return of his or her property, 
claiming that "what you received is mine" .66
One commentator, Stoljar, recognised the affinity of the money had and 
received claim with other claims for the return of property and developed his 
proprietary theory of quasi-contractual liability.67 Stoljar considered that many 
claims68 for money had and received could be seen as arising from the fact that
Lane (1951) 52 N.S.W.S.R. 37.
63 Thus, to cite an early case, Core's Case (1537) Dyer 20a, 22b:
And besides if I bail twenty pounds to one to keep for my use, if the twenty pounds
were not contained in a bag, coffer, or box, an action of detinue doth not lie, because
the twenty pounds could not be discovered or known to be mine, but debt and account
lie at my pleasure.
64 Even where money can be "followed" into the hands of a third party, or into a 
product for which the money has been substituted, any proprietary claim over such money or 
its substitute still has to be one for the equivalent amount rather than the very notes (if any) 
originally held by the plaintiff. The concept of following money will be returned to when three- 
party transactions are considered below.
63 See Stoljar, Chp. 5, particularly 117, Stoljar, S., "Unjust Enrichment and Unjust 
Sacrifice" (1987) 50 M.L.R. 603, 606, and Muir, G., "The Contribution of Professor Sam Stoljar to 
the Law of Quasi-Contract" Unpublished Paper, delivered to the Restitution Group, SPTL 
Conference, Aberdeen, 1991, paragraph 3.07.
66 Cf. Muir, ibid, paragraphs 3.11, 3.13.
67 The theory was first postulated in the first edition of Quasi-Contract (1964). The 
second edition, published in 1989, suggested a narrower ambit for the theory. A determination 
of whether money was recoverable was no longer to be on the same basis as a determination of 
the passing of property (as in the first edition). Instead, Stoljar appears to have perceived his 
proprietary theory more in terms of an analogy with tort claims such as detinue. As Muir, ibid, 
paragraph 3.11, has said in relation to the second edition, "it is fair to say that the proprietary 
theory had, at this stage, by Stoljar's own hand, been somewhat eviscerated. The extended 
formulation becomes descriptive but not explanatory."
68 Claims for total failure of consideration, for example, were considered by Stoljar to 
be essentially contractual. See Stoljar, 222-6. See also Burrows, 4. Many of the topics Stoljar 
considered to be contractual in their underlying concerns (i.e., based on consensual 
relationships) have been considered in Chapter 6.
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money belonging to the plaintiff had been received by the defendant without 
the plaintiffs consent (or intention to transfer) or, in the case of mistaken 
payments, without his or her sufficiently informed consent.69 Stoljar's 
proprietary theory does not seek to explain all of quasi-contractual liability; in 
fact, it is limited to claims for mistaken payments and payments wrongfully 
acquired, under compulsion or otherwise.70 Stoljar used other theoretical 
constructs to explain other areas of quasi-contract.71 Yet, although some 
commentators have criticised Stoljar on this basis—for "impairing the unity of 
the subject"72—in this writer's view, one of the strengths of Stoljar's writing is 
its recognition of the very different grounds upon which quasi-contractual 
recovery was granted. Indeed, Stoljar's approach highlights the very gap-filling 
role which gives quasi-contract its unique quality as a "renvoi-category" 73
If one takes Stoljar's proprietary theory as an analogy or descriptive 
device,74 then it proves particularly useful in relation to mistake, in two ways. 
First, it suggests why a mistaken payment can be sought to be undone at all. It 
is the lack of a sufficiently informed intention to dispossess oneself of particular 
property which is at the crux of the mistaken payer's claim. "[Pjroof of mistake 
affirmatively excludes intention" 75 to transfer property. It is trite to reply that
69 See particularly Stoljar, 5-6. The right to recovery is founded on the fact that a 
defendant came to the money “without any transmissive or transactional consent from [the 
plaintiff]" (emphasis in original). Stoljar clearly perceived a mistaken transfer to be non- 
consensual, but this must presumably be the consequence of the original consent being 
insufficiently informed. Cf. Muir, supra, n. 65, paragraph 3.14. For a historical account of the 
proprietary theory of the recovery of money, see Stoljar, S., "The Transformation of Account" 
(1964) 80 L.Q.R. 203, particularly 211-2.
70 See Stoljar, 18, and generally, Chps 2-5.
71 See supra n. 68. To explain service cases outside of a contractual context, Stoljar 
developed his theory of unjust sacrifice. Many of the cases sought to be explained by this 
theory have been considered in Chapter 8.
72 Burrows, 4.
75 Stoljar, 18. Stoljar considered that quasi-contract "remained a subject still strikingly 
disorderly".
74 Cf. Muir, supra n. 65, paragraph 3.13, 3.14.
75 Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society v. Wm H. Price Ld [1934] A.C. 455, 463, per Lord 
Wright. The test for ascertaining such intentions is objective.
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in most cases "property" in the money will have passed.76 Stoljar appears to 
have recognised this.77 Indeed, even if property in money has not passed, a 
right to specific money will almost always have disappeared, so that recovery 
must of necessity take the form of a claim for equivalent value.78 The fact that 
property in the money has passed, however, does not preclude the plaintiff still 
asserting that it was not intended that the defendant should have the money in 
the circumstances under which the transfer in fact occurred. Thus, Muir has 
concluded that
it is undoubtedly true that in every circumstance in which property can 
be recovered because the owner did not consent to its transfer, money or 
its equivalent can or should also be recovered. The concept of consent is
76 Unjust enrichment theorists consider that the fact that legal property in the money 
will usually have passed is sufficient to refute Stoljar's theory. See Burrows, 4, and Birks, P., 
"English Recognition of Unjust Enrichment" [1991] L.M.C.L.Q. 473, 482:
[The proprietary approach] brings with it the danger of a new heresy, requiring a 
continuing property as a condition of a claim for restitution. It is quite incorrect to 
assert or to imply that our law does or should make restitution depend on a continuing 
property in the plaintiff. If it did, there would be very restricted recovery of mistaken 
payments ....
Clearly, to argue that a claim for restitution of money is, or ought to be, limited to 
circumstances in which property has not passed is unsustainable. In ANZ v. Westpac (1988) 78 
A.L.R. 157,162, the High Court considered that a claim for recovery of a mistaken payment
is a common law action for recovery of the value of the unjust enrichment and the fact 
that specific money or property received can no longer be identified in the hands of the 
recipient or traced into other specific property which he holds does not of itself 
constitute an answer in a category of case in which the law imposes a prima facie 
liability to make restitution.
Glover, ]., "Equity, Restitution and the Proprietary Recovery of Value" (1991) 14 U.N.S.W.L.J. 
247, 248-50, considers that this statement contradicts a proprietary explanation of money had 
and received; that the claim is not "of nature proprietary". This is certainly valid if one takes 
the proprietary theory literally, as one of strict property law, rather than as an analogy. But 
Stoljar repeatedly stressed that the nature of money meant that any claim, for practical 
purposes, had to be for the return of equivalent value, rather than for the very property 
transferred. In other words, Stoljar's theory is concerned with explaining the reason for the 
remedy in money had and received and does not suggest that the form of that remedy is 
proprietary. The force of a property analogy remains: the plaintiff is essentially seeking the 
return of what "belongs" to him or her.
77 Although at times Stoljar appears to suggest that legal property has not passed 
where money has been mistakenly paid (eg., Stoljar, 5-6), at other points he appears to state his 
proprietary theory more in terms of an analogy. The notion of property merely explains why 
money is recoverable: that there was no intention sufficient to give the defendant a better right 
to the money than the plaintiff. A claimant has only a prima facie right to property, which can be 
defeated by defences such as change of position (7). See also at 27, for example, where Stoljar 
talks of a "principle of property" that P "retains a right to his money" (emphasis added).
78 Supra nn. 59-66 and text thereto.
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at once familiar and narrative. Property cannot pass without consent.79
As Muir points out, although there is consent in cases of mistaken payment,80 
yet this is not a sufficiently informed consent, so that the plaintiff may still 
assert "I did not mean [the recipient] to have this in those circumstances" .81 Such 
an assertion is not far removed from one that there had been no consent at all to 
the transfer.82
Stoljar saw his proprietary theory as giving substance to the conclusion 
that a recipient of money was unjustly enriched:83
Instead of P claiming recovery merely on the ground that D is "unjustly" 
enriched ..., we can now say E^s enrichment is indeed unjust: it is unjust 
precisely because D retains money without title, having got it without 
P's consent, so that P now has a claim on straightforward proprietary 
grounds. Thus if D were to dispute his claim, P can say: "I claim this 
money because it is mine."84
Perhaps one of the reasons for the cursory dismissal of Stoljar's views by many 
unjust enrichment theorists is that they appear to take statements such as the
79 Muir, supra n. 65, paragraph 3.13.
80 Contrast Stoljar, supra n. 69.
8  ^ Muir, supra n. 65, paragraph 3.14, emphasis added. A similar conclusion appears to 
have been reached by Watts, supra n. 2, 148, discussing the reasoning of the High Court in 
David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57:
[W]hat seems to be at play is a principle that persons should not be parted from, at 
least tangible, items of their wealth unless they acted freely and unqualifiedly and were 
fully apprised of relevant facts.
Watts goes on to state, however, "[a]t least within the confines of this principle, it seems not 
inappropriate to call the cause of action 'unjust enrichment,/,.
82 There will have been no consent at all to a transfer, for example, where money has 
been stolen. Perhaps Stoljar perceived the quasi-contractual claim as modifying notions already 
existing in property law as to what amounted to a sufficient intention to pass property.
83 Burrows, 4, states that Stoljar saw his theory "as a more concrete clarification of 
what is meant by unjust enrichment."
84 Stoljar, 6-7. Stoljar continues:
Certainly D is also unjustly enriched; but in confirming that he is, we are not so much 
activating our sense of justice in response to an allegedly undue benefit (though we 
may do that too) as rather stating that D is retaining money which, being non- 
consensually acquired, belongs to P. The injustice here lies in the retention of assets 
demonstrably belonging to someone else.
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above too literally. If Stoljar had said that the money "in essence belongs" to P, 
his views would not be far removed from mainstream unjust enrichment 
explanations of the recovery of mistaken payments: that the mistake vitiates the 
intention to transfer, so that a plaintiff "did not mean" the defendant to have 
the money.85
The second way in which a property analogy proves useful is that it 
suggests why recovery of a mistaken payment achieves a fair outcome, does 
not in fact disadvantage a defendant. To say that a defendant must return the 
plaintiff's "property" hints at the crux of the money claim: that the recovery of 
money is akin to specific restitution of the very thing received by a defendant. 
Of course, specific restitution of money as banknotes86 is almost invariably 
impossible. But this is an inconsequential observation, since the important 
characteristic of money is not the legal status as chattels of any specific notes 
transferred but its inherent or abstract quality as a means of exchange: a 
mechanism for purchasing other things—goods, realty, services—in short, as 
representing wealth.87 A plaintiff seeking to recover money seeks to recover its 
value equivalent, or the "economic advantage" which money represents. It 
follows that if such economic advantage subsists in a defendant's hands, the 
justification for its return becomes more compelling and any justification for its 
retention is diminished, even where the actual money received is no longer 
identifiable. To order restitution of that economic advantage does not impose 
hardship; it is not, in fact, a new obligation at all, but a form of specific 
restitution of the "very thing" (the economic advantage) originally transferred.
There is some judicial support for the view that a plaintiff is entitled to 
recover money which properly belongs to him or her and that further, the 
essential and relevant feature of money is as representing wealth. In the House 
of Lords, Lord Dunedin in Sinclair v. Brougham considered that:
both an action founded on a jus in re, such as an action to get back a 
specific chattel, and an action for money had and received are just 
different forms of working out the higher equity that no one has a right
85 Cf. Birks, 140.
86 In any case, the use of banknotes in any large-scale modern transactions is 
becoming more and more infrequent. For example, electronic transfers of funds are a common 
means of facilitating modern transactions. Such transfers will involve merely the debiting and 
crediting of bank accounts.
87 Money is also, of course, the m easure of all wealth. Cf. Mann, 28-9. See also M u tual 
Pools &  Staff P ty  Ltd v. Com monwealth of A ustralia  (1994) 119 A.L.R. 571, 606, per Dawson and 
Toohey, JJ.
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to keep either property or the proceeds of property which do not belong 
to him.88
But Lord Dunedin recognised that what was required to be returned was not 
the money itself, but the economic advantage, or "superfluity", which that 
money represented:89
[I]f the proceeds of property can be shewn to be what I have called a 
superfluity in the person of the recipient, then [equity] will hold that that 
property is traced just as surely as if it was still in the original form.90
More recent statements have similarly emphasised plaintiffs' rights to 
reclaim money "belonging" to them, particularly in three-party transaction 
cases.91 Moreover, the acceptance of a property analogy may also explain a 
preparedness on the part of some courts (though not without generating 
controversy) to allow a proprietary claim for the return of a mistaken payment, 
so that a plaintiff is entitled to priority ahead of other creditors in order to 
reclaim what rightfully belongs to him or her.92
88 [1914] A.C. 393,436.
89 At [1914] A.C. 393, 434, Lord Dunedin considers a superfluity to be "something 
which if [the defendant] kept would be pure gain to him" (434). Cf. per Viscount Haldane L.C. 
at 420. See also the discussion of Lord Dunedin's view in Chase Manhattan Bank v. lsrael-British 
Bank [1979] All E.R. 1025.
90 Sinclair v. Brougham [1914] A.C. 398, 437. See also Mutual Pools v. Commonwealth 
(1994) 119 A.L.R. 577, 606, per Dawson and Toohey JJ., who emphasise the nature of money as 
representing purchasing power or wealth and consequently as conferring economic advantage, 
rather than as property per se. Although the comments by Lord Dunedin were made in relation 
to a tracing claim in equity, they suggest a sufficiently liberal basis for such a claim so as to 
achieve a similar result as where a personal claim subject to a change of position is available. 
This will be explored further in § 9.3. In any case, Lord Dunedin makes it clear that equity here 
was merely "helping" the common law where the action in money had and received was 
unavailable (in Sinclair v. Brougham, because a contract could not be implied).
91 Nelson v. Larholt [1948] 1 K.B. 339, 342, per Denning J., as he then was; Lipkin 
Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] A.C. 10,16, per Lord Templeman, and 27, per Lord Goff. For criticism 
of these views, see Birks, supra n. 76, 482. For an early opinion to this effect, see Clarke v. Shee & 
Johnson (1774) 1 Cowp. 197.
92 See Chase Manhattan Bankv. lsrael-British Bank [1979] 3 All E.R. 1025,1039, citing the 
commentary in the Restatement of Restitution, 664-5:
[W]here property is transferred under a mistake entitling the transferor to restitution, 
the transferor retains the beneficial interest in the property, and a holding that where 
the legal remedy is adequate he cannot have specific restitution is merely procedural. If 
the transferee is insolvent, the transferor is entitled to specific restitution, even though 
the property is of such a character that were he not insolvent the remedy at law would 
be adequate and the transferor would not be entitled to specific restitution.
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Can the property analogy be taken further so as to suggest that the basis 
of recovery rests on the immoral conduct of a defendant in refusing to return 
the property? Some commentators, including Blackstone, for example, have 
emphasised the unjust retention by a defendant of money which he or she 
ought to refund.93 Of course, where a defendant refuses to refund money once 
he or she becomes aware of the mistaken actions of the plaintiff, such a 
defendant may be acting wrongly or unconscionably. But this need not be the 
case. A defendant may refuse to return money because of an honestly held 
belief of a right to it, believing, for example, that the mistake was insufficient to 
vitiate the plaintiff's intention to transfer it. Alternatively, the defendant may 
genuinely believe that he or she has changed his or her position. We must 
remember that we are dealing with defendants who, at the outset at least, are 
innocent of any wrongdoing. Even once such a defendant becomes aware of the 
plaintiff's mistake, it does not necessarily follow that a refusal to repay from 
that point onwards is unconscionable. In any case, the view of the High Court 
of Australia, that a defendant's prima facie liability arises as soon as the payment 
is received,94 appears to preclude basing liability on a defendant's wrongdoing. 
The defendant may not even be aware of the receipt of money and yet a prima  
facie obligation to refund it will arise. In this writer's view, a plaintiff's right to
The result in Chase Manhattan has been criticised by Tettenborn, A., "Remedies For the 
Recovery of Money Paid by Mistake" [1980] C.L.J. 272, and see the reply by Jones, G., [19801 
C.L.J. 275. Whether the decision will be followed is questionable, after the Privy Council 
decision in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1994] 2 All E.R. Although the Privy Council did not 
express an opinion as to the correctness of the decision in Chase Manhattan, the judgment takes 
a fairly restrictive approach as to the circumstances in which a proprietary interest arises. But if 
one accepts the correctness of the result in Chase Manhattan (and the property analogy suggests 
it is correct, but policy considerations need to be weighed as to whether priority over other 
creditors is justified), the proprietary right should not give rise to a claim over any larger sum 
than the original economic advantage transferred. Thus, if the recipient of $5000 mistakenly 
transferred buys a ring with that money, such ring now being worth, say, $7000, the plaintiff 
should still only be entitled to recover $5000. Cf. Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan (1760) 2 
Burr. 1005, 1009, who states that a defendant "can be liable no further than the money he has 
received". See also Goff & Jones (3rd. ed., 1986), 78. The principle of achieving a fair outcome 
aimed at restoring a plaintiff to his or her previous position explains why this view must be 
correct. But contrast Burrows, 58-9, who argues that the plaintiff in such an example should be 
entitled to the value of the substituted property (i.e., $7000).
93 Blackstone, Sir William, Commentaries on the Laws of England (9th ed, 1783; 1978 
reprint, Garland Publishers), Vol. Ill, 163. See also Austin, J., Jurisprudence (4th ed., 1879), Vol. 2, 
944-5, Kelly v. Solari (1841) 9 M. & W. 54, 58-9; E.R. 24, 26, and Avondale Printers v. Haggie [1979] 
2 N.Z.L.R. 124,150.
94 David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 80-1. 
This conclusion follows from the High Court's view that a defendant is unjustly enriched from 
the moment of receipt.
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be restored to his or her original position arises as soon as a plaintiff acts 
detrimentally on the basis of a mistake, and continues so long as a remedy 
achieving a fair outcome is possible. In many cases this will be so long as the 
economic advantage received survives in the recipient's hands.
§ 9.2.2.2 The significance of change of position
The recipient of money may either have retained that economic 
advantage received, even if preserved in a different form (for example, having 
been invested in gold bullion, shares or realty),95 or else have dissipated that 
economic advantage (for example, having gambled it away or expended it on 
travel). If the law is concerned with achieving fair outcomes, then a crucial 
inquiry is whether a defendant can return all or some of the economic 
advantage received. The common law has acknowledged the importance of 
such an inquiry in its recent recognition of a "change of position" defence.96 As 
will be suggested, the essence of a change of position is that the defendant has 
innocently dissipated some or all of the economic advantage received, which 
part thereof is consequently not returnable and restitution of which ought not 
be required.
Even before the express recognition of a change of position defence, 
other defences served a similar function, albeit in a less general and, perhaps 
(depending on the future development of change of position), less sophisticated 
way .97 It is not proposed to consider specific formulations of these previous
95 If the money has been converted into a different form, the form in which the wealth 
is preserved must be one realisable in money.
96 In Australia, the defence was expressly recognised in David Securities Pty Ltd v. 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, after considerable obiter dicta in support of 
such a defence in recent times, for example, as in National Mutual Life Association of Australasia 
Ltd v. Walsh (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 585. In England, the defence has been recognised in Lipkin 
Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10. Before these judicial developments, it had been 
repeatedly asserted in both English and Australian law that no such defence existed. Perhaps 
the most categorical judicial rejection of the availability of a change of position defence can be 
seen in Baylis v. The Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127. See, however, infra nn. 97-9 and text 
thereto.
97 Before the acceptance of a general change of position defence, there appear to have 
been four possible heads on which a defendant may have relied in order to defend a claim for 
the restitution of money paid under a mistake:
(1) The defence of bona fide purchaser for value of the money received (that is, as the defence is 
alternatively expressed, that the defendant gave good consideration), considered in both David 
Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, and Lipkin Gorman v. 
Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, to be a separate defence to change of position. Birks has argued that 
the gist of a good consideration defence is the same as that of change of position, which in 
Birks' terms, is whether an enrichment has been "cancelled out". See Birks, supra n. 76, 490-2.
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defences: most will now have been incorporated or subsumed within a general 
change of position defence.98 Although the formal common law position may 
have appeared harsh and oppressive, it would seem that before the express 
recognition of change of position the results of the cases were far less
Although this may well be correct, the matter is of no consequence if one recognises, as Birks 
does, that in cases of bona fide purchase, the consideration is taken to be a complete change of 
position, so that there is no need to determine whether the value of consideration (on a market 
assessment, for example), is the same as the money received in exchange. See also Millett, P., 
"Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 71, 82. One example of a bona fide purchaser 
is where a defendant has discharged a debt owed to him or her, such as where money is 
credited to an overdrawn account. See, e.g., Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank [1893] A.C. 282, and 
Union Bank of Australia Limited v. Murray Aynsley [1898] A.C. 693 (P.C.).
(2) A defence of "payment-over" (see Stoljar, 35-7) or "ministerial receipt" (see Birks, 
Restitution: The Future, 139-41), which arises where an agent, prima facie liable as the recipient of 
money, pays over that money to his or her principal, or in accordance with the direction of his 
or her principal. In other words, the defence arises wherever the recipient was a mere "conduit- 
pipe" for another. See ANZ v. Westpac (1987) 78 A.L.R. 157. For an extension of this defence to 
allow for a far more general change of position defence, see Transvaal & Delagoa Bay Investment 
Co. Ltd v. Atkinson [1944] 1 All E.R. 579.
(3) The defence of estoppel, the basis of which is that a defendant has detrimentally relied upon 
a "representation" of the plaintiff that the defendant "was entitled to treat the money as his 
own": Goff & Jones, 747, and generally 746-50. Significantly, such a "representation" "may be 
implicit in the payment itself, in light of the surrounding circumstances": Goff & Jones, 747, 
citing Holt v. Markham [1923] 1 K.B. 504, per Scrutton L.J. See also Stoljar, 37-9. Most cases of 
estoppel would now be subsumed within change of position—see an early statement equating 
the two in Lamer v. L.C.C. [1949] 2 K.B. 683, 688, per Denning L.J.—but note Birks' view that 
there may still be a distinct operation for an estoppel defence: Restitution—The Future, 144-7. 
This view derives from one significant feature of estoppel distinct to that of change of position, 
namely that estoppel operates as a defence for recovery of the entire sum received where there 
has been any detrimental reliance, even if comparatively insignificant when compared with the 
sums received. Estoppel does not operate pro tanto. See Avon County Council v. Howlett [1983] 1 
W.L.R. 605.
(4) A form of change of position defence, as perhaps recognised in Re Diplock [1948] 1 Ch. 458, 
may also have been possible. See Stoljar, 44, who appears to treat this case as recognising a 
general change of position defence. This view seems flawed, however, for the defence in that 
case was limited to the proprietary claim over money (or its substitute) surviving in the hands 
of the defendant (i.e., an equitable proprietary claim) and not as a defence to a personal claim. 
See Sutton, R.J., "'Quasi-Contract': Lost Cause or Current Issue" (1990) 7 Otago L.R. 336, 338. 
Cf. Goff & Jones, 698; Birks, 371, 411-2; and Maddaugh & McCamus, 141, fn. 68.
It is also important to note that two further restrictions upon recovery—now abandoned— 
would also have considerably limited potential claims against a recipient of money. These 
restrictions were (1) no recovery where the mistake was one of law (see supra n. 2); and (2) no 
recovery unless the mistake was "fundamental", or perhaps even one going to liability.
98 Cf. Birks, supra n. 76, 487: "some or all of these seemingly separate defences will 
turn out to be no more than those fragments of the defence of change of position which were 
already recognised in our law."
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draconian." Change of position, once given substance, may prove to be no 
wider than these previously recognised defences. Since the scope of a change of 
position defence "has been deliberately left less than fully formed" ,100 it is 
proposed to rely on the results of past cases, as well as ob iter d icta  from 
authoritative decisions, in order to provide some idea of the future operation of 
change of position defence.
Perhaps the essence of a change of position is the dilution or dissipation 
of an economic advantage received by the bona fide actions of a defendant able 
to be "ascribed to the mistaken payment" .101 Each reliant action which pro  
ta n to 102 reduces the economic advantage gives rise to a change of position 
defence to that extent. The important factor is that defendants cannot avail 
themselves of the defence merely because they no longer have the actual 
money received.103 For example, if money is paid into a bank account of a 
defendant, the normal day to day workings of that account will result in 
fluctuations over a period of time. At times, no money may remain in the 
account. Nonetheless, without more, there will not have been a change of 
position. A defendant who has used the mistaken payment merely to meet 
ordinary living expenses,104 or to pay off an existing debt, cannot avail himself 
or herself of the defence. But the defence will be available where a defendant 
has changed his or her lifestyle, in the sense of changing his or her usual 
pattern of disbursements, in reliance upon the payment.105
"  Contrast Finn, P., "The Liability of Third Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance" 
in Waters, D.W.M., (ed.) Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993) 195, 210, suggesting that the 
recipients of money paid under mistake were treated with "little mercy" by the law. By 
comparison, Stoljar, 35, considered that a defence of change of position historically had been 
widely recognised, despite its express rejection by some courts.
100 Birks, supra n. 76, 487, citing Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10,15A (per 
Lord Bridge), 23F (per Lord Ackner), 34G (per Lord Goff). Similarly, the High Court in David 
Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, has deliberately failed 
to clarify the precise scope of the defence. Perhaps a general guide as to future developments of 
the change of position defence may be gained from the Restatement of Restitution, §69, §142.
101 David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 81.
103 Cf. the operation of the estoppel defence, supra n. 97.
103 David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 81.
104 David Securities Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 109 A.L.R. 57, 81.
105 See Brisbane v. Dacres (1813) 5 Taunt. 143,162, per Mansfield C.J. Such a change of 
position will more usually occur where a series of payments have been made, as in Skyring v. 
Greenwood (1825) 4 B. & C. 281.
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Similarly, a defendant who has on the faith of the receipt incurred one- 
off extraordinary expenditure which he or she would not otherwise have 
incurred106—such as a donation to charity107—will not be liable to repay such 
sums. Difficulties may arise where a defendant has converted money into a 
form which, if required to be realised, may disadvantage the defendant: for 
example, having expended the money on improvements to his or her house. 
The problem is essentially the same as faced when considering recovery from 
the "recipient" of mistakenly conferred services, to be considered below. It 
suffices to say for now that in deciding such cases, it becomes vital for the 
courts to have due regard to the very specific contexts within which the cases 
arise so as to achieve a fair outcome.
Two specialised aspects of change of position also need to be noted. A 
defendant who has given good consideration for the mistaken payment, such 
as by discharging a debt owed by a third party to the defendant, will not be 
liable to make restitution.108 Also, a defendant who has received the mistaken 
payment as an agent and who has forwarded that money to his or her 
principal, or paid it at the direction of his or her principal, will not be liable to 
repay such sum .109
Provided there is a liberal development of the change of position 
defence, then recovery against an innocent recipient will be limited to economic 
advantage surviving in his or her hands—the superfluity, to use the language 
of Lord Dunedin. Recovery of such superfluity does not leave a defendant at a 
disadvantage, even if the defendant no longer has the money actually received. 
At the same time, recovery of the superfluity to that extent undoes the mistaken 
transaction and effectively returns both parties to their pre-mistaken position. 
Consequently, a fair outcome is achieved.
It remains only to note that in one regard, a defendant's awareness of the 
plaintiff's mistake is relevant. This is in relation to establishing that a change of 
position is bona fide. If a defendant dissipates an economic advantage in bad
106 5^  generally cases cited under estoppel, in Goff & Jones, 699-707.
107 Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [19911 3 W.L.R. 10, 34.
108 Such circumstances will usually arise in relation to three-party transactions. See 
supra n. 97, (1). Perhaps, strictly speaking, in such circumstances a defendant has not dissipated 
or lost an economic advantage, but never received one at all.
109 ANZ v. Westpac (1987) 78 A.L.R. 157. See supra n. 97, (2).
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faith, courts will no longer protect such a defendant from the consequences of 
such actions. Only where the dispersal of an economic advantage was innocent 
can a defendant rely on a defence of change of position.110 The law has not as 
yet determined what level of knowledge is sufficient to justify a conclusion that 
a defendant has acted in bad faith.* 111
§ 9.2.3 The Mistaken Conferral of Services
Where services have been mistakenly conferred, a plaintiffs plea (like 
that of the mistaken payer) is to have the transaction undone. But services 
present far greater difficulties. For although in some cases the end-product of a 
service may be returnable (as will be seen below), services as such cannot be 
specifically returned .112 This is the crux of the problem faced by a mistaken 
service provider: there is no reason why the defendant should bear the costs of 
the plaintiffs services and the defendant does not usually retain anything 
which belongs to the plaintiff and which can. consequently be returned.113
Despite these difficulties, the position of the mistaken service provider is 
not entirely hopeless, and in limited circumstances, courts have been prepared 
to grant remedial relief. The cases allowing relief are largely consistent with 
and can be rationalised on the basis of achieving fair outcomes. Relief, where 
granted, generally does not require defendants to "reach into their own 
pockets" or in any other way disadvantage them. Nonetheless, it will be argued 
below that courts in England and Australia could go further to achieve fair 
outcomes than they have been prepared to go. An unwillingness to resort to
110 That is, once a defendant becomes aware of the plaintiffs right to reclaim the 
money or at least the facts establishing such right, he or she cannot rely on subsequent actions
to reduce a plaintiffs entitlement. Any dissipation of economic advantage thereafter will be 
considered to be in bad faith and a change of position defence will not protect such actions. 
Perhaps such further liability to restore a plaintiff even despite the economic advantage having 
been dissipated could be said to arise from the defendant's wrongdoing. But the prima facie 
liability need not be explained by reference to wrongdoing.
111 See discussion in Goff & Jones, 744-5.
112 Goff & Jones, 18.
113 Requiring innocent defendants to pay for services interferes with their freedom to 
choose how best to spend limited resources. This will be so even where the defendant was (by 
some objective test) been enriched. See Mathews, P., "Freedom, Unrequested Improvements 
and Lord Denning" [1981] C.L.J. 340, for a perhaps overly-strident defence of a defendant's 
freedom to choose. Although Mathews' arguments are based on the justifiable ground of 
protecting an innocent defendant, he does not consider the possibility of remedies which are 
consistent with the primary aim of a fair outcome, where possible, that is, one which does not 
disadvantage a defendant.
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imaginative remedies, such as those utilised in some jurisdictions in the United 
States, has meant that many Anglo-Australian decisions have denied relief in 
circumstances in which some measure of restoration could otherwise have been 
achieved without disadvantaging the defendant.
In cases involving the receipt of money, a fair outcome is achieved 
essentially through one mechanism: the recovery of surviving economic 
advantage. The property analogy tells us that specific restitution of something 
belonging to the plaintiff (the economic advantage) is possible and thus ought 
to be allowed. In service cases, the service may also give rise to an economic 
advantage (including a negative one, such as the saving of an expense by 
payment of a debt) in a defendant's hands, though this is less likely. In such 
cases, the property analogy again proves useful. Further, the property analogy 
also explains the other significant category of service cases in which fair 
outcomes are possible, namely where some specific item of property—the end- 
product of a service, materials attached to land or goods and so on—can be 
"returned" to the plaintiff.114 As a generalisation, then, relief will usually be 
granted to a service provider, as with the mistaken payer, whenever a remedy 
akin to specific restitution can be formulated so that a fair outcome is possible. 
Such a remedy will require a defendant to "return" something received as a 
result of the plaintiffs mistake. To take one example, let us say P builds a shed 
on D's land, mistakenly believing the land to be his own. If the shed is readily 
removable, there appears to be no reason why P ought not be entitled to 
remove the shed. As Dickinson has said:
If removal is found to be feasible, an owner's argument that he or she 
has acquired rights in the improvement through the common law 
doctrine of accession becomes mere sophistry.115
Consequently, in some American jurisdictions, removal of such 
"fixtures" has been allowed.116 Although there is considerable contrary English 
authority,117 it ought to be possible to fashion a similar result in Australian law
114 Strictly speaking, the very thing received, the service, in the form of time effort and 
skill expended, cannot be returned.
115 Dickinson, K.H., "Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate" (1985) 64 N.Car. L.Rev. 37, 
67. In German law, the standard remedial response to the mistaken improvement of land is to 
give the landowner the choice of either allowing the removal of the improvement or 
compensating the improver for the market increase in the value of the land. See Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, Sections 997, 258.
116 See, e.g., Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d. 563 (1956), discussed infra n. 142.
117 Reynolds v. Ashley & Son [1904] A.C. 466; Gough v. Wood & Co [1894] 1 Q.B. 713, and
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by taking a less formalistic approach to fixtures than that displayed in those 
authorities.118 Of course, many service cases do not lend themselves so easily to 
remedial relief which achieves a fair outcome. This explains the courts' greater 
reluctance to grant relief in service cases than in money cases.
In any case, it is not possible nor, in this writer's view, desirable, to 
provide a single formula for arriving at a fair outcome. As will be seen, cases in 
which services have been mistakenly conferred arise in a variety of diverse 
factual contexts. It is only by taking cognisance of the individual facts of each 
case that a fair outcome can be achieved. To some extent, this must involve an 
exercise of discretion. But this is not intended to suggest that courts should 
resort to fairness at large. One can articulate a number of relevant factors which 
assist in determining whether a fair outcome is possible. It is proposed to 
consider such factors within the context of the different categories of service 
case which typically arise.
§ 9.2.3.1 Mistaken improvement of another's land
Example (1). P builds a machinery shed, specifically designed for use in 
his specialist business, on the edge of D's large sprawling rural allotment, 
believing it to be his own land. D is unaware of P's actions, due to unclearly 
marked boundaries. The mistake is subsequently discovered. The building is 
entirely useless to D, and does not enhance the market value of her property, 
but nor does it interfere in her grazing business. It is not practical to remove the 
shed without destroying it.119
Example (2). P contracts with TP to paint TP's house whilst she is away 
on vacation. As a consequence of P's mistake, he paints D's house instead (D, a
cf. the New Zealand decision oi Masefield v. Rotana (1891) 10 N.Z.L.R. 169.
118 Contrast, for example, the dissenting judgment of Denniston J. in Maseßeld v. 
Rotana (1891) 10 N.Z.L.R. 169, to that of the majority. It has been argued that the above 
authorities may not be as conclusive as they at first appear. See Sutton, supra n. 44, 250, fn. 32. 
Allowing removal of fixtures mistakenly attached is consistent with notions of protecting 
property which might be said to underlie the rules of fixtures. In other words, a defendant 
landowner should not be allowed to use a rule aimed at protecting the landowner's property 
rights to confiscate another's personal property. Cf. Pull v. Barnes, 35 P. 2d 828 (1960), 829.
119 Cf. Eagle Oil Corporation v. Cohassett Oil Corporation, 248 N.W. 840 (1933), in which 
the "improvement" was of detriment to the landowner, rather than of benefit.
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neighbour of TP, is also absent). Upon discovering his mistake, P seeks to 
recover the cost of his work, $5000, from D.120
In the absence of any statutory provision, it is often said that as a general 
rule a mistaken improver of land will be left without a remedy unless the 
owner of land has encouraged, acquiesced in, or is perhaps in some other way 
responsible for, the plaintiff's mistaken conduct.121 The rationale for such a 
stance is straightforward: the owner of the land acquires title to all fixtures 
thereon and this extinguishes any claim the improver may have to the 
improvement.122 In fact, the improver is technically a trespasser and is liable 
for damages incurred by the defendant.123 This would appear to be the position 
in Australia and England, though there is little direct124 authority in point.125
120 Cf. Nicholson v. St. Denis (1975) 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699
121 See Nicholson v. St. Denis (1975) 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699, 702, 704, and Restatement of 
Restitution, §42 (1). It is said that a defendant must be "guilty of something in the nature of 
fraud": Brand v. Chris Building Co. [1957] V.R. 625, and cf. Fridman, 334, Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 283-8, and Montreuil v. Ontario Asphalt Co. (1922) 69 D.L.R. 313, 333. Although 
equitable relief founded upon equitable fraud will provide the most common ground for 
remedy, it would appear that a plaintiff may also recover where the mistake was the result of 
the defendant's negligence, for example. See Phelps v. Kuntz, 76 A. 237 (1910), supra n. 5.
122 Sutton, supra n. 44, 242. Merryman, J.H., "Improving the Lot of the Trespassing 
Improver" (1959) 11 Stanf. L.Rev. 456,480, has said:
For several centuries [the maxim quicquid plant atur solo] has been firmly embedded in 
the common law, and it is doubtful that any other slogan has been as troublesome as 
'what is attached to the land becomes part of it'. The history of the law of fixtures can 
accurately be described as a long, tedious and painful series of efforts to overcome its 
effect.
Cf. Pull v. Barnes, 350 P. 2d 828 (1960), 829-30. A much narrower test of fixtures would provide 
scope for amelioration of the effects of the general fixtures rule, and it has been suggested that 
the courts have been willing to ameliorate the general rule via special rules and exceptions. See 
Casad R.C., 'The Mistaken Improver: A Comparative Study" (1968) 19 Hastings L.J. 1039,1039.
123 Damages would normally be nominal. See, however, the Texan case of Producers 
Lumber & Supplies v. Olney, 333 S.W. 2d 619 (1960), in which an improver sought to remove the 
improvement, thus committing a further "mala fides" trespass. The improver was liable for the 
damages incurred by the plaintiff, including damages to the improvement. The result seems 
harsh, given the landowner's intransigence in coming to a fair settlement before the improver's 
actions in frustration. Note the vigorous dissent of Barrow J.
124 Most Australian and English authorities which indirectly support the proposition 
involve some elements of request, acquiescence, or a contractual relationship. See Ramsden v. 
Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129, as perhaps one of the strongest authorities for the general rule, in 
which none of these elements were considered to be present, so that any form of relief to the 
"mistaken" improvers was consequently refused. It has been pointed out, however, that the 
improvers in that case were not acting under a mistaken assumption, but on the basis of a 
misprediction. See Birks, 278-9. On this view, and it appears to have merit, given the improvers' 
belief that a lease over the land would be granted, the fair outcomes jurisdiction would not be 
appropriate and relief would only have been possible on the basis of some conduct on the
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One example, however, is Brand v. Chris Building Co. Pty Ltd,126 in which a 
building contractor was denied any relief after he mistakenly built a house on 
the wrong suburban allotment.
The legal position may be "overstated" 127 and more sympathetic to the 
plight of the mistaken improver than the above suggests. There are significant 
authorities allowing improvers redress by indirect (or "passive" or 
"defensive" )128 means. "Indirect" refers to the fact that such relief occurs in the 
context of a landowner who has brought an action against the improver (for 
damages, ejectment and so on) and that the landowner's successful claim is 
conditioned upon some set-off against, or accounting for, the value of the 
improvements.129 Relief to a mistaken improver by such indirect means is thus 
consistent with achieving a fair outcome: its very distinguishing feature is that
defendant's part.
For a summary of the early history of the common law of mistaken improvement, see 
Merryman, supra n. 122, 458-60.
The common law position has been modified by statute in some jurisdiction. See, e.g., Property 
Lazo Act 1974 (QLD), ss. 195-8; Property Law Act 1969 (WA), s. 123; Property Law Act 1952 (New 
Zealand), s. 129A. Even where such provisions exist, however, they rarely cover all possible 
types of mistaken improver problems. The Queensland provisions, for example, would not 
appear to apply to an improver who mistakenly believes he or she is a remainderman to an 
estate. See also Sutton, supra n. 44, 246-7.
128 Compared with the situation in the United States, there is a "most remarkable 
absence of reported litigation on the subject in England": Merryman, supra n. 122, 463. Contrast 
the Queensland Law Reform Commission, Report No. 16 (1973) at 105: "The incidence of 
building on one allotment in mistake for another is surprisingly large". However, no 
authorities are cited. See also Sutton, supra n. 44, 249. There are a number of reported cases 
dealing with the encroachment of buildings over the boundaries of a neighbour's land and 
there are legislative provisions in Australia to deal with the problem. See, e.g., Property Law Act 
1974 (QLD), s. 189; and the Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). In relation to the latter 
Act, the High Court has reconfirmed the view that it does not apply to cases in which a 
mistaken improver builds entirely within the confines of another's land. See Amatek Ltd v. 
Googoorewon Pty Ltd (1993) 67 A.L.J.R. 339. This reversed a finding of the NSW Supreme Court 
that the Act gave the Court jurisdiction to deal with such cases. See "The Conveyancer" (1992) 
66 A.L.J. 530, for a note on the Court of Appeal decision subsequently reversed by the High 
Court.
126 [1957] V.R. 625.
127 Stoljar, S., "Mistaken Improvement of Another's Property" (1980) 14 U.W.A.L.R.
199.
128 Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 138, Maddaugh & McCamus, 283-4.
129 See Stoljar, Negotiorum Gestio, 138; Maddaugh & McCamus, 283-4, and Birks, P. 
"Restitution for Services" (1974) 27 C.L.P. 13, 20 et seq.
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it usually does not leave the defendant out of pocket, or if it does, it does not in 
all the circumstances disadvantage the defendant. Thus, a landowner who 
claims profits earned by an improver (the defendant) whilst in possession of 
the land130 may have his or her claims set-off against the value of 
improvements made to the land.131 Consequently, such a landowner will only 
recover the actual damages suffered and not an additional windfall of the value 
of the improvements. Similarly, where a landowner
seeks the aid of a court of equity to establish his ownership or to recover 
possession of the premises, he may be required, as a condition of the 
granting of such relief, to compensate the defendant for improvements 
made thereon in good faith under a mistaken belief of ownership.132
Thus, in Mill v. Hi//,133 the plaintiff owner of the fee simple of certain land 
sought to set aside a deed of conveyance by a third party (a life tenant) to the 
innocent defendant, who had taken possession. The deed was set aside, subject 
to an order that the plaintiff account for "any permanent improvement to the 
pecuniary value" of the land.134 Similarly, equitable relief allowing an owner to 
recover property may be granted subject to a lien over the estate for the value 
of the improvements.135
130 Such claims are said to be for "mesne" profits, as they are known: "profits lost to 
the owner of land by reason of his being wrongfully dispossessed of his land." See Osborne's 
Concise Law Dictionary (7th ed.) 219.
131 Although some doubt has been expressed as to the availability of such a set-off at 
common law, in Montreuil v. Ontario Asphalt Co. (1922) 69 D.L.R. 313, 338, such a set-off was 
allowed in that case. In the United States, the right to such a set-off seems clear. See McCorkle, 
C.R., "Annotation" 57 A.L.R. 2d 263 (1955), 267-8. The set-off is limited to the value of the 
profits claimed.
132 McCorkle, ibid, 269. See also Montreuil v. Ontario Aisphalt Co. (1922) 69 D.L.R. 313, 
334. The rule is said to be based upon the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity" 
(McCorkle, 269), but as has been pointed out in Neesom v. Clarkson (1845) 4 Hare 97,101, this is a 
"rule of unquestionable justice, but which decides nothing in itself."
133 (1851-2) III L.R. H.L.C. 828, 869.
134 Id. The requirement to account was limited to "expenditure with a view to 
permanent improvement", and the court excluded in that case improvements which may have 
been adopted as a matter of "taste" or "personal convenience".
135 E.g., Attorney General v. Baliol College Oxford (1744) 9 Mod. 407; 88 E.R. 538; Cooper 
v. Phibbs (1867) II L.R. 149, 167; and Neesom v. Clarkson (1845) 4 Hare 97, though note that 
Anglin J. in Montreuil v. Ontario Asphalt Co (1922) 69 D.L.R. 313, 334, does not consider the last a 
particularly satisfactory authority.
See also Palmer, Vol. II, 436, 438. In the United States such "passive" relief in equity may take 
the form of an order for the removal of the fixtures, or even a requirement that the owner
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Outside the United States, authorities have not tended to go beyond 
such indirect relief.136 Perhaps this is a result of a lack of flexible remedial 
options: a blanket rejection of a mistaken improver's claim protects the 
landowner's position, albeit somewhat crudely. Consequently, plaintiffs have 
been denied relief in circumstances in which imaginative remedies may have 
achieved a fair outcome.137 In contrast, courts in the United States have used a 
number of different remedial techniques to achieve fair outcomes. As Palmer 
has pointed out:
One of the striking aspects of these decisions is the flexibility sometimes 
shown in the form of the decree, usually with the aim of lessening the 
hardship on a landowner of being forced to pay for an unsolicited 
improvement.138
Two examples of direct or active relief utilised in some United States 
jurisdictions139 include:
relinquish title to the land to the improver, in return for its unimproved value. See McCorkle, 
supra n. 131, 271.
Stoljar, supra n. 127, 204, notes that the very fact that the owner of land is seeking relief 
suggests that the improver was on the land with the owner's approval or knowledge and 
perhaps even suggests the owner's consent to the improvements.
136 See, however, Edlin v. Battaly (1668) 2 Lev. 152, in which the improver successfully 
made a direct claim against the landowner. In that case, a settlement was reached by the 
parties, but only after the Master of the Rolls "adjudged the [improver] should be relieved and 
hold the land till he be repaid his charges in building". The result achieved a fair outcome in 
the circumstances: the case is considered further, infra n. 153.
137 Brand v. Chris Building Co. [1957] V.R. 625, is one example. The improvement was 
made on a wrong suburban lot, one amongst many in a subdivision. There was no evidence 
that the lot had any special qualities. In the United States, one remedy which potentially may 
have been utilised in such a case would be to give a landowner the choice of either replacing or 
swapping the improved lot with an improver's still vacant lot (this would not leave the 
landowners out of pocket) or alternatively, paying for the improvements. Admittedly, such an 
option would have been difficult in Brand's case, given that the builder who was seeking 
redress did not own the adjoining land. The neighbouring landowner, with whom the builder 
had contracted, was responsible for the mistake, but was not joined in the action.
138 Palmer, Vol. II, 446-7.
139 A significant minority of jurisdictions allow direct relief. Perhaps the classic 
statement in favour of relief is that of Story J. in Bright v. Boyd (1841) 1 Story 478. See Jensen v. 
Probert, 148 P. 2d 248 (1944). Decisions such as these overturn what in the view of one author is 
the "quite harsh and crude" common law on the subject: Merryman, supra n. 122, 466. Direct 
relief is not dependent upon any acquiescence or other wrongdoing on the part of the 
defendant. See also Dickinson, supra n. 115, 64-68 for some of the remedial options. Clearly, 
some of these remedies are not restitutionary. Other jurisdictions have maintained a common 
law position similar to that in Australia and England, despite the view of some (Casad, supra n.
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(a) allowing a plaintiff to remove the improvement where that is a 
feasible option;140 or alternatively giving the landowner the choice of 
either paying for the improvement or allowing its removal.141 Allowing 
removal of improvements is consistent with the very argument a 
defendant may raise in order to resist paying for the improvement—that 
it was unwanted; and
(b) ordering the exchange of adjoining lots in a subdivision where they 
are approximately of equal value and quality.142
122, 1047) that there has been an almost "universal disapproval" of such a position by "writers 
and judges, who even while applying it often expressly deplore it." See Palmer, Vol. II, 439-40, 
for the positions in the different states.
140 Shick v. Dearmore, 442 S.W. 2d. 198 (1969).
141 In Beacon Homes v. Holt, 146 S.E. 2d 434 (1966), an order for compensation of the 
increased value of the land was justified on the fact that the owner had refused to allow the 
removal of the readily removable "shell home". The court asked the rhetorical question:
Can the owner of a lot upon which a house has been built by another, who acted in 
good faith under a mistake of fact, believing he had a right to build it there, keep the 
house, refuse to permit the builder to remove it so as to restore the property to its 
former condition, enjoy the enhancement of the value of the property and pay nothing 
for the house? For the owner to do so is ... contrary to equity and good conscience ....
A similar point was made in Jensen v. Probert, 148 P. 2d 248 (1944), 252:
The argument, I am aware, is, that the moment the house is built, it belongs to the 
owner of the land by mere operation of law; and that he may certainly possess and 
enjoy his own. But this is merely stating the technical rule of law, by which the true 
owner seeks to hold, what, in a just sense, he never had the slightest title to, that is, the 
house.
This affirms the emphasis that the aim of the remedy is to return to the plaintiff what, in effect, 
belongs to him or her (though strict legal title rests with the defendant) and of which "specific 
restitution" ought to be granted where possible. See also Dickinson, supra n. 115; Palmer, §10.9; 
Pull v. Barnes, 350 P. 2d 828 (1960), 829-30, and Producers Lumber & Supply Co. v. Olney Building 
Co., 333 S.W. 2d 619 (1960), 627, per Barrow J. (dis.). Can such a remedial response be seen as 
restitutionary, as reversing enrichment? It is difficult to consider it as such. To take the example 
of a removable shed which neither enhances the value of the land, nor is of any use to the 
owner. Clearly, such a land owner ought to return the shed, but to suggest that he or she 
should do so because he or she has been "enriched" does not ring true. The owner does have 
something belonging to the improver and should return it if possible; but this does not mean 
that the owner is necessarily enriched thereby.
142 Voss v. Forgue, 84 So. 2d 563 (1956). The remedy in that case was in the form of a 
decree ordering the exchange. Palmer, Vol. II, 449, points out that the court should have given 
the landowner the alternative of either paying for the improvement or allowing its removal. 
This seems a fair criticism, given that maximising the choice available will minimise any 
disadvantage or inconvenience to the defendant. It is difficult to perceive of such a remedy as 
restitutionary in the sense of benefit disgorgement, though it does effect a form of specific
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Arguably, relief in such forms imposes no hardship upon landowners. The 
landowners are left in much the same position as before the mistake and are not 
left out of pocket unless they choose to pay for the improvements. A remedy 
which returns the end-product of a service to a plaintiff is akin to specific 
restitution143 in the sense that it returns what can rightly, if somewhat loosely, 
be described as the plaintiffs property, even though in strict legal theory it is 
not.144 It is quite irrelevant whether a defendant was in any way enriched by an 
end-product where it can be returned.145 Indeed, such a remedy should be 
available even where a defendant has not been enriched. Consider, for 
example, a case in which a building of no use to the defendant, and which 
decreases the market value of the land, is removable.
There may be other ways in which one can effect a remedial purpose of 
returning property to a plaintiff. Example (1) (where P builds a machinery shed 
on D's rural allotment) provides a good illustration. If the end-product of P's 
service in that example can be restored to him without disadvantaging D, then 
a fair outcome will be achieved. Theoretically, at least,146 one could effect such 
"specific restitution" by requiring D to transfer a small part of her allotment to 
P, in return for its unimproved value. Such a remedy does not leave D out of 
pocket. Unless the land has some special quality, or was being used or is 
intended to be used in a specific way (the facts here suggest the contrary), D is 
not in other ways disadvantaged. If, however, D can point to some unique 
quality of the improved portion of the land—its special value to her147—this
restitution. The importance of this type of remedial relief is that it appears to recognise that 
land can at times be little different from fungible goods.
143 It is not possible, of course, to return the very thing received: the plaintiff's services 
which resulted in the end-product.
144 The rule of fixtures deeming it to form part of the defendant's land and therefore 
the defendant's property.
145 Contrast Burrows, 7, who considers that "benefit" can be established simply by 
showing that a defendant has particular property which can be returned. With respect, 
although Burrows is right to conclude that a defendant retaining such property "cannot validly 
refuse to give up the property", this is not because such a defendant is necessarily enriched 
thereby.
146 There may be practical difficulties in that courts may lack power to grant a 
particular remedy. Local government regulations against rural subdivision, for example, might 
preclude a remedy in such a form.
147 In general, "special value" might be anything which suggests that the owner's 
purposes could not be satisfied by other land.
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particular form of relief would be inappropriate. However, cases in which an 
owner of mistakenly improved land can establish its special value may, in fact, 
be quite rare.148 Significantly, a remedy which requires a defendant to transfer 
for value part of his or her land to the mistaken improver—though effecting a 
return of the end-product of the improver's services—cannot be considered to 
be restitutionary in any strict sense of the term.
A defendant will not usually be disadvantaged by being required to 
return some end-product received as a result of the plaintiff's mistaken actions. 
Imaginative remedies such as those canvassed above may effect such specific 
restitution and thus achieve a fair outcome. Such cases may not be common, 
however, and often remedies akin to specific restitution may simply not be 
possible. As example (2) illustrates, an existing building may have been 
improved in a way which leaves no "removable" end-product, such as where 
the building is painted. Yet even in circumstances such as these, a fair outcome 
may be possible, though perhaps only in exceptional cases.
A number of factors appear relevant in solving a problem such as that 
in example (2). A precondition for liability being imposed is that the
148 As Stoljar points out, supra n. 127, 205, where an owner was equally mistaken as to 
the boundaries or title of particular land, the owner "cannot really complain that the land on 
which the improvements take place matter to him significantly. ... [Wie now seem to be dealing 
with land concerning which the owner can in fact be taken to be indifferent to for the simple 
reason that [the ownerl does not even believe that the land is his property." The facts of Pull v. 
Barnes, 35 P. 2d 828 (1960), illustrate the point. The defendants watched the plaintiffs construct 
a cabin, but were not aware of the fact that it was on their own land until a survey was 
undertaken.
Cf. Dickinson, supra n. 115, 53, et seq., where Dickinson traces the history of the development 
of the view that land is unique. At 64, he concludes that there is a "paucity" of case dealing 
with special values, suggesting that "there may be fewer unique pieces of land than has been 
supposed." At 71 he states:
Not every piece of land is cherished by its owner for the sweetness of the fruits that 
grow there or for the majesty of the view from the crest; therefore, some exceptions to 
the principle that land is unique should be made in cases where the principle obviously 
does not apply.
But later Dickinson stresses that:
If an owner who does not share complicity for the improver's mistake establishes that 
the land has special values that are lessened or destroyed by the presence of the 
improvement, the owner's equities are greater than those of the improver. In such a 
case the improver, rather than the owner, should be required to make restitution. Such 
cases have been extremely rare, probably because an owner with such a strong 
attachment to the land is likely to be in possession and thus able to object to the 
improvement as soon as it is begun.
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improvement must have increased the market value of a defendant's land.149 
Such an increase is not, however, on its own sufficient to justify liability. A 
further inquiry needs to be made as to whether restitution of such equivalent 
value does not disadvantage the defendant in the circumstances.
There are a number of factors which would weigh in favour of a 
remedy of restitution of the value of the enhanced economic advantage. (1) If 
the land has no special or unique qualities, it may be little different to a 
fungible and be readily replaceable. Identical suburban lots may in some cases 
be so described.150 (2) Land having special qualities may nonetheless have no 
special value to a defendant, such that an owner's interest in the land may be 
"strictly financial".151 The land may form part of the stock in trade of the 
defendant's business, where, for example, the defendant is a land developer 
constantly buying and selling land as if a commodity.152 Alternatively, a 
defendant may not have been aware of or been mistaken as to his or her right to 
the land, so that once the true position is established, the defendant receives not 
only the windfall of valuable land, but also an added bonus of valuable
149 If there has been no increase in market value of land and there exists no end- 
product capable of being returned imposing liability in any form would not appear to be 
justifiable. See, e.g., Republic Resources Ltd & Joffre Oils v. Ballem [1982] 1 W.W.R. 692, in which 
the Alberta Queen's Bench court refused restitutionary relief where the improvement to the 
defendant's land, a gas well, was not removable, and was not of any ascertainable value, not 
even being in production. For a criticism of the decision in that case, however, see Percy, "The 
Law of Restitution and the Unexpected Termination of Petroleum and Natural Gas Leases" 
(1988) 27 Alb.L.R. 105,117-21. For a case reaching a similar conclusion as Republic Resources, on 
very similar facts, see Eagle Oil Corp. v. Cohasset Oil Corp., 248 N.W. 840 (1933).
150 This appears to have been recognised in the United States. See, e.g., supra n. 142.
151 Dickinson, supra n. 115, 72. Contrast, however, land owned as a commodity, for 
example, that is, for its existing market value, with land owned for its income-producing 
capacity. Although a defendant's interest in the land in the latter case could still be described as 
strictly financial, the value of that interest would depend on the land's special qualities and the 
defendant's intended use of that land.
152 The defendant may be a corporation with numerous vacant lots to be sold. As 
Dickinson has pointed out, supra n. 115, 72, in such circumstances, the sale of the land in order 
to pay for the value of the improvements is "just to both parties ... the improver is 
compensated, and the owner received what he or she wanted from the land—its value in 
money."
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improvements.153 Perhaps many of the cases of indirect relief noted above 
share this feature.
Considerations such as these may suggest that any increase in the 
market value of the improved land equates with the receipt by the defendant of 
an economic advantage of that value, and which economic advantage can and 
thus should be returned. This contrasts with any case in which land is held by 
its owner for its inherent or unique qualities,154 such as where the defendant 
uses the land or intends to use it for a specific purpose, for example, as a 
domestic dwelling. In such a case, the increased market value of the land does 
not represent any economic advantage to that defendant and further, he or she 
might be forced to sell the "special" land in order to meet an obligation to pay 
for the improvement.155 The defendant may legitimately argue: "I would not 
have utilised my limited resources in such a way." 156 Consequently, any  relief 
in such circumstances would leave the defendant "distinctly worse off" .157
153 One of the few English examples of direct relief for a mistaken improver, Edlin v. 
Battaly (1668) 2 Lev. 152, (see supra n. 136), is of this type. In that case, the owner of the land 
had been away overseas for many years and was not made aware of his interest until his 
return. Consequently, he suddenly and quite unexpectedly found himself in possession of an 
extremely valuable estate, valuable to him purely in terms of its market worth, rather than 
because of any personal attachment to the land. Consequently, requiring the owner to pay for 
substantial improvements made by the dispossessed improver would not have disadvantaged 
him or left him out of pocket (though note the actual settlement reached in that case). He would 
still have received the net economic advantage (in the form of money) which the land 
represented to him.
154 See Rudden, B., “Things as Thing and Things as Wealth" (1994) 14 O.J.L.S. 81, who 
draws a distinction in relation to all property between the situation in which such property is 
treated as something unique or special, compared with those situations in which it is treated as 
merely a member of a class, totally convertible or replaceable. In the latter situation, the 
property is valued for its "opportunity cost", that is, the wealth it represents (86). The 
distinction Rudden draws is one which cuts across existing divisions in property law, such as 
those between fungibles and non-fungibles or real and personal property. In other words, 
property which in law, at least, is said to be unique, such as real estate, may form merely part of 
an investment portfolio or stock in trade. Alternatively, even fungibles may be owned and used 
for their unique qualities; for example, flour which is to be used to make a special bread.
155 Cf. Palmer, Vol. II, 449-50. Cf. Dickinson, supra n. 115, 72.
156 The Canadian case of Nicholson v. St. Denis (1975) 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699, 704, provides 
a good example. The court pointed out that:
St. Denis neither sought nor desired the work to be carried out on the property, and 
was given no opportunity to express his position until long after the work was 
completed. He has been guilty of no wrongdoing, nor of encouraging the plaintiff in his 
work. I can see no grounds, under the circumstances of this case, for extending the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment or of restitution to the circumstances of this case.
157 Stoljar, supra n. 127, 206.
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Consistently with this view, the authorities generally refuse any relief and the 
losses of the mistaken conduct are thus left to lie with the plaintiff.158
By taking into account relevant factors such as those noted above and 
by utilising imaginative remedies tailored to the specific contexts of each case, 
it will often be possible to at least partially restore a plaintiff to his or her pre­
mistaken position. Recovery will only be allowed, however, where it is 
consistent with the principle that "[i]f the landowner was not at fault the 
primary obligation of the court would be to protect him against loss."159 This is 
the essence of a fair outcome, which ensures that
any supposed hardship to the owner of the improved land can be swiftly 
assessed and dealt with by an order which is appropriate to the 
particular facts of the case, and it will be unusual for such hardship to 
preclude each one of the several forms of relief which are available.160
By way of contrast, unjust enrichment theory is not particularly suited 
to balancing the differing considerations which need to be taken into account to 
ensure that a defendant is not disadvantaged. This is because of such theory's 
focus on the issue of enrichment. For example, where the market value of a 
building has increased by $5000, different formulations of incontrovertible 
benefit support different conclusions as to whether or not a defendant has been 
enriched. On one view, such increase in value must have been realised in 
money in order to be enriching, on another view, such increase must merely be 
realisable. Yet neither view can be consistently applied to achieve a fair 
outcome. For neither view encapsulates the essential idea that the issue is 
whether it is fair in all the circumstances to require a defendant to make 
restitution of the increase in value.
§ 9.2.3.2 Mistaken improvement of another's goods
The position of the mistaken improver of another's goods is very similar 
to that of the mistaken improver of land. Again, at first blush, there appears to
158 Nicholson v. St. Denis (1975) 57 D.L.R. (3d) 699. Cf. Svenson v. Payne (1945) 71 C.L.R. 
531, although the court's finding in that case that the owner had not acquiesced in the 
improver's actions is open to question.
159 Merryman, supra n. 122, 494. Similarly, Dickinson, supra n. 115, 75, concludes that 
"an owner should be held harmless so that any loss that must be borne by one of the parties 
will fall on the improver, whose mistake occasioned the loss."
160 Sutton, supra n. 44, 264, (footnotes omitted). See also Casad, supra n. 122, 1049. 
Note that statutory provisions in Australian states dealing with encroachment have given 
courts wide remedial powers. See, e.g., Haddams Pty Ltd v. Nesbitt [19621 Q.W.N. 44.
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be little scope for recovery. An improver of goods, even where acting under a 
bona fide mistake (as to his or her title to the goods, for example), is nevertheless 
a tortfeasor and can be sued in conversion or detinue.161 Given the doctrine of 
accession, whereby an accessory annexed to a principal object162 becomes part 
of that object and prima facie belongs to the owner of the principal object,163 
such an improver would appear to be left with few remedial options.164 The 
owner of the improved goods, not having acquiesced in or requested the 
improvements, may echo the words of Pollock C.B. in Taylor v. Laird: "One 
cleans another's shoes; what can the other do but put them on."165 Yet the law's 
indifference to the mistaken improver of goods is more apparent than real. 
Again, most relief is in an indirect form.
Where an owner of goods sues in conversion for their value, he or she 
will only be entitled to recover their unimproved value,166 provided the 
converter has acted in good faith.167 This effectively compensates a converting
161 See Mathews, P., "Proprietary Claims at Common law for Mixed and Improved 
Goods" [19811 C.L.P. 159.
162 The "principal object" is that which is the greater in value. See Guest, A.G., 
"Accession and Confusion in the Law of Hire Purchase" (1964) 27 M.L.R. 505, 507, fn. 11. Cf. 
McKeown v. Cavalier Yachts Pty Ltd (1988) 13 N.S.W.L.R. 303, 311f-g, per Young J.
163 "Accession" is based on principles of Roman law—accessio cedit principali. See 
generally, Guest, supra n. 162; Mathews, supra n. 161; and Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 
651, 659-60. It is debateable whether the owner of the principal object has title to the goods, or 
whether the improver merely forfeits the right to possession of the improvements. McKeown v. 
Cavalier Yachts (1988) 13 N.S.W.L.R. 303, particularly at 312, and Rendell v. Associated Finance 
[1957] V.R. 604, at 610 ("property is deemed to pass by operation of law") clearly suggest the 
former; whereas Mathews, supra n. 161,175-6, has argued that the latter is the correct position, 
so long as the improvements are still separately identifiable. Rules of accession apply even 
where a third party is responsible for the accession.
Of far lesser significance is the concept of confusion: the mixing of goods belonging to different 
owners so that separate identification is no longer possible. See Guest, 518. This concept will 
not be considered separately here.
164 See, for example, counsel's concession in Walker v. Mathews (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 109, 
110-1, despite the fact that the expenditure there was necessary to preserve the property.
165 (1856) 25 L.J. Ex. 329, 332. Cf. Stocker v. Planet Bid Soc. (1879) 27 W.R. 793, 794, per 
Jessel M.R.: "Let me put the case of a man who would like to see clean windows, cleaning his 
neighbour's windows without consent. The same reason might apply to washing his 
neighbour's face. A man has a right to enjoy his property in his own way."
166 See Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus Brothers <S Co. [1892] A.C. 166, 174; Wood v. 
Morewood (1841) 3 Q.B. 440n; 114 E.R. 575n; Maddaugh & McCamus, 302; and Mathews, supra 
n. 113, generally. As to the position in relation to hire purchase, see Yeoman Credit Ltd v. 
Waragowski [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1124.
167 See Mathews, supra n. 113, 342-5, and Martin v. Porter (1839) 5 M. & W. 351; 151
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improver both for improvements taking the form of added parts or materials 
and also labour.168 The improver will either have sold the goods at their 
improved value or still have possession of them. If the improver still has 
possession of the goods, and the owner alternatively claims in detinue, the 
authorities favour the view, despite some doubt, that damages will be reduced 
by the value of the improvements.169 Similarly, an order for specific restitution 
of the goods may be made conditional upon the owner compensating the 
improver for the increase in the value of the property.170
Where, however, the owner of goods has retaken possession of them, the 
improver's position is less hopeful, though not without any possibility of relief. 
One circumstance in which the improver may at least partially be restored to 
his or her original position is if the improvements have not been sufficiently
E.R. 149. Contrast, however, Munro v. Willmott [1949] 1 K.B. 295, in which a deliberate converter 
of the plaintiff's goods nevertheless was entitled to have the value of his improvements taken 
into account in reducing the amount of damages payable. Mathews considers that this "slightly 
odd case" may be explicable on the basis of which act of conversion was considered to be the 
relevant one (the improvements to the goods, rather than the subsequent sale). But this seems 
an arbitrary distinction, since presumably in that case the plaintiff could have relied on either 
act of conversion. Perhaps the most significant factor in the decision was the plaintiff's quite 
unusual and unreasonable behaviour which led the defendant to convert the goods.
Query the situation where the trespasser has acted in good faith, but negligently. Mathews 
considers that this would preclude damages being limited to the unimproved value, citing 
Wood v. Morewood (1841) 3 Q.B. 440; 114 E.R. 575n. Contrast the cases cited by Maddaugh & 
McCamus, 302, fn. 123, as authorities rejecting the view that negligence precludes indirect relief 
to the defendant improver, but of these, only the last, Kirkland v. McNamee (1905) 36 S.C.R. 152, 
157, appears to conclusively support the proposition.
168 Many of the early cases in which the damages rule was applied concerned 
conversion of the plaintiff's coal, so that the defendant was effectively receiving compensation 
for the hewing, cutting and carrying of the coal.
169 See Peruvian Guano Co. v. Dreyfus Brothers & Co. [1892] A.C. 166, 176. Were it 
otherwise, the question would need to be answered as to why the owner of goods should be in 
a worse position where the trespasser has completed the wrong and sold the goods than if he or 
she has not yet done so.
170 See Greenwood v. Bennett [1973] 1 Q.B. 195, and the judgments of Phillimore and 
Cairns L.JJ., and authorities cited. Cf. the judgment of Denning L.J., and the interpretation of 
this decision by Young J. in McKeown v. Cavalier Yachts (1988) 13 N.S.W.L.R. 303. Contrast, 
however, the decision in Greenwood with that in Walker v. Mathews (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 109. Note 
that in Greenwood, the increase in value was taken to be the money expended by the improver. 
The case is discussed further, infra n. 181.
Of course, an order for specific restitution will only exceptionally be made. See supra n. 52.
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annexed to the defendant's goods so as to form a "joint product" .171 This is a 
question of degree and various alternative tests have been adopted in different 
jurisdictions.172 But if the plaintiff can show that the applicable test of accession 
has not been satisfied, he or she will be able to reclaim the actual parts or for 
their conversion.173 Thus, the narrower the test of accession adopted, the more 
considerable the scope for offering an improver redress.174 Mistake negatives 
any intention that the property should pass to the defendant,175 and a fair 
outcome—specific restitution of the plaintiff's property—is clearly possible.176
To this point, a mistaken improver's rights appear to have been 
exhausted. A plaintiff whose work has largely taken the form of labour (for 
example, painting a vehicle), is left in a particularly vulnerable position. The 
generally stated preclusion against recovery for unrequested services would 
appear to apply.177
This raises the important question: why are the courts more readily 
prepared to grant relief to a mistaken improver of goods, as with land, simply
171 Guest, supra n. 162, 507.
172 Ibid, 507-10; Maddaugh & McCamus, 111-3.
173 Thomas v. Robinson [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385.
174 Consider, for example, the narrow test of accession adopted in Rendell v. Associated 
Finance [1957] V.R. 604, concerning improvements to a car, in which the Supreme Court of 
Victoria considered that the accessories only passed to the defendant where it was a necessity 
of the case; if, "as a matter of practicability, they cannot be identified, or if identified, they have 
been incorporated to such an extent that they cannot be detached from the vehicle" (610). Thus, 
a car engine was considered to remain the property of the owner of the engine. Note that in that 
case, the parts had been installed by a third party. In Thomas v. Robinson [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385, 
spare parts, including an engine exhaust system, clutch, and carburettor, were not considered 
to form part of the vehicle. Where an accessory is removable, the improver must account for 
any damage which results from the removal of the parts.
These decisions contrast with the much wider test of accession adopted in some Canadian 
cases. One case even held that car tyres became part of a vehicle. See Guest, supra n. 162, 508-9. 
See also Bergougnan v. British Motors Ltd (1929) 30 N.S.W.S.R. 61.
175 Rendell v. Associated Finance [1957] V.R. 604, 607: "fundamentally the transfer of 
property in chattels in English law depends upon intention and consent." See also at 610.
176 This is provided that the goods are removable without serious damage to the 
principal chattel.
177 Goff & Jones, 166. Cf. Cairns L.J. in Greenwood v. Bennett [1973] 1 Q.B. 195. Palmer, 
Vol. II, 454, has stated that "[n]o American case seems to have given relief to one who 
mistakenly repairs or improves the chattel of another." Presumably, Palmer is referring to cases 
where plaintiffs are seeking direct relief. See, e.g., Winney v. Leuci, 74 N.Y.S. 2d 585 (1947).
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because he or she happens to be a defendant in the action? Why should 
outcomes be so significantly affected by whether the owner is plaintiff or 
whether the improver is plaintiff?
In this writer's view, the answer lies in the fact that an owner of goods 
taking legal action to assert his or her right to the goods will in all but the most 
exceptional case only be entitled to damages. Irrespective of any special value 
goods may have to the owner, such goods are treated in law as having only one 
relevant characteristic: their monetary value. If an award of damages went 
beyond the unimproved value of the goods, the owner would be advantaged as 
a result of the plaintiffs mistake, receiving a money equivalent for the goods' 
increase in value.178
Although this may explain why indirect relief is usually granted to a 
mistaken improver, it does not explain why there should be a blanket rejection 
of direct claims where the improver is the plaintiff.179 Where the market value 
of goods has been increased, a fair outcome may often be possible. Recovery of 
the increase in value may not disadvantage the owner of the goods in some 
cases, and similar factors as those considered in relation to improvements to 
land would be relevant in determining whether this was the case. For example, 
the goods may be fungibles,180 or the goods may form part of the stock in trade
178 The increase in market value may not equate with the costs incurred by the 
improver in performing such services. Should such costs be less than the increase in market 
value of the property resulting from the improvements, then theoretically the improver should 
be limited to relief measured by the costs incurred. But it is difficult to see how this could be 
achieved in cases of indirect relief.
179 This presumes that some form of specific restitution, of removable spare parts, for 
example, is not possible.
180 A Canadian case, Mayne v. Kidd [1951] 2 D.L.R. 652, suggests a more liberal 
approach whereby active relief is possible if the improved goods were fungibles of no special 
value to the defendant. (Although it has been queried whether in fact the improver in that case 
was acting under a mistake in that case—Maddaugh & McCamus, 303, suggest not and the 
report does not indicate as such—the existence of a mistake seems evident from the assumption 
which led the improver to act as he did.) The improver had cleaned another's wheat, thereby 
increasing its value, and subsequently claimed for the cost of doing so after the owner had 
repossessed the cleaned wheat. The court noted, at 654-5, that if the owner had not seized the 
wheat and instead sued in detinue, any remedy would have compensated the improver for the 
increased value. Since there was no reason why the owner "should be allowed to obtain more 
by retaking the goods than he would have obtained had he taken the other remedy" (655), the 
court upheld the improver's claim for the cost of cleaning the wheat. The court treated the cost 
of cleaning the wheat to be the same as the increase in its value. This does not, of course, 
necessarily follow. Presumably, there would exist distinct market prices for both cleaned and 
uncleaned wheat. The difference between such price, it is suggested, ought to have been the 
appropriate measure of recovery. Leaving this aside, however, the important factor in Mayne v. 
Kidd appears to be that the more valuable wheat in the owner's hands effectively represented 
money. Wheat is a fungible commodity to be sold on the market and was not in this case
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of the owner's business,181 so that the owner's interest in the goods is strictly 
financial. The goods may have no special value to the owner and readily be 
replaceable. Where goods are of this type, the difference in the market price 
between their unimproved value and improved value is thus an economic 
advantage, just as money is, and whether or not that economic advantage has 
already been converted into money ought not be relevant.182 To require the 
"return" of such economic advantage would not disadvantage the owner, who 
would not be required to reach into his or her own pockets to pay its equivalent 
value.183
§ 9.2.3.3 Mistaken payment of another's debt
Where a person pays the debt of another under a mistaken belief that the
property of personal value to its owner.
181 Greenwood v. Bennett [19731 1 QB. 195, might be considered an example. The legal 
owner of a car (Bennett) had recovered the vehicle by court order and the order had not 
granted one Harper any allowance for improvements mistakenly made by him. (The original 
trial involved a number of claimants, including Greenwood, but the dispute resolved itself to 
one between Harper and Bennett.) Harper appealed, claiming the costs of the improvements, 
and succeeded. The reasoning of the majority rested on the view that conditions can be, and 
ought to have been, attached to the order for specific restitution. Consequently, the court made 
such an order, conditioning specific restitution upon the payment of the value of the 
improvements, even though the car was already in the hands of the owner. The order was thus 
one rectifying the error of the court below in failing to apply such a condition on specific 
restitution. See per Phillimore and Cairns, L.JJ.; and Mathews, supra n. 113, 353. Lord Denning 
reasoned differently and would have allowed even direct recovery, in wide restitutionary terms 
(see at 202). Perhaps the factor of greatest significance was one not stressed by the court, 
namely that Bennett was a motor dealer who regularly bought and sold cars as commodities, 
and who had already sold the subject vehicle at its improved value. See argument by counsel, 
ibid, 198. The defendant had thereby realised the economic advantage which those 
improvements represented. The point was that the car was never an item having any personal 
value to the defendant. The owner was thus not being required to pay for unwanted (or at least 
unrequested) improvements of a chattel of personal value. If, conversely, the vehicle had been 
for private use, the result would almost certainly have been otherwise. Cf. Birks, 124-5, and see 
also Goff & Jones, 172-4, for their discussion of the case.
182 Consequently, it should not be necessary that the goods and their increase in value 
have been realised in money, for example, as Birks would require as part of his test of 
incontrovertible benefit. Cf. Goff & Jones, 172, who suggest recovery should be allowed 
wherever a defendant has gained a "financial benefit, readily realisable without detriment to 
himself". The qualifier, "without detriment", is clearly consistent with this writer's own view, 
but seems removed from any aim of disgorging enrichment.
183 This is because the increased value will be realised by the sale of the goods. If one 
considers the example of Mayne v. Kidd [1951] 2 D.L.R. 652, the case of the cleaned wheat, one 
could aptly misquote Pollock C.B. in Taylor v. Laird (1856) 25 L.J. Ex. 329, (text to n. 164, supra): 
"One cleans another's wheat; what can the other do but what one always does, sell it at the 
market rate."
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debt is owed by the payer, then the payer may have a remedy against the payee 
(creditor) for restitution of money paid under a mistake.184 Restitution from the 
creditor, however, may not be possible for a number of reasons, as where the 
payee can raise some defence to the claim.185 The payer will then be limited in 
his or her remedial rights to seeking recovery from the debtor, who has not 
received money, but who can be said to have received the value of the payer's 
service. In which circumstances will such a claim succeed? The authorities are 
divided on the issue of whether as a general rule the mistaken payer can 
recover, but the weight of both English and Australian law tends against a right 
to recover,186 whilst United States authorities generally favour such a right.187
Speaking very generally, the basis of the English and Australian position 
seems an excessively formalistic one:188 unless a debtor ratifies the payment of 
the debt, such debt will not be discharged by a mistaken (as opposed to a
184 The scope of such potential recovery appears to have been expanded by the 
decision of Barclays Bank v. Simms [1980] Q.B. 677. See Friedmann, D., "Payment of Another's 
Debt" (1983) 99 L.Q.R. 534, 545, et seq. In Barclays Bank v. Simms, Goff L.J. concluded that a 
mistaken payment by a third party does not discharge the debt and is thus recoverable from the 
payee/creditor. See further, infra nn. 188-94 and text thereto, for a criticism of this view.
185 The debtor may have ratified the payment of the debt and thus discharged it. In 
such a case, the creditor has given good consideration for the payment and no recovery from 
the creditor will be possible. But recovery from the debtor follows as of course. Even if the 
debtor has not ratified the debt, the creditor may still argue a change of position, or that the 
payment was received in good faith, in discharge of the debt owed, so that consideration has 
been given for the payment. See Friedmann, ibid, 547-8. The difficulty raised by Barclays Bank v. 
Simms [1980] Q.B. 677, in relation to the latter defence, is that if one argues that the debt is not 
discharged then no consideration has flowed from the creditor. But arguably, a creditor merely 
treating the debt as discharged can be said to have given consideration even if, legally, the debt 
is not discharged: the creditor may no longer pursue the debtor, rights may lapse, the creditor's 
position may in other ways be prejudiced. At the very least, such conduct may amount to a 
change of position. Consequently, the payment should not and presumably will not be 
recoverable from the creditor: cf. Friedmann, ibid, 539.
186 See, e.g., Hill v. Zymack (1908) 7 C.L.R. 353.
187 See the Restatement of Restitution, §43, §54, and Palmer, Vol. Ill, §14.17, §14.18. See 
also Friedmann, supra n. 184, 547-8. Where the payment is of taxes or government charges on 
land, some jurisdictions generally refuse reimbursement. See, e.g., McMillan v. O'Brien, 29 P. 2d 
183, 91 A.L.R. 383 (1934), and the annotation thereto, which cites conflicting views from 
different jurisdictions. Contrast Brookfield v. Rock Island Improvement Co., 169 S.W. 2d 662 (1943). 
See Palmer, Vol. Ill, §14.19, for a discussion of the divergent authorities.
188 The position at times is justified by reference to the need to protect a defendant's 
choice as to his or her creditors. There are at least two difficulties with this view. First, the 
ready assignability of debts makes this protection in any case limited. If a creditor accepts a 
payment in discharge of the debt, one can see such acceptance as little different to a valid 
assignment of the debt. Secondly, a debt may be discharged even without a debtor's ratification 
where the payer has paid the debt under compulsion, legal or practical.
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compelled) payment of it.189 In strict legal theory, the debtor is thus still liable 
to pay the debt. But since the debt is not discharged, it is argued, recovery can 
be had from the creditor, the recipient of the money.190 But with respect, this 
need not necessarily be the case. A payer may not be able to recover from the 
creditor even if the debt is not legally discharged. For example, the creditor 
may have treated the debt as discharged and thus may have changed his or her 
position, such as by allowing rights to lapse or by no longer pursuing the 
debtor.191 Where this has occurred, the creditor will almost certainly be able to 
raise a change of position defence. Yet according to the "orthodox" 192 view, 
recovery from the debtor will also be precluded because the debt is not 
discharged. This will be despite the fact that the payer, being mistaken, will not 
be an intermeddler seeking to impose himself or herself on the defendant.
Such reasoning is "unhelpful" .193 In this writer's view, the preferable 
approach is that advocated by Friedmann, which is consistent with the 
approach adopted by courts in the United States: a debt is treated as discharged 
whenever the payment is not recoverable from the creditor. This will be so 
whenever a debt is received by a creditor "in good faith in discharge of a valid 
claim . " 194 Consequently, a mistaken payer will prima facie have a right to
189 In support of the orthodox position, see Birks, P., & Beatson, ]., "Unrequested 
Payment of Another's Debt" (1976) 92 L.Q.R. 188, 200-1, (also in Beatson, 177, 189-90), and a 
postscript to this article in Beatson, 200; and Barclays Bank v. Simms [1980] Q.B. 677. Goff & 
Jones, 310 et seq., suggest that recovery for payment of another's debt will only be available 
where such payment was made under compulsion. See also Watts, P., [1993] N.Z. Recent L.R. 
248. In Canada, it is similarly stated that in order to found recovery, a plaintiff must have been 
under some legal obligation or practical compulsion to make the payment. But in the view of 
Fridman, 299, and on the authority of County of Carleton v. City of Ottawa (1963) 39 D.L.R. (2d) 
11, a mistaken belief that the plaintiff is under an obligation to pay may be sufficient to amount to 
compulsion. However, strictly speaking, the County of Carleton case did not concern payment of 
another's existing debt. The case will be considered further, text to n. 204, et seq.
190 See Barclays Bank v. Simms [1980] Q.B. 677.
191 See supra n. 185.
192 See Watts, supra n. 189.
193 Friedmann, supra n. 184, 537.
194 Palmer, Vol. Ill, 233. See generally §14.17 and §14.18. Friedmann, supra n. 184, 537, 
argues the point persuasively:
It is obvious that payment does not discharge the debt if the payor is entitled to recover 
it from the creditor and, in fact, does so. But this reasoning is, at best, circular and does 
not reveal the actual ground for recovery. It is clear that the mere fact that the payor 
acted without the debtor's authority does not entitle him to restitution from the 
creditor. There may, of course, be instances of mistake, fraud or duress in which 
recovery from the creditor is allowed. In these circumstances, the original debt remains
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recover from the debtor in all cases in which no claim subsists against the 
creditor.
In the United States, the remedial technique usually employed to allow 
recovery by the mistaken payer of another's debt is subrogation of the payer to 
the creditor's rights against the defendant. This is a quintessential fair outcome. 
The plaintiff has no greater rights to recovery from the defendant than the 
creditor would have had, so that the plaintiff's claim may be defeated by any 
defences the defendant could have raised against the creditor.195 The defendant 
is in no way disadvantaged by such remedy. The defendant is placed in the 
same position as before the mistake, with only one inconsequential exception: 
the identity of the party to whom the obligation is owed has changed. This is 
inconsequential precisely because the plaintiff must have been a mistaken payer 
and this requirement precludes claims by intermeddlers seeking to impose 
themselves upon the defendant.196 Subrogation thus ought to be accepted in 
Anglo-Australian law as the standard remedial response so that "the mistaken 
discharge of another's debt ought to be assimilated to a mistaken payment 
made directly ... to the debtor."197 Although recent decisions may be leaning
outstanding. But to treat this as the ground for recovery is to put the proposition the 
wrong way round. Rather it is because recovery is allowed that the debt cannot be 
treated as having been extinguished.
... It is submitted that whenever the creditor is entitled to keep the payment, which he 
received in discharge of the debt, the debt must be treated as having been discharged, 
even if the creditor was not entitled to demand the payment from the person who made 
it. (footnotes omitted).
See the Restatement of Restitution, §43, §54, and Palmer, Vol. Ill, §14.17, §14.18. See also Scott, 
S.R., "Mistaken Payment of Another's Debt—is there an equitable solution?" [1993] N.Z. Recent 
L.R. 232, and contrast the reply by Watts, P., [1993] N.Z. Recent L.R. 248.
195 The debt may be doubtful, or the defendant may have a valid counterclaim or set­
off available against the creditor. Watts, supra n. 189, 249, has defended the orthodox rule that 
recovery should not be allowed against a debtor unless payment is made under compulsion, by 
pointing to such possible defences which the debtor may have. Such arguments are not relevant 
where the remedy is one of subrogation, as recovery from the debtor is "subject to any defence 
which was available to the debtor against the original creditor" to reduce or defeat the claim: 
Friedmann, supra n. 184, 546. See also Palmer, Vol. Ill, 227-8.
196 This thus overcomes the fear expressed in Exall v. Partridge (1799) 8 T.R. 308, 310, 
that an "enemy" "might convert himself into my debtor, nolens volens."
197 Friedmann, supra n. 184, 546.
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toward such an approach and toward rejection of the orthodox position,198 
until this occurs, a plaintiff may be refused relief even though a fair outcome is 
possible.
§ 9.2.3.4 Other mistakenly conferred services
Where mistakenly conferred services do not create any end-product, 
result in an increase in the value of existing property, or "discharge" a debt, the 
only possible remedy which a plaintiff may pursue is payment for the 
reasonable value of the services rendered.199 Examples of such services being 
mistakenly conferred are rare; recovery even rarer.200 Even in the United 
States, there are few reported examples and even fewer in which plaintiffs have 
successfully claimed for the value of their services.201
Requiring a defendant to pay for the reasonable value of services would 
in most cases leave that defendant out of pocket and thus at a disadvantage 
compared with his or her pre-mistaken position. Consequently, given that a fair 
outcome is not generally possible, relief will be denied, for the innocent
198 See Scott, supra n. 194, and his discussion of Westpac v. Rae [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 338. 
Contrast Watts, P., “Restitution" [1991] N.Z. Recent L.R. 419, 441.
199 Subrogation, restitution of the enhanced value of property or relief akin to specific 
restitution are not available remedial options.
200 One English example where services of such a kind were performed and recovery 
was refused, is Macclesfield Corp. v. Great Central Railway [1911] 2 K.B. 528, discussed Chapter 8. 
In that case, the defendant repaired a bridge in circumstances where there was a necessity to 
perform the work, but the plaintiff council also acted under a mistaken belief that it was 
obliged to perform the service. Nevertheless, it failed to recover for the work done. It has 
already been argued previously that the plaintiff ought to have recovered, given the 
circumstances of necessity. The logical consequence of the plaintiff's failure to do so is that if it 
had only acted under a mistake (i.e., where there was no necessity), then it is even less likely 
that the plaintiff would have succeeded. One case in which a plaintiff recovered for the 
reasonable value of services rendered under a mistake is Upton-on-Severn R.D.C. v. Powell [1942] 
1 All E.R. 220. The plaintiff provided fire-fighting services to the defendant, under the mistaken 
belief that the defendant was in the Upton fire district and thus entitled to the services 
gratuitously. In fact, the defendant lived outside the district. The plaintiff would thus have been 
entitled to contract for payment for its services. It subsequently sought such payment. The 
plaintiff was held to be entitled to recover on the basis of an implied contract despite the fact 
that both parties believed that the services were freely provided. Too much should not be made 
of the decision, however, for arguably it falls outside the boundaries of spontaneous mistake 
cases. The defendant also believed he was in the Upton district and it was this initial mistake 
which led to the plaintiff being called. But for the defendant's mistake, the plaintiffs would 
either not have performed the services, or performed them with the intent to charge therefor. 
The plaintiff's mistaken belief was thus caused by the defendant's request for the services in the 
circumstances. Cf. In re Agnew's Will, 230 N.Y.S. 519, 526 (1928). Contrast Merritt v. American 
Docks, 13 N.Y.S. 234 (1891), and Town of Durham v. Carlisle (1975) 63 D.L.R. (3d) 88.
201 Note, however, the cases cited below.
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defendant ought not be forced to bear the plaintiffs losses. For example, in 
Cahill v. Hall,202 the plaintiff mistakenly kept and trained the defendant7s horse, 
but was held not to be entitled to recover for such services.
Perhaps the only circumstance in which a fair outcome may be possible 
is where a plaintiff has fulfilled an obligation of the defendant, such as a 
statutory duty or contractual obligation (other than a debt). In the United States 
and Canada, a few exceptional cases have allowed recovery (though even in 
those jurisdictions, many if not most of the few authorities deny relief).203 It is 
difficult to draw any general conclusions from these few authorities, but 
perhaps a fair outcome will be possible where a defendant would have had to 
incur a debt to fulfil the obligation. For example, in County of Carleton v. City of 
Ottawa,204 the plaintiff mistakenly fulfilled the defendant's statutory duty to 
maintain an indigent, by providing board, lodging and medical assistance.205 
The important factor in the case is that both parties, being local authorities, 
could only meet the obligation by paying an agent to fulfil the requisite duty 
and perform the services. In fact, the plaintiff's "services" simply took the form 
of payments made to a third party (to whom the work was contracted out)
202 37 N.E. 573 (1894).
202> A number of United States cases have dealt with essentially the same problem. 
These cases concerned the transport of mail. Typically, the plaintiff owes a contractual duty to a 
third party to transport goods (mail) between two places (let us say from A to B). The 
defendant also has a contractual obligation to the same third party, to transport the same goods 
further (let us say from B to C to D). The plaintiff, for considerable periods of time, mistakenly 
transports the goods partly along the route the defendant is obliged to serve (from point A to B 
to C); yet the defendant has received payment from the third party for the work it is obliged to 
do. The plaintiff seeks reasonable payment for the service of transporting the goods beyond its 
obligated route. One case, McClary v. Michigan Central Ry Co., 60 N.W. 695 (1894), allowed 
recovery in essentially these circumstances on the basis of implied contract. Cf. Blowers v. 
Southern Ry, 54 S.E. 368 (1906), and Blackwood v. Southern Ry Co., 100 S.E. 610 (1918), in both of 
which the defendant companies were aware of the plaintiffs' mistake. Such acquiescence of 
itself provides a sufficient basis upon which to grant recovery and takes the latter two 
authorities outside the sphere of spontaneous mistakes. There was no knowledge by the 
defendant of the plaintiff's mistake in McClary's case. See Palmer, §17.7, however, who ignores 
this significant factual distinction and treats all three decisions as one. In other cases in which 
the defendants were unaware of the plaintiffs' mistakes, again in the context of similar facts, 
relief was denied. See Johnson v. Boston & M. R. Co., 38 A. 267 (1897), and Columbus v. Goffney, 61 
N.E. 152 (1901). The inconsistency of the decisions (the essential problem in all the cases being 
the same) reflects competing legal motivations: on the one hand, to undo the mistake and thus 
relieve the plaintiff of the unintended consequences of its actions; on the other hand, to not 
impose a burden upon the defendant to pay for the services. Outside the context of the mail 
cases, see Rohr v. Baker, 10 P 627 (1886), the result of which is inconsistent with McClary's case.
204 (1965) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 220.
205 The particular indigent had been omitted inadvertently from a list of persons 
resident in the defendant's area.
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which, but for the mistake, would have had to have been made by the 
defendant. In effect, the plaintiff met the defendant's "debt", especially given 
that the defendant would apparently have paid the same third party to perform 
the services. A subrogation-like remedy of recoupment of the expenditure 
incurred was appropriate.206
A subrogation-like remedy, where the plaintiff is subrogated to the 
rights of some hypothetical "creditor" with whom the defendant would have 
had to enter into a contract to fulfil the obligation, may in some circumstances 
achieve a fair outcome.207 But this suggests only a very limited scope for 
achieving fair outcomes, and recovery has been and will almost certainly 
continue to be exceptional.208
As our discussion of service cases suggests, it is not possible to achieve a 
fair outcome by applying specific rules formulistically. A detailed consideration 
of the individual facts of each case is necessary in order to determine whether 
any remedy can be found which does not leave a defendant at a disadvantage, 
but which restores (as nearly as practicably possible) the plaintiff to his or her 
pre-mistaken position. In most mistaken transactions, this may still be a
206 Contrast Fridman, 249, and Maddaugh & McCamus, 731-4, where the case is 
subsumed under the category of compulsory discharge of another's liability. To suggest that 
payment in the circumstances was "compelled" seems seriously misconceived. It is true that the 
plaintiff was under a contractual obligation to the third party to make the payments, but only 
because it assumed such an obligation as a result of its mistake.
207 Once the obligation owed by the defendant can only be fulfilled by incurring a 
debt, than recovery should ensue, on the same terms as which the defendant would have had 
to fulfil its obligation. Perhaps the sort of problem raised by the "mail" cases, discussed supra 
n. 203, might be resolved by inquiring whether a defendant in a particular case could have 
fulfilled the obligation other than by incurring a debt. For example, a defendant may have been 
capable of doing the work personally, or may already have had employed staff who could have 
performed the extra work within the scope of their duties, at no extra cost to the defendant. In 
such a case, the defendant would not have had to incur a debt to meet its obligation. 
Alternatively, a defendant may only have been able to fulfil its contractual obligation by sub­
contracting out for the work.
208 As an interesting aside, even if one were to except an unjust enrichment 
explanation of mistake cases, recovery will never be had for mistakenly conferred "pure" 
services, that is, ones which do not create an end-product, improve existing property or fulfil a 
debt or other legal obligation. Cf. Beatson's definition of pure services (Beatson, 23). 
Consequently, this suggests that in the one category in which unjust enrichment may have a 
role to play, pure services will never give rise to recovery and can thus never be said to be 
enriching. This makes Beatson's argument particularly compelling, that, generally speaking, 
only a receipt of wealth (including the saving of necessary expenses) can be considered as 
enriching. In mistake cases, courts generally will not require payment of the reasonable value of 
services rendered. Liability rules which do give rise to a right to recover the reasonable value of 
services, such as those considered in Chapter 6, are triggered by particular conduct of the 
defendants justifying recovery of reliance losses.
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relatively straightforward determination. Three-party transactions raise far 
more complex factual problems.
§ 9.3 THREE-PARTY TRANSACTIONS
§ 9.3.1 Introduction
Let us turn our attention to transactions which, at their simplest, involve 
three parties. A plaintiff seeks to maintain a claim against the defendant in 
circumstances where a third party has misdirected the plaintiffs property (in 
these cases, our concern is almost invariably with money, in the wide sense of 
the term),209 or property substituted for the plaintiffs property210 to the 
defendant.211 Although the 'Third party" is the principal wrongdoer (which 
term includes one who breaches a duty even innocently), nonetheless the claim 
is made against the defendant recipient of property who, if not involved in the 
wrongdoing,212 is an innocent defendant in the same way as a recipient of 
mistaken money or services. A simple example is where TP steals $5000 cash 
from P and transfers that sum to D, who places that money into a bank 
account.213 TP, of course, is liable to repay P, but as is often the case in such
209 See supra n. 26.
210 At times, the defendant will have received property such as shares or gold bullion 
or similar items which have been substituted for money misdirected from the plaintiff. For 
purposes of simplification, however, references will often be made merely to the misdirection 
and receipt of money. Where a plaintiff has legal title to property other than money, which has 
been stolen or converted, title to that property, unlike title to money, will remain with the 
plaintiff even if transferred to a bona fide purchaser (nemo dat quod non habet). Since the plaintiff 
can then simply assert title to the property which, moreover, will often be relatively easy to 
identify, recovery of such property from someone in possession of it will be a relatively 
straightforward process. Such cases are not considered here.
211 Many cases involve complex commercial dealings in which any number of parties 
and transactions may be interposed between the third party wrongdoer and the defendant 
recipient. Often, these parties may be interconnected via intricate corporate structures, so that, 
for example, one party may be fully or partially owned by another party to a transaction, or 
parties to a transaction may share common agents. Factors such as these, of course, may 
complicate the factual context within which a claim is made against a given party.
212 Although the defendant here is a third party to another's wrongdoing or breach of 
duty, and liability of such defendant is often described in terms of "third party" liability, where 
references here are made to a "third party", they are intended to refer to the wrongdoer.
213 Cf. Black v. Freedman (1910) 12 C.L.R. 105; Banque Beige pour I'Etranger v. Hambrouck 
[1921] 1 K.B.321.
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circumstances, TP may be insolvent or may have absconded. Consequently, P 
seeks to impose liability on D.
The problem thus raised is essentially the same as arises in a mistaken 
transfer made directly by a plaintiff to the defendant. Speaking very loosely, 
one can say that the defendant has received money (or substituted property) 
'"belonging" to the plaintiff which the defendant was never intended or entitled 
to have.214
Although the problem to be addressed in three-party transactions can be 
stated in such relatively simple terms, its solution is not by any means a simple 
matter. Indeed, potentially there are a number of legal doctrines which may 
apply to the three-party problem outlined above, each of which have 
developed separately and on the basis of quite distinct underlying ideas, 
involve their own detailed rules and raise considerable complexities and 
uncertainties as to their exact scope and operation. Although each doctrine has 
its own sphere of operation, there are points of overlap between the doctrines 
and, unacceptably, the conclusion reached in a given case will depend 
fortuitously upon which doctrines are applicable. To put it bluntly, the law in 
this area is a mess.
Although our concern is chiefly with determining the liability of an 
innocent defendant (that is, one not involved in the third party's wrong), 
nonetheless it is also necessary to refer to rules in equity concerned with 
liability of a participant in another's wrongdoing.215 The reason for this is that 
such rules form part of the overall, considerably complex position governing 
three-party transaction. Indeed, in some cases the only possible basis for 
liability of a defendant may be by an application of equity's participatory 
liability rules, so that an entirely innocent defendant will be absolutely 
protected from liability.
To simplify the matter considerably, there appear to be three main types 
of claim which are potentially available to a plaintiff seeking to impose liability 
on a defendant who has received property216 from a third party.
214 See supra n. 16.
215 See further, § 93.2.2.
216 Where a defendant has received personal property, other than money, to which the 
plaintiff has title, then such property is recoverable on the basis of the plaintiff's continuing 
legal title to that property, even if the defendant was a bona fide purchaser. See supra n. 210. 
However, the defendant may have received personal property to which the plaintiff never had
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First, the plaintiff may be able to pursue a personal claim seeking the 
imposition of strict liability (that is, liability independent of any wrongdoing), 
upon the defendant for the value of property received by the defendant which 
can be said to belong to the plaintiff. Such strict liability will most likely be 
imposed in an action in Restitution, for money had and received, for the 
recovery of m isdirected money to which the plaintiff had legal title. 
Alternatively, there exists the possibility of strict liability being imposed on the 
basis of the albeit narrow equitable rule applied in Re Diplock217
Secondly, the plaintiff may be able to pursue a personal claim on 
equitable principles, where he or she can establish that the defendant 
"knowingly" assisted in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty ,218 or "knowingly" 
received trust property. Liability founded on these formulations is dependent 
on some involvem ent in w rongdoing or, m ore accurately, since mere 
negligence may suffice,219 at least some fault on the part of the defendant. 
Consequently, where these equitable rules apply, personal liability may be 
limited to recovery from defendants who are wrongdoers so that innocent 
defendants, even if volunteer recipients of property, may be protected 
absolutely.
Thirdly, the plaintiff may be able to establish a tracing claim at common
any legal title, such as property substituted for money stolen from the plaintiff, of which the 
plaintiff nonetheless is seeking recovery. Such recovery cannot be on the straightforward basis 
of continuing legal title to that property.
212 [1948] Ch. 465, on appeal, Ministry of Health v. Simpson [1951] A.C. 251.
218 The "classic" formulation of the basis of liability upon parties implicated in a 
breach of trust or other fiduciary duty, other than the principal wrongdoer, is that of Lord 
Selbome L.C. in Barnes v. Addy (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244. Subsequent applications of the rule 
in Barnes v. Addy led to the currently widely accepted view (in English and Australian law, at 
least) that there are two separate classes of liability: "knowing assistance" and "knowing 
receipt". See Finn, supra n. 99, 197-8, 201-2. Under the "knowing assistance" category of Lord 
Selborne's formulation, participants must have "knowingly assisted" in a "dishonest and 
fraudulent design", and in England, the courts appear to continue to adhere to such a 
requirement, although this is sometimes couched in the language of a "want of probity": cf. 
Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v. Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch. 250; In re Montagu's 
Settlements Trusts [1987] Ch. 264; and Competitive Insurance Co. v. Davies Investments [1975] 1 
W.L.R. 1240; and contrast Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v. Craddock (No. 3) [1968] 2 All E.R. 
1073, 1105. In Australia, however, there is support for the view that knowingly assisting in a 
mere breach of duty, rather than a "dishonest or fraudulent" design, may be sufficient to found 
liability under this head. See Consul Development Pty Ltd v. D.P.C. Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 
C.L.R. 373, 396 per Gibb JL , and 411-2, per Stephen J; Austin R.P., "Constructive Trusts" in Finn, 
P.D., Essays in Equity (1985), 233; and Finn, supra n. 99, 206.
219 See infra n. 258.
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law or, more likely, in equity, to property subsisting in a defendant's hands. 
Liability is not here in personam and is limited to recovery of identifiable, 
"traceable" property which can be said to belong in law or in equity to the 
plaintiff.220
Each of these very different types of claim will be outlined below, 
though the uncertainty as to the details of specific doctrines and their 
application necessitates only a general overview of the current legal position. 
The divergent results of the application of different doctrines, specifically in 
relation to the imposition of personal liability, either strictly or on the basis of 
fault, is sometimes stated in terms of a divergence between common law and 
equity, respectively 221 Although this is not entirely accurate, as the possibility 
of "Re Diplock" strict liability demonstrates,222 nonetheless the law/equity 
divide is a factor of continuing significance in determining, ultimately, the 
liability of a defendant.
There is one important feature common to all cases irrespective of the 
type of claim pursued: if a defendant in his or her transaction with the third 
party has given good consideration and has no notice of the third party's 
wrong (that is, the misdirection) or the plaintiff's interest, then such defendant 
will be entitled to raise a defence of bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
and will in all cases be protected from any liability. In the first type of claim, 
this is because of the operation of a bona fide purchaser defence; in the second 
type of claim this is because a bona fide purchaser, not having notice of the 
wrong, will not satisfy the requirement of knowledge needed to trigger
220 The plaintiff will have had legal title to, or an equitable interest in, or be a 
beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship owed in respect of, the subsisting property or property 
for which it was substituted.
22  ^ See, e.g., Burrows, 143.
222 [19481 Ch. 465. See Birks, supra n. 16, 310-6. In Restitution—The Future, 39, Birks 
states "this conflict is not a clash between law and equity." It is true, however, that but for the 
(it is suggested) narrow rule in Re Diplock, equity has shunned strict liability so that there is 
some validity in perceiving the divide in equity/common law terms. Although Birks considers 
fault-based liability cases as the exception, as Burrows, A., "Misdirected Funds: A Reply" (1990) 
106 L.Q.R. 20, 23, has concluded:
Birks argues that the trend of the cases towards fault-based liability for third party 
recipients turns the law and decided cases upside down. The picture of the law I 
present sees no such upheaval. On the contrary it is Birks' approach that would 
constitute a revolution. After years of argument as to whether an intermeddling 
stranger's equitable liability for "knowing receipt and dealing" should be based on 
mere negligence or dishonesty ... it comes as an abrupt shock to hear a call for neither 
of these but for strict liability.
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equitable liability;223 and in the third type of claim, this is because a plaintiffs 
right to trace money or property substituted for it is extinguished once it has 
been transferred for valuable consideration to a bona fide defendant, who does 
not take subject to the plaintiffs prior interest.
The bona fide purchaser being in all cases protected, the critical difference 
in the operation of different doctrines can be seen in relation to recipients who 
are volunteers, that is, who have not given consideration in exchange for the 
property received.224 Hence, in what follows, the emphasis is on volunteers. If 
a volunteer is innocent of any fault, then achieving fair outcomes would appear 
to be the appropriate rationale for determining the scope of liability.225 It is in 
relation to volunteers that the difference between strict and fault-based 
personal liability is brought out most sharply: in the former case, a volunteer 
will be liable whenever he or she has received any of plaintiffs property, 
subject to available defences, whereas in the latter case, the volunteer will be 
protected from personal liability if he or she is not imbued with the requisite 
knowledge, though such a volunteer may still be liable to give up traceable 
property which can be identified as surviving in his or her hands (the
223 This will be so even though there may be a difference between the degree of 
knowledge which constitutes "notice" of a prior interest for the purposes of the bona fide 
purchase defence protecting a defendant taking property the subject of a plaintiffs prior 
interest, and the degree of knowledge which constitutes "knowing receipt". "Notice" and 
"knowledge" are "not necessarily the same thing". See Sachs L.J., in Carl-Zeiss Stiftung v. 
Herbert Smith & Co. (No. 2) [19691 2 Ch. at 296. Contrast Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v. Societe 
Generale [1982] 4 All E.R. 161, per Peter Gibson J. Since "knowing receipt" gives rise to full 
personal liability as a constructive trustee, any divergence between knowingly receiving and 
notice should favour a higher degree of knowledge in the former case. Liability where a 
purchaser has "notice" is limited to returning property received with such notice and thus is 
not as wide as liability for "knowing receipt". See In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] 1 Ch. 
264, 278, where Megarry V.C. considered that:
The cold calculus of constructive and imputed notice does not seem to be an 
appropriate instrument for deciding whether a man's conscience is sufficiently affected 
for it to be right to bind him by the obligations of a constructive trustee.
Consequently, if a defendant does not have notice of the plaintiff's interest he or she certainly 
will not be liable under equity's "knowing receipt" rule. The converse, however, does not 
necessarily hold true: a defendant not having knowledge sufficient to be a knowing recipient of 
trust property might be held to have notice of the plaintiff's interest.
224 Alternatively, the "volunteer" may be one who has given consideration which the 
law does not recognise as valid, such as entry into a void contract. See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale 
[1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, though the decision in that case, it is respectively suggested, is wrong. See 
infra n. 244.
225 If a defendant is an innocent purchaser, a remedy which does not disadvantage the 
defendant is not possible and the plaintiff will be restricted to recovery against the wrongdoer.
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proprietary/third type of claim). It is the possibility of a tracing claim which 
will be seen to provide the possibility for bridging the seemingly wide gap 
between strict (usually common law) and fault-based (equitable) personal 
liability. The underlying rationale for bridging this gap will be argued to be 
that of achieving fair outcomes.
§ 9.3.1.1 The technique of tracing property
Before we turn to the three main types of claims potentially applicable to 
three-party transactions, a little further needs to be said about the technique of 
tracing property. The technique by which property is followed from the hands 
of one person into those of another, or from one type of property into another, 
is by way of the rules of tracing. These rules—developed at common law and in 
equity—provide the means by which a plaintiff maintains the link between 
property dealt with by a wrongdoer226 and property which a defendant has 
received. These rules do not of themselves establish liability. Rather, they are 
techniques which allow a party to draw factual conclusions about the transfer 
of property to another, or the continued subsistence of property in another's 
hands. As Burrows has pointed out, tracing provides merely a "means of 
getting to particular remedies" .227
Tracing rules can serve at least two quite distinct purposes. First, the 
rules may establish that the defendant has indeed received something which 
can be said to belong to the plaintiff. As such, the rules are relevant even to 
establishing personal liability for value received. Thus, irrespective of whether a 
defendant must have knowingly received the property or is strictly liable as a 
result of its receipt, in both cases, it is the receipt of something to which the 
plaintiff can lay claim that is the necessary precondition for liability. The 
second purpose which tracing rules can serve is to establish some proprietary
226 The tracing rules presuppose, as does this discussion, that there is some extant 
proprietary right against the third party initially misdirecting the property the subject of such 
right, though see infra n. 229. Such right may merely arise because a constructive trust exists in 
relation to the property. In some cases, whether the particular wrong or breach of duty by a 
third party should give rise to a constructive trust over property subsequently misdirected, 
may be controversial. It may depend on policy considerations of particular relevance to the 
type of case under consideration. For example, should an equitable claim to property owned by 
an ex-de facto spouse necessarily give rise to a constructive trust, so that a transferral of such 
property by the ex-de facto is a misdirection of that property? The policy concerns which 
would need to be considered to answer this question are not within the scope of this thesis.
227 Burrows, 57. See also Birks, P., "Persistent Problems in Misdirected Money: A 
Quintet" [1993] L.M.C.L.Q. 218, and Glover, supra n. 76, 272-3.
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claim over an identifiable asset which still subsists in a defendant's hands.228 
Once such assets have been identified, the defendant may be liable to account 
for them. The plaintiff's claim to the surviving property derives not from the 
tracing rules themselves, but from the legal or, more usually, the equitable 
right229 to that property or a previous substitute.230
It is the second purpose of tracing rules that will be discussed below, 
when we consider the possibility of a proprietary claim. But the first purpose is 
relevant in establishing a necessary precondition for liability in all three types 
of claim (two personal and one proprietary), as in all three the defendant must 
have at least received the plaintiff's property. To establish a proprietary claim, a 
plaintiff then has to go further to identify traceable property which is retained 
by the defendant.
The tracing rules themselves, specifically those concerned with tracing 
money, are complex. Inconsistencies exist between those rules of equitable 
origin and those of common law origin.231 What is clear is that in the past, the
228 Consequently, if a claim is in a proprietary form, the claimant will gain priority 
ahead of unsecured creditors. The circumstances in which a plaintiff should be entitled to 
priority is an interesting issue, but not one which will be pursued in this thesis.
229 It need not be an equitable interest and although generally a requirement of some 
initial equitable proprietary right is stated as a prerequisite, it is difficult to see how this is met in 
some cases. A beneficiary of a deceased estate, for example, merely has a personal right against 
the executors to have the estate duly administered. See Commr of Stamp Duties v. Livingstone 
[1965] A.C. 694. Nevertheless, should the executors breach their duties, a right to trace may 
arise: see Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 458.
230 See Millett, supra n. 97, 80: "The tracing claim in equity gives rise to a proprietary 
remedy which depends on the continued existence of the trust property in the hands of the 
defendant." In other words, the recipient takes the property subject to a prior equitable interest: 
cf. Finn, supra n. 99, 202.
Strictly speaking, even if the property in the defendant's hands is a substitute for the plaintiff's 
original property, tracing is only possible on the basis of a continuing legal or equitable right. 
But this will often be via the quite technical tracing rules, so that rather than saying the 
plaintiff's right continues into the substitute property, it is perhaps more accurate to say that 
"the owner of the original property exercises a power to transfer his title, retrospectively, from 
the original property to the substitute product": Burrows, 58, and see also at 65-9.
231 See generally Sutton, R., "Tracing" [1982] N.Z.L.J. 67, and Burrows, Chp. 2. It 
seems fair to conclude that the equitable rules are generally wider in their potential scope. In 
equity, the right to trace generally is said to be dependent upon the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship between the plaintiff and the wrongdoer or at least arising upon the receipt of 
property, but such a relationship is often quite artificially discovered. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. Israel-British Bank [1979] 3 All E.R. 1025. In Australia, an existing fiduciary relationship 
may not be a prerequisite to an equitable tracing claim. See Glover, supra n. 76, 272-3, and Black 
v. Freedman (1910) 12 C.L.R. 105; cf. Goff & Jones, 83-6, as to the English position. Common law 
tracing is limited to circumstances in which a plaintiff can show a continuing legal title to the 
property, which title, in the case of money, is readily lost. Consequently, at common law there
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right to trace via these obscure, highly technical and perhaps "arbitrary" 232 
rules233 was extremely limited. These limitations are not surprising given that 
the rules originated from a conception of v/ealth taking the form of banknotes. 
It will be suggested below that there is much to be said for a liberalisation of 
the tracing rules.
§ 9.3.2 Three Types of Claim
§ 9.3.2.1 Strict personal liability
At common law, a plaintiff will be able to maintain a claim against the 
defendant for recovery of the value of money had and received by the 
defendant, to which money the plaintiff can show a continuing legal title up 
until the time of receipt.234 It is not necessary to show that the defendant knew 
of or was in anyway involved in the wrong which deprived the plaintiff of his 
or her money. Consequently, liability can be said to be strict, though it is
exists a restriction on tracing into "mixed" funds; that is, where money of the party seeking to 
trace is mixed with money belonging to someone else. Although, common law tracing rules 
appear to have been liberalised in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [19911 3 W.L.R. 10, it must be 
noted, however, that there were a number of concessions by counsel in that case without which 
the plaintiffs' claim may have failed. See Birks, supra n. 76, 479. Many commentators perceive 
at best only a limited operation of the common law rules. See, e.g., Millett, supra n. 97; and 
Sutton, ibid. See also Stoljar, Chp. 5, for discussion of the historical development of tracing 
rules. The division between equitable and common law tracing seems to serve no purpose and 
will become redundant if the approach canvassed below is adopted. Many see the desirability 
of the fusion of the common law and equitable rules. Cf. Burrows, 76. For judicial opinion to 
this effect, see, e.g., Elders Pastoral Ltd v. Bank of New Zealand [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 180, 185-6, per 
Cooke P., and 193, per Somers J.; Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, suggests that the 
House of Lords may be leaning in the same direction. See also Watts, P. "Unjust Enrichment 
and Misdirected Funds" (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 521, generally, and at 526.
232 Glover, supra n. 76, 271.
233 Cf. Goff & Jones, 86, in relation to equitable tracing rules. For an example of the 
considerable complexities which can arise in applying common law tracing rules, see the 
detailed discussion in Birks, supra n. 76, in relation to tracing in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale 
[1991] 3 W.L.R. 10.
234 This simplifies the matter somewhat. The money received could also be the 
traceable substitute of property to which the plaintiff had legal title. Although strictly speaking, 
the plaintiff needs to show continuing title, this does not mean the plaintiff needs to identify the 
very notes transferred: it is sufficient to show a continuing legal title to the value the money 
represents. For example, in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, the money received by 
the defendant was in substitute for a chose in action to which the plaintiffs had legal title. See 
particularly at 28-9, per Lord Goff. See also Birks, supra n. 76, 478-9, and cf. Burrows, 65-9. See 
also supra n. 231. Although a plaintiff can trace property substituted for money, recovery of 
that substituted property could not be in an action for money had and received, but would 
have to be on the basis of a proprietary claim.
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always subject to any available defences. There are in fact few authorities 
allowing recovery of money from a recipient who has not received it from the 
plaintiff235 (or his or her agent),236 but the availability of such a claim is now 
clearly beyond doubt after the decision of the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman 
v. Karpnale.237 Unlike liability founded on tracing to be considered below, the
235 As Goff & Jones, 78, explain:
The claim can only succeed if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant received 
his money and that he did not, as a result of that receipt, obtain good title to it. Given 
the defence of bona fide purchase, successful claims are rare (emphasis in original, 
footnote omitted).
Consequently, innocent purchasers will be protected from such a claim. But there are 
surprisingly few authorities in which innocent volunteers have been held liable. Of the earlier 
authorities, three of the most significant cases are all consistent with the claim to traceable 
assets still surviving in the defendant's hands (see below), rather than full liability for recovery 
of money received. Indeed, it is notable that in two of these three cases (Black v. Freedman (1910) 
C.L.R. 105, Banque Beige pour I'Etranger v. Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321), the plaintiffs' claims 
were limited to sums of money still in the defendants' accounts, although unjust enrichment 
advocates are quick to point out that the plaintiff could have claimed more. See Birks, supra n. 
16, 311-2, and Burrows, 145-6. In the third case, Transvaal & Delagoa Bay Investments Co. v. 
Atkinson [1944] 1 All E.R. 579, despite the plaintiff claiming for the value of all money received, 
the court allowed a defence of "ministerial receipt" (see supra n. 97, (2)) so that the innocent 
defendant was not held liable beyond that sum which she retained. The applicability of the 
defence has been doubted (Birks, supra n. 16, 313, fn. 61, considers that the innocent defendant 
"was undeniably lucky to be given the advantage of this defence") and one commentator treats 
the case as an example of a general change of position defence (see Stoljar, 122). Cf. also Calland 
v. Lloyd (1840) 6 M. & W. 26, in which money in an account had been deposited by a third party 
with the defendant bank. The bank had given value in the form of a contract for the money 
received, but the court considered the contract a nullity, so that the defendant was in effect as a 
volunteer. Recovery was allowed for money held in the account. See Birks, supra n. 16, 317-8.
236 A defendant may have received money from the plaintiffs agent, in which case the 
receipt is treated the same as if it came directly from the plaintiff. Similarly, where money is 
received by a defendant's agent, the receipt is again treated as if it had gone directly to the 
defendant.
237 [i99i] 3 w.L.R. 10. In essence, the facts of the case were these. A solicitor, Cass, 
withdrew funds from his firm's account, without the consent of his partners. He proceeded to 
use the money to gamble at the defendant club, where he lost a net sum of £174,745, of which it 
was agreed by the parties at least £154,695 was derived from money obtained from the 
plaintiffs' account. The plaintiffs successfully recovered this latter sum in an action for money 
had and received against the defendant club, who it was accepted had at all times been 
unaware of Cass's source of funds and his dishonest acquisition thereof. The House of Lords 
considered that the club had been enriched to the extent of the money gambled by Cass, which 
belonged to the plaintiffs; that the club had not given valuable consideration for Cass's bets, 
since the gaming contracts were void (though not illegal); but that the club was entitled to raise 
a defence of change of position to the value of winnings paid to Cass. Hence, the solicitors were 
entitled to recover Cass's net losses.
The imposition of strict liability has been championed with particular vigour by Birks. See, e.g., 
Birks, supra n. 16; supra n. 76; supra n. 227; "Misdirected Funds" (1989) 105 L.Q.R. 352; and 
Restitution: The Future, Chp. 2. Birks argues that the logic of unjust enrichment requires that 
recovery lie on the same terms as in two-party mistaken transactions. In both types of case, the 
intention to transfer is vitiated. Birks appears to be at pains to deny the proprietary nature of
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personal claim for money had and received is not dependent upon any 
traceable property being identifiable and subsisting in the hands of the 
defendant. It is the receipt of the plaintiffs money which is the crux of the 
liability rules. Interestingly, although the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman 
considered unjust enrichment to be the underlying basis of the plaintiffs' claim, 
the language of property featured prominently in the judgments: the unjust 
enrichment arose because the defendant had received the plaintiffs' 
property.238
The scope of the operation of the common law money had and received 
claim may be very limited. One significant limitation upon recovery is that a 
plaintiff must show that he or she had legal title to money239 at the time it was 
misdirected, and that the money must be traceable to the point of its receipt240 
by a defendant. This requires the plaintiff to show a continuing legal title which 
survives any transactions or substitutions which have occurred. This may be 
difficult. For example, any mixing of funds precludes tracing at common law 
into such mixed funds (ones in which a plaintiff's money is mixed with money 
of another), so that the defendant in question must not have received money 
from a mixed fund.241 Similarly, the transaction may be such as to make it 
difficult to show continuing legal title, as illustrated by Lipkin Gorman itself. In 
that case, the third party rogue was authorised to draw money from the 
plaintiffs' account. Hence, he had legal title to the cash withdrawn (that is, the 
money substituted for the plaintiff's property in the chose in action) which he 
then used for an unauthorised purpose (gambling). Consequently, Lord Goff
the claim, but it is difficult to deny the analogy with property: that the aim of recovery is to 
protect the plaintiff's "property" whenever it has been received by a defendant, whether 
innocent of any wrongdoing or not. Cf. discussion in Finn, supra n. 99, 210-12.
238 See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, e.g., at 27. See also supra n. 91.
239 Included within the meaning of money is like property, such as a chose in action: 
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10 (debtor/creditor relationship subsisting between 
bank and depositor).
240 Again, money received is given a wide definition. For example, in Lipkin Gorman v. 
Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10, a banker's draft was equated with money. See at 23B, per Lord 
Templeman. If property other than money is received, the claim could not be for money had 
and received. See supra n. 234.
241 Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson [1991] 3 W.L.R. 116, discussed and criticised by Burrows, 
63-5, and cf. Bancjue Beige pour I'Etranger v. Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321.
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relied on the power of the plaintiffs to vest the money in themselves as sufficient 
an interest to be traced.242
As has already been mentioned, although common law liability is strict, 
it is also subject to available defences. For one, a bona fide purchaser is 
absolutely protected against liability and the courts do not inquire into the 
adequacy of the consideration given.243 Thus, if X steals $5000 from P and uses 
it to purchase land from D, then D is absolutely protected unless he or she had 
notice of P's right to the money. It is not relevant to the operation of the defence 
that D's land has a market value, say, of only $3500, at the time of the 
exchange.244
The bona fide purchaser defence does not, of course, assist the volunteer. 
The most important defence potentially available to a volunteer defendant is 
that in reliance upon the receipt, the volunteer changed his or her position. If it 
is accepted, as was argued previously, that change of position is concerned 
with the loss of economic advantage by a defendant, then a liberal application 
of the defence would preclude recovery of any economic advantage innocently 
dissipated. A volunteer defendant will only be liable if he or she retains some 
economic advantage as a result of the receipt of money. Even though 
personally liable, such liability would in effect only require a defendant to 
make "specific restitution" of any economic advantage retained. If such a view 
is correct—it depends on the future development of the change of position 
defence—then "strict" liability imposed on the innocent volunteer on such
242 See discussion, Birks, supra n. 76, 477-9.
243 The separate operation of a bona fide purchase defence to that of change of position 
is discussed supra n. 97.
244 Consequently, despite the considerable winnings of the club in Lipkin Gorman v. 
Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 10 (for the facts, see supra n. 237), the club should have been entitled to 
a bona fide purchase defence. Not only did the club enter into wagering contracts with Cass, it 
also provided the venue and facilities, staff, and other services which form part and parcel of 
gambling contracts. The fact that the club won considerable sums from Cass does not mean that 
value was not given. It is submitted that the club gave value and ought not have been held 
liable. Birks, supra n. 76, 492-6, agrees that the club gave value and that prima facie, should have 
been able to raise a defence, but proceeds to argue that the policy of the statutory provisions 
nullifying the gambling contracts barred the defendants "bringing into account the value" 
given (495). This argument is unpersuasive, as it extends the operation of the nineteenth 
century Gaming Act 1845 on the basis of its supposed "policy" in a way which is detrimental to 
an innocent defendant.
It should be noted, however, that although there is generally no need to inquire as to the value 
of consideration, an extreme disparity between such value given by a defendant and the wealth 
transferred by the wrongdoer may of itself be evidence of a lack of bona fides on the defendant's 
part.
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terms does not disadvantage a volunteer and achieves a fair outcome.
The return of subsisting economic advantage appears to be the gist of the 
money had and received claim in three-party transactions as in mistaken 
transactions. It is questionable, however, whether the at-present highly 
technical tracing rules (specifically here, at common law and for the purpose of 
establishing a receipt of the plaintiff's property) adequately allow economic 
advantage to be followed. Perhaps more liberal tracing rules can be utilised to 
establish that a defendant has in fact received an economic advantage which 
belongs to the plaintiff. Even if a plaintiff cannot trace a continuing legal title 
through forms of property previously substituted for money received (for 
example, choses in action, goods, cash, cheques), but which represent the same 
economic advantage that economic advantage may still be traceable. We will 
return to this below.
In equity as at common law, the possibility exists for strict liability to be 
imposed on an innocent volunteer, on the basis of the authority of Re Diplock245 
(on appeal, Ministry of Health u. Simpson),246 and a number of cases which have 
applied it.247
The rule in Re Diplock allows for actions by the beneficiaries of estates, in 
personam, against overpaid beneficiaries of that estate.248 In Re Diplock itself, 
executors of an estate, acting under a mistake of law, paid out money to certain 
charities. The next of kin of the testator were able successfully to maintain 
personal claims against those recipient (volunteer) charities. However, the exact 
scope of the operation of the liability rule in Re Diplock is uncertain. The case 
itself was expressly confined to the distribution of funds in the administration 
of a deceased's estate.249 Although some cases have suggested that its authority 
may extend beyond those specific facts, for example, to include trustees of inter 
vivos trusts,250 the rule in Re Diplock certainly does not apply to all fiduciaries
245 [1948] Ch. 458.
246 [1951]A.C. 251.
247 See cases cited in Birks, supra n. 16, 313-6.
248 Cf. Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, 365.
249 [1948] Ch. 458, 476-8.
250 Cf. G.L. Baker Ltd v. M edw ay Building & Supplies Ltd [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1216, and see 
other cases cited by Birks, supra n. 16, 313-6.
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dealing with beneficiaries' interests.251 In any case, unless the rule is 
interpreted sui generis to only cover deceased estates, it is inconsistent with and 
has been largely ignored by equitable cases (considered below) concerned with 
the "knowing receipt" of trust property. As Burrows has pointed out, the 
decision
has had no influence on those cases—indeed it has rarely been cited— 
and the conventional view is that it belongs to a specialised pocket of 
law principally concerned with the administration of estates.252
Strict liability in equity on the basis of Re Diplock may thus be no more than an 
anomaly, though one which certainly adds to the complexity of the state of the 
law governing three-party transactions.
One of the difficulties created by the rule in Re Diplock is that it is 
inconsistent with protecting innocent defendants, for in that case, no change of 
position defence was allowed to mitigate the seemingly harsh consequences253 
of allowing the personal claims. Some of the charities in question had made 
alterations and improvements to buildings which they may not have made but 
for the receipts, but such expenditure was not considered to reduce the 
personal liability.254
§ 9.3.2.2 Fault-based personal liability
If a plaintiff merely has an equitable interest in money or property or is a 
beneficiary of a trust or some other fiduciary relationship under which the 
property is held, personal liability may be imposed upon a defendant
251 Cf. Austin, supra n. 218, 213-7.
252 Burrows, 156-7. See also Burrows, supra n. 222, 23-4. Those few cases which appear 
to have extended Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 458, beyond its facts appear contrary to the whole tenor 
of the equitable decisions relating to the "knowing receipt" of trust property.
253 There was one significant qualification made to the personal liability imposed, 
namely that the personal claims against the charities were subject to the plaintiffs exhausting 
their personal remedies against the executors. For an explanation of this qualification in unjust 
enrichment terms, see Smith, L.D., "Three Party Restitution: A Critique of Birks's Theory of 
Interceptive Subtraction" (1991) 11 O.J.L.S. 481. See also Burrows, 51-3.
254 In the House of Lords, see [1951] A.C. 251, 276, per Lord Simonds. To the extent 
that the money was expended on improvements to land the charities were themselves using, 
such expenditure would appear to have dissipated the economic advantage received. See the 
discussion in relation to services, § 9.2.3.1, particularly as to the question of when an 
improvement to land may amount to a surviving economic advantage capable of being 
returned.
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"implicated in another's breach of fiduciary duty or breach of trust." 255 
Recovery is generally said to be on the basis of one of two classes of liability: 
that the defendant has "knowingly" assisted in a breach of trust or fiduciary 
duty256 or has "knowingly" received trust property. A defendant involved in 
the wrong in either of these two ways becomes subject to the full rigours of 
personal liability attaching to a constructive trustee of property. If a defendant 
has not received any trust property, liability can only be under the first class of 
liability, which need not concern us, having no consequences for innocent 
recipients of property.257
If a defendant has received trust property, liability rests firmly on that 
defendant's conduct: he or she must have "knowingly" received the property. 
Although there is considerable debate as to the requisite degree of knowledge 
sufficient to justify liability—broadly speaking, between those who consider 
constructive knowledge and thus carelessness as sufficient and those who 
consider that actual knowledge, described by some as dishonesty, is 
required258—whichever view prevails, it is clear that liability under the
255 Finn, supra n. 99,196.
25  ^ See supra n. 218, as to whether the involvement need be in a dishonest and 
fraudulent design, or merely in a breach of duty.
257 The only possible basis for liability for "knowing assistance" is the defendant's 
involvement in the wrong. Cf. Birks, supra n. 16, 334: "The equitable liability for assisting fraud 
is virtually unintelligible without fault." The requisite degree of involvement in the wrong, 
however, is the subject of some debate. This debate centres on the degree of knowledge which a 
defendant must have in order to be caught by equity's liability rule. Authorities range from 
those requiring actual knowledge in order to establish a sufficient degree of dishonesty (e.g., 
Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung v. Herbert Smith & Co. (No. 2) [1962] 2 Ch. 276, 301 per Edmund-Davies L.J.), 
to those authorities which have considered constructive knowledge ("a negligent failure to 
inquire") as sufficient (e.g., Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v. Craddock (No. 3) [1968] 2 All E.R. 
1073). In Australia, the position may be midway between these two views. Liability for a 
"negligent failure to inquire" has been rejected (e.g., Consul Development Pty Ltd v. D.P.C. Estates 
Pty Ltd [1974] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 443; (1975) C.L.R. 373) but there is support for the view that 
knowledge of the circumstances which would indicate a breach of duty to a reasonable and 
honest person is sufficient (see Consul Development Pty Ltd v. D.P.C. Estates Pty Ltd, and Austin, 
supra n. 218, 234-40).
258 In support of the former view, see, e.g., Consul Development Pty Ltd v. D.P.C. Estates 
Pty Ltd [1974] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 443, 459, per Jacobs P.; in support of the latter, see Finn, supra n. 99. 
Finn considers that an innocent (that is, merely careless) defendant ought not be subjected to 
the full range of equitable personal remedies and argues that participation in the wrong ought 
to be the minimum requirement for personal liability arising. This does not preclude the 
possibility of a proprietary claim to recover traceable assets, as to which see below. If 
negligence is not considered sufficient to justify imposing the full range of equitable personal 
remedies against an otherwise innocent defendant, than the question of liability of such a 
defendant would need to be determined on the same basis as a totally innocent defendant. It 
will be argued below that this ought to be on a fair outcomes basis. See also Birks, supra n. 16, 
327-34, for a summary of English authorities in support of each of these views. Birks considers
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equitable formulation is not strict. Either actual knowledge or at least some 
fault is required before the defendant is asked to compensate the plaintiff for 
the losses incurred as a result of another's wrong. In the words of Burrows:
The controversy raging in the 'knowing receipt' cases ... is whether the 
standard of liability includes negligence (ie constructive knowledge) as 
well as dishonesty. ... The possibility of being strictly liable, as at 
common law, for having received property that was transferred without 
the equitable owner's knowledge has not been on the agenda.259
Consequently, an innocent defendant, even if a volunteer, will be protected from 
the imposition of personal liability for the full value of money received.260
The approach of equity in these cases is consistent with the paramount 
concern in cases of spontaneous mistake of protecting innocent defendants 
from disadvantage,261 although in cases where the equitable formulations 
govern, this protection is absolute. But this appears to preclude the possibility 
of a fair outcome which restores a plaintiff without disadvantaging the 
defendant, and unless there exists the possibility of a concurrent common law 
claim, is inconsistent with the result arrived at in cases where the liability rule 
applied is strict.262
Equity's position towards a plaintiff claiming from an innocent 
defendant may not be as adverse as this would suggest. For the possibility may 
exist of an equitable tracing claim to assert a proprietary right to property
these equitable authorities to be in "disarray": Birks, supra n. 76,485.
259 Burrows, 150. See also Burrows, supra n. 222.
260 Cf. Finn, supra n. 99, 211. Such personal liability will either be in the form of an 
award in damages or an accounting for profits made from the use of the plaintiff's property.
261 The point is reiterated by Finn, supra n. 99, 209:
One would have thought, as a matter of basic justice to the [defendantl, compelling 
reasons bearing on his or her own conduct would need to be found before that person 
was to be subjected, potentially, to the full range of personal liabilities that equity can 
impose on a defaulting fiduciary.
Should the cases move in the direction of excluding liability for the knowing receipt of trust 
property on the basis of mere negligence, then we can include careless defendants within the 
category of innocent defendants.
262 In the case of strict liability, this will usually be at common law. Birks, supra n. 76, 
485, has said in the context of discussing liability as fault-based or strict: "(I]t is hard to see how 
there can be rational room for a disagreement on this issue between equity and law."
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subsisting in the defendant's hands. Tracing claims generally thus need to be 
considered.
§ 9.3.2.3 Tracing property: proprietary claims
Tracing rules at common law and in equity allow a plaintiff to follow 
property to which the plaintiff has a legal or equitable right, through a number 
of transactions and substitutions. If the plaintiff can identify property in the 
defendant's hands in which the plaintiff's right subsists, he or she can assert a 
proprietary claim for recovery of it. The plaintiff's claim to the surviving 
property derives not from the tracing rules themselves, but from the pre­
existing legal or equitable right to that property or a previous substitute. To the 
extent that it is possible to trace property, requiring a defendant to return such 
property achieves a fair outcome. The defendant in effect is ordered to make 
"specific restitution" of the property. Such a remedy clearly does not 
disadvantage a defendant.
Where a plaintiff successfully traces in equity, a proprietary claim will 
lie even against a defendant who holds such property as an innocent 
volunteer263 and is thus protected from personal liability. It must be stressed, 
however, that the potential for such a proprietary claim is, at best, limited. For 
although generally speaking it is fair to conclude that equity's tracing rules 
provide a greater potential for following property than the corresponding rules 
at common law,264 nonetheless, the possibility of successfully tracing property 
are still very limited. This is because tracing rules, even in equity, are highly 
technical and complex and may not necessarily reflect modern day conditions.
There is much to be said for more liberal, less-technical tracing rules.265 
As was emphasised in two-party transactions, the receipt of money is 
essentially about the receipt of economic advantage, and the recovery of that
263 If the defendant is an innocent purchaser, the right to trace will disappear, the 
defendant not taking the property received subject to the plaintiff's prior right to the property.
264 See supra n. 231. Common law tracing is restricted by the requirement that the 
plaintiff can show a continuing legal title in identifiable property held by the plaintiff. Even if 
one can establish such title at the point of receipt, it is far less likely that the property will still 
be identifiable as surviving in the defendant's hands. Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale [1991] 3 W.L.R. 
10, demonstrates the point. The plaintiffs in that case successfully traced money to establish 
that the defendant had received the plaintiffs' money, but almost certainly would have been 
unable to identify any surviving property in the defendant's hands.
265 This should be so both at common law or in equity, it matters not, for there is also 
much to be said for the fusion of the rules. Cf. the widespread calls for equity's more liberal 
rules to be available at common law: supra n. 231.
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economic advantage is justifiable where it has not been dissipated. If this is so, 
then tracing money should likewise be about tracing the economic advantage 
which that money represents.
There is some judicial support for a liberalisation of the tracing rules.266 
One of the earliest examples of a liberal approach to tracing can be seen in the 
judgment of Lord Dunedin in Sinclair v. Brougham, who spoke of following a 
"superfluity" into another's hands.267 In the writer's view, such an approach is 
to be preferred. If the tracing rules are to have any relevance to modern 
conditions, then they ought to be both a realistic and flexible means of 
identifying the transfer of an economic advantage from one party to another 
and from one type of property into another.268 As Finn has concluded:
266 for example, the approach of Lord Templeman, in Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale 
[1991] 3 W.L.R. particularly at 16, who takes a fairly impressionistic approach, but which 
approach nevertheless appears to lead to quite accurate conclusions in the circumstances. Such 
an approach may be necessary where complex transactions are at issue. The notion of tracing 
economic advantage suggests a certain flexibility, perhaps even a "common sense" approach. 
Contrast this with the still highly technical approach of Lord Goff and the refined distinctions 
which need to be drawn as a result. See, e.g., Birks, supra n. 76, 476-81, and the detailed 
discussion therein. The arguments can become so complex as to be incomprehensible, to this 
writer at least; see, e.g., Fitzgerald, B., "Tracing at Law, the Exchange Product Theory and 
Ignorance as an Unjust Factor in the Law of Unjust Enrichment" (1994) 13 Tas. Univ. L. Rev. 
116. A number of commentators also support such a liberal approach to tracing. See, e.g., Goff 
& Jones (3rd ed., 1986), 80, who consider that a defendant should be considered to retain what 
the plaintiff seeks to recover wherever the defendant's asset's are "swollen". Cf. 4th ed., 1993, at 
98-102. Burrows, 45, points out that the difficulty with this approach is that it does not indicate 
the specific assets over which the proprietary claim extends. He suggests that perhaps a 
floating charge over all of the defendant's assets may be one solution. But it need not 
necessarily follow that more liberal tracing rules for the purpose of allowing a plaintiff to 
identify a surviving economic advantage need be a proprietary claim. The rights of other 
parties, such as creditors, still need to be taken into account. It is suggested below that a 
liberalisation of tracing rules need not necessarily give rise to proprietary rights.
267 See [1914] A.C. 393,437, and supra nn. 88-90 and text thereto.
268 One of the conceptual problems arising as a result of the current tracing rules, with 
their emphasis on specific property and the ownership thereof, is that where the property is 
substituted (for example, money is used to buy a car), the potential of a plaintiff to claim 
against two or more parties for the "return" of the property or its substitutes leads to a 
"geometric multiplication of the plaintiff's property": Birks, 394. The economic advantage 
approach avoids this difficulty, as there can only ever be one economic advantage subsisting at 
the one time, although it may of course have been divided between parties, or increased in 
value such as where a profitable investment is made. Other claims against parties who no 
longer have the economic advantage must be based upon some form of wrongdoing, though 
these claims may take a proprietary form. For example, TP steals $1000 from P, uses it to buys a 
car from Dp TP proceeds to give the car to Ö2- The economic advantage stolen from P in these 
circumstances rests with D2 , and may be recoverable where D2 still has that economic 
advantage. Since Dj has not received any economic advantage, having given consideration for 
the money, any remedy against D2 must be based on him or her having notice of the right to 
the money, so that a bona fide purchaser defence cannot be raised. And of course, the liability of 
TP is not for the return of the economic advantage, but is based on his or her wrong and is one
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Given that money provides an economic advantage or benefit to a 
recipient, the tracing rules ... should focus upon whether and to what 
extent the recipient retains that advantage or benefit and not upon the 
destination and/or use of the actual money received. On this view 
expenditure of the actual money would not of itself result necessarily in 
the loss of any of the benefit the receipt provided ... .269
One cannot, of course, take an entirely impressionistic approach. Many 
issues would need to be addressed before tracing economic advantage becomes 
a workable notion. This discussion does not purport to set out the detail of 
specific tracing rules. But a liberalisation of the tracing rules will be seen to 
provide the basis for rationalising or bringing together strict and fault-based 
personal liability into a coherent approach to resolving three-party transaction 
problems, consistent with the general orientation of the law to achieve fair 
outcomes.
§ 9.3.3 Rationalising the Existing Legal Position
Ideally, perhaps, the accumulated jumble of doctrine considered above 
should be swept aside. One need not go so far, however, in order to attain a 
coherent legal position which is consistent with fundamental principles relating 
to the liability of innocent defendants. Three important points need to be made. 
First, where a defendant is innocent, the paramount concern of any liability rule 
must be to protect such a defendant from any disadvantage which may flow 
from imposing liability. In three-party transactions this is as important a 
concern, and perhaps even more so, as in mistaken transactions. The defendant 
will have relied on the integrity of his or her independent transaction with the 
wrongdoer and if completely unaware of the wrong, has no reason to suspect 
the receipt of the property or to safeguard the position of the plaintiff.270 
Secondly, a fair outcome—one which restores, as near as possible, a plaintiff to 
his or her position as before the third party's wrong, and which does not 
disadvantage an innocent defendant—may be possible where the defendant 
has received and still retains an economic advantage which can rightfully be
to compensate P for harm suffered.
2 9^ Finn, supra n. 99, 211, fn. 87. Cf. Scott on Trusts (4th ed., 1989) paragraph 292.2.
270 Contrast the recipient of a mistaken payment who, once becoming aware of the 
receipt, would arguably in many cases have reason to suspect the mistake. This would be so in 
all cases where there is no apparent reason for the payment, such as where a debt is paid twice. 
A change of position in such circumstances is unlikely to be bona fide.
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said to belong to the plaintiff. Requiring the return of such economic advantage 
is not a disadvantage to the defendant. Thirdly, doctrines and rules both at 
common law and in equity go some way toward recognising these two 
fundamental points and can be rationalised to achieve fair outcomes, 
consistently with the position governing two-party mistaken transactions. This 
last point needs further explanation.
For its part, equity's largely fault-based personal liability rules271 
emphasise the protection of innocent defendants. It seems appropriate that any 
inquiry as to liability should commence with a determination of whether a 
defendant was in any way culpably involved in the third party's wrong. Such a 
starting point does suggest a fundamental difference in attitude to that 
displayed by advocates of strict liability, such as that championed by Birks 
under the rubric of unjust enrichment. Such strict liability is prima facie 
triggered by satisfaction of the precondition (irrespective of whether a 
defendant is innocent or not) that a defendant has received property (a benefit) 
at the expense of the plaintiff.272 As Re Diplock perhaps harshly 
demonstrates,273 the danger of such an approach is the potential for onerous 
burdens to be imposed upon innocent defendants unless defences to the liability 
rules are well-developed and generous.
Conversely, if strict liability is subject to well-developed and generous 
defences, such liability will achieve a fair outcome if remedies restoring the 
plaintiff do not disadvantage an innocent defendant. The common law has 
recognised the need for such defences, specifically accepting a change of 
position defence which potentially protects a defendant to the extent he or she 
has innocently dissipated any economic advantage received. Liability is then 
limited to requiring a defendant to return the economic advantage he or she 
retains.
Although equity's fault-based personal liability appears to preclude such 
a fair outcome, it must be recalled that there is always the further possibility of 
a tracing, proprietary claim. It as at this point that liberal tracing rules become
271 The exception being ignored is Re Diplock [19481 Ch. 458. In this writer's view, if 
the suggested approach is accepted, there is probably no meaningful role which that authority 
can play.
272 A positive answer to this inquiry may trigger prima facie liability as "ignorance", on 
the approach of many theorists, is sufficient to satisfy the unjust element. See supra n. 16.
273 Ironically, the case is a decision in equity, which has generally set itself against 
strict liability.
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important. If the tracing rules focus on following economic advantage, where it 
is possible to identify the economic advantage the plaintiff lost and which is 
surviving in the defendant's hands, a claim for "specific restitution" 274 of that 
economic advantage is little different to the current strict liability (subject to 
change of position) at common law. An innocent volunteer may then be liable 
by either of two paths, each leading to the same result. The volunteer is either 
liable to return any traceable surviving economic advantage identifiable in his 
or her hands; or alternatively, the volunteer is liable for the full amount of any 
economic advantage received, less any economic advantage lost or dissipated 
(change of position). This equates with the surviving economic advantage.275 In 
either case the defendant is only required to return the identifiable surviving 
economic advantage to the plaintiff, and any further liability must be on the 
basis of either some participation in another's wrong, or perhaps negligent 
conduct. Such a development would be consistent with achieving fair 
outcomes, as in cases of mistake.
There is one significant difference between these two pathways to 
recovery .276 Allowing a plaintiff to trace in order to establish a right to 
surviving economic advantage in a defendant's hands is a proprietary claim. 
There are difficulties with formulating a proprietary right in such loose terms. 
The fact that a defendant can be said to retain an economic advantage does not 
mean it is possible to point to specific property which belongs to the plaintiff. If 
the law were to accept liberal tracing rules which follow economic advantage or 
wealth, it may not be perceived as necessarily desirable that these liberal 
tracing rules give rise to an equally liberal proprietary claim, with the 
consequent advantages of such a claim, such as priority over other creditors. 
The law may not wish to take such a step and the absence of specific 
identifiable property may provide the basis for such a choice.277 The traceable
274 The claim is to the effect, you have my economic advantage and I have priority 
because you are not a bona fid e  purchaser.
275 Contrast Birks, supra n. 16, 304. Birks' views are predicated upon the current 
technical and narrow tracing rules. Interestingly, despite the seemingly different attitude of the 
common law and equity to the innocent recipient, of the few common law cases which have 
held innocent volunteers liable, most only allowed recovery of traceable property surviving in 
defendants' hands, usually retained in bank accounts. See cases dted supra n. 235.
276 Another difference between the two pathways to recovery is in relation to the onus 
of proof: should a plaintiff be required to prove that an economic advantage received is still 
retained, or should the onus be on the defendant to prove that an economic advantage received 
has been dissipated? However, there may be little practical difference in the outcomes in either 
case.
277 There is evidence to suggest that the courts may well be reluctant to extend
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economic advantage could thus be held to be only recoverable in a personal 
claim unless specific property can be identified as belonging to a plaintiff.
However, the logic of the cogent property analogy which underpins the 
notion of the retention of economic advantage does suggest that a plaintiff 
should be entitled to a proprietary claim against the defendant (and priority in 
a case of insolvency to recover what could otherwise be considered a windfall 
in the hands of the creditors). Since no specific property need be identifiable, 
the proprietary claim could be in the form of a lien over a defendant7s assets. 
The issue is one for the future, though it can only be added that the availability 
of proprietary claims generally is an issue of great complexity and perhaps one 
of the most important to be addressed in the future development of Restitution.
Should they emerge, more liberal tracing rules which give an accurate or 
realistic answer to the question, "has the defendant received something which 
"belongs7 to the plaintiff? 77 would further enhance the prospect of being able to 
restore a plaintiff to his or her previous position via a claim (personals or 
proprietary) for the value of an economic advantage received and surviving in 
the defendant's hands. The common law and equitable position could thus be 
rationalised in the way indicated above. It is suggested, however, that the 
equitable approach of protecting an innocent defendant, subject to a claim for 
traceable economic advantage retained, suggests a legal orientation more in 
tune with the fair outcomes approach, than does the strict liability subject to 
available defences approach of the common law.
One final point needs to be made. Even if the law does proceed down 
the path of imposing liability upon an innocent defendant who has received the 
plaintiff's economic advantage, subject to a generous change of position 
defence, equity's rules concerned with knowing receipt of trust property and 
knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty or trust still have a relevant 
field of operation. These rules impose liability on the basis of involvement in 
another's wrong and the potential scope of such liability will often be wider 
than a fair outcome. For example, a defendant who no longer retains an 
economic advantage received may nonetheless be liable to repay the full value 
of what he or she knowingly received. In other words, a change of position 
defence would not be available to reduce the liability of the knowing recipient. 
The scope of knowing receipt and knowing assistance liability needs to be
proprietary notions to give rise to proprietary rights. See Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1994] 2 All 
E.R. 806, and supra n. 92.
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clarified. For example, should a negligent recipient of property (that is, one 
having constructive notice) be subject to the full extent of personal liability that 
follows from being deemed a constructive trustee of such property? Given the 
possibility of a fair outcome remedy, even against an entirely innocent 
defendant, it is arguable that equity's reach in knowing receipt cases ought not 
extend to negligent defendants, who should be protected, subject, however, to 
any remedial relief achieving a fair outcome.
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Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
All names of good and evil are images; they do not speak out, they only hint. He 
is a fool who seeks knowledge from them.1
Despite its description as an "abstract proposition of justice" ,2 unjust 
enrichment is being asked to fulfil a pre-eminent role within the law of 
Restitution. Unjust enrichment is perceived by many as a means of rationalising 
past decisions, solving future problems and shaping liability rules, and 
moreover, it is argued by many to perform such a role in Restitution to the 
exclusion of other informing ideas or concepts. As such, unjust enrichment 
becomes the only explanation and means of analysis of the liability rules in 
Restitution. The vital role assigned to unjust enrichment is highlighted all the 
more by the perception of Restitution as a "large" subject. Since unjust 
enrichment is said to shape the very subject-matter of Restitution, its perceived 
pre-eminence and pervasive reach is said to sustain a large and important 
subject, the third arm of a tripartite division of the law of obligations, rightfully 
taking its place alongside contract and tort. It need only be added that if one 
goes further and considers unjust enrichment to be a cause of action, as in 
Canada, then that concept is being asked to fulfil an even more demanding role 
in the law.
In the first part of this thesis, a critical appraisal of attempts to convert 
unjust enrichment into a workable concept capable of fulfilling the role asked of 
it concluded that unjust enrichment is not a concept which provides an 
appropriate analytical tool for all or even most of Restitution. It is not proposed 
to summarise arguments considered earlier, but the difficulties appear to stem 
from the very process of reasoning which drives unjust enrichment thinking. A 
restitutionary response to a given liability rule is said to suggest that the purpose 
of that rule is the reversal of enrichment. Such process of reasoning backwards
1 Nietzsche, F., Thus Spake Zarathustra (Hollingdale, Trans. 1969), 101.
2 Goff & Jones, 13.
from remedy can have and has had the consequence of falsely uniting unlike 
cases in which liability is triggered by very different causative events, simply 
because of the common restitutionary remedial responses to those events. Even 
apart from the fact that many so called restitutionary responses are not even 
measured by a defendant's enrichment (quantum meruit is the obvious 
example), an individual liability rule which principally or perhaps even 
exclusively gives rise to restitutionary responses need not have a purpose of 
reversing enrichment. As our discussion of topics such as duress and 
precontractual liability demonstrated,3 such liability rules may gain their 
explanatory force from the common causative events triggering a number of 
related liability rules to which responses other than restitution may give effect 
to the underlying purposes.
Unlike unjust enrichment reasoning, in seeking a new perspective on 
Restitution, the four categories identified in this thesis have not been fashioned 
by a process of working backwards from a particular remedial response in 
order to unite liability rules according to a common remedial response. Indeed, 
in each category, a number of remedial responses may follow from the 
triggering events which give rise to liability. It is the common causative events 
which justify treating particular liability rules together within each category. It 
is important to remind ourselves of the diversity of the remedial responses to 
the liability rules in each category.
In the first category of cases (conduct-based liability) the liability rules 
can be said to expand notions of what amounts to "wrongful", liability-creating 
conduct beyond the type of conduct encompassed within mainstream contract 
and tort law. Although some detriment to a plaintiff as a result of the 
defendant's conduct is a prerequisite for any liability, remedial relief is not 
limited to returning a plaintiff to his or her status quo ante, that is, to 
compensation for the detriment incurred or transaction avoidance. More 
extensive remedial rights may arise, so that at times a plaintiff may even 
receive remedial relief measured by what he or she is reasonably entitled to 
expect, or even his or her actual (often "contractual") expectations. Of course, if 
a defendant has received an enrichment which equates with the plaintiff's 
losses, then restitution will effect a restoration of the status quo ante.
In the second category of cases (parties sharing common interests) the 
liability rules give rise to an obligation to share gains and losses, but such
3 See generally § 4.4.3.
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obligation can be effected by a number of remedial responses. Again, if a 
plaintiffs losses equate with the defendant's benefit, then restitution will be an 
appropriate remedial response, equalising each party's losses and gains. 
Alternatively, if only one party has suffered a loss, contribution toward that 
loss effects a sharing of that loss. In the context of frustration of contracts, 
traditionally there has existed a reluctance to go beyond restitutionary 
remedies, but statutory reforms have in some jurisdictions at least accepted an 
underlying philosophy of loss and gain sharing and provided remedial 
mechanisms for achieving this.
In the third category of cases (unsolicited interventions) remedial relief is 
characteristically limited to recompense for the "costs" of a justifiable 
intervention in the form of expenses incurred and perhaps time and effort 
expended. Yet even in this category, the causative events giving rise to liability 
do not result in an exclusive remedial response. For example, in maritime 
salvage cases, rewards may be awarded, perhaps to encourage what is 
perceived to be particularly socially useful or necessary conduct.
The fourth, residual category of liability rules in this regard is different. 
It is the only category in which liability is explicable in terms of and limited by 
the appropriate remedial response to the liability rules. In other words, the 
liability rules are largely explicable in terms of their remedial purpose, that of 
achieving fair outcomes which do not leave a defendant at a disadvantage. 
Although for the most part, this remedial purpose is achieved by restitution or 
"specific" restitution, it was argued that a description of the rules in terms of 
unjust enrichment does not accurately capture the subtlety of the fair outcomes 
orientation of the liability rules.
As this brief summary shows, the liability rules encompassed within the 
subject of Restitution (either historically or on the basis of wide claims made for 
unjust enrichment), are largely not explicable in terms of any particular 
remedial purpose, let alone in terms of a restitutionary purpose. A number of 
remedial responses may give effect to the underlying purpose or purposes of 
the rules, and a focus on remedy consequently is not of much assistance in 
explaining liability. Unlike unjust enrichment theory would suggest, it is not 
possible to draw a simplistic equation between the liability-creating events and 
one specific remedial response to them. Consequently, in discussing the four 
categories of liability rules, this writer has sought to outline more specifically 
than simply "unjust enrichment" the ideas and principles which may be at 
work in the law. It is suggested that these ideas and principles provide us with 
a better means of ordering our law than does the abstraction, unjust
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enrichment.4 This is particularly so given that the abstraction is given "content" 
by theories which are little more than restatements of the abstraction. Thus, 
unjust enrichment becomes "was the defendant enriched at the plaintiffs 
expense, which enrichment is for some reason unjust?".
Perhaps, ultimately, the "traditional" criticism of unjust enrichment as 
vague and uncertain and no more than an appeal to individual moral opinion 
remains as valid today as ever. Can we ever intelligibly seek to identify the 
underlying ideas and principles at work in given liability rules by describing 
such rules simply as having a purpose of reversing unjust enrichment? In this 
writer's view, such liability rules become far more intelligible if, for example, 
one describes them as activated by disproportionate gains and losses arising as 
a result of unprovided for contingencies affecting parties sharing a common 
interest; or as activated by a plaintiff's detrimental reliance on the defendant's 
clearly expressed intention to assume an obligation, albeit one, as it turns out, 
which does not have contractual force; and so on.
If the liability rules considered in this thesis cannot be simplistically 
explained in terms of a purpose of reversing unjust enrichment, where does 
this leave the subject of Restitution, the very name of which reflects the 
supposedly restitutionary purpose (in the sense of benefit disgorgement) of the 
liability rules encompassed therein? Of course, the term "restitution" need not 
necessarily be limited in its meaning to benefit disgorgement. Restoration, 
specific restitution, and compensation are all notions within the dictionary 
meaning of the term .5 If used so widely, however, it is doubtful whether a 
subject entitled "Restitution" casts much light on the nature of the subject- 
matter gathered under its head.6 So what are the consequences for the subject 
of "Restitution" of accepting the burden of the four categories suggested in Part 
II of this thesis?
Before an attempt is made to answer this question, it is perhaps first 
appropriate to consider what possible role unjust enrichment could play in the 
subject-matter encompassed within Restitution, given this writer's rejection of
4 In any case, unlike unjust enrichment theory with its claim to exclusivity, the ideas 
and principles identified within each category do not necessarily represent the only concerns 
addressed by the cases considered in each category.
5 See § 1.3.2.2.
6 For example, much of property and tort law could be considered to fall within the 
scope of such a subject.
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the concept as a unifying and exclusive explanatory principle and as an 
analytical tool dictating our approach to problems in Restitution. Can unjust 
enrichment usefully serve any other role in our law?
To say that someone has been "unjustly enriched" has an obvious 
visceral appeal if circumstances are such that a seemingly unearned or 
undeserved windfall has been received. For example, a person may have built a 
house on another's land where there is no contractual obligation to pay for such 
work and no donative intent. The landowner's "unjust enrichment" in such a 
case may activate or excite legal interest in the matter, or suggest a need to 
inquire further. But in this sense, unjust enrichment operates no differently as 
when a serious injury sustained by a person immediately activates us to inquire 
"Is anyone responsible?". Unjust enrichment does not take us any further, to 
enable us to determine whether liability in any form should be imposed. In the 
improvement of another's land example, such liability would depend on factors 
such as whether the builder acted on the basis of any expectations created or 
allowed to continue by the landowner; whether the builder was mistaken; 
whether the landowner acquiesced in such mistake; whether the building is 
removable; and so on. The liability rules which determine whether any liability 
is appropriate are far more sophisticated than any inquiry as to whether a 
defendant was unjustly enriched.
Once our sense of justice is activated to commence more detailed legal 
inquiry by a seemingly undue benefit, the value of unjust enrichment would 
appear to have been exhausted.
Unjust enrichment may also arguably serve as a descriptive conclusion 
after a particular process of reasoning has been finalised, such that it could be 
said that a defendant would be unjustly enriched if liability in some form were 
not imposed upon him or her. For example, as was noted in Chapter 9, we may 
well say that if a particular recipient of a mistaken payment is not required to 
disgorge it, he or she would be unjustly enriched. Such a conclusion activates 
our sense of justice and gives further weight to a process of legal reasoning 
which has determined, for example, that the mistake was sufficient to vitiate an 
intention to transfer the money and that the defendant retains the economic 
advantage which the money represents. But such reasoning is not dictated or 
enlightened by the concept of "unjust enrichment" itself. Consequently, even as 
a description which gives further weight to a conclusion reached by a far more 
complex process of reasoning, unjust enrichment may not be particularly 
useful. For such a conclusory label may be equally applicable to a defendant 
who refuses to either return or pay for the plaintiff's goods; or perhaps even a
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contract-breaker if not required to pay damages. When used in this sense, 
unjust enrichment follows the liability rules and does not explain them; and 
further, a conclusion that a defendant is unjustly enriched could be said to 
follow such a diverse range of liability rules that we could say much of our law 
is about unjust enrichment; or that, consequently, none of it is.
For this reason, there does not appear to be any advantage in persisting 
in the use of the language of unjust enrichment as an explanation of liability 
rules or even as a description of conclusions reached after the applications of 
liability rules. There is a further reason for avoiding the language of unjust 
enrichment as an explanation or description of liability rules. Since much of 
unjust enrichment theory, in England at least, is gaining the status of 
orthodoxy, the language of unjust enrichment may somehow always suggest 
an approach which seeks to straitjacket Restitution within the confines of the 
very specific processes of analysis such theory encompasses. In other words, 
"unjust enrichment" may lead, for example, to Birks' "phases of inquiry" 
dictating our analysis of problems in Restitution.
Let us return, then, to the issue of how one conceives the "large" subject 
of Restitution (as currently perceived), if one accepts the four categories and 
their suggested burden outlined in Part II and accepts that unjust enrichment 
has no useful explanatory role to play.
The historical sources of Restitution are diverse and address a wide 
variety of legal problems. The only real link between those diverse liability 
rules, it was suggested, is the gap-filling and ameliorative functions such 
liability rules performed and still perform. Both the common law and equitable 
liability rules now claimed for Restitution originated much like the rules and 
doctrines of equity as a whole. In seeking to reconsider liability rules claimed 
for unjust enrichment from a new perspective, this writer has allowed the 
widest claims as to the reach of unjust enrichment to set the agenda of the 
liability rules and doctrines to be considered. Consequently, some equitable 
doctrines have been considered in this thesis.
If this writer's views are correct, liability rules in Restitution other than 
those of equitable origin have performed ameliorative and gap-filling 
functions, much like equity as a whole. This is not intended to suggest that 
equity or Restitution can be seen as merely "appendices or glosses to different 
parts of the common law" .7 Instead, each addresses substantive problems in
7 Beatson, 246
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our law in often unique and interesting ways. Given their common 
ameliorative origins, however, equity and the non-equitable parts of Restitution 
may be seen to share considerable common ground.
It has been said that one of the challenges facing equity lawyers is "to 
explore more systematically the unities and dissonances in equity's doctrines" .8 
This writer has attempted some such exploration of the liability rules in 
Restitution. Those equitable doctrines considered in this thesis can be fitted into 
the four categories outlined above, but this leaves unaddressed the issue of 
how other equitable doctrines not considered in this thesis relate to the four 
suggested categories. Perhaps much of equity conforms with the broad 
concerns addressed by each of the categories. Alternatively, equitable doctrines 
may also address other concerns altogether, concerns not specifically addressed 
by the four suggested categories. Certainly, there is much work to be done on 
the inter-relationship of the liability rules in equity and Restitution and such 
work offers considerable challenges for the future.9
In this writer's view, perhaps the best way forward is to conceive of 
Restitution as a much smaller subject, encompassing essentially category four- 
type cases (that is, in which liability is imposed on recipients despite their being 
"innocent"). Such a subject of Restitution would be largely concerned with the 
restoration of plaintiffs, usually by means of restoration of their "property" in a 
manner which achieves fair outcomes. This, of course, leaves three outstanding 
categories without a "home". It is proposed to consider some of the options for 
each of these categories by outlining some of the issues which would need to be 
addressed in the future. Each category raises very distinct issues, and in this 
writer's view, the best way forward is to accentuate the very differences 
between each of the four categories, in order to allow for the unifying and 
organising ideas within each to be more fully explored and developed. The 
ideas developed in this thesis are merely a starting point for a new 
conceptualisation of the law of Restitution. It is time for a reconsideration of 
liability rules which previously either were treated together with unalike rules
8 Finn, P., "Mr. Beatson's 'Unfinished Business'" Paper delivered to the Restitution 
Group, Society of Public Law Teachers Conference, Aberdeen, (1991), at 8
9 For an attempt to commence the task of exploring the inter-relationship of equity and 
Restitution, albeit from an unjust enrichment perspective, see Beatson, Chp. 9, "Unfinished 
Business: Integrating Equity". For a reply, see Finn, ibid.
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or separately from alike rules because of historical or other divisions in the 
law.10 Let us consider each category in turn.
Category (1): conduct-based liability. Perhaps the most significant 
feature of the liability rules considered in this category is their affinity with 
contract and tort. The conceptual development of each sub-category within this 
category (contract-like and tort-like liability) would seem to be closely tied to 
the essential concerns of contract and tort, respectively. The obvious question 
which needs to be addressed is the exact nature of the relationship of contract­
like and tort-like liability rules with liability rules in contract and tort 
respectively. One possible way forward would be to expand the existing 
boundaries of contract and tort in order to incorporate the cases of contract-like 
and tort-like liability. For example, Stoljar's less formal, more inclusive views of 
contract could readily encompass much of what now falls outside of contract, 
but is clearly contract-like.11 An expansive view of contract or tort, however, 
would not necessarily resolve the difficulties in categorising cases near the 
newly drawn boundaries.
Alternatively, one need not necessarily greatly expand contract and tort. 
Perhaps one can see individual doctrines and rules giving rise to, say, contract­
like liability, as "satellites" orbiting the core ideas and concerns of contract. 
Such a conception would emphasise the obvious link between contract-like 
liability and contract, but is sufficiently flexible to avoid the difficulties of 
drawing the boundaries of any expanded categories of contract (and tort). 
Liability rules could be said to "orbit" a central body of core concerns, even if 
that central body is itself defined formulistically. Such a conception also 
recognises that some liability rules are closer to a central body than others; and 
that further, some "orbiting" liability rules may come under the influence of 
several central bodies (for example, both contract and tort).
Category (2): common interests and the consequences of unprovided for
10 For example, the distinction between common law and equity has meant that 
liability rules whose essential burden is similar have historically been treated separately. 
Similarly, the distinction between money had and received and claims for services in quantum  
m eruit has precluded alike cases being treated together. Conversely, treating all claims for the 
reasonable value of services as one, purely because of the historical antecedents of the quantum  
m eruit common count, has meant that very different types of claims have been treated together. 
For example, a claim for reasonable value of services may be contractual, contract-like, or arise 
on the basis of an entirely non-consensual transaction such as a necessitous intervention. More 
recently, the false unity imposed on the basis of unjust enrichment has lead to unalike cases 
being treated together.
11 See §6.2.4.
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contingencies. Liability rules considered here do not draw their justification 
from ideas forming a central part of any established category of law and 
consequently cannot draw on such other established categories of law for their 
conceptual development. Rather than perceive of these liability rules as a 
separate and distinct category of law, however, it may perhaps be best to 
emphasise the underlying principle of liability, the principle of just sharing, as 
one which manifests itself in a wide variety of contexts. Clearly, some 
principles informing our law do arise in many different contexts.12 The 
principle of just sharing can thus be seen as ameliorating the strict outcomes 
dictated by other rules applicable in very different contexts.
The underlying notions justifying the principle of just sharing can be 
clearly articulated and provide a cogent philosophical basis for liability. Parties 
sharing a community of interest owe a duty to share gains and losses caused by 
unprovided for contingencies, which gain and losses as between strangers 
would be left to lie where they fall. Of course, what amounts to a sufficient 
community of interest to give rise to the operation of the principle of just 
sharing is the preliminary inquiry for the potential operation of the principle, 
perhaps even in response to new problems. Applications of a principle of 
sharing in the context of domestic property disputes illustrates that the 
principle, though an ancient one, may well be utilised in new and imaginative 
ways.
Category (3): allocating the costs of justifiable conduct. This category is 
small and perhaps will always only be of marginal significance, offering 
solutions to only a narrow and exceptional class of case. Yet unlike the previous 
category, the liability rules here do not appear so much ameliorative, as instead 
filling a very specific and distinct gap in our law.13 Conceptually, this category 
of cases is very distinct from other established categories of law, though it has 
not been recognised at common law (unlike in civil law jurisdictions) as 
forming part of a distinct, coherent doctrine or principle. Perhaps in seeking a 
rubric which can encompass cases in this category, resort may be had to civil 
law notions of negotiorum gestio, at least in relation to cases concerning the
12 It is important to note, however, that this category of cases may in any case be fairly 
small, and only operates if no conduct, in breach of a tort or tort-like duty, or amounting to a 
contractual or contract-like assumption of risk, does not justify a greater right to have losses or 
gains shifted, rather than merely shared.
13 And this is despite the fact that many of the liability rules within this category are 
actually “mainstream" rules utilised in new ways. For example, agency rules have been 
expanded to impose liability even on strangers on the basis of "agency of necessity".
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altruistic intervener. The essence of negotiorum gestio is the taking over or 
management of another's affairs without his or her consent, albeit which 
actions are justifiable only within very narrow confines. Although the common 
law has traditionally denied the existence of any general doctrine of negotiorum 
gestio, there exist sufficient individual instances of its application arguably to 
justify acceptance of a general doctrine in some such terms.
Negotiorum gestio, however, does not readily extend to cover cases of 
intervention in another's affairs by self-serving interveners. The self-serving 
intervener, acting from a need to protect himself or herself from a defendant's 
failure to fulfil a duty, must be dealt with in conceptually distinct ways to the 
altruistic intervener. The idea which links the two types of cases is the fact that 
the costs of the intervention are allocated to defendants because social policy 
concerns warrant such allocation. Social policy concerns allow a defendant's 
actual choices in the matter to be overridden. Perhaps the two sub-categories of 
claims could thus be brought together under a distinct rubric of "justifiable 
sacrifice", highlighting the deliberate incursion of costs by a plaintiff, for 
reasons which social policy deems to be justifiable and appropriately borne by 
the defendant.
Category (4): innocent recipients. Finally, the last group of cases, large 
and at the core of Restitution, may perhaps best continue to be considered 
under some such heading. Restitution here, however, is meant in the sense of 
restoration of a plaintiff to a previous position in a manner which achieves a 
fair outcome, characteristically by means of "specific" restitution or a remedy 
which effects a form of specific restitution. Liability in these cases is not 
dependent upon establishing any reason for a defendant to bear in or share in 
any losses incurred by the plaintiff (hence, "innocent" defendants). Typically, 
the plaintiff is simply seeking restoration of his or her "property" which the 
defendant still retains and was not intended or is not now intended to have. 
Consequently, this category may be seen as a residual source of liability, able to 
be resorted to even as against defendants who are not innocent as such, but 
where a plaintiff does not seek to make anything of the defendant's conduct, 
for example, but merely seeks restoration of his or her "property".
This category shares considerable proximity with both property law and 
those parts of tort concerned with the protection of property. Arguably, much 
of the law in this area expands common law and equitable notions of what is a 
plaintiff's "property", that is, what can be said to "belong" to a plaintiff, 
specifically in many cases by expanding our ideas of what may negative or 
vitiate an intention to divulge oneself of property. The issues are raised most
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sharply in relation to money given its status as personal property which is also 
a means of exchange. Claims for money, irrespective of the basis for such 
claims, must of necessity be in a personal form for an equivalent sum. This will 
be so even where the basis of liability is distinctly akin to a claim for the 
recovery of one's property. The proximity of this category to property law 
notions is borne out by the considerable difficulties surrounding the issue of 
the potential availability of proprietary remedies. The question of the inter­
relationship of property and Restitution is one which will pose considerable 
challenges for the future development of the law of Restitution.
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